THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EVAN C. NETTLES, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 4-24-0962
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
October 18, 2024
2024 IL App (4th) 240962
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Knecht and Vancil concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Evan C. Nettles appeals the trial court‘s order denying him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the
¶ 2 ¶ 3 In February 2024, the State charged defendant by way of information with two counts of aggravated battery (
¶ 4 At the detention hearing that followed, the State proffered that at approximately 9 p.m. on February 20, 2024, in Bartonville, Illinois, police responded to the report of a shooting. At the scene, officers found a vehicle containing two 17-year-olds who had suffered gunshot wounds. The victims were transported to a hospital for treatment. Multiple spent cartridge cases were discovered inside and outside of the vehicle. While officers were still processing the scene, defendant arrived and turned himself in.
¶ 5 The minor victims gave statements to police indicating that they had driven to the scene for the sale of cannabis and that Donald Grant entered the vehicle‘s back seat while they sat in the front. Grant pulled out a gun, and one of the minors attempted to take it away from him. Grant then shot both occupants. Grant was taken into custody shortly after the incident.
¶ 6 During defendant‘s interview with police, he stated that Grant had planned a robbery to obtain both cannabis and money. Grant planned to commit the robbery armed with a rifle; instead, defendant supplied Grant with a handgun. The two then went to the location of the premeditated robbery. Once the two minors arrived with the cannabis, Grant got into their vehicle while defendant remained in the other vehicle with the rifle pointed out the window at the other vehicle. Grant then opened fire on the occupants of the vehicle, and he and Grant fled.
¶ 7 When Grant was interviewed by police, he claimed that he and defendant planned to rob the minors of the cannabis and sell it themselves to pay for defendant‘s “rent.” Grant got into the back seat of the minor‘s vehicle, and once he saw the cannabis, “he pulled out the handgun and put it to [the minor‘s] face.” A struggle for the gun ensued, and Grant fired the handgun, striking the minor in the driver‘s seat. The gun jammed following one of the shots. Grant grabbed the cannabis, cleared the jam in the gun, and exited the vehicle. After exiting the vehicle, Grant fired upon the minor who was sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. Grant and defendant then left the scene on foot.
¶ 8 The State then turned to the Virginia pretrial risk assessment, on which defendant scored 8 out of 14 and was rated as a “high risk.” The State also argued that, while defendant was a young individual and did not have a lengthy criminal record, the offenses on his record were serious and violent, including domestic battery, residential burglary, robbery, and the unlawful use of a weapon.
¶ 9 Defendant did not make a proffer but argued that the pretrial assessment determination that he was a high risk to reoffend was skewed by the serious nature of the charges and that he was unemployed. Defendant did not have a history of missing court dates, turned himself in for the current offenses, made a confession, and cooperated with police. Further, it did not appear from the State‘s proffer that defendant was familiar with the minors that were robbed; if released on electronic monitoring, defendant argued he would have no contact with them.
¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court‘s denial of his pretrial release. The motion contained an opening paragraph and a prayer for relief requesting pretrial release. The substance of the pleading is as follows:
“1. On February 22, 2024, the State charged Defendant with two counts of Aggravated Battery, both Class X felonies, and one count of Armed Robbery, a Class X felony.
2. The State also filed a Petition to Deny Pretrial Release in this case on February 22, 2024, and the Court held a detention hearing on that same date.
3. The Court granted the State‘s Petition and ordered Mr. Nettles be detained indefinitely until trial.
4. Defendant requests this Court reconsider his pretrial detention pursuant to
725 ILCS 5/1 105(f-5) .”
The pleading did not contain a citation of
¶ 12 At the hearing on defendant‘s motion to reconsider, defense counsel argued that defendant had not missed any court dates and that his criminal history mostly consisted of offenses perpetrated when he was a juvenile. Counsel stated that defendant had family in the area and that defendant wanted to be released so “that he can be there for his family.” The State argued there was no information available that would change the initial detention determination and reiterated the proffer from the original detention hearing.
¶ 13 The trial court denied defendant‘s motion, finding he needed to remain detained “for reasons set forth by the State.” This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 ¶ 15 On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) filed a memorandum of law arguing that the trial court erred in determining that there were no conditions of pretrial release that would mitigate the potential threat that defendant posed. Within this argument, OSAD presents the contention that the court erred in relying on the alleged statement by Grant that it was defendant‘s plan to commit the robbery. Alternatively, to the extent that defense counsel failed to present this argument to the court during the hearing, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective or that the court committed plain error. Defendant also argues that the court committed plain error in relying on the pretrial assessment that defendant was at high risk to reoffend.
¶ 16 The State argues defendant waived the arguments presented in the memorandum by failing to advance those grounds in a motion for relief pursuant to
¶ 17
¶ 18 Here, after being denied pretrial release, defendant filed a “Motion to Reconsider Pretrial Release.” This motion failed to reference
¶ 19 Initially, we find that, because defendant explicitly claimed to raise his motion under
¶ 20 We also refuse to allow the appellate memorandum filed by OSAD to frame the issues on appeal where the rule requires arguments to be advanced in a motion for relief in the trial court under penalty of waiver. In People v. Drew, 2024 IL App (5th) 240697, ¶ 44, the Fifth District addressed this issue and found that the language in
¶ 21 Under such circumstances, the proper path forward is to dismiss defendant‘s appeal. While the failure to file the appropriate pleading stating the grounds for relief in the court below is not a jurisdictional bar (see People v. Cooksey, 2024 IL App (1st) 240932, ¶ 19), the defect requires dismissal of the appeal. We agree with Cooksey that our jurisprudence in the treatment of appeals from final judgments following negotiated guilty pleas under
¶ 22 Apparently aware of the failure to preserve the arguments he advances on appeal, defendant attempts to escape dismissal by arguing that trial counsel‘s failure to preserve those arguments amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, defendant contends that the matters at issue constitute plain error on the part of the trial court.
¶ 23 ¶ 24 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“The United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 44 (citing
¶ 25 We undertake our analysis under the assumption that a hearing on the question of pretrial detention is a critical stage of the proceedings at which a defendant is entitled to the representation of counsel. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (“[T]he right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty.“); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (addressing a pretrial determination of bail). In the particular context of a pretrial detention decision, however, we fail to see how the second Strickland factor—prejudice—can be shown. The detention decision is not closed; indeed, it cannot be, as it must be revisited at every subsequent court date. See Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶¶ 20, 27 (noting the court‘s inherent authority to modify interlocutory orders and citing
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we find that defendant cannot rely on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to address matters that his trial counsel is still free to address.
¶ 27 B. Plain Error
¶ 28 The plain-error exception to forfeiture is meant to be applied narrowly in situations where plain errors or defects impact substantial rights. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 19. A reviewing court may address forfeited arguments under the exception when a “clear or obvious error occurred” and “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or the error is “so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant‘s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).
¶ 29 Turning to defendant‘s attempt to invoke the doctrine of plain error, we look first to the language of
“Such a distinction is important because if [a] defendant has waived the issue, we need not review his claim for plain error.” People v. Scott, 2015 IL App (4th) 130222, ¶ 21; see United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We review forfeited arguments for plain error, whereas waiver extinguishes error and precludes appellate review.“).
¶ 30 While it has been recognized the terms “forfeiture” and “waiver” are often used interchangeably, we do not believe that the Illinois Supreme Court was careless in its selection of the word waiver within
¶ 31 To the extent there is ambiguity, we note that the rule change by our supreme court followed issuance of the report of the Illinois Supreme Court Pretrial Release Appeals Task Force. That report noted that “It would be helpful to all involved to have the rules regarding issue preservation made explicit.” Ill. S. Ct. Pretrial Release Appeals Task Force, Report and Recommendations 7 (2024), https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/628434e3-d07f-4ead-b1f6-4470d7e83bf3/Pretrial%20Release%20Appeals%20Task%20Force%20Report_March%202024.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL5Y-R4FN]. The task force then proposed that, “[o]ther than errors occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, issues not raised in the motion will not be considered on appeal,” noting “that this leaves no room for alternative means of analysis such as plain error review or a contention of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The reasoning was “that an expedited, limited review of detention decisions is designed in the first instance to be review of the trial court‘s decision” and it was “unreasonable to expect this expedited process to carry the same weight and scope of argument that is seen in a direct appeal following conviction.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.
¶ 32 It was against this backdrop that the supreme court determined that issues not raised in the petition for relief were waived on appeal. We find no reason to conclude that the court did not mean what it said. See People v. Foster, 271 Ill. App. 3d 562, 567 (1995) (finding that the Illinois Supreme Court meant what it said in the plain language of a supreme court rule even in the absence of precedent authorizing the action articulated in the rule); English, 2023 IL 128077, ¶ 13 (“When a rule is plain and unambiguous, we may not depart from [its] terms by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions [this court] did not express, nor may we add provisions not found in the [rule].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 33 We note that courts interpreting an identical provision in
¶ 34 Ultimately, undertaking plain-error review is discretionary. See
¶ 35 ¶ 36 We conclude that defendant‘s motion does not constitute a pleading contemplated under
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 38 Appeal dismissed.
People v. Nettles, 2024 IL App (4th) 240962
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 24-CF-143; the Hon. John P. Vespa, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Eric E. Castañeda, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys for Appellee: Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People.