THE PEOPLE,
S143531
Supreme Court of California
January 23, 2020
Riverside County Superior Court RIF109916
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakuaye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred.
Justice Cuéllar filed a concurring opinion.
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
While his estranged girlfriend was studying abroad, defendant Jose Luis Leon went to her home and fatally stabbed her grandmother and 13-year-old brother. He also attacked her grandfather with a hatchet. Although admitting the crimes, he claimed he acted in imperfect self-defense. He was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of
I. BACKGROUND
A. Guilt Phase
1. Defendant‘s Relationship with the Ragland Family
Veronica Haft and her younger brother, Austin Perez, lived with their grandparents, Hope and Marion Ragland. Hope was a nurse, and Marion was retired.2 They had raised Veronica since childhood. Austin came to live with them around age seven. Veronica was particularly close to Hope, whom she called “my best friend.”
Veronica began dating defendant when she was 16. He said he was 19 but was actually 21. He had moved to the country from Mexico two years earlier and spoke only limited English. Veronica and her grandmother were fluent in Spanish. Veronica‘s brother and grandfather did not know Spanish and spoke with defendant in English.
The first year of their relationship was happy. Defendant spent time at the Ragland home and was included in their family activities. Hope initially welcomed defendant‘s presence, cooking for him and joining the couple on outings. A few months into the relationship, Hope purchased a red Ford Mustang for defendant, who agreed to make monthly payments to her. He kept up with the payments initially but later began missing them.
After defendant‘s parents moved back to Mexico, he rented an apartment from a woman Hope visited for tarot card readings. Defendant believed the two were involved in witchcraft. Around this time, defendant stopped working. He spent his days at the Ragland house and became increasingly possessive and jealous. Near the end of her senior year, Veronica suggested breaking up. Defendant responded by angrily punching his windshield and grabbing Veronica‘s wrist as she tried to leave the car.
Veronica attended the University of California, Riverside and secured a full scholarship to spend the spring term studying at Oxford. When told, defendant begged her not to go. This angered Hope, who told defendant to stop ruining Veronica‘s life. During the argument, Hope followed the couple outside and, at one point, moved as if to pick up a brick from the walkway. Veronica told Austin to call the police. Hope did not pick up the brick, and no one was injured.
Veronica went to England in mid-February 2003. Although she tried to end the relationship before leaving, defendant called her often. When he began calling 20 to 25 times a day, she turned off her phone. Defendant called on April 29, begging her to return to him. She spent more than two hours explaining the relationship was over. Defendant blamed Hope, but Veronica assured him the decision was hers. By the end of the conversation, defendant‘s tone had changed, and Veronica thought he had finally accepted the situation. Two days later, on May 1, Veronica answered a final call from defendant, who said, “No matter what happens . . . I‘ll always love you.” Irritated, Veronica hung up. The attacks happened that night.
2. Testimony Regarding the Night of the Murders
The Raglands lived in a gated community near a small shopping center. Two video store employees who knew defendant saw him shortly before 6:00 p.m. on May 1, 2003. Monique Perez saw him driving a red Mustang slowly around the parking lot. Not long thereafter, he walked toward the Raglands’ house. Yvette Alvarez also saw him sometime after sundown, walking back at a faster pace.
Consistent with his usual routine, Marion left home around 6:20 p.m. to walk the family dog. Austin was at his friend Osvaldo Magdaleno‘s house, directly across the street. At some point, Magdaleno noticed defendant standing outside the community‘s gate. Pedestrian entrances to the property were kept locked, but defendant walked inside when a resident opened the gate to drive out. While playing outside, Magdaleno saw defendant inside the Ragland house, looking out the window. Austin went home but could not open the front door. No one answered his knock, so he jumped the back fence.
Crime scene investigators found two bodies in the house. Hope had been killed while sitting in a lounge chair, but her body was stuffed into a kitchen closet. She had been stabbed eight times in the throat, chest, and abdomen. The neck wound pierced her larynx and jugular vein. Her lungs, pulmonary artery, and aorta were also perforated. Austin lay in the kitchen, facedown in a pool of blood. Blood spatter evidence indicated he had been stabbed near a door leading to the garage then dragged into the kitchen. He had been stabbed 12 times. The wounds severed the jugular vein and carotid artery and perforated the liver, stomach, and aorta.
The contents of Hope‘s purse had been dumped on the floor, and “Austin is a bad student” was written on the living room mirror in Hope‘s lipstick. The upstairs rooms had been ransacked. In the backyard, investigators found a hatchet and a knife with a bent and bloody blade. A ski mask and vinyl gloves were later found in defendant‘s car, and his keys bore remnants of blood.
3. Defendant‘s Police Interviews and Walkthrough
After the murders, defendant arrived on time for his 10:00 p.m. shift at a local dairy. The police brought him to the station for questioning the next morning. He waived his Miranda rights3 and spoke with the police.
During the initial interview, defendant adamantly denied committing the killings or even entering the Ragland house. In his first version, he said he went to the house to give Hope a car insurance payment but left because Marion was home. Marion did not like him and did not want him there while Veronica was away. Defendant claimed he had dinner then returned around 7:30 p.m. No one answered the door, so he sat on the porch but left when he saw Marion returning.
Questioned again the next morning, defendant said he was fearful and angry with Hope. He believed she put things in his food and practiced
Shortly after this interview, defendant provided additional details during a videotaped walkthrough at the crime scene. He and Hope argued. She stood and tried to slap him, but he grabbed her and took her phone. Hope retreated but came back at him holding a knife. They fell to the floor fighting. Hope threatened to kill him, but he rolled on top of her and grabbed the knife. Hope threw him off, then lunged at him and impaled herself on the knife, afterward exclaiming, “What did you do to me?” Defendant “lost [his] mind” when he saw the blood and stabbed Hope repeatedly. When Austin came in, defendant dropped the knife. Seeing Hope, Austin yelled and tried to hit him with his skateboard. Defendant closed the sliding door so the neighbors would not hear the commotion. He took away the skateboard and tried to calm Austin, but the child ran toward the front door yelling for help. Defendant grabbed him and kicked the door shut. Austin struggled and tried to escape, so defendant stabbed him. Defendant said he sat crying for several minutes then looked for Veronica‘s new phone number. His anger returned. He went back to Hope‘s body and saw her lipstick on the floor. He stuffed her into a closet, then dragged Austin‘s body across the floor and wrote the message in lipstick on the mirror. Worried that Marion would return soon, defendant took a hatchet and a crowbar from the garage and waited for him in the living room. When Marion opened the front door, defendant threw the hatchet at him and fled. He dropped the knife outside. Defendant claimed everything he did was in self-defense.
1. Prosecution Evidence
Veronica described Hope as happy, outgoing, and much loved by her friends and family. A nurse for 30 years, she cared greatly about her patients and was respected by her coworkers. She attended church every Sunday and gave Veronica a religious upbringing. Veronica considered Hope her mother and “best friend.” The two frequently did things together and expressed their love for each other. Hope encouraged Veronica to work hard in school and take advantage of opportunities she never had. When Veronica left for England, both became emotional because they were not used to being apart. Veronica was devastated to learn of the murders. She continued living with her grandfather, but their life was lonely, especially at holidays. She was no longer comfortable in the house, and they moved five months after the crimes. Veronica had difficulty with the loss and will always feel guilty for inviting defendant into their family.
Hope‘s nephew remembered her generosity. She cooked breakfast and dinner for the household every day, even though she worked full time. Holidays were especially hard for the family now.
Veronica testified that Austin came to the Raglands from a foster home. His birth mother abused drugs and had lost custody of her four children. Austin initially knew Hope as “grandma,” but after a while began calling her “mom.” Hope took him to church regularly. Austin was polite, respectful, and very popular. After he died, fellow students planted a tree in his memory. Marion enjoyed spending time with Austin. They regularly walked the dog, played catch, and worked outside together. He missed having Austin and Hope in his life and now spent most of his time alone.
2. Defense Evidence
Defendant grew up in a town about three hours south of Mexico City. He lived with his parents and three younger sisters in a small house that, for many years, lacked indoor plumbing. All of his extended family lived on the same dirt road. One sister testified the home was humble but filled with love. Defendant and his eldest sister took a university entrance examination together but were not accepted. Defendant dreamed of marriage and a family. He enjoyed rural life and wanted to work with animals.
Around age 12, defendant began working with a neighbor, curing hides to make leather jackets. He worked half days while in school, then later full
Defendant‘s father once came to the United States but soon left because he missed the family. The father later returned to America, and defendant accompanied his mother to join him. They traveled 15 days and made four unsuccessful attempts before finally crossing the border at Sonora in 2000. Defendant never returned to Mexico. His mother and sisters missed him and hoped he would not be executed.
Defendant‘s girlfriend from Mexico testified that they began dating as teenagers. He often ate with her family and helped with chores. Her parents liked him and treated him like a son. The girlfriend‘s parents testified that they trusted defendant and believed he would have made a good husband. The couple loved each other and often talked of marriage and children. Defendant left for America during the girlfriend‘s first year at university. While parting was difficult, defendant felt he had to go to protect his mother. Initially, the couple spoke frequently by phone, but the relationship faded and defendant said he had met someone else.
A deputy sheriff who worked for two years at defendant‘s jail testified that he never had to report defendant for rules violations. Defendant took adult education courses and correspondence courses in religion. A correctional consultant interviewed defendant and reviewed his county jail history, finding no indication of future dangerousness. The consultant believed defendant could be institutionalized and avoid future problems. Once, when another inmate tried to intimidate him, defendant struck the man in the jaw, a response the witness considered appropriate under the circumstances. Afterward, the two interacted without further animus. Unlike most inmates facing capital charges, defendant had successfully shared living quarters with at least 15 others. The witness was confident that, if given a life sentence, defendant could be successfully housed in a level 4 prison. Defendant had no prior criminal record in Mexico or the United States.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Guilt Phase Issues
1. Admissibility of Defendant‘s Confessions
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting his confessions, both because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights and
a. Background
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements. The court reviewed a videotape and transcript of defendant‘s first interview and heard testimony from an interrogating officer and a clinical psychologist.
Defendant was initially interviewed on May 2, 2003 at the Corona Police Department by Detective Ron Anderson and Corporal John Rasso. Rasso is a native Spanish speaker and certified as a bilingual officer. Rasso brought defendant water at the start of the interview. Before any mention was made of the murder, Rasso read defendant his Miranda rights in Spanish from a preprinted form. When admonishing in Spanish, Rasso takes care that the subject understands what is said. There are multiple Spanish dialects, and words in one may have a different meaning in others. Rasso “made sure” defendant would understand the dialect he chose. It appeared defendant understood Rasso, and Rasso was able to understand him. Rasso asked if defendant understood each right and defendant confirmed that he did. Defendant initially responded “uhm-hm,” but Rasso asked him to clarify “yes or no.” Defendant answered “yes” then, after a pause asked, “[D]oes my girlfriend already know” about the murders? Focusing on the Miranda issue rather than a discussion of the facts, Rasso responded, “[Y]ou have these rights with you. Do you want to talk about what happened last night or what?”
When defendant replied in the affirmative, Rasso gave him the form, which lists the rights in both Spanish and English and asks whether, with those rights in mind, the subject wishes to speak with police. Rasso crossed out the English portion of the form to indicate that the rights were given in Spanish. Rasso recorded defendant‘s Spanish replies that he both understood his rights and he wished to speak with officers. Defendant, Rasso, and Anderson all signed the form.
Defendant denied the murders and insisted he had not even gone into the house. The next day he was interviewed a second time, then walked through the crime scene with investigators. Before the interview, Rasso told defendant, “[Y]ou always have the right to, not, not talk to us. To not tell us anything, and . . . that way yesterday, . . . where I read you those rights.”
Defense expert Dr. Francisco Gomez tested defendant to assess his ability to understand the Miranda advisements. Defendant consistently performed in the borderline range on intelligence tests, indicating low intellectual functioning. He reported failing sixth grade, which was consistent with “mild retardation” or borderline intelligence.6 Gomez administered screening tests for intelligence. He did not go on to assert whether defendant was intellectually disabled. He was not asked, nor did he give, a specific IQ score for defendant.
Defendant read, in Spanish, at a third to fifth grade level. In Gomez‘s view, understanding the Miranda warnings requires at least seventh grade level reading comprehension. Defendant was depressed, with low self-esteem and a “dependent” personality. He was passive, anxious, and agreeable, “a follower” who might “be easily manipulated.” Gomez detected no symptoms of any thought disorder.
Although defendant had been in the United States for some time, his acculturation was very low. He had been sheltered for most of his life, living with family and securing jobs through friends. Because he grew up in a small town and had never been in trouble, defendant‘s knowledge of the legal system came mainly from Mexican soap operas. He had the distorted view that American police are very aggressive. For example, he once interrupted the officers to ask, ” ‘Are they gonna kill me today, or are they gonna kill me tomorrow?’ ”
Gomez acknowledged that defendant was initially read the full Miranda warnings from a form, “which is the standard way of doing it.” He was reminded of the rights twice on the second day of questioning. In addition, Corporal Rasso explained to defendant that the prosecutor who was with them in the crime scene walkthrough was not his lawyer but was “the attorney for . . . the law.” Defendant was told he would be given his own attorney when he went to court. The third time defendant was given the Miranda warnings, later in the walkthrough, he agreed he would tell Rasso if
On cross-examination, Gomez acknowledged that defendant lied to police almost immediately after he agreed to talk to them. The doctor was aware that there was writing in English on “a window” at the crime scene. Gomez did not read the statement but agreed that if it said, “Austin is a bad student,” the statement would be grammatically correct. Gomez was unaware that defendant was able to consult want ads, find two different apartments, or move in and pay rent. He admitted defendant “concocted a story.” He was unaware that after the murders defendant went to the dairy and worked a normal shift. During the first interview, when told the family had been killed, defendant appeared to cry and denied involvement. Gomez agreed that was a lie. Gomez asserted he was providing an opinion based on “the best information available,” but he admitted he did not read the police reports, interview defendant‘s coworkers, or do further evaluation for IQ testing.
The court denied the suppression motion. Referring to defendant‘s demeanor in the videotaped interview, the court observed, “[T]here is not even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that he did not understand the rights that were read to him. He immediately responded in the affirmative, either through a nod or audible answer, that he understood them, that he was willing to waive them and talk to the officers.” Defendant‘s understanding could also be inferred from the lies he told after waiving his rights. The court noted, “Clearly, he knew he was in trouble and he needed to come up with some sort of explanation regarding the conduct he was being accused of, and he set forth a story denying even being present.” Defendant spoke clearly and without hesitation. He did not ask for questions to be repeated. Furthermore, there was no evidence the police induced his statements through any threats or promises of reward. The court concluded it was “abundantly clear” that defendant understood his rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived them. The court acknowledged that the preponderance of evidence standard applied but noted, “in fact, if the standard were even higher, it would be beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood his rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived them.”
b. Validity of the Miranda Waiver
“To safeguard a suspect‘s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467), the high court adopted a set of
Defendant cites several circumstances to show he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. He argues he was distressed and inattentive during the advisements, merely affirming his understanding and agreeing to talk out of a need to please authority figures. The advisements were read to him all at once, rather than individually, which defendant suggests gave him less time to consider their significance. Defendant similarly contends his signing of the waiver form was perfunctory. He looked at the form only briefly and signed without reading. Separately, relying on Gomez‘s testimony, defendant argues he lacked the cognitive ability, acculturation, or criminal justice experience to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. To the contrary, ample evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant understood the Miranda rights and validly waived them.
Defendant waived his rights at the beginning of the first interview, before any questions were asked about the incident. The videotape indicates that Rasso read the Miranda rights slowly. He paused periodically and looked up. Defendant nodded throughout this recitation and immediately responded in
The trial court rejected defendant‘s claim that he lacked the intellectual capacity and experience necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Our independent review of the videotape supports that conclusion. We have not decided that any particular intelligence or experience level is required to understand the Miranda warnings or to waive them. (See People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 951.) Moreover, defendant‘s attempt to deceive the officers in his initial interview indicates attentiveness and an awareness of his circumstances. He was not so inattentive or distracted during the questioning that he could not formulate a false account of what happened.
Defendant‘s reliance on federal appellate cases is also unavailing. The cases are not controlling precedent and are factually distinguishable. In Cooper v. Griffin (5th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 1142, 1144-1145, the defendants were only 15 and 16 years old and demonstrated considerable intellectual deficiency. They read at or below third grade level and had IQs ranging between 61 and 67, well into the “mentally retarded” range. (Id. at p. 1145.) Moreover, uncontroverted testimony from four of their special education teachers established that neither was capable of understanding the Miranda
Apart from Gomez‘s testimony, which the trial court was entitled to reject, the record reveals no basis to conclude defendant‘s Miranda waiver was anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Having been admonished in his own language, defendant, an adult, repeatedly affirmed both verbally and in writing his understanding of the Miranda rights and his desire to waive them. The trial court‘s denial of the suppression motion is well supported.
c. Violation of Consular Rights
It is undisputed that the officers did not alert defendant to his right to have the Mexican consulate notified of his detention, as required by
“Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Vienna Convention provides that law enforcement officials ‘shall . . . inform’ the person of his rights.”
arrested foreign nationals of their right to have their consulate notified of their arrest, and if a national so requests, inform the consular post that the national is under arrest.” (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 709.) Article 36 generally requires that such an advisement be given “without delay.” (
We have assumed, without deciding, that
A consular notification claim may be raised as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of a confession. (Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 350.) But defendant does not claim his statements to police were involuntary. As a result, he frames his consular notification argument somewhat differently, asserting the lack of consular notice is a circumstance that rendered his Miranda waiver invalid because the waiver was not knowing or intelligent. Assuming this argument is appropriate, it fails because defendant has established no relation whatsoever between his confession and the lack of consular notice. Defendant asserts he needed consular assistance because he was poorly acculturated and inexperienced. He contends, ”Miranda advisements read from a form by an interrogating police officer” could not substitute for the “full[] and careful[]” explanation of his rights from a representative of the consulate. Even assuming defendant might have received a more compelling advisement from a consular representative, the suggestion that he would have deferred to this advice is entirely speculative.
2. Instruction Regarding Preoffense Statements
Defendant claims the court improperly gave
Veronica testified that defendant had difficulty accepting the end of their relationship and blamed Hope for influencing Veronica‘s decision. In a phone call two days before the murders, defendant told Veronica, “I know it‘s [Hope] that‘s making you think like this.” Veronica also testified that in their last brief phone call, on the day of the murders, defendant said, “No matter what happens . . . I‘ll always love you.” Although Veronica found the statement odd, she was mainly irritated by the call.
Based on these two statements, the prosecution requested
Defendant argues the instruction was not supported by the evidence. “A trial court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.) Veronica‘s testimony supported the instruction. Defendant acknowledges that she testified about the statements in question but disputes the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from them. Defendant insists his statement “No matter what happens, I‘ll always love you” did not suggest an “intent, plan, motive, or design” to kill, but “was simply the classic lament of a man professing eternal and unconditional love for a young woman who has told him she wants to end their relationship.” While this is one possible interpretation of the statement, it is not the only one. Even defense counsel acknowledged that ominous inferences could be drawn from the statement, in which defendant suggested something might “happen” only hours before he went to the Ragland house, murdered Hope and Austin, and attacked Marion with a hatchet. Defendant‘s innocent interpretation is also at odds with his other statement, blaming Hope for “making [Veronica] think like this.” This earlier statement conveys defendant‘s apparent aggravation with Hope and could support a conclusion that he harbored a criminal intent. Ultimately, the jury had to decide whether defendant actually made the statements attributed to him, and, if so, what the statements implied. The cautionary instruction properly informed them how to evaluate this evidence.
Defendant argues the jury‘s only proper role under
Finally, any error in giving the instruction was clearly harmless. As we have previously observed,
B. Penalty Phase Issues
1. Instructions Requested by Defense
Defendant challenges the court‘s denial of his request to change to
a. CALCRIM Instructions
Before trial began, the court gave counsel the option of using either
acknowledged that the
Defendant‘s argument rests entirely on the complaint that
We have frequently rejected this argument. (See, e.g., People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 122; People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 73.)
Defendant next claims the court erred in refusing three proposed special instructions based on
Defendant‘s first proposed instruction stated: “You may consider sympathy or compassion for the defendant.” However, the jury had already been instructed that it could consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‘s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.” (
The second proposed instruction stated: “You may not consider as an aggravating factor anything other than the factors contained in this list that you conclude are aggravating in this case. You must not take into account any other facts or circumstances as a basis for imposing the death penalty.” On request, trial courts generally should permit an instruction explaining that only the listed sentencing factors and related evidence may be considered in aggravation. (See People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn. 14; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1324.) However, any error in refusing such an instruction is “nonprejudicial under any standard [where] the record does not suggest that any extraneous ‘factors’ were in fact presented to or considered by the jury.” (Williams, at p. 1324CALJIC No. 8.85 is reasonably inferable from that instruction, which directs jurors to consider the listed sentencing factors “if applicable.” (See People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1100; Gordon, at p. 1275, fn. 14.)
Moreover, no evidence or argument here concerned a nonstatutory factor. There was guilt phase evidence that defendant went to work as usual on the night of the murders and did not seem agitated. That evidence was
Defendant‘s third proposed instruction stated: “Even if a fact is both a ‘special circumstance’ and also a ‘circumstance of the crime,’ you may consider that fact only once as an aggravating factor in your weighing process. Do not double-count that fact simply because it is both a ‘special circumstance’ and a ‘circumstance of the crime.‘” There is no sua sponte duty to instruct that facts supporting a special circumstance may not also be used as an aggravating factor. (See People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 254 (Salazar); People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 476.) However, “[a] trial court should, when requested, instruct the jury against double-counting these circumstances.” (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 789section 190.3, factor] (a) presents a theoretical problem . . . since it tells the penalty jury to consider the ‘circumstances’ of the capital crime and any attendant statutory ‘special circumstances.’ Since the latter are a subset of the former, a jury given no clarifying instructions might conceivably double-count any ‘circumstances’ which were also ‘special circumstances.’ . . . [¶] However, the possibility of actual prejudice seems remote. . . .” (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768.)
The Attorney General concedes omitting the instruction was error but contends it was harmless. We agree. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misunderstood the instructions to permit double counting. (See People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289.) “[T]he standard instructions do not inherently encourage the double counting of aggravating factors. [Citations.] We have also recognized repeatedly that the absence of an instruction cautioning against double counting does not warrant reversal in the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor.” (Ibid.; see Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 714.) There was no misleading argument. Although the prosecutor mentioned that two people had been killed, he did not suggest that this fact be given additional aggravating weight.
Defendant raises several familiar challenges to the constitutionality of California‘s death penalty scheme. Although recognizing we have previously rejected all of these arguments, he renews them to urge reconsideration and preserve the issues for federal review. We decline to reconsider our settled precedent and continue to hold the following:
The category of death-eligible defendants under
The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review. (Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 594; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.) Nor does the death penalty statute violate equal protection by providing different procedural safeguards to capital and noncapital defendants. (Johnson, at p. 594; Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.) Finally, we have repeatedly held that California‘s capital sentencing scheme does not violate international norms or evolving standards of decency in violation of the
C. Cumulative Error
Defendant asserts that errors in his trial were cumulatively prejudicial. We have held that potential errors in denying instructions on aggravating evidence and double counting were harmless. Even considered together, these omissions do not warrant reversal. (See People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 63.)
D. Restitution Fine
At the time of defendant‘s crimes,
The Attorney General agrees the record does not support imposition of a $10,000 restitution fine. Instead of remanding for a restitution hearing, which would entail an inordinate expenditure of resources, he agrees with defendant that the fine should be reduced to the $200 statutory minimum. Defendant‘s proposal is appropriate. (See Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1076; People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 188.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. On remand, the trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the minimum restitution fine of $200 under
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
Concurring Opinion by Justice Cuéllar
As 93 million Americans managed to travel abroad last year to nearly every corner of the planet, the United States hosted almost 80 million foreign nationals. (Nat. Trade and Tourism Off., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Citizen Traffic to Overseas Regions, Canada & Mexico 2018 (Feb. 2019) U.S. Citizen Travel to International Regions: 2018 <https://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2018-O-001/index.html> [as of Jan. 23, 2020]; Nat. Trade and Tourism Off., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Travel and Tourism Industry (Oct. 2019) International Visitors to the U.S. <https://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/Fast_Facts_2018.pdf> [as of Jan. 23, 2020].)1 When our country ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the early 1960s, we gave our word that the United States would treat foreigners in our country with dignity by allowing them contact with their country‘s consular officials—and we let the world know we expected no less for Americans traveling abroad. (Apr. 24, 1963,
Law enforcement officials have a duty under
The majority rightly observes that
Whether or not violations of this international treaty ever require a specific judicial remedy, such as the suppression of statements made to police, our failure to honor our treaty commitment deserves to be remedied. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has articulated several possible remedies for a consular notification violation. A defendant may raise an
Circumstances warranting a judicial remedy may arise rarely, but the United States Supreme Court has carefully avoided the conclusion that suppression is never a remedy for an
Also warranting attention is the telling fact that our own
No one should question how complicated it may sometimes prove to calibrate the proper remedy for any procedural violation affecting the criminal justice system. Remedies in virtually any context, no less than in consular notification, often involve fact-specific determinations and intricate balancing of competing concerns. I agree with the majority that we should not suppress Leon‘s statements to the police here. Nor should we forget that our police often shoulder difficult burdens and resolve competing demands with finite resources as they work to advance public safety. But when our country‘s given its word, there‘s no sensible excuse for condoning practices that ignore our obligations under the Vienna Convention or disregard protections guaranteed by California‘s
Americans abroad, and not just foreigners on our soil, are protected by the reciprocal logic of our commitment to honor consular notification. I respect our law enforcement officials too much to believe they can‘t honor our treaty commitments and the laws of this state while also pursuing their investigative mission effectively. Nor can I presume their capacity to execute that mission is so fragile that success depends on permitting consular notification to slip
CUÉLLAR, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Leon
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S143531
Date Filed: January 23, 2020
Court: Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Christian F. Thierbach
Counsel:
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Andrea G. Asaro, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Andrea Asaro
Deputy State Public Defender
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor
Oakland, CA 94607-4139
(510) 267-3300
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9007