Medellin v. Texas

MEDELLIN TEXAS CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS Argued

No. 06-984. October 2007 Decided March Donald, Francis Donovan for cause argued petitioner. and Catherine him on the briefs were Carl Micarelli With M. Amirfar. General Clement

Solicitor cause for argued curiae amicus him reversal. With urging States Attorney Dep- Fisher, Assistant General were on the brief uty Irving Gornstein, Dreeben, L. Solicitor General and Robert Erickson. J. Cruz,

R. Ted cause Texas, argued Solicitor General Greg Abbott, on the brief were for With him respondent. Sullivan, General, Kent C. Attor First Assistant Attorney Nichols, Eric J. R. General, Attorney General, Deputy ney Jordan, D. S. Sean General, and Solicitor Deputy Kristofer Geyser, Aston, L. Adam Monson, Daniel W. Assistant Solicitors General.* the Government *Briefs of amici curiae reversal were filed for urging Babcock; L. American Bar Sandra for the by Mexican of the United Bleich; Jeffrey L. Foreign Sover- by Karen J. Mathis

Association Hirsch, Bhansali, Smyser, and Jason Craig A. M. Steven eigns Asim by Koh, Hongju Don- Diplomats Harold Luong; for Former United States delivered of opinion Chief Justice Roberts Court.

The (ICJ), International of Justice located in the Court is a tribunal Hague, established to the United Na pursuant tions Charter to between member adjudicate states. disputes Concerning In the Case Avena and Nationals Other Mexican ( S.), U. 31) I. C. J. of Mar. (Judgment Mex. (Avena), that tribunal considered a claim Mexico brought by the United on against that, States. ICJ held based vio lations of the Convention, Vienna 51 named Mexican nation Morse, Ayer, al B. R. Vergonis; Charles A. and Christian G. and for et al. Daniel C. Malone. Ambassador L. Laingen by Bruce Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Common- McDonnell, wealth Robert F. Virginia by Attorney of et al. General of Thro, E. Stephen William R. McCul- Virginia, General, State Solicitor lough, Mims, and William C. Deputy General, Dep- State Solicitor Chief uty General, Attorney by Attorneys respective General for their jurisdictions Alaska, Troy King Colberg Talis J. Alabama, as follows: of of Terry Goddard G. Arkansas, Dustin McDaniel of Edmund Arizona, of Brown, Jr., Colorado, Joseph R. Biden California, John W. Suthers of of III of Delaware, Bill McCollum of ThurbertE. Baker of Florida, Georgia, Lawrence Morrison of Idaho, Wasden Steve Carter of Paul J. Indiana, of Kansas, Gregory D. Sturnbo of Jere- Jim Hood Kentucky, Mississippi, of (Jay) miah W. Nixon of Mike McGrath of Catherine Missouri, Montana, Stenehjem Roy Cooper Wayne Cortez Masto of Nevada, Carolina, of North Oklahoma, Hardy Myers W.A. Drew Edmondson of Dakota, of of North Corbett, Jr., J. Sdnchez- Thomas W. Roberto Oregon, Pennsylvania, Henry Ramos of Puerto D. Lawrence Rico, Carolina, McMaster of South Jr., L. Long Cooper, E. E. Mark Dakota, Tennessee, Robert of South and Rob McKenna Utah, Constitutional Washington; for Shurtleff Young Ernest A. and Edward C.Daw- by and International Law Scholars son; Charles by Department for Former Senior of Justice Officials of the Koukoutchos; Cooper J. Foun- and Brian Stuart Washington Legal for the Randy and Popeo Samp; J. and Richard A. Daniel by dation et al. and for Scheidegger. Sandra Ertman et al. Kent S. by by Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the European Union et al. by Quigley; S. Adele Shank and John B. EarthRights International by Experts Chomsky; Judith Brown of Justice for International Court Jr.; Verrill, Moun- Charles Owen and for the Lori Fisler Damrosch Pendley. Perry Foundation William Legal tain States of their review and reconsideration als were entitled to in the States. and sentences state-court convictions any right regardless to raise so This was forfeiture complywith claims of a failure to Vienna Convention because challenges applicable governing generally state rules criminal convictions. Oregon, U. S. 331 Sanchez-Llamas v. —issued involving named who

after Avena but were individuals contrary judgment to the ICJ's that, in the Avena held —we preclude the did not the Vienna Convention determination, application decision, After the default rules. Avena state through George determined, President Bush a Memoran- W. (Feb. 2005), Attorney App. to Pet. 28, dum for General (Memorandum Memorandum), 187a or President’s Cert. “discharge its ob- that the United would international “by having give ligations” effect under Avena State courts to the decision.” Medellin,

Petitioner Ernesto who had been convicted José of the murder, and sentenced Texas state court for is one Relying named in the Avena decision. Mexican nationals Memorandum, on the ICJ’s and the President's decision corpus application filed writ of Medellin an for a habeas Appeals dis- state court. The Texas of Criminal Court application under missed Medellin’s as an abuse the writ given law, raise Con- state failure to his Vienna Medellin’s timely law. We vention claim in a manner under state granted questions. First, to decide two certiorari directly in Avena enforceable as domestic ICJ’s Second, in a state in the does law court United States? require independently the States President’s Memorandum provide claims review and reconsideration regard to state without Mexican nationals named Avena procedural Avena neither default rules? We conclude directly en- constitutes nor the Memorandum President’s pre-empts on state limitations forceable federal law that of successive filing habeas We therefore affirm petitions. the decision below.

I A In 1969, the United States, the advice and upon consent of the Senate, ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular (Vienna Relations Convention or Convention), 24, Apr. ^[1970] 21 U. S. T. T. I. A. S. No. and the Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention Protocol (Optional Protocol), or Apr. 24,1963, ^[1970] 21 U. S. T. 325, T. I. A. S. No. 6820. The preamble to the Convention its is to provides purpose “contribute to the development relations friendly among supra, at 79; Sanchez-Llamas, nations.” T., U. S. at 337. Toward that end, Article 36 of the Convention was drafted “facilitat[e] exercise of consular functions.” Art. 36(1), 21 U. T., S. at 100. It if de- provides person tained aby “so foreign country au- requests, competent thorities of the shall, State without inform receiving delay, the consular of the post of detention, State” such sending and “inform the of his to assist- righ[t]” request [detainee] id., ance from the consul of his own state. Art. 36(l)(b), at 101.

The Optional Protocol a the venue for resolution provides of disputes out of the arising or of interpretation application the Vienna Convention. Art. 21I, T., U. S. at 326. Under the Protocol, such “shall lie within the disputes compulsory of jurisdiction the International of and “may Court Justice” be accordingly before the to brought by any party [ICJ]... Ibid. the a dispute being to Protocol.” Party present The IC J is “the Na- of United principal judicial organ tions.” Charter, 92, 1051, United Nations T. S. Art. Stat. (1945). to the No. It was in 1945 established pursuant to the United Nations Charter. The ICJ Statute —annexed organizational provides framework and U. N. Charter — procedures brought governing before the ICJ. for cases (ICJ Statute), of Statute of the International Court Justice (1945). No. 59 Stat. T. S. 94(1) “[e]ach Charter, Article of the U. N. Member

Under comply to with the deci- of the Nations undertakes United any party.” [ICJ] in to which it is a Stat. sion case any jurisdiction particular case, how- 1051. The ICJ’s upon parties. dependent Art. See ever, is the consent ways in id., two 1060. The delineates ICJ Statute jurisdiction: may may It con- which a to ICJ nation consent any arising generally jurisdiction question under to on sent 36(2), general it ibid., or law, international Art. or particular may jurisdiction specifically cat- over a consent disputes separate treaty, egory pursuant to Art. or cases 36(1), originally to the The consented ibid. United States general jurisdiction of when it filed a declaration the ICJ 36(2) recognizing compulsory jurisdiction in 1946. under Art. jurisdiction general from United withdrew ICJ States Dept, in 1985. Letter and Statement Con- U. S. of State See cerning Compulsory Acceptance of Juris- Termination of ICJ (1985). (Oct. 1985), reprinted diction 24 I. L. M. By Optional ratifying Convention, Protocol the Vienna specific jurisdiction of the to the United consented States arising respect out the Vienna Conven- ICJ with to claims subsequent the ICJ’s 7, 2005, tion. On March gave of withdrawal from notice Avena, the United Optional Letter Protocol to the Vienna Convention. Secretary Annan, Kofi Rice, State, A. from Condoleezza Secretary-General Nations.

B has Medellin, national, a Mexican Petitioner José Ernesto preschool. A member lived States since gang, capital “Black and Whites” Medellin was convicted of gang rape murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the teenagers. and brutal murders of two Houston 24,1993,14-year-old 16-year- On June Ertman Jennifer and walking they old Elizabeth Pena were encoun- home when gang tered Medellin and several fellow members. Medellin attempted engage to Elizabeth in conversation. she When petitioner ground. run, tried to threw her to the Jennifer grabbed by gang response was other she, members when help. gang to her friend’s ran back cries, members raped girls prevent both for over an Then, hour. their identifying gang victims from them, Medellin his fellow and girls members murdered the their discarded bodies personally responsible a wooded area. Medellin was strangling girls at least one of the with her own shoelace. approximately

Medellin was arrested at on a.m. June 1993. A few later, a.m., hours between and 7:23 5:54 given warnings; signed Medellin was Miranda he then gave written waiver and written confession. detailed App. Respondent to Brief for 32-36. Local law enforcement officers did not, however, inform Medellin of his Vienna Con right notify vention consulate of his Mexican deten tion. Brief for Petitioner 6-7. Medellin was convicted of capital death; murder and sentenced to his conviction appeal. State, sentence were affirmed on Medellìn v. (Tex. 16, 1997), App., May App. 71,997 to Brief for No. Crim. Respondent 2-31. in his claim

Medellin first raised his Vienna Convention application postconviction relief. The state first for state procedurally defaulted trial court held that the claim was trial or on direct to raise it at because Medellin had failed rejected the Convention The trial also Vienna review. court “fail[ed] finding had that Medellin merits, claim on the any im- authorities of the Mexican show that non-notification Id., or punishment.” of his conviction validity on pacted Id., affirmed. at 62.1 Appeals The Texas Court of Criminal at 64-65. in District Federal

Medellin then filed a habeas petition relief, holding denied The District Court Court. claim de procedurally was Medellin’s Vienna Convention aris to show prejudice faulted and that had failed Medellin Medellin from the violation. See ing Vienna Convention (SD 26, 2003), Tex., June Cockrell, Civ. Action No. H-01-4078 66, 86-92. to Brief for Respondent App. for a certificate appeala-

While Medellin’s application its the ICJ issued Circuit, in Fifth bility was pending The held the United States in decision Avena. ICJ 36(l)(b) by of the Vienna Convention had violated Article nationals, including to the 51 named Mexican inform failing J., I. at 2004 C. Medellin, rights. of their Vienna Convention was United States determination, 53-55. In the ICJ’s review choosing, “to means of its own obligated provide, convictions sentences reconsideration 36(l)(b) that the Convention requirement of Article the Vienna satisfied, delay” is notify the detainee’s consulate “without detaining state days. ICJ, provided working three according to the where notice is within 31). Avena, 12, 52, Mar. See Sanchez- (Judgment ¶ C. 2004 I. J. J., concurring in Oregon, Llamas v. 548 U. S. (Ginsburg, Here, of his arrest— judgment). confessed within three hours Medellin right to Vienna Convention consul before there could be a violation of his In a second state Respondent Brief 32-36. App. ate notification. prejudice by expand his claim of application, sought habeas Medellin Convention noncompliance contending that the State’s Vienna during the developing mitigation evidence deprived him of assistance however, likely waived: argument, was capital phase of his trial. This during preparation of counsel Medellin had assistance consulate relief, this postconviction yet failed raise application his for state first Corpus of Habeas argument Application at that time. See for Writ (Tex. 26, 1998), Medellin, App., Mar. parte Crim. Ex No. 675430-A case, disposition we need consider light of this pp. 25-31. of our his of Vienna any way by the violation prejudiced whether Medellin was rights. Convention 153(9).

[affected] ¶ Mexican Id., nationals.” The ICJ required regard indicated that such review was without procedural state Id., default rules. at 56-57. appealability. The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of (2004). Medellín Dretke, 270, 371 F. 3d 281 The court concluded that the Vienna Convention did not confer indi vidually rights. enforceable Id., at 280. The court further any by ruled that it was in event bound this Court’s decision (1998) curiam), (per in Greene, Breard v. 523 U. S. subject pro which held that Vienna are Convention claims by contrary cedural default rules, rather than the ICJ’s deci in sion Avena. 371 3d, F. at 280. granted

This Court certiorari. Dretke, Medellín v. curiam) (Medellín I). (per U. S. Before we argument, George heard oral however, President BushW. Attorney issued his for Memorandum the United States Gen providing: eral, pursuant authority

“I have determined, to the vested by me as President the Constitution and the laws of the of America, that the United States will discharge obligations its international under the decision by of the International in [Avena], Court Justice hav- ing give State courts effect to the decision in accordance general by principles comity in cases filed the 51 App. Mexican nationals addressed that decision.” Pet. Cert. 187a. relying and the

Medellin, on the President’s Memorandum application Avena, for habeas ICJ’s decision filed a second parte Medellín, relief in state Ex 223 S. W. 3d court. (Tex. 2006). App. the state-court 322-323 Crim. Because proceedings might provided the review have Medellin with requested, because his claim for and reconsideration he might barred, we dis have been federal relief otherwise granted. improvidently petition for certiorari as missed his supra, I, Medellín at 664. subsequently Appeals dis- Criminal

The Texas Court of application as an habeas state missed Medellin’s second view, the court’s 3d, at 352. the writ. 223 S. W. abuse of Memorandum the President’s nor neither the Avena decision displace lim- “binding State’s law” that could federal was applications. 223 filing habeas of successive itations on granted U. S. again certiorari. 3d, at 352. We S. W. (2007).

II judgment in Avena the ICJ’s Medellin first contends obligation fed- “binding” on the state constitutes a “by argues that virtue He eral courts of the United States. compli- requiring Supremacy the treaties Clause, already the ‘Law of are ance with the Avena country in this courts state and federal Land’ which all Accordingly, Reply 1. for Petitioner Brief are ‘bound.’” binding of decision argues, rule federal Avena is Medellin ha- contrary pre-empts on successive limitations that state petitions. beas that disputes decision the Avena decision—a one

No through sub- which the United from the treaties flows respect jurisdiction to Vienna Convention mitted to JIC obligation on the disputes law an international —constitutes law obli- part international But not all of the States. binding automatically law enforce- gations federal constitute question here we confront The courts. able in United States legal judgment automatic domestic has the Avena is whether applies in state own force of its effect such that the and federal courts. recognized between long the distinction has

This Court automatically law, as domestic have effect treaties they law commit- international constitute those that —while binding law. by. federal function as themselves ments—do not explained Mar- Chief Justice was well The distinction (1829), opinion Neilson, 2 Pet. in Foster v. shall’s grounds, on other Perckeman, overruled United States v. (1833), treaty “equivalent Pet. 51 which held that a to an legislature,” self-executing, “op act of the and hence when it any legislative provision.” erates of itself without the aid supra, “[treaty] stipula Foster, When, in contrast, self-executing they only pursu tions are not can be enforced legislation carry ant Whitney them into effect.” (1888). Robertson, 124 U. sum, S. while treaties “may comprise they international . . commitments . are not Congress implement domestic law unless has either enacted ing treaty conveys statutes or the itself an intention that ‘self-executing’ it be and is ratified on these terms.” Igartúa-De (CA1 La Rosa States, v. United 145, 150 F. 3d 2005) (en banc) J.).2 (Boudin, C. treaty “primarily compact

A is, course, between inde- pendent Money nations.” Head Cases, 112 U. S. (1884). ordinarily “depends It for the enforcement of its provisions governments on the interest the honor parties which are Ibid.; 1961) (A. Hamilton) to it.” see also Federalist (J. p. (comparing No. 33, 207 Cooke ed. supreme laws that individuals are “the “bound observe” as treaty, dependent good law of the land” with “a on the mere parties”). [interests] faith of the fail, “If these its infraction subject negotiations becomes the of international and recla- judicial mations It is .... obvious that with all this the nothing give courts have can to do and no redress.” Head Money supra, Only “[i]f Cases, at 598. contains stipulations require self-executing, leg- which are no is, operative, they [will] islation to make them have the force 2 “self-executing” convey The label has on occasion been used differ ent meanings. by “self-executing” treaty we has What mean is that upon Conversely, automatic domestic effect as federal law ratification. a “non-self-exeeuting” treaty by give domestically does not itself rise enforceable federal law. a has domestic effect de Whether such pends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.

506 Whitney, supra, at enactment.” effect of a legislative

194.3 his amici Op- nonetheless contend

Medellin and Statute Charter, supply and ICJ Protocol, tional U. N. the Avena judgment binding to give “relevant obligation” Reply of the United States. effect in the domestic courts of these treaty Because none Brief for Petitioner 5-6.4 of imple- law the absence creates federal binding sources that no it is uncontested and because menting legislation, the Avena judgment conclude that exists, such we legislation law. not domestic binding is automatically A like the interpretation The of a treaty, interpretation Saks, text. Air France 470 v. statute, with its begins 3 they create self-executing in the sense that Even when treaties are agree law, background presumption “[international is that federal ments, private persons, generally do directly benefiting even those of action in domestic provide private cause private rights create or (Third) the United Foreign Relations Law of courts.” 2 Restatement Restatement). (hereinafter a, Ac §907, p. Comment 395 presumed that treaties Appeals have cordingly, a number of the Courts of express lan- rights in the absence of privately enforceable do not create Emuegbunam, 268 F. 3d g., e. United States See, v. guage contrary. to the Jimenez-Nava, 192, (CA6 195 2001); 243 F. 3d United States 377, v. 389 2000) (en (CA1 banc); Li, (CA5 States v. 2001); 60-61 United 206 F. 3d (CA4 1992); (Panama) States, S. A. v. 967 F. 2d Goldstar (CADC 1980); States, 1081, 1092 Transp. F. Canadian Co. United v. 2d (CA3 Mills, Cong Corp., F. 2d Mannington Inc. oleum 1979). binding effect in Avena has question is whether the Statute, Char Protocol, and U. N. Optional ICJ domestic courts under the Con unnecessary to whether Vienna Consequently, it resolve ter. individually grants it Medellin “self-executing” whether vention is itself or (disclaiming reliance rights. Reply Brief for Petitioner enforceable See 342-343, Sanchez-Llamas, S., Convention). 548 U. on the As Vienna foreign nationals grants Article 36 assume, deciding, that we thus without officers be request that their consular individually right to “an enforceable right to be informed detention, accompanying and an notified of their availability notification.” of consular authorities of the

507 (1985). treaty 392, U. S. 396-397 Because a the ratified agreement among sovereign powers,” United States is “an interpretation” we have also considered as “aids to its negotiation drafting history and of the as well as postratification understanding” signatory “the nations. Co., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines 516 U. S. 226 (1996);see Stuart, also United 489 365- U. S. (1989); States, Choctaw Nation v. United 318 U. S. 423, (1943). 431-432 signatory Optional

As a Protocol, to the the United States agreed disputes arising to submit out of the Vienna Conven- provides: “Disputes arising tion to the ICJ. The Protocol interpretation application [Vienna] out of the or of the Con- compulsory jurisdiction vention shall lie within the of the International Court of Justice.” I, T., Art. U. S. submitting jurisdiction agreeing course, Of to and to be things. party example, bound are A could, two different agree compulsory nonbinding agree- an arbitration. Such require party appear ment would before the arbitral obligating party tribunal without to treat the tribunal’s binding. g., decision as See, e. North American Free Trade

Agreement, 2018(1), U. S.-Can.-Mex., 17, 1992, Art. Dec. (1993)(“On receipt report [the I. L. M. of the final panel requested by Party agreement], arbitral disputing dispute, agree Parties shall on the resolution of the normally which shall conform with the determinations panel”). recommendations of the reading Optional is as a The most natural of the Protocol only “[disputes grant jurisdiction. provides bare It application arising interpretation out of the or compulsory jurisdic- [Vienna] Convention shall lie within “may accord- tion International Court of Justice” by any party ingly brought [ICJ] be before the ... dispute being Party present I,Art. Protocol.” to the nothing says effect about the T., U. S. at 326. Protocol signatories to not itself commit of an ICJ decision and does similarly judgment. comply The Protocol is si- with an ICJ any mechanism. lent as to enforcement signatory comply obligation part to on of nations The Optional judgments Protocol, not from the with derives ICJ provi from of the U. N. but rather Article 94 Charter —the specifically of ICJ decisions. sion that effect addresses 94(1)provides “[e]ach of the United Na Article that Member [ICJ] comply in undertakes to with decision tions (emphasis any party.” 59 1051 case to which it is a Stat. added). phrase Branch contends that the Executive acknowledgement comply” “an that an is not “undertakes legal in the will immediate effect courts ICJ decision have part on the members,” rather “a commitment U. N. but political through action their members to U. N. take future comply Brief for United branches to an ICJ decision.” with I, 2004, Amicus in Medellín O.T. States as Curiae p. 34. 04-5928, No. agree 94. The Arti with construction Article

We this provide courts. It does cle is not a directive to domestic comply an “must” that the “shall” or ICJ United States the U. that ratified N. decision, nor indicate that the Senate legal immediate Charter intended to decisions with vest ICJ “[t]he of Article Instead, words effect domestic courts. governments upon take action.” Com 94 call certain ... Nicaragua Living v. mittee United States Citizens (CADC 1988) Diggs (quoting Reagan, F. 2d 938 859 (CADC 1976); internal Richardson, 2d F. omitted). quotation Foster, Pet., also marks See non-self-executing (holding treaty its text— because “ ”— grants be and confirmed’ shall ratified ‘all... land ... directly “pledge[d] grants” but rather did not “act on the ratify pass acts which shall faith of the United States them”). reads words, the Charter In other U. N. confirm “depends compact independent nations” like “a between provisions and the on the interest for the enforcement itsof Head honor of the which are to it.” governments parties Cases, 112 atS.,U. 598.5 Money The remainder of Article 94 confirms that U. N. Char- ter does not the automatic of ICJ enforceability contemplate 94(2) decisions in domestic Article enforce- courts.6 —the ment the sole remedy noncompli- provision provides — an ance: referral the United Nations Council Security state. Stat. 1051. aggrieved The U. N. Charter’s of an express diplomatic— provision is, is itself evidence ICJ nonjudicial remedy judg- — courts. ments were not meant to be enforceable domestic Sanchez-Llamas, at 347. And even this S., See U. id., at is not international “quintessentially remed[y],” the must neces- First, absolute. Council Security “dee[m] to effec- the issuance of a recommendation or measure sary” 94(2), Second, tuate the 1051. Art. Stat. judgment. in sub- the President and were aware undoubtedly Senate Protocol, the to the U. N. Charter and scribing Optional .. . to mean that United States “‘“[t]he 5 Wedo not read “undertakes” matter, they think liberty respecting shall be at to make such laws as th[e] ’” Post, (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Todok v. Union proper.” at 554 (1930) Harvard, treaty 449,453,454 (holding that a State Bank 281 U. S. as to the Norway “operat[e] [Nebraska] with did not to override the law of or not the United States disposition property”)). of homestead Whether may nothing what laws it comply treaty says to with a about “undertakes” liberty make ... such laws as always “at to enact. The United States Id., Indeed, statute a later-in-time federal proper.” at 453. [it] think[s] See, e.g., Cook v. United supersedes provisions. inconsistent (1933). comply” Rather, to States, 102,119-120 the “undertakes 288 U. S. judgment to an ICJ give to effect language confirms that further action judgments position that such contemplated, contrary to the dissent’s was post, law, more. See also without directly enforceable federal constitute (Stevens, J., concurring judgment). at 533-535 perform 94(2) a ease fails to any party to provides in full: “If Article by the rendered judgment a upon it under obligations the incumbent Council, Security which may to the Court, party have recourse the other upon meas or decide necessary, make recommendations may, if it deems 59 Stat. judgment.” the give effect to ures to be taken right unqualified its exercise retained the United States any Security veto of Council resolution. understanding Branch when was of the Executive

This the agreed the to the and declara- the President U. N. Charter compulsory jurisdiction. accepting general See, ICJ tion g., for the Maintenance e. Charter of United Nations Security: Hearings before Peace and of International Cong., Foreign 1st Relations, 79th Committee on Senate (“[I]f (1945) perform obliga- fails to its Sess., 124-125 state may party judgment [ICJ], the other tions under a (state- Council”); Security id., have recourse to the Secretary Pasvolsky, Special to the Leo Assistant ment of Affairs) Organizations Security International State (“[W]hen one of has rendered Court politi- dispute accept parties becomes it, then refuses political dispute legal. that the It is cal rather than as a Council”); Security A Resolution matter is to the referred Proposing Acceptance Compulsory of Interna- Jurisdiction Hearings before on S. Res. 196 tional Court of Justice: Foreign on Rela- Senate Committee Subcommittee (statement Cong., of Charles Sess., 79th 2d tions, Adviser) (while accept Legal parties Fahy, Dept. State obligation” comply jurisdiction have “a moral ICJ 94(2) provides the means Article exclusive decisions, ICJ enforcement). automatically regarded judgments as

If were instead ICJ they immediately and di- be law, enforceable domestic would pursuant rectly binding the courts to on state and federal Supremacy no need would have Clause. Mexico or ICJ judgment Security proceed to enforce the to Council to through judgment Noncompliance an ICJ in this case. with always regarded Security as exercise of the Council veto— during ratifying by option Senate an the Executive and Optional Protocol, Charter, of the U. after consideration N. longer be a viable alternative. no and ICJ Statute —would nothing light There would be In veto. the U. N. Char- ter’s remedial there scheme, is no reason to that the believe signed up President and Senate for such a result. sum, Medellin’s view that automati- ICJ decisions are

cally fatally by enforceable as domestic law is undermined by the enforcement structure established Article 94. His option noncompliance construction would eliminate the 94(2), contemplated by undermining ability Article of the political comply branches to determine whether and how judgment. foreign policy with an ICJ Those sensitive deci- sions would instead be transferred state and federal charged applying judgment directly courts with an ICJ empowered domestic law. And those not courts would be always comply judgment again, decide whether to with the — regarded option by any political as an more branches— may any comply than courts consider whether to other species particularly of domestic law. This result would be light principle “[t]he in anomalous of the conduct foreign relations of our Government is committed Legislative politi- Constitution to the Executive and —‘the Departments.” Oetjen Co., 246 v. Central Leather cal’— (1918). U. S. incorporated pro Statute, Charter, ICJ into the U. N. vides further that the Avena evidence in ICJ’s automatically judicially does not constitute law en federal forceable United courts. Art. Stat. begin “principal purpose” To with, the to be ICJ’s is said particular govern disputes to “arbitrate between national supra, (citing 59 Sanchez-Llamas, ments.” Stat. at 1055). Accordingly, disputes only between can ICJ hear 34(1), (“Only id., nations, individuals. Art. may parties [i. countries] e., states be cases before [ICJ]”). provides important, More Article 59 statute except binding “[t]he [ICJ] decision of the has no force particular parties respect case.” between the 512 added).7 explain (emphasis The does dissent

Id., at 1062 party to the ICJ be a Medellin, individual, can how an proceeding. argues him, involves case that the Avena

Medellin because named 50 Mexican nationals clear that he—and the other it is regarded parties decision—should be in the Avena judgment. But cases 21-22. Brief for Petitioner Avena involving by disputes precipitated the ICJ are often before particular disputes persons that nation elects entities, or Concerning g., up the Barce- e. See, as its own. Case to take (Belg. Spain), Light 1970 v. Traction, Power Co. lona & 5) (claim Belgium brought by (Judgment on J. 3 Feb. I. C. shareholders); Belgian Concern- nationals and Case behalf of ing Per- and Protected Protection French Nationals (Fr. (Order Egypt Egypt), Mar. I. 1950 C.J. sons 29) (claim by brought behalf of French nationals France on Anglo-Iranian protected persons Egypt); Co. Oil (U. July Iran), (Judgment of I. K. v. 1952 C. J. Case 22) (claim Kingdom brought on behalf of the United Anglo-Iranian Company). been under- That has never Oil only express rules that to alter the and established stood may parties ICJ, Art. 59 Stat. before the nation-states be post, contrary position at dissent, 1059, and— only binding judgments those are between 559—that ICJ parties, 1062.8 Art. 59 Stat. Stat ICJ language provide in his brief Medellin alters this particular respect “in the Avena judgment binding [his]

ute makes omitted). (internal Med quotation marks case.” Brief Petitioner the terms of ICJ under a case before the ellin does not and cannot have the ICJ Statute. law binding federal the ICJ dissent concludes overrides Convention part its the Vienna large on belief based 555-557, 559. even But not post, See contrary procedural rules. state (dis for Petitioner 5 Reply Brief on the Convention. See Medellin relies by the reliance). is foreclosed good reason: Such reliance claiming For Sanchez-Llamas, S., (holding that U. at 351 this Court in decision of

513 is, It moreover, well that settled the United States’ of a “is entitled interpretation treaty great to weight.” Sumitomo America, Inc. Shoji Avagliano, 176, v. 457 U. S. El Al 184-185 Airlines, Israel Tsui see Ltd. v. (1982); also Yuan (1999). Tseng, 525 155, U. S. The Executive Branch has its adhered to view that the relevant unfailingly treaties do not create enforceable federal law. domestically .9 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-29

The pertinent international do not agreements, therefore, provide of implementation ICJ direct judgments through enforcement in domestic courts, and “where a does not treaty a provide either or particular remedy, it expressly implicitly, the Convention preclude application procedural bars); does not of state id., (Ginsburg, J., see also at concurring in judgment). There is no basis for relitigating Further, rely the issue. to on the Convention would elide the treaty negotiated distinction between a by and President — signed by Congress judgment pursuant a rendered to those treaties. —and 9In interpreting treaty obligations, our we also consider the views of itself, “giv[ing] the ICJ respectful interpretation consideration of an to the treaty international an jurisdiction rendered international court to Greene, Breard v. interpret treaty].” [the (per 523 U. S. curiam)', Sanchez-Llamas, swpra, see at 355-356. It is not clear whether principle apply would question binding when the is the of force ICJ judgments themselves, scope rather than the substantive interpret resolving ICJ must disputes. Cf. Phillips Co. Petroleum Shutts, (1985) (“[A] 797,805 472 U. dispute may S. adjudicating court not predetermine judicata be to judgment”); able the res effect its own Wright, Miller, C. §4405, A. & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d (“The 2002) p. 82 ed. get first court does not courts dictate other preclusion consequences any its judgment”). event, nothing own suggests judgments ICJ automatically views its enforceable in signatory the domestic Avena courts nations. The itself di provide rects the United States to and the af review reconsideration of “by choosing.” means its own fected convictions sentences 153(9) added). J., (emphasis I. C. at language, ¶ This as well as the “judicial mere suggestion process” provide ICJ’s suited is best review, id., 65-66, enforceability such confirm that in court is domestic part parcel of an judgment. ICJ impose on the States one courts is not for the federal lawmaking through Sanchez-Llamas, 548 of their own.” S., at 347. U.

B analysis it “looks for because The dissent faults our (explicit expression wrong thing about self- textual execution) wrong (clarity) using wrong the the standard (the treaty language).” our obli- place Post, at 562. Given treaty interpret provisions whether gation to determine to they self-executing, do think confess that we we have to are treaty language important to see what the it rather to look to say all what the Sen- That is after it has to about the issue. treaty. approve deciding the to whether to ate looks today— employed by interpretive approach the Court early hardly resorting cases In two text —is novel. the treaty Spain involving land-grant the and an between language of found the Marshall States, United Chief Justice distinguishing treaty be- dispositive. after Foster, the (those “equivalent an self-executing act tween treaties (those non-self-executing “the legislature”) treaties the execute”), legislature held Marshall must Chief Justice treaty non-self-executing. 2 Pet., at 314. the was Supreme years another considered later, the Court Four treaty treaty, the concluded that same but claim under the self-executing. at The rea- Percheman, Pet., 87. was See self-executing treaty sometimes was son was not because Span- language of” “the not, but because and sometimes (brought for attention to the Court's ish translation time) ratify parties' con- intent to first indicated Id., “by grant instrument itself.” land force firm the at 89. approach, the dissent against textual time-honored

As this analysis that judgment-by-judgment proposes multifactor, open-ended predictability “jettiso[n] relative would Grubart, Inc. v. rough-and-tumble B. Jerome of factors.” (1995). Dredge Co., 513 U. S. Dock Lakes & Great approach (or, deciding The dissent’s novel which more ac- when) curately, give directly treaties rise to enforceable fed- arrestingly Treaty language eral law is indeterminate. (“[T]he barely probative. presence Post, at 549 absence or language treaty provision’s ain about a self-execution all”). proves nothing Determining whether treaties themselves create federal law is sometimes committed to the political judiciary. branches and sometimes to Post, judiciary, at 549-550. Of those committed the courts pick binding and choose which shall be United States law— trumping only state but other federal law as well—and They which Post, shall not. at 550-562. this on do “context-specific” inquiry. basis of a multifactor, Post, at gives then, Even the same sometimes rise to again depending law and sometimes does not, judicial on an ad hoc Post, assessment. at 550-562. procedures Our Framers established a careful set of must be followed before federal law can be created under the vesting political that branches, decision the Constitution — subject § to checks and Const., I, balances. U. S. Art. 7. They recognized also that treaties law, could create federal again through political but the branches, with the President making treaty § approving the and the it. II, Senate Art. 2. understanding treaty depending The dissent’s route, judiciary looking on an ad hoc of to the without treaty language by very language negotiated the the —the approved readily by President and the Senate—cannot be ascribed to those same Framers. approach

The dissent’s involve- risks United States’ agreements. ment in It to believe that international is hard the United into that are some- States would enter treaties treaty times enforceable and sometimes not. a would Such equivalent judiciary. writing be the a blank check to quite Senators treaties on could never be sure what the say they voting Only judge which a could were meant. uncertainty only sure and at some date. This could future sign negotiate inter- and efforts to the United States’ hobble agreements. national bag grab than of no less a case, this dissent—for judg- particular ICJ tell us that this reasons—would

seven no sort Post, That is law. at 549-562. ment is federal say any guidance. the federal Nor is it answer agreements police en- diligently international will courts they only when international tribunals force the decisions of non-self-executing point of The be enforced. Ibid. should judi- political, treaty not the to the that it “addresses itself is legislature con- department; execute the must cial and the Foster, a rule for the Court.” tract it can become before added); (emphasis Whitney, supra, S., U. at 314 (“The judiciary supra, is not that de- at 307 Foster, also See its government, partment the assertion which confided”). against foreign powers dissent’s is interests politi- assign contrary approach to the courts—not would deciding primary how when and role in cal branches—the agreements To read will be enforced. international law some- has effect of domestic so that it sometimes judiciary vesting with the tantamount times does not is only interpret power the law. also to create but not C by itself constitute that Avena does Our conclusion “postratification un- binding law confirmed federal derstanding” Zicherman, signatory nations. See parties currently are 47 nations S., at 226. There are U. parties to are Optional and 171 nations to the Protocol his amici nor Yet neither Medellin the Vienna Convention. judgments single treats ICJ nation that have a identified determining the that binding in domestic courts.10 as 10 up is with experts as amici curiae can come the ICJ best that judgments to ICJ referred courts have that local Moroccan the contention Even n. 31. Amici Curiae Experts “dispositive.” Brief ICJ as at is practice holding, and Moroccan experts ICJ not cite a case so the do

517 require Vienna Convention did not certain in relief United pertinent States courts in Sanchez-Llamas, we found it that requested treaty the relief would not be available under the any signatory country. other atS., 343-344, See 548 U. any supposing n. 3. So too here the lack of basis for any country that judgments other would treat ICJ as di- rectly strongly enforceable as a of matter its domestic law suggests treaty that the should not be so viewed in our courts. supported by general

Our conclusion principles is further interpretation. begin To with, we reiterated Sanchez- “ Llamas what we in Breard, held ‘absent clear and express contrary, procedural statement to the the rules govern implementation the forum State ” (quoting S., State.’ Breard, U. atS.,U. 375). judgments may Given that ICJ interfere state procedural expect ratifying parties rules, one would clearly the relevant treaties to have stated their intent to give judgments they those if effect, domestic so in had Optional tended. Here there no statement in the Proto supports col, the Charter, U. N. or the ICJ Statute that judgments displace procedural notion that ICJ state rules. consequences argument give Moreover, of Medellin’s pause. judgment, goes, only argument An ICJ is not binding domestic law but result, is also unassailable. As a may neither Texas nor this Court look behind (We quarrel reasoning already with its or know, result. disagrees from Sanchez-Llamas, that this Court with both inconsistent, best for at least one local Moroccan court has held that ICJ g., judgments e. binding See, municipal are as a matter of law. Khadar, Mackay & Radio Tel. Co. Fatma si el Lal-La Bent Mohamed ^[1954] Int’l L. Rep. (Tangier, Ct. App. Int’l Trib.) (holding that ICJ v. Greek decisions are not State, ^[1951] binding 18 Int’l L. on Morocco’s domestic Rep. (Belg., courts); Trib. Civ. de see also Bruxelles) “Socobel” (holding judgments predecessor, Court ICJ’s Permanent enforceable). Justice, domestically International were not Avena.) interpreta- reasoning result in Medellin’s and judgments override otherwise bind- to tion would allow ICJ exempt nothing logic ing his that would g., there is law; state contrary e. Cook v. See, fate. law from same federal (later-in-time self- States, 102, 119 288 U. S. executing treaty supersedes if is a there a federal statute conflict). prevent nothing from or- to the ICJ there is And and sen- dering convictions courts to annul criminal state by any Indeed, the ICJ. for reason deemed sufficient tences, requested. precisely Avena, 2004 the relief Mexico that is C.J., I. at 58-59. reading treaties at the relevant flinches

Even the dissent judgments self-executing It give in all cases. rise to ICJ unlikely “Congress automatic authorize is admits that enforceability judgments, judicial for that could of all ICJ judgments politically others bet- and include some sensitive by Post, other branches.” ter suited for enforcement that in- point precisely. draw from But the lesson to Our judg- sight hardly judiciary which should decide is that politically which are not. are sensitive and ments “[n]oth- Sanchez-Llamas, and as we observed short, suggests ing purpose of ICJ or in the structure interpretations on our to be conclusive its were intended holding, it difficult is S., courts.” 548 U. at 354. Given purpose establish, can and how that same structure see argues, judgments nonetheless ICJ as Medellin A on our courts. were intended be conclusive binding only it makes so. a rule of law that if there is judgments question can bind domes- ICJ And the whether analysis depends upon undertaken tic courts same set forth above. and Sanchez-Llamas holding prior the dissent decisions identified Our post, self-executing, at 545-546, see treaties to be number of proposi- only Appendix the unremarkable A, stand self-executing agreements are international tion that some “[ijnterpreta- It settled that is well others are not. treaty]... [a tion begin language must, of course, with the Treaty Shoji itself.” Sumitomo America, Inc., 457 S., U. at 180. As a result, we have held treaties to be self- executing provisions when the textual indicate that the Pres- ident agreement and Senate intended for the to have domes- tic effect.

Medellin Comegys and the dissent cite Vasse, v. 1 Pet. 193 (1828), proposition judgments for the that the of inter- automatically national binding tribunals are on domestic post, Reply courts. See at 546; Brief for Petitioner 2; Brief for Petitioner 19-20. case, That of course, involved a differ- treaty ent than only the ones at issue here; it stands for the principle modest treaty that the terms of a control the out- come suggest of a case.11 We do not that treaties can never binding afford domestic judg- effect to international tribunal only Optional that the U. Charter, N. Protocol, ments— and the ICJ Statute do not do so. And whether the treaties underlying self-executing judg- are so that the directly ment is enforceable as domestic law our courts is, of course, a matter for this to Court decide. See Sanchez- supra, Llamas, at 353-354.

D holding question ordinary Our does not call into en- foreign judgments forcement of or international arbitral 11The other proposition case Medellin cites for the judgments of international Mining La Abra Silver Co. v. United binding, courts are States, (1899), 175 U. S. 423 and the proposition cases he cites for the routinely this Court has foreign enforced treaties under which nationals rights, have asserted similarly only principle stand for the that the terms treaty govern of a Reply 4, 5, its enforcement. See Brief for Petitioner case, and n. 2. interpreted treaty prior each this Court first to Rauseher, g., e. States v. finding domestically See, it enforceable. 119 U. S. (holding treaty required 422-423 that the extradition Bell, (1806) (hold Hopkirk only specified offenses); 454, 458 3 Cranch ing treaty peace that the between Great Britain and the United States prevented debts). operation of a state statute of limitations on British that, a gen- Medellin as we with Indeed, agree agreements. in- of an the result” “an abide matter, eral agreement means, an he agree- what really ternational adjudication —or legal domestic of such adjudication ment result give other, so long like any be a treaty obligation effect —can See is consistent Constitution. agreement the particular Brief for Petitioner 20. point their relies do which Medellin on obligations domestic law. own force create doubt on some that our decision casts

The dissent worries has agreed under which the United 70-odd treaties similar” according “roughly to the ICJ submit disputes under 552-553. 540-541, Again, See provisions. post, self-executing some treaties are our established precedent, That the not, judg are on the treaty. and some depending be automatically not might ment of an international tribunal is treaty the underlying come domestic law means hardly 553; at 548 (describing See at cf. post, post, “useless.” always requir[e] British which treaties “virtually system still would legislation”). judgments Such parliamentary of po obligations, proper subject constitute international Cases, Money See Head litical and diplomatic negotiations. could them give 112 U. at 598. And elect S., Congress (rather ap effect than the judgment-by-judgment wholesale 560) im at dissent, through by post, proach hypothesized See, e. For it has. g., regularly plementing legislation, 1998, § 2242, Act of Restructuring Affairs Reform eign § 1231 (directing 8 U. S. 2681-822, note C. following Stat. im regulations “prescribe “appropriate agencies” under Article of obligations plement of Other Forms Torture and 3” of the Against Convention Punishment); Treatment or or Cruel, Inhuman Degrading im of legislation examples also at 521-522 (listing see infra, obligations). international plementing automatically not be may an ICJ Further, the particular mean courts does enforceable domestic underlying treaty Indeed, is we not. have held that a num- “Friendship, Navigation” ber of Commerce, Treaties by Appendix post, cited the dissent, B, see are self- executing language the[se] Treaties].” on “the —based Shoji supra, See Sumitomo America, Inc., at 180, 189-190. Oregon, (1961), In Kolovrat v. 187, 366 U. S. ex- for ample, Yugoslavian the Court found that claimants denied Oregon inheritance per- under law were entitled to inherit property pursuant Treaty Friendship, sonal to an 1881 Navigation, and Commerce between the United States and Serbia. See also Clark Allen, U. 507-511, S. 517- (1947) (finding right property that the to inherit real granted Treaty Friendship, aliens German under the Com- Rights Germany prevailed merce and Consular over law). Contrary suggestion, California to the dissent’s see post, approach require neither our nor our cases treaty provide many a self-execution so talismanic opinion. words; that is a caricature the Court’s Our cases simply require treaty’s courts to decide re- terms whether negotiated flect determination the President who it and the Senate that confirmed it has domestic effect. Congress up implementing

In addition, to the task non-self-executing involving complex treaties, even those disputes. post, commercial J., Cf. at 560 (Breyer, dissent ing). judgments The of of a number international tribunals enjoy implementing legislation a different status of because 1650a(a) (“An by § Congress. g., enacted 22 See, e. C. U. S. pursuant chapter an award of to arbitral tribunal rendered [Convention of the on the Dis IV Settlement Investment putes] arising treaty right shall create a a of the under obligations pecuniary imposed United The States. such given an full award shall be enforced and shall be the same judgment of a faith and credit as if the award were a final States”); general jurisdiction 9 court of of the several one (“The §§ 201-208 Recogni- [U. N.] U. S. C. on the Convention 522 Foreign Awards of June Arbitral Enforcement of

tion and in accord- courts be enforced United States 10,1958, shall §201). language chapter,” demon- Such ance this Congress effect to accord domestic knows how strates that obligations such a result.12 when it desires to international though giving argument as frames his Further, Medellin simply binding judgment courts in domestic the Avena effect generally proposition courts that domestic conforms to judgments. give foreign not ask But Medellin does effect to settling typical judgment foreign-court com- a us to a enforce Guyot, g., property dispute. 159 Hilton v. See, e. mercial or (1895); Arredondo, 6 Pet. S. States v. U. (1832); United Recogni- Foreign Money-Judgments see also Uniform (2002) (“ ‘[FJoreign §1(2), pt. p. 44 A., 2, L. tion Act U. granting foreign judgment’ any judgment state means money”). denying recovery Rather, Medellin or of a sum of enjoining argues judgment has the effect of that the Avena operation more, is on Medellin’s of state law. What judgment to take action view, force the State would general reconside[r]” how- rule, his case. “review and awarding injunctive judgments foreign courts ever, is sovereign private parties, States, alone let relief, even as generally 1 Restate- to enforcement.” See “are not entitled § b, ment Comment in- creates an Avena sum, while the ICJ’s part obligation States, law on the

ternational binding law federal its force constitute it does not of own non-self rarely That had occasion find this Court has (Breyer, J., post, at 545 dissent surprising. all See exeeuting is not See, with, regularly done so. Appeals have ing). begin To the Courts (CA2 2007) (holding that Gonzales, g., e. Pierre v. F. 3d 119-120 Cruel, Inhu Against and Other Torture the United Nations Convention non-self-executing); Singh or is Degrading man or Treatment Punishment Johnson, (CA6 2005) (same); Beazley v. Ashcroft, 398 F. 3d 396, 404, n. 3 (CA5 2001) Covenant (holding that the International 242 F. 3d Further, noted, non-self-executing). Rights Civil on and Political for treaties legislation Congress pass implementing has not hesitated require legislation. its view such pre-empts filing state on restrictions the of successive petitions. habeas As we Sanchez-Llamas, noted in a con- trary given extraordinary, conclusion would be that basic rights guaranteed by our own Constitution do not have the displacing procedural effect of S., state rules. See 548 U. Nothing background, negotiating at 360. in text, drafting history, practice among sug- signatory or nations gests improbable that the President or Senate intended the giving judgments of result anof international tribunal a higher enjoyed by “many status than that of our most funda- protections.” mental constitutional Ibid.

III argues judgment next Medellin that the in ICJ’s Avena binding on state courts virtue of the President’s February 28, 2005 The Memorandum. con- judgment tends that while the Avena not of does its own require ordinary force domestic courts to set aside rules procedural judgment default, that became law the land precisely pursuant that effect to the President’s Memo- power binding randum and his “to establish rules decision preempt contrary state law.” Brief for United States Accordingly, as Amicus Curiae we must decide whether the President’s declaration our alters conclusion that the judgment binding Avena is not a rule of domestic law state and federal courts.13

A The United States maintains that the President’s constitu- “uniquely qualifies” tional role him to the sensitive resolve issue, The deciding dissent refrains from but finds it “difficult powers pursuant believe that II to a ratified in the exercise of his Article treaty, setting President can never take action that would result Post, questions here agree. aside state law.” at 564. are We unilaterally far more limited he create federal law may ones whether pursuant by giving tribunal effect this international not, rely and, may he on other non-self-executing treaty, this if whether authority partic this support the Constitution to the action taken under only questions ular case. Those are we decide.

524 compliance an J foreign policy with IC that bear on decisions expeditiously.” for United Brief and “to do so decision question these 11, 12. We do as Amicus Curiae States City g., propositions. Bank v. Banco e. Nat. See, First (1972) (plurality opin Cuba, 759, S. Nacional de 406U. ion) (The foreign policy”); in role has “the lead ... President Garamendi, 539 U. S. American Ins. Assn. v. (Article places the President II of the Constitution “ foreign responsibility of our conduct ‘vast share of ” Sawyer, (quoting Youngstown Tube Sheet & Co.

relations’ (1952)(Frankfurter, concurring))). J., 610-611 U. S. seeks vindicate United case, In this the President ensuring reciprocal the Vienna observance of in interests foreign governments, protecting relations with Convention, demonstrating of international to the role commitment compelling. plainly law. These interests are to set aside do not allow us however, Such considerations, authority to as with principles. act, The President’s first power, any governmental either “must stem the exercise of Congress itself.” or from the Constitution from an act of Regan, Youngstown, supra, & Moore v. 585; at Dames (1981). S. U. tripartite provides familiar scheme

Justice Jackson’s evaluating accepted in this action executive framework for “[wjhen pursuant to an ex- acts First, area. the President authority Congress, implied is press his or authorization possesses in his he all that maximum, at its for it includes Youngs- delegate.” Congress right plus can all that own (concurring opinion). Second, S., at 635 town, 343 U. congres- “[w]hen of either acts absence President only rely upon authority, his grant he can or denial of sional twilight independent powers, is zone of but there own authority, may Congress or have concurrent which he and In this Id., is uncertain.” in which its distribution support authority from can derive circumstance, Presidential quiescence.” Ibid. “congressional or indifference inertia, “[wjhen Finally, incompatible the President takes measures expressed implied Congress, power with the or will of his “only at its lowest ebb,” and the can Court sustain his actions by disabling Congress acting upon subject.” from Id., at 637-638.

B principal arguments The United States marshals two authority binding favor of the President’s “to establish rules preempt contrary of decision that state law.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5. The Solicitor General argues give first that the relevant treaties the the President authority implement to the Avena and that Con- gress acquiesced authority. has in the exercise of such The upon “independent” United States also relies an interna- dispute-resolution power wholly apart tional from as- the authority pertinent serted based on the treaties. Medellin argument adds the additional that the President’s Memoran- power dum is a valid exercise of his to take care that the faithfully laws be- executed.

The United States maintains that the President’s Memo- by Optional randum is authorized the Protocol and the N.U. Brief Charter. for 9. United States as Amicus Curiae obligation That is, because the “create relevant treaties an comply they “implicitly give to Avena,” the President authority implement treaty-based obligation.” Id., to that added). (emphasis at 11 result, As a the President’s Memo- grounded category Youngs- randum is well the in the first town framework. disagree. array political

We The President has an diplomatic obliga- international means available to enforce treaty non-self-executing unilaterally converting tions, but a responsi- self-executing among into a one them. The is not arising bility transforming obligation for an international treaty non-self-executing to a into domestic law falls from Whitney, Congress. 194; S., 124 U. at Foster, Pet., 315; at has Igartúa-De at As this Court Rosa, 3d, 417 F. La self-executing treaty stipulations explained, are “not when carry pursuant legislation they only to be can enforced Whitney, supra, Moreover, at 194. them into effect.” liberty passed, is “[u]ntil the Court shall be such act subject.” Foster, disregard existing on the the laws supra, at 315. Congress, President, requirement rather than treaty non-self-executing the text

implement from a derives power treaty-making Constitution, which divides The Constitution the President and the Senate. between treaty. authority to “make” the President with vests treaty § 2. If the Executive determines II, Art. own that determina force, have effect of its should domestic by treaty, “mak[ing]” may implemented ensur tion be language ing plainly providing domestic it contains self-executing treaty enforceability. in this If the be requi respect, must consent Senate constitu with all other vote, ibid., consistent site two-thirds tional restraints. clearly provisions treaty accord- a is ratified without

Once treaty ing the will ever however, it whether effect, domestic by governed constitu- have such effect the fundamental necessary power principle “‘[t]he to make the tional ” Congress; power in the President.’ laws is in execute (2006) (quot- 557, 548 U. S. Hamdan Rumsfeld, (1866) (opinion ing Milligan, parte 4 Wall. Ex (“All § legislative J.)); I, 1 Chase, Const., see U. S. Art. C. Congress granted be vested a Powers herein shall States”). already of a non-self- noted, the terms As only treaty executing in the same law can become domestic legislation by through way any passage both other law— Congress, the President’s either combined with Houses of signature congressional veto. of a Presidential or override power § to see that Indeed, “the President’s I,Art. 7. See faithfully the laws are executed refutes the idea that he is to Youngstown, be a lawmaker.” 343 U. atS., A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was understanding ratified with the that it is not to have domes- tic effect of its own understanding precludes force. That Congress implicitly assertion that has authorized the Pres- acting on precisely his own—to achieve the same ident— result. given

We therefore conclude, the absence of con- gressional legislation, non-self-executing treaties at issue “express[ly] here implied[ly]” did not or vest the President with authority the unilateral to make them self- executing. (Jackson, id., concurring). See at 635 J., Ac- cordingly, the President’s Memorandum does not fall within category Youngstown first of the framework. preceding

Indeed, the discussion should make clear that non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only ratifying parties refutes the notion that the vested the authority President unilaterally with the treaty make obli- gations binding implicitly pro- on domestic courts, but also doing hibits him from so. When the President asserts the power to non-self-executing treaty by “enforce” a unilater- ally creating domestic he law, acts in conflict with the im- plicit understanding ratifying Senate. His assertion authority, pertinent insofar as it is based on the non-self- executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the first or even the id., second. See 637-638.

Each giving of the two means described above for do- treaty obligation mestic effect to an international under the making requires joint by Constitution—for action law— Legislative ratify Executive Branches: The can Senate self-executing “ma[de]” Executive, if the or, self-executing, Congress ratified is not can enact im- plementing legislation approved by the President. It should surprising contemplate not be that our not Constitution does vesting power such in the Executive alone. As Madison ex- constitutional our plained No. under in The Federalist magistrate “[t]he in whom system balances, of checks and make a himself power resides cannot the whole executive (1961). however, p. would, That ed., Cooke law.” J. authority description apt asserted executive an seem obligations unilaterally give law effect of domestic treaty. non-self-executing under a the Presi- maintains nonetheless The United States given law as domestic effect should be dent’s Memorandum in the action Presidential a valid “this case involves because 'acquiescence.’” Congressional Brief for United context Youngstown 11, n. 2. Under as Amicus Curiae perti- acquiescence congressional tripartite framework, cate- the second falls within action nent when the President’s gory a con- of either he “acts in absence is, when —that authority.” grant S., at 637 gressional 343 U. or denial (Jackson, concurring). have ex- however, as we Here, J., effect to plained, to accord domestic effort the President’s prerequisite. meet that not the Avena does congres- any persuaded that if we were event, In even support acquiescence President’s asserted sional could pursuant authority non-self- to a domestic law to create treaty, acquiescence here. executing not exist does such acquiescence congressional first locates United States following resolution Congress’s President’s to act failure ac- prior of the Executive’s A review controversies. ICJ support claim prior cannot cases, however, tions in those particular acquiesced of Presi- Congress exercise in this remotely authority, trans- involved for none of them dential obligation law and forming into domestic an international thereby displacing state law.14 Paramilitary Activi Military and Concerning in the Case Rather, S.), (Nicar. (Judgment v. U. I. C. J. 14 Nicaragua Against

ties in and States would the United 27), determined the President of June reparations States owed that the United the ICJ’s conclusion comply with Maritime Concerning Delimitation the Case Nicaragua. The United States us the President’s “re also directs to lated” statutory and to role” responsibilities his “established in as for the foreign concerns Presi litigating policy support decision in Avena dent’s asserted to the authority ICJ’s give the force of domestic United States as Ami Brief for law. cus Curiae 16-19. has indeed authorized the Congress President the States before the United represent United Nations, ICJ, the § 287, the 22 U. S. C. Security Council, but the of the the authority President United represent (Can. Boundary S.), in the Maine Area U. (Judg v. C. J. 19841. Gulf of 12), ment of a agency Atmospheric Oct. federal National Oceanic and —the complied Administration —issued a final the ICJ’s bound rule which Concerning ary Rights Case Nationals the The determination. of (Fr. S.), United America in v. U. Morocco (Judg 1952 I. C. J. 176 27), ment of Aug. legal concerned status of the United States citizens liv ing Morocco; it was not in United enforced States courts. The final two cases the In arose under Vienna Convention. the (F. S.), R.

LaGrand Case G. v. U. 27), 1. C. J. (Judgment June the ICJ ordered the review and reconsideration of convictions and sen- tences of response, German nationals In denied consular notification. the Department State sent “encouraging” letters to the States them to con- sider the clemency process. Vienna Convention in for Brief United Amicus Curiae 20-21. States as encouragement give not Such did ICJ law; thus, prece- direct effect as serve as domestic it cannot dent doing might acquiesced. for Congress so which be In said to have Concerning Case Convention on Relations Vienna Consular S.), {Para. U. (Judgment Apr. 9), 1998 I. C. J. ICJ issued a provisional order, directing the measures at its “take all States to disposal final pending ensure is not executed decision [Breard] (internal Breard, S., quotation [the proceedings.” 523 U. at 374 ICJ’s] added). omitted; emphasis Secretary response, marks State sent stay letter to Virginia requesting the Governor of that he Breard’s exe- Id., cution. sought stay at 378. When from this Paraguay of execution Court, argued every the United States it had measure at its taken disposal: system imposes govern- “our federal because federal limits on the States,” justice ability systems ment’s to interfere with the criminal compulsion.” Brief “only persuasion,” “legal those included not measures Curiae, (A-732), p. United States Amicus O. T. No. 97-8214 by the precedent proposition asserted contrary This of course is Solicitor in this General case. speaks interna- to the President’s

States before such bodies authority any responsibilities, to create unilateral tional authority expressly Con- conferred domestic law. gress “invite” said to realm cannot be in the international Youngstown, at issue here. See Presidential action (Jackson, concurring). supra, none of bottom, At J, at 637 sup- by authority the United identified sources acquiesced Congress ports has President’s claim that power or law to his to on his own federal asserted establish state law. override say, of a however, to that the combination

None of this is legis- implementing non-self-executing treaty and the lack of acting comply precludes with an from to lation President say treaty only obligation. that the is It international non-self-executing unilaterally execute a Executive cannot by giving treaty the non-self- is, it effect. That domestic treaty executing President’s constrains the character of a unilaterally comply treaty ability commitments with making treaty binding The Presi- on courts. domestic obligations by comply treaty’s may some other dent with the long they with the Constitution. so are consistent means, rely non-self-executing may upon to “es- But not a he contrary preempt binding state rules tablish of decision Brief for as Amicus Curiae law.” United States 2 independ- claim thus turn the United States’ We that — treaty obligations ent Memoran- of the United States’ —the foreign affairs au- dum a valid of the President’s is exercise foreign thority disputes Id., nations. resolve claims cases in relies on a series of at 12-16. United States authority upheld President which has this Court agreement. foreign pursuant to an executive to settle claims S., 453 U. Moore, Garamendi, 415; at Dames & S., See U. (1942); Pink, U. S. 679-680; United States (1937). Belmont, States v. U. S. 324, 330 these explained pervasive enough, cases this Court has if that, a history congressional acquiescence can be treated as “gloss §by on ‘Executive Power’ in the vested President (some supra, of Art. Moore, II.” Dames & at 686 internal omitted). quotation marks argument

This of a different than nature the one re- jected relying above. Rather than on the United States’ treaty obligations, independent the President on an relies authority ordering put proce- source of Texas to aside its petitions. dural bar to successive habeas Nevertheless, we support find that our claims-settlement cases do the au- thority that . the President asserts this case.

The claims-settlement cases involve narrow set of cir- making agreements cumstances: the of executive to settle foreign govern- civil claims between American citizens foreign g., ments supra, or See, nationals. e. Belmont, at They systematic, are based on the view that “a un- practice, long pursued knowledge broken, executive to the Congress questioned,” and never before can “raise presumption pursu- [action] [taken] a that had been (inter- supra, ance of its Dames Moore, consent.” & at 686 omitted). quotation explained nal marks As this Court Garamendi:

“Making agreements executive to settle claims of Amer- against foreign governments particu- ican nationals is a larly longstanding practice Given the that .... fact practice goes years, back over 200 and has received congressional acquiescence history, throughout its foreign conclusion that President’s control rela- indisputable.” tions is includes the settlement claims (internal quotation marks and brack- S., U. at 415 omitted). ets power still,

Even the limitations on this source executive clearly been careful to note are set forth and the Court has power.” by practice “[p]ast create not, itself, does supra, Moore, Dames at 686. & supported “par- is not The President’s Memorandum congressional acquies- practice” ticularly longstanding supra, but rather what Garamendi, 415, cence, see “unprecedented action,” has described as United States itself in Sanchez- Amicus Curiae Brief for United States as pp. In- 04-10566, and 29-30. T. Nos. 05-51 Llamas, O. single instance has not identified deed, Government (or acqui- attempted Congress has has which the President in) much courts, to state esced a Presidential directive issued police deep the heart of the State’s that reaches into less one reopen compels criminal powers final state courts to and neutrally applicable judgments laws. state aside set (“States U. Abrahamson, Brecht v. 507 S. Cf. defining enforcing authority possess primary Engle (quoting Isaac, U. S. criminal law” omitted)). (1982); quotation Executive’s The internal marks strictly authority international to settle narrow and limited agreement disputes pursuant can- an executive claims support Presidential so as to the current not stretch far Memorandum. argues ais Memorandum

Medellin the President’s power. “[T]ake for Peti- Brief valid exercise of his Care” rely upon States, however, does tioner 28. responsibility the Laws to “take Care President’s § faithfully We think II, Art. 3. Const., be executed.” U. S. authority the President this a concession. This allows wise we For the reasons not make them. laws, execute judgment law; is not domestic accord- stated, have the Avena powers ingly, rely on his Take Care the President cannot here. Appeals is Criminal

The of the Texas Court of affirmed. is so ordered.

It Justice in Stevens, concurring judgment. great Breyer’s

There is a deal wisdom in Justice dis- agree history Supremacy sent. I that the text and of the treaty-related Clause, as well as cases, this Court’s do not support presumption against post, self-execution. See proposition I 541-546. also endorse the that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, ^[1970] self-executing U. 77, S. T. T. I. A. S. No. itself “is judicially Post, Moreover, enforceable.” at 555. I think presents question opinion this case a closer than the Court’s persuaded allows. In the end, however, I am rele- judg- vant treaties do not authorize this Court enforce (ICJ) ment of the International Court of in Case Justice Con- (Mex. cerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 31) (Avena). S.), (Judgment U 2004 I. C. J. 12 of Mar. obligation comply source the United States’ 94(1) judgments of the is found in Article ICJ of the United 94(1) Charter, Nations which was Article ratified provides “[e]ach of the United Member Nations under- comply any [ICJ] takes to with the decision the case party.” (emphasis which it is a 59 Stat. T. S. No. 993 added). my comply”— view, the words “undertakes to self-executing while not the model of either a or a non- self-executing naturally commitment—are most read as a promise steps judgments. to take additional to enforce ICJ

Unlike of the treaties, the text of some other the terms necessarily incorporate do not inter Nations Charter judgments g., Cf., into domestic law. e. United Na national Sea, VI, tions on Law of Annex Art. Convention Treaty 103-39, 1833 Dec. N. T. S. 570 10,1982, S. Doc. No. U. (“[Decisions Disputes] [Seabed be en of the Chamber shall of the Parties in the same forceable in territories highest judgments manner court or orders sought”). Party territory State whose the enforcement is Congress passed implementing legislation to Moreover, has judgments, ensure of other international the enforcement treaty provisions more man- operative use far even when the comply.”1 datory language to than “undertakes 94(1) the kind not contain hand Article does On the other foreclosing is unambiguous language that self-execution obligation to undertake com- to The found in other treaties. ply with self-execution is more consistent with ICJ decisions legislation. obligation example, Cf., to enact an for than, g., I, Convention, Art. e. International Plant Protection Dec. 6, 1951, ^[1972] 23 U. S. T. 2770, T. I. A. S. No. 7465 (“[T]he leg- adopt the contracting to undertake Governments specified in measures administrative islative, technical and Convention”). has the Senate Furthermore, this whereas ratifying when issued declarations of non-self-execution respect the United to it did not do so with treaties, some Nations Charter.2 presumption way read- other, the best a one or the

Absent comply” my judgment, ing inis, of the words “undertakes by political contemplates branches. one that future action unlikely agree “Congress au- I with the that dissenters judg- judicial enforceability of all ICJ thorize automatic judg- politically sensitive could include some ments, tween States § 6, (“Each See, Art. Contracting e. 54(1), g., Convention and Nationals Mar. State 18, 1965, on the Settlement shall of Other States ^[1966] recognize 17 U.S.T. an award (ICSID Convention), of Investment rendered T. I. A. S. No. 6090 Disputes be pursuant ch. IV, imposed pecuniary obligations binding this and enforce the Convention judgment it a final by its as if were that award within territories (“An State”); § of an arbitral tribunal S. C. award court in U. 1650a create a chapter Convention] shall pursuant [ICSID IV the rendered pecuniary obliga right arising of the United States. under given the and shall be tions an award shall be enforced imposed such of a final court if were a same full faith credit as the award States”). jurisdiction of general one several Understandings, Inter Reservations, Declarations and Cf., g., U. S. e. Cong. Rec. 8071 Rights, 138 Civil Political national Covenant on through (“[T]he of Articles provisions United States declares self-executing”). are 27 of Covenant by ments and others better suited for enforcement other branches.” Post, at But 560. this concern counsels in favor 94(1) reading any ambiguity leaving in Article as comply judgments, choice of whether to with in ICJ political, judicial what department.” manner, “to the not the (1829).3 Foster Neilson, 2 253, Pet. treaty provisions

The additional cited the dissent do suggest not In otherwise. an annex to the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) states that a decision of the ICJ “has no bind- ing except parties respect force between the and in of that particular 59, case.” Art. I Stat. 1062. Because read provision confining, expanding, the effect of ICJ judgments, undertaking comply it does not make the with judgments any such more enforceable than the terms Arti- 94(1) judgment “binding” cle That itself. aas matter says nothing legal of international law about its domestic my opinion “compulsory effect. inNor does the reference to jurisdiction” Optional Concerning in the Protocol the Com- pulsory Disputes Settlement of to the Vienna Convention, Art. I, Apr. ^[1970] U. S. T. T. I. A. S. any light provision No. 6820, shed on the matter. This merely signatory spe- secures the consent of nations to the jurisdiction respect arising cific with the ICJ to claims out 36(1), of the Statute, Vienna Convention. Art. See ICJ (“The jurisdiction comprises Stat. 1060 all Court ... specially provided matters for in treaties and conventions ... force”). sug Congress’ implementation options are broader than the dissent gests. judgment by judgment, enforcing all legislating addition to lines,” post, judgments indiscriminately, devising “legislative bright 560, Congress could, example, judgments make ICJ enforceable political branches an upon expiration waiting period gives of a Cf., g., 120-day § e. opportunity (imposing C. 1823 to intervene. 16 U. S. effect). fishery agreements take waiting period before international judgment “the su- though Avena is not Even ICJ’s 2, no one preme VI, Art. cl. Const., Land,” Law of the U. S. obligation on law disputes it an international constitutes issuing By part ante, at States, of the United give declaring effect should that state courts memorandum made a commend- the President Avena, discharge attempt the Nation’s able to induce majority judges agree obligation. and the the Texas I is not bind- memorandum that the President’s of this Court leg- ing cannot the President Nonetheless, the fact that law. from unilaterally the United States does not absolve islate necessary comply with the promise to take action its to judgment. ICJ’s Supremacy the express Clause, the the terms of

Under comply” “undertak[e] obligation with the to to United States’ Fed- as well as the of the decision falls on each States ICJ’s govern- consequence form of of our eral One Government. primary the must shoulder ment is that sometimes States integrity protecting of the responsibility the honor and for greater duty respect the since is all Texas’ this Nation. by failing provide consular notice to it was Texas that — the with the Vienna Convention—ensnared accordance already Having controversy. in the current United States treaty, up Texas put now to one it is the breach of Nation prevent the of another. to breach merely obligates the United in Avena decision choosing, by and recon- provide, review means of its own “to [affected] of the sentences of the convictions and sideration 153(9), ¶ a view “with at nationals,” J., 2004 I. C. Mexican proper provide notice ascertaining” the failure to whether prejudice the defendant actual officials“caused to consular justice,” id., at process of criminal in the administration complying Avena ¶ The cost to Texas would 60, 121. the given particularly likelihood the remote minimal, be actually prejudiced José of the Vienna Convention violation ante, Ernesto 500-502, Medellin. See at n. 1. It is cost that the State Oklahoma unhesitatingly assumed.4

On the hand, other the costs of the refusing respect ICJ’s judgment are The entire significant. Court and President that breach agree will jeopardize States-’ interests in “plainly compelling” “ensuring recip- rocal observance of the Vienna Convention, rela- protecting tions with foreign commit- governments, demonstrating Ante, ment to the role of international law.” at 524. When the honor of the Nation is balanced modest cost against of compliance, Texas would do well to that more is recognize at stake than judgments ICJ, whether and the princi- admonitions pled States, President of the United state trump rules in procedural the absence of implement- ing legislation.

The Court’s which I does foreclose fur- judgment, join, ther action appropriate State of Texas.

4 Avena, expressed “great the ICJ concern” that Oklahoma set had date of execution for one of the Mexican nationals involved in judgment, Torres, May 18, J., Osbaldo 2004. 2004 I. C. ¶ Avena, Responding stayed Appeals the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Torres’ hearing execution and an evidentiary ordered on whether Torres been prejudiced by had the lack of consular notification. See Torres State, (May 13,2004), day, No. PCD-04-442 43 I. L. 1227. On M. the same the Governor of Oklahoma commuted Torres’ sentence to life death with (1) the possibility out parole, stressing signed of that the United States (2) Convention, the Vienna “important protecting in is (3) rights abroad,” of American rights citizens the ICJ ruled that Torres’ (4) violated, had been Department urged and the U. S. State his office to give careful treaty obligations. consideration to the See United States’ of Henry, Henry Office Governor Gov. Brad Press Release: Grants Clem ency 13,2004), to Death (May http://www.ok. Row Inmate Torres online at (as gov/governor/display_article.php?artiele_id=301&artiele_type=l vis file). 20, 2008, Mar. in ited and available Clerk of case After Court’s evidentiary Appeals hearing, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal held that prejudice respect guilt phase had of Torres failed to to the establish with trial, sentencing phase had any prejudice respect his and that with State, been mooted v. 120 P. 3d 1184 the commutation order. Torres (2005). 538

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and Jus- Ginsburg tice join, dissenting.

The Constitution’s Clause Supremacy that “all provides Treaties .. . which shall be made ... under the Authority States, United shall be the Law of supreme the Land; and the Judges every State shall be bound thereby.” Art. VI, cl. 2. The Clause means that the “courts” must “a regard treaty... to an act equivalent of the legislature, whenever it operates itself without the aid of any legisla- tive provision.” Foster Neilson, 253, Pet. (majority J.). opinion Marshall, C.

In the Avena case the (ICJ) International Court of Justice and (interpreting the Vienna applying Convention on Con- Relations) sular issued a judgment requires to reexamine certain criminal in the proceedings Concerning cases of 51 Mexican nationals. Case Avena and (Mex. S.), Other Mexican Nationals v. U I. C. J. (Avena). 31) (Judgment Mar. The question here is the ICJ’s Avena whether enforceable now as a e., i. whether matter of domestic law, it of itself “operates without the aid” of further any legislation.

The United States has signed ratified a series of trea- ties it to obliging comply ICJ judgments cases in which it has its given consent to the exercise of the ICJ’s adjudicatory authority. Specifically, United States has agreed submit, in this kind of to the case, ICJ’s “compul- sory jurisdiction” for purposes settlement.” “compulsory Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Protocol (Optional or Protocol), I, Art. 24, Apr. ^[1970] 21 U. S. T. T. I. A. S. No. (capitalization altered). And it agreed ICJ’s would judgments have force . . . “binding between the parties respect of [a] particular case.” Charter, United Nations Art. Stat. 1062, (1945). T. S. No. 993 President Bush has deter- mined that domestic courts should enforce this particular ICJ judgment. Memorandum- for the Attorney General

(Feb. (hereinafter 28, 2005),App. to Pet. for Cert. 187a Presi Memorandum). Congress nothing dent’s And has done suggest contrary. Under circumstances, these I believe treaty obligations, judgment, resting and hence the upon it does the consent of the States to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, bind the courts no less than would “an act of the legislature.” [federal] supra, Foster,

I keep To understand the issue before us, the reader must separate in mind three ratified United States treaties and judgment against one ICJ the United States. The first treaty, the provi Vienna Convention, two contains relevant requires sions. The signa first the United States and other tory foreign sep nations to inform arrested nationals of their Convention-given right arate their contact nation’s consul. (of says rights person) The second that these an arrested conformity regula “shall be exercised in laws and arresting provided tions” of the nation, that the “laws and regulations given purposes ... enable to be to the full effect “rights which” those ... are intended.” See Vienna Con for 36(l)(b), 36(2), Apr. vention on Consular Relations, Arts. ^[1970] U. S. T. 100-101 (emphasis added). treaty, Optional The second Protocol, concerns the “compulsory disputes. settlement” Vienna Convention provides parties S. at T., U. 326. It that elect to arising “[disputes subscribe to the out Protocol, of the inter- pretation application [Vienna] or Convention” shall be “compulsory jurisdiction submitted to the of the Interna- any It tional Court of ibid. authorizes I, Justice.” Art. party (by signing jurisdiction that has consented to the ICJ’s Protocol) Optional bring party such before another that Court. Ibid. treaty, says Charter, third United Nations

every signatory comply with the deci- nation “undertakes to any sion of the International Court of case to Justice 94(1), party.” In an 1051. annex a Art. 59 Stat. which it is International Court of Jus- the the Charter, to Statute (ICJ Statute) “binding judgment has tice that an ICJ states respect particular parties force the ... between id., at 1063 at 1062. also Art. 59, id., case.” Art. (ICJ See appeal”). “judgment is final and without judgment judgment Avena, a The is at issue the ICJ’s brought against on behalf the United States case that Mexico crimi- in different States on different of 52 nationals arrested charges. at claimed that state J., nal 39. Mexico I. C. notify had failed to the within the United authorities States rights persons and, Vienna arrested of their Convention give procedural applying did not law in a manner which state rights, deprived had full the effect to Vienna Convention judgment appropriate remedy. them Ibid. The ICJ of an “by requires reexamine the States in Avena United choosing” aspects the relevant means of its own certain proceedings of of these individual Mexican state criminal (internal quotation ¶ marks omit- Id., at nationals. ted). be that this should The President has determined done. President’s Memorandum. See Supremacy question

The here is whether critical requires enforce, this ICJ e., to follow, Clause Texas to i. says nega- judgment. its And it reaches Court “no.” labyrinth provi- by interpreting tive answer creating legal obligation that binds sions as pur- Supremacy internationally, Clause but for which, automatically poses, as domestic law. enforceable simply majority’s Optional sends Protocol view, says dispute will the ICJ to the the ICJ Statute ICJ; judgment; con- subsequently the N. Charter U. reach a comply’” “‘undertak[e] promise tains more than a no promise, ma- judgment. Ante, at Such a with that 500. (in jority says, Chief Jus- matter does not as domestic-law words) “operat[e] the aid of of itself without tice Marshall’s supra, any legislative provision.” Rather, Foster, (and presumably any here other ICJ rendered pursuant any approximately treaties in U. S. submitting treaty- provisions force that contain similar for disputes parties) based to the that bind the ICJ decisions Congress specific legislation judg- must enact before ICJ pursuant compulsory ments entered our consent to ICJ jurisdiction can Brief for Inter- become domestic law. See Experts (“Ap- national Court of Justice as Amici Curiae 18 proximately obligations in force contain U. S. treaties now comparable Optional to those the Protocol for submission treaty-based ICJ”); disputes of id., to the see also at n. 25. my correctly

In the that view, President has determined Congress legislation. major- need not enact The additional ity places says weight upon treaty language too much that “ ‘undertake] little about the matter. The words to com- ” ply/ example, judgment for an do tell us whether ICJ compulsory pursuant parties’ rendered to the consent to ICJ jurisdiction automatically part does, not, or become does question our domestic To answer that we must look law. many particular, instead tó our own to the law, domestic treaty-related interpreting Supremacy the Clause. cases including by written well aware cases, Those some Justices original to the conclusion that intent, the Founders’ lead a matter of the before us is enforceable as ICJ legislation. domestic law without further

A stretching Supreme more than 200 back Court case law present purposes, years helps explain Founders the what, for they be the . shall meant that “all Treaties . . when wrote supreme VI, the Art. cl. Law of Land.” Hylton, example, the the case Ware Court decided sought payment Ameri of an A Dall. 199. British creditor argued Revolutionary that he The debtor debt. can’s War complying Virginia repaid with the debt law, had, under Revolutionary during that War the enacted a state statute money repay British creditors required owed to debtors (opinion Chase, Virginia Id., at 220-221 state fund. into a J.). state- that this claimed creditor, however, The provision of repayment not count because did sanctioned Treaty Britain and between the 1783Paris Peace should meet either side that “‘the creditors of States said recovery impediment the full with no lawful theretofore contracted’ debts, all bona value ... of fide effectively argued, provision, nullified the creditor Summary). (Reporter’s The Id., at 203-204 state law. agreed writing separately, each Justice Court, with Virginia and found invalid, held the statute creditor, British American liable for debt. remained debtor Id., at 285. Congress key had not fact relevant here is treaty provision enforcing specific

enacted a statute provision had to decide whether issue. Hence the Court terms) (to “self-executing.” present put the matter was Ratifying Con- Carolina’s Iredell, Justice member North setting specifically, forth matter the vention, addressed explain Story the later relied to views on which Justice Supremacy drafting 3 J. the Clause. Founders’ reasons for Story, the United on Constitution Commentaries (hereinafter Vázquez, Story). See States 696-697 Self-Executing 89 Am. Treaties, J. Doctrines of Four (1995)(hereinafter (describing Vázquez) Int’l 697-700 L. Clause). Supremacy history purpose also See Scholarship, Original Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Understanding, “Supreme Land,” Law of the Treaties as (1999) (contending the Founders that Colum. L. Rev. self- Supremacy ratified treaties to make Clause crafted executing). and the Constitution: Yoo, But see Globalism Original Understand- Non-Self-Execution, and Treaties, (1999). ing, L. Rev. 1955 99 Colum. treaty provisions, pointed that some out

Justice Iredell independ declaring example, an States United those, for acknowledging right navigate ent or Nation its the Missis sippi taking automatically River, were “executed,” effect upon provisions Dall., ratification. 3 at 272. Other were “executory,” they in the sense were “to be carried into by signatory execution” each “in nation the manner which prescribes.” the Constitution of nation Ibid. Before adoption provisions of the U. S. all such Constitution, would only have Congress taken effect as domestic law on the if side, American or Parliament on the British side, had written them into Id., domestic law. at 274-277. adoption,

But, adds, Justice Iredell the Constitution’s after parliamentary necessary while further action remained (where “practice” parlia- Britain of the need for an “act of respect “any thing legislative ment” in of a nature” had constantly 275-276), legisla- “been observed,” id., at further respect treaty’s provision tive action in to the debt-collection longer necessary was no Id., the United States. at 276- Supremacy 277. The ratification of the Constitution with its treaty provisions Clause means that bind (and did) may in this instance also enter domestic law congressional automatically without further action and bind the States and courts as well. at Id.,

“Under this Constitution,” concluded, Justice Iredell “so treaty constitutionally binding, upon far principles as a obligation, by vigour authority moral it is also of its own to be executed in It fact. would not be the otherwise Su preme provided law in the Ibid.; new sense see for.” also § Story, (noting Supremacy 1833, that the Clause’s lan guage “obligation was crafted make the Clause’s more strongly judges” every “remov[e] felt the state and to pretense” by they “escape controlling [its] which from could (C. power”); p. 42, see also The Federalist Rossiter No. 1961) (J. Madison) (Supremacy ed. Clause “disembarrassed” problem presented by the the Convention of the Articles might be substan Confederation where “treaties States”). tially by regulations Justice Ire- frustrated of the re no longer that would of provisions dell gave examples the as those action, requiring such further legislative quire “‘future war-related those prisoners, forbidding release ” “ ” the and, course, spe ‘prosecutions,’ confiscations’ and at issue in the Ware itself. case cific debt-collection provision Dall., to the “self- later, returned the Court Some years Foster, Pet. Court exam- problem. execution” Florida Spain ceding in treaty ined a an provision “ of land said that States; ‘grants to the provision United “ ” ratified 24, 1818, ‘shall be January made’ before by Spain ” Id., at 310. Chief Justice to the grantee. confirmed’ mat- that, as a Court, general for the noted Marshall, writing a treaty a nation execute ter, might expect signatory one authority sovereign exercise of domestic a formal its through (e. g., Id., at 314. But an act legislature). through principle” Ibid. “a in the applies. United States different here, added). that, means Clause Supremacy (emphasis in Courts to be regarded is “the law of the land ... legislature” “op- to an act of of justice equivalent legislative provision” the aid of any erates of itself without by legisla- execution unless it specifically contemplates political, to the “addresses ture and thereby itself Ibid, judicial department.” added). The Court (emphasis was not self- the treaty question decided provision demon- be ratified” words “shall view, in its executing; action. legislative further strated that the foresaw provision Id., at 315. result its mind about however,

The Court, changed Foster four a less legislatively shown later, being after years Spanish- authentic oriented, tentative, equally but less v. Perche- See treaty. version of language man, (1833). 1840, instances And 88-89 7 Pet. of domes- became part automatically which treaty provisions “it to write for one Justice were common enough tic law of Con- “that an act assert would be bold proposition”

545 must be first gress in order to passed” effect give treaty law of the land.” Lessee Pollard’s Heirs as “a supreme v. Kibbe, 14 353, Pet. J., 388 (Baldwin, concurring). Pollard,

Since Foster this or Court has frequently held assumed that are particular treaty provisions self-executing, automatically the States binding without more. See Appen dix A, as 29 such (listing, examples, cases, including infra 12 concluding the treaty invalidates state or provision territorial law or as a policy Wu, also consequence). See Domains, (2007) (con Treaties’ 93 571, Va. L. Rev. 583-584 “enforcement cluding is the against and his primary most torically significant type enforcement in the States”). As far as I tell, can the Court has held supra, Foster, in two contrary cases: only which was later Septic reversed, and Cameron Tank Knoxville, Co. v. 227 U. (1913), S. 39 where actions specific congressional indicated that Congress further thought legislation necessary. See also Vázquez 716. The Court has found “self-executing” provisions multilateral treaties as well bilateral trea g., e. Trans Airlines, World Inc. v. Franklin Mint ties. See, Corp., Corp. 252 (1984); Bacardi America v. 466 243, U. S. Domenech, (1940). 311 150, 160, U. S. n. 9, 161 And the subject matter of such has varied from provisions widely, g., e. Rauscher, United States v. extradition, see, 119 S.U. see Wilden 407, 411-412 (1886), to criminal trial jurisdiction, Case, hus’s 11, 17-18 120 S. 1, (1887), see, U. to civil liability, g., Tseng, e. Al Airlines, El Israel Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan S.U. Bacardi, 155, 161-163 (1999), to trademark see infringement, supra, 160, 161, at and n. 9, to an alien’s freedom to engage g., Tashiro, e. Jordan v. see, trade, 123, 126, 278 U. S. n. see Nielsen v. John (1928), immunity taxation, from state son, Perche 47, 50, 279 U. S. to land (1929), ownership, supra, g., man, e. Kolovrat 88-89, see, and to inheritance, Oregon, (1961). S. U. n. case, Of to the the Court has particular relevance present held that be United States may obligated by treaty comply inter an international tribunal with the any congressional treaty, preting despite the absence requiring compliance. specifically See Com such enactment (1828)(holding decision egys that Vasse, 193, 211-212 1 Pet. v. States-Spain pursuant a United of tribunal rendered obliged parties treaty, make sat “undertake to which treaty-based rights, final” was “conclusive isfaction” courts); see also Meade American and “not re-examinable” (1870)(holding that decision States, 9 691, 725 Wall. v. arising adjudicating under United States- claims of tribunal bar[red] treaty a recov Spain conclusive, final and “was court). upon ery in American the merits” self-executing treaty All of these cases make clear peculiar provisions our or creatures of are not uncommon subjects; they range law; that cover wide domestic ques- Supremacy itself answers self-execution Clause directly treaty provisions by applying many, all, tion but not the self-execution answers States; to the and that Clause differently many question other nations. than does the law provide supra, page. also this The cases at 541-545 and See automatically help provisions which criteria that determine apply which I now turn. so matter to —a

B magic ques- simple provides to the no answer The case law self-executing. treaty provision particular whether a tion today’s clear insofar that, But case law does make majority language in the “self-execution” for about looks it “clear statement” insofar as erects itself and designed help mis- presumptions it is answer, an find “clea[r] (expecting e.g., state- guided. ante, See, at 517 “may treaty obligation inter- parties’ [ment]” intent where (for treaty rules”); procedural ante, at 526 fere with state “ensur[e] drafting self-executing, Executive should to be plainly providing domestic language it that enforceability”). contains many treaty provisions that this Court has found self- (see executing language point Ap contain no textual on the pendix infra). any, provisions A, Few, if of these are clear. J.). g., (opinion See, Ware, Dall., e. at 273 of Iredell, Those displace respect quintessential state law to such state say, property, matters repayment, as, inheritance, or debt “clea[r]state[ment]” lack today apparently that the Court requires. Compare (majority expects ante, “clea[r] at 517 parties’ state[ment]” treaty obligation “may intent where rules”). procedural interfere with state This is also true of roughly those comparable cases that deal with state rules majority suggests require special sort that the accommo g., Hopkirk See, dation. e. Bell, Cranch 454, 457-458 (1806) (treaty Virginia pre-empts state statute of limita tions). (setting majority’s ante, Cf. at 517 forth reliance on apparently inapposite). many case law that is These Su preme finding provisions treaty Court cases be self- executing majority’s cannot be reconciled with the demand clarity. for textual majority point single

Indeed, the not does to a ratified treaty “clea[r]” United States “plai[n]” that contains of the kind or majority textual indication for which the searches. upon Ante, at 517,526. reliance one rati- Justice Stevens’ treaty point fied and one m-ratified to make the that a treaty speak clearly could self-execution, on the matter of (opinion concurring judg- ante, see at 533-534, and n. ment), suggest does that there are But a few such treaties. simply highlights actually speak how few of them do clearly on the matter. And that is not because the United hardly or never, ever, has entered into a any self-executing provisions. The law belies con- case such leg- Rather, clusion. it is because the whether further issue required treaty provision islative action before a takes signatory domestic matter effect nation is often a of regards legal provision’s how that nation’s domestic law status-determining differs status. And that domestic law markedly generally Hollis, from one nation to another. See Treaty Approach Practice, Comparative Law and (D. Treaty Hollis, 1, 9-50 Practice Law and National Hollis). (hereinafter 2005) Ederington & L. eds. Blakeslee, M. years ago, for ex- pointed Britain, As Iredell out Justice trea- taking makes ample, the British Crown the view that virtually always law, domestic Parliament makes ties but supra, at parliamentary legislation. Ware, requires See Kingdom, in Sinclair, Maciver, 274-277; Dickson, & supra, Treaty 727, 733, at Practice, Law and National (in (citing self-executing’” are not Britain, n. “‘treaties Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Queen State for (1993))). Rees-Mogg, [1994] parte B. 552 Q. ex Lord Affairs, The Establishment Torruella, also The Insular Cases: See Apartheid, Regime Int’l L. 29 U. Pa. J. Political (2007). its States, with hand, the United On the other e, g., See, Supremacy view. not take Britain’s Clause, does J.). supra, (opinion law And the Iredell, Ware, at 277 directly example, incor- nations, other Netherlands porates many into its the executive treaties concluded approval explicit parliamentary even without domestic law treaty. in National Netherlands, The Brouwer, See supra, Treaty Practice, 483-502. Law and correctly majority do ex- the treaties notes that self-executing. obligations plicitly are that the relevant state why among given would drafters nations, But the differences say, stating provision treaty language about, a write self-executing? How could property is inheritance, alien signatory agreement nation one when drafters achieve those Why follows another? and a second follows one tradition try sufficiently for drafters such a difference matter would example, prevent, Britain’s language for that would secure (per- following treaty law while further with a ratification apply insisting unnecessarily) haps that the legislation? treaty provision domestic further a without language specific about the absence of all, Above what does prove? may “self-execution” It reflect the drafters’ aware- may practical ness national differences. It reflect the fact favoring speedy, implementation, drafters, effective con- they practices legal clude should best leave national alone. may It achieving agree- reflect the fact that international point simply game ment on this is a not the worth candle. present purposes, In presence word, for or absence language treaty provision’s proves in a about a self-execution nothing hunting at all. At best Court is the snark. At legalistic it appli- worst erects hurdles that can threaten the provisions many existing cation commercial and other treaties negotiate and make it more difficult to new ones. (For examples, Appendix infra.) see B, suggests practical, context-specific

The case law also crite- previously ria that help this Court has used to determine Supremacy purposes, treaty provision whether, for Clause self-executing. provision’s is very text matters much. ante, Cf. at 514-516. But that not it lan- is because contains guage explicitly refers self-execution. For reasons I already explained, swpra, have Part I-B-l, one should not expect Drafting history that kind of textual statement. again, explic- also But, relevant. it that is because will itly question. history, address the relevant text and Instead along subject characteristics, matter and related will help our whether, courts determine Justice Mar- Chief put treaty provision it, shall political... “addresses itself judi-

department^]” action or to “the further department” cial Foster, Pet., for direct enforcement. J.) (“No (opinion 314; Ware, see also at 244 Dali, Chase, stipulate, may one can acts doubt that a that certain by Legislature; shall be be done that other acts shall by Judiciary”). done and others Executive; making this has found determination, this Court matter, provision’s subject particular importance. Does promise provision peace? treaty it Does declare political engage to the so, it addresses itself in hostilities? If J.). (opinion Al- Iredell, id., branches. See at 259-262 adjudication ternatively, of traditional it concern does property, legal rights private rights to con- to own such as recovery? so, If it tort business, a or to obtain civil duct Enforcing may judiciary. such to the well address itself setting rights is the bread-and-butter their boundaries g., Allen, v. 331 U. S. 503 e. See, work of courts. Clark (1947) subject (treating provision matter as self- with such (1924) (same). executing); 265 U. Seattle, S. Asakura v. treaty provision might confers also ask whether the One rights. specific, legal it set forth Does detailed individual readily judges Other can enforce? definite standards that readily being rights specific things equal, en- are where likely provision “addresses” the more forceable, the Airways judiciary. g., Olympic Husain, 540 U. S. v. See, e. (2004) liability); (specific for air-carrier civil conditions (French Geofroy Riggs, citizens’ inher- 133U. S. provi- supra, (treaty rights). Foster, at 314-315 itance Cf. stating and con- sion that landholders’ titles “shall be ratified action). legislative firmed” foresees require Alternatively, the courts enforcement would direct such enforcement to create a new cause of action? Would controversy? engender it con- create Would constitutional stitutionally other branches? conflict with the undesirable likely provision con- is not that the circumstances, it such g., judicial Asakura, e. templates See, direct enforcement. by any express provision supra, (although “not limited at 341 treaty-making power of Constitution,” what the Con- far to authorize States “does not extend ‘so ”). stitution forbids’ stretching questions, back from case law

Such drawn magic years, simple formula. let alone test, do not create context-specific practical, they help do to constitute a But judicial judicial approach, seeking separate run-of-the-mill matters from politically other matters, sometimes more charged, clearly responsibility sometimes more the of other lacking per- branches, sometimes those attributes that would mit courts to act on their own without more ado. And such approach an legal is all we that need to find an answer question now before us.

C Applying approach just I described, would find the rel- treaty provisions self-executing applied evant to the ICJ judgment (giving judgment legal before us that domestic ef- fect) following together. for the reasons, taken language strongly

First, the sup- of the relevant treaties ports judicial enforceability, judgments direct at least of Optional the kind at issue here. Protocol bears title “Compulsory Disputes,” thereby emphasizing Settlement of mandatory binding procedures nature of the it sets body says forth. 21 U. T., S. at 326. The of the Protocol specifically “any party” that that has consented to the ICJ’s “compulsory jurisdiction” may bring “dispute” a before the against any party. court such other I,Art. ibid. And the proceedings Protocol compulsory contrasts of the kind with procedure,” an alternative “conciliation the recommenda- party may “accep[t].” tions of which a decide “not” to Optional id., Ill, Art. Thus, Protocol’s basic ob- jective just provide is not forum settlement but to provide compulsory a forum for settlement. 94(1) accepting “[e]ach

Moreover, Charter, Article of the comply Member . . . undertakes to decision” any party.” ICJ “in case it to which is a 1051. And Stat. Charter) (part the ICJ clear Statute U. N. makes parties a decision of the ICJ between that have consented to compulsory “binding jurisdiction the ICJ’s has . .. be- force parties respect particular tween the case.” added). (emphasis id., Art. at 1062 Enforcement of a quintes- judgment “binding court’s that has force” involves judicial activity. sential explicitly states nor the

True, neither the Protocol Charter obligation comply automat- with an ICJ ically party law without as a matter domestic binds language legislation. But could the further domestic how treaties are multilat- those documents do otherwise? The of eral. signatories explained, follow And, as I have some principles, further-legislation-always-needed others British Supremacy principles, and still follow Clause treaty directly incorporate g., others, the can Netherlands, e. particular provisions circum- into their domestic law Why, given differences, national Hollis 9-50. stances. See seeking strong legal obligation as is drafters, would as requires practically language all attainable, use signatories adopt in this treatment uniform domestic-law respect? language likely can make

The of that unobtainable absence pur- considering language for no are difference. We pur- poses applying Supremacy for that Clause. And of self-executing pose, multilateral has to be this Court found (on treaty language far forceful the rele- that is less direct or present point) language in the trea- than the set forth vant g., Airlines, S., 247, 252; at ties. e. Trans World U. See, language here at and n. Bacardi, S., 311 U. compulsory signatory an nations make ICJ effect tells binding you jurisdiction judgment Thus, as- “as can.” language suming adds, self-execution, favor other factors support. subtracts, rather than swpra, 540-541, as I have

Indeed, said, approximately dis- treaties with ICJ States has ratified pute provisions roughly to those contained similar resolution contemplate many Optional of those treaties Protocol; in the (prop- adjudication matters sort substantive ICJ like) erty, dealings, has that the Court and the commercial self-executing, appear addressed to or otherwise found Appendix of the ICJ judicial B, None branch. See infra. stronger language provisions about treaties contains these g., language See, self-execution than the at issue here. e. Treaty Friendship, Navigation Commerce and between Kingdom the United Denmark, States America and the Art. XXIV(2), Oct. 1, 1951, ^[1961] 12 U. T. S. T. I. A. S. (“Any dispute No. 4797 in- between the Parties as to the terpretation application present Treaty, or not satis- factorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be to the submitted agree International Justice, Court of unless Parties means”). by pacific signing settlement some other these (in respect say, ownership provisions) treaties to, alien land engaging was the United States in a near useless act? Does majority Congress expected believe the drafters to enact legislation say, rights, further an about, alien’s inheritance decision decision? recognize, majority emphasizes,

I as the that the U. N. comply,” Charter uses the than, words “undertakes to rather say, comply” comply.” “shall or “must But what is inade- quate leading contempo- “undertake]”? about the word A rary dictionary “lay[ing] it in defined terms of oneself under obligation perform ... or to execute.” Webster’s New (2d 1939). Dictionary International 2770 ed. And that defi- just equally Spanish nition is what the authoritative version (familiar Mexico) provision says directly: to The words “compromete cumplir” obligation present a indicate a to exe- any majority cute, without tentativeness of the sort the finds English in the word “undertakes.” See de las Naci- Carta 94(1), (1945); Spanish ones Unidas, Art. 59 1175 and Stat. (1945) English Legal Dictionary (defining and Commercial 44 liable”); “comprometer” (defining id., as “cum- “become at 59 execute”); plir” perform, discharge, carry “to out, as see also equally (Spanish-language Art. Ill, 59 version Stat. valid); (looking Spanish to Percheman, Pet., at ver- 88-89 version). English up ambiguity sion of a to in clear Harvard, 281 U. S. Cf. Todok v. State Bank Union self-executing (treating treaty provision 449, 453 a says though expressly majority the the even it stated what implicitly “‘[tjhe that “undertakes” provides: word matter, to make this ... be at liberty respecting shall ”). laws as think they such proper’ lan that the even I And if agreed Stevens Justice (which not), I I could is do perfectly ambiguous guage that contemplates that best is ... one “the reading... agree Ante, action the branches.” future by political fate inter is to the of an of such a reading place consequence the hands made the United States national promise by ante, And precisely a See at 536-537. single State. enacting the sought prevent by the situation that Framers of Su the Clause. See 3 Story (purpose Supremacy “difficulty” the Clause “was obviate” probably premacy will the a treaties were “dependent upon good where system Ware, Dall., at see also execution”); of the states for their J.). 277-278 of Iredell, (opinion ante, at 509-

I also as the recognize, majority emphasizes, to a case 511, that says any party the U. N. Charter “[i]f it under incumbent upon fails perform obligations Justice, International rendered Court Security other have recourse Council.” party may ratified 94(2), Art. 1051. And when the Senate 59 Stat. it comfort in the fact that the United States charter, took Rec. a veto Cong. has Council. See Security (1946) (statements Connally). 10694-10695 of Sens. Pepper with, To what that to with the matter? begin But has do sig- politically the Senate would have been contemplating g., e. com- decisions, nificant IC J bread-and-butter not, are subjects mercial and matters the typical other event, both any And treaty provisions. self-executing de- discuss provision and U. Charter Senate debate N. de- (or when nation not what does happen) scribe happens not to of the Charter See out an ICJ decision. cides carry Peace International for the United Nations Maintenance on For- .the Senate Committee before Security: Hearings and (1945) (statement Sess., 79th 1st Relations, eign Cong., Pasvolsky, Special Secretary of Leo to Assistant Affairs) Organization Security State for International and (“[W]hen the Court has rendered a of the and one parties accept dispute politi- refuses to it, then the becomes legal”). cal rather than The refer to debates remedies for a promise carry breach of our an out ICJ decision. The (unlike example, Congress leg- Senate understood, for that permit islatures other nations that do domestic 47-49) legislation trump treaty obligations, Hollis can through legislation self-executing, block as well non-self- as executing determinations. The debates nowhere refer to affirmatively carrying the method we use for out an ICJ obli- gation political that no branch has dishonor, decided to still (without congressional less to a decision that the President dissent) aspects seeks to enforce. For reason, that these point. of the ratification are debates here beside the See infra, at 560. upshot says language

The is that deci- an ICJ legally binding, implementation sion is but it leaves binding legal obligation sig- to the each domestic law of natory Supremacy nation. Nation, this Clause, long consistently interpreted, and indicates ICJ deci- pursuant adjudica- provisions binding sions rendered domestically legally binding tion be must enforceable purposes domestic courts at least sometimes. And for argument, this I The re- that conclusion is all that need. why, judgments explain if mainder discussion will ICJ they sometimes bind have that effect courts, domestic then here. dispute applies Optional

Second, the Protocol here to a meaning provision that is about the Vienna of a Convention self-executing judicially itself The Conven- enforceable. namely, “rights,” provision his tion is an about individual’s separate right being upon of his arrested to be informed 36(l)(b), right contact See Art. his nation’s consul. language precise. provision dis- T., U. S. 101. The right with pute anof individual arises at the intersection consequently procedure; con- ordinary it of criminal rules judges are familiar. with which of matter cerns kind judicially provisions standards. enforceable contain ibid, rights 36(2), (providing “in con- for exercise See Art. arresting regulations” formity na- laws and with the regulations full provided . . . enable “laws and tion that the rights purposes given ac- for which be to the effect to intended”). judgment And Article are corded under this typically hearing requires that is sort itself a further judicial. at 562-564. See infra, treaty provisions self- similar

This Court has found executing. g., 429- 410-411, at Rauscher, S., e. 119 U. See, (violation raised as defense could be of extradition trial); Browne, 309, 317-322 v. 205 U. S. criminal Johnson (extradition treaty required grant habeas of writ of (treaty corpus); de S., at Case, 11, 17-18 Wildenhus’s U. case). jurisdiction It scope is in a criminal fined of state surprising Congress consequently ratified the when that, not reported Department that the “Con Convention, the State entirely and does vention is self-executive considered legislation.” any complementing require implementing or (“To (1969); p. id., Rep. at 18 see also 91-9, S. Exec. No. legislation or with Federal extent that there are conflicts would ratification, after Convention, State laws the Vienna govern”). in this Court Branch has said And Executive indistinguishable provisions other, Vienna Convention self-executing. Amicus are Brief for United States See Oregon, 05-51 T. Nos. Curiae in O. Sanchez-Llamas (majority p. leaves 506, n. 4 ante, cf. 04-10566, 2; n. question open). providing treaty provision logic suggests

Third, treaty-based “settl[e]” “binding” judgments that “final” and question self-executing disputes insofar as treaty provision meaning underlying an concerns the Imagine parties a con- self-executing. that two is itself agree binding tract arbitration about whether a contract provision’s “grain” rye. They expect word includes would if “grain” that, the arbitrator decides that the word does in- rye, simply clude the arbitrator will then read the relevant provision “grain rye.” including They as if it said would expect binding also the arbitrator to issue award that em- appropriate bodies whatever relief would be under that circumstance.

Why differently parties’ agreement binding treat the to g., proper interpretation ICJ determination e. about, the of the containing rights Vienna Convention clauses the at here Why simply issue? read the relevant Vienna Conven- (between provisions parties respect tion as if and in issue) they 51 encap- individuals at contain words that (ICJ sulate the ICJ’s decision? See Art. Stat. “binding parties decision has force . . . between the and in case”). respect particular [the] Why of would ICJ judgment precisely way not bind in the same those words they appeared would bind if in the relevant Vienna Conven- provisions just says, purposes tion as the ICJ for of this — they case, that do? put point differently:

To the same it What sense would (1) (2) self-executing promise promise make to make a accept judgment interpreting an final that ICJ self- (3) executing promise, yet judgment insist itself (i. self-executing Congress specific is not e., must enact it)? legislation to enforce any satisfactory ques-

I am not of aware answer to these point tions. It is no answer to to the fact that in Sanchez- (2006), Oregon, Llamas v. 548 U. this inter- S. 331 Court preted differently provisions the relevant Convention from interpre- the ICJ in Avena. This Court’s Sanchez-Llamas respect tation binds our courts with to individuals whose rights espoused by party in Avena. More- were not state recognizes, over, ante, 497-499, itself see as the Court recognizes, Memorandum, as the see President President’s applying very question question different here is very parties judgment whose inter to the the ICJ’s Avena espoused in the ICJ United States ests Mexico and the respect proceeding. to these individuals It is in Avena promised will have decision has the ICJ the United States binding 1 Restatement 1062. See force. Art. 59 Stat. (Second) (1969); § 98 Restatement of Conflict Laws (Third) (1986); § 481 Foreign 1 Restatement Relations (all (Second) recognition § calling Judgments hearing pro judgment in a contested fair after rendered authority adjudicatory ceeding over a court with before (Second) case). of Laws of Conflict also 1 Restatement See (“A § recognized other and enforced will be though was made an of fact or of law states even error § ”); judgment. proceedings id., 106, Comment .. before (“Th[is] applicable judgments in rendered rule . . a is . Country ”); foreign of in This Status Reese, nations ... Judgments 789 783, L. Rev. Abroad, Colum. Rendered merely (“[Foreign] judgments effect will not be denied original of or an error either fact the court made because law”). of suggestion,

Contrary majority’s ante, at see 511- to the disappear by binding virtue of 512, force does presented his himself, Mexico, fact that rather than Medellin part brought in the Avena case claims Mexico ICJ. protection right diplomatic itsof in “the its of exercise of (3), 13(1), including ¶¶ g., J., 20-21, e. I. C. at nationals,” ¶ claims are derivative id., 25, see at 16. Such Medellin, law, the United of international well-established feature of own on behalf its them has several times asserted States (Third) Foreign Relations, of 2 See Restatement citizens. Concerning supra, Case a, b, 217-218; at §713, Comments (U. Italy), 15, p. 1989 I. C. J. A. S. v. Elettronic Sicula S. Concerning 20); July States (Judgment United of Case (U. Iran), S. v. Diplomatic Tehran in Consular Staff Concerning 15); (Judgment Case of Dec. 1979 I. C. J. Rights Nationals States America in United Mo- of (Fr. S.), (Judgment rocco U v. 1952 I. J.C. 180-181 27). Aug. They respects are in relevant as the treated represented claims of the individuals themselves. See Re- (Third) Foreign statement Relations, §713, Com- particular, they give a, ments b. can to remedies, rise against tailored to the individual, that bind the nation whom States). brought (here, the claims are ibid.; the United See g., Frelinghuysen Key, see also, e. 110 U. S. 71-72 (1884). recognition binding

Nor does ICJ as with respect espoused by to the individuals whose claims were any way derogate holding Mexico in from the Court’s supra. Sanchez-Llamas, ante, 512-513, See n. 8. This implicate general question interpretive case does not an- swered Sanchez-Llamas: whether Vienna Convention displaces procedural state rules. We are instead confronted question obligation comply the discrete of Texas’ binding judgment with a issued tribunal with undis- puted jurisdiction adjudicate rights of the individuals adjudication named “It therein. inherent international may reject country’s legal that an international tribunal one position explic- in favor of another’s—and the States itly accepted possibility Optional this when it ratified Protocol.” Brief for United Amicus Curiae 22. majority’s very approach

Fourth, the different has seri- ously negative practical implications. The United States provisions has at entered into least 70 treaties that contain dispute for ICJ settlement to the before us. similar Protocol Many provisions of to these treaties contain similar those previously self-executing provisions this Court has found — example, property rights, that for contract and com- involve, injury, rights, liability personal mercial trademarks, civil for rights diplomats, jurisdic- foreign taxation, domestic-court Ap- Compare Appendix tion, and A, so forth. infra, pendix Optional to- here, If the Protocol taken B, infra. Statute, gether its annexed ICJ and with the U. N. Charter judgment of the ICJ enforcement to warrant is insufficient a different could reach see how one it is difficult to us, before any the conse- And other instances. of these conclusion longstanding treaties in those efforts quence is to undermine interpreting system for international to create an effective self-executing treaty many, applying commercial, often right majority it when is provisions. that the I thus doubt bind- suggest can never afford says, treaties that “We do not judgments.” tribunal ing effect to international domestic currently respect that 70 treaties to the at 519. Ante, authority, binding adjudicatory disputes to the ICJ’s refer just the ma- what bilateral, that is multilateral, some some jority has done. legislation majority congressional for look to can the

Nor ju- unlikely Congress automatic quick to authorize is fix. judgments, in- enforceability could for that all ICJ dicial judgments better politically and others sensitive clude some example, those for other branches: suited for enforcement handling activity, touching upon military hostilities, naval likely Congress so forth. Nor material, nuclear legislate will, let alone available, time have the (or say, the ICJ’s judgment-by-judgment of, enforcement tribunals’) non-politically- resolution other international prior disputes. this And as Court’s sensitive commercial bright-line in- laying rules but avoided down case law has approach, un- complex it adopted seems a more stead has legislative easy develop Congress likely it will find (addressed to the provisions pick bright those out lines Branch) warranted. seems where self-execution Judicial Congress necessary to do so—at course, it is But, Supremacy Clause that this Court’s not if one believes least reasonably likely well. already embody to work criteria cases apply here. that I would those criteria It is judgment particular related to factors, other Fifth, judi- direct well suited issue, make here specific cial enforcement. The issue before the con- ICJ “ ” “possible preju- cerned ‘review and reconsideration’ of the arresting dice” caused in each of the 51 affected cases an provide rights guaran- State’s failure to the defendant with by the teed Vienna at Avena, J., Convention. I. C. ¶ understanding 138. This review will call for an of how procedure including criminal works, whether, how, a no- may prejudice. tification failure Id., work at As the 56-57. recognized, judicial process ICJ itself “it is the that is suited ¶ frequently this at Id., task.” work Courts procedure prejudice. Legisla- with criminal and related readily tures do not. Judicial are standards available for working Legislative in this technical area. are standards readily Judges typically not available. determine such mat- deciding, hearings example, ters, whether further are necessary, reviewing after in a record an individual case. Congress normally legislate respect does not to individual repeat eases. I Indeed, above, what said what kind of special legislation majority Congress ought does believe to consider? obligations

Sixth, to find the United self- States’ (and executing applied judgment consequently as to the ICJ enforceable) judgment to find that does not' threaten consti- require tutional conflict branches; with other it not us does activity; engage nonjudicial require it us does only question to create a new before cause action. binding application us concerns the of the ICJ applicable parties particular proceed- law criminal to the treaty. ing independently Texas law creates repeat question I us not involve before does (and majority’s private right reli- of a creation of action authority regarding such is mis- ance on a circumstance 3). placed, ante, see n. Congress expressed nor has

Seventh, neither the President judicial ICJ decision. concern about direct enforcement contrary, of this To favors enforcement the President impact, foreign policy judgment. the inter- as insofar Thus, any treaty provisions, the other matter within or relation foreign treaty, military, re- special and affairs President’s sponsibilities might prove rather favor, factors relevant, such judgment against, before the militate enforcement of than g., Immigration Customs e. See, us. Jama Enforce- “customary (noting Court’s ment, 543 U. S. foreign policy in the matters of deference to President affairs”). I find that the United reasons,

For these would seven judgment treaty obligation comply to with the ICJ States’ further case without in Avena is court in this enforceable beyond congressional rele- ratification of the action Senate majority conclusion reaches a different vant treaties. expres- wrong thing (explicit it textual because looks for the self-execution) (clarity) wrong using standard sion about the (the wrong Hunting place language). what for in the wrong turn. It threatens text it contain, the cannot takes deprive including property own- businesses, individuals, testamentary others, officials, consular ers, beneficiaries, many procedures dispute of the workable resolution provide. including commercially treaties, oriented treaties, become and travel have commerce, trade, In a world where step wrong direction. international, ever more that is a of its the direction for a moment to shift Were Court legal gaze, looking Supremacy Clause and to the instead applied interpreting the extensive case law Clause supported, more I it would reach a better treaties, believe approach, That well embedded felicitous conclusion. judg- that the ICJ case leads to conclusion law, Court legis- judicially without further ment before enforceable us lative action.

II judgment is enforceable A determination that ICJ judgment quite re- itself matter, does end quires It decision. directs us to make one further provide judicial further review of the 51 “by cases of choosing.” Mexican nationals means of own its 153(9). Avena, explained, ¶ 2004 I. C. J., at As I have I believe the addresses itself to the Judicial consequently Branch. This Court must “choose”the means. say, conducting And than, rather the further review in this requiring Court, or Medellin to seek the review in another I proper federal court, believe forum for review proceedings would be the Texas-court that would follow a remand of this case.

Beyond the fact that a remand would be the normal course upon reversing judgment, a lower court there are additional why particu- reasons further state-court review be would larly appropriate place here. The crime took in Texas, and prosecution prosecution. at issue is a Texas The Presi- specifically dent has endorsed further Texas-court review. judgment requires See President’s Memorandum. ICJ hearings police further as to whether the failure to in- prejudiced form rights Medellin of his Vienna Convention hearings if Medellin, even such would not otherwise be avail- procedural able under Texas’ default rules. While Texas already fully, has considered that it matter, did not consider example, appointed whether counsel’s coterminous 6- suspension practice month from the of the law “caused actual prejudice prejudice to the not have that would defendant” — existed had Medellin known he could contact his consul and thereby lawyer. ¶ Id., find a different

Finally, Texas law authorizes a criminal to seek defendant postjudgment Ann., Art. review. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon 5(a)(1) 2006). § pro- Supp. 11.071, law And Texas provides vides for further review where American law “‘legal previously that basis’” was “‘unavailable.’” See (Tex. parte App. Medellin, Ex 3d Crim. S. W. 2006). I this case to the Texas Thus, would send back apply judgment courts, then as bind- which must Avena ing g., see e. VI, also, law. U. S. Art. Const., 2; See cl. Dominguez 92, 99, Tex. 234 S. W. State, Crim. “part supreme (recognizing treaties are duty courts of the “it is law of the land” and that give cognizance effect” them of, construe state take omitted)). (internal quotation marks

Ill majority interna- Nation’s Because the concludes obligation legal decision is to enforce the ICJ’s tional obligation, automatically legal must then deter- it a domestic authority the constitutional mine whether the President has majority See finds that he does not. it. And the enforce Part III, ante. implica- my has broader view,

In that second conclusion majority suggests. here seeks The President tions than the implement treaty provisions in which the United States respect binding agrees to the ICJ upon Consequently, his parties. his actions draw Avena foreign authority affairs. the area constitutional power falls that middle this of that within case, his exercise authority Congress range has neither where of Presidential specifically specifically the Presi- nor forbidden authorized question. Youngstown & Tube Sheet dential action in See (1952) (Jackson, Sawyer, J., concur- 579, v. 343 637 Co. U. S. ring). to have time, if the President were At same setting require authority a aside here, it he asserts would procedural state law. his Article that the exercise of

It is to in difficult believe treaty, powers pursuant President can to a ratified II setting state law. in aside action would result never take (“No State 203, 233 Pink, 315 S. Cf. United States v. U. foreign policy own domestic to its our to conform can rewrite necessary Suppose it policies”). believes President prisoner provision requiring a implement that he custody to exchange involving order in state someone military Dall., at proven Ware, 3 threat. Cf. avoid a

565 suppose Or necessary he foreign believes it to secure a con- treaty-based rights sul’s freely to move or to contact an ar- foreign rested national. Cf. Vienna Convention, 34, Art. U. S. T., at require 98. Does the Constitution the President every in each and special such instance to obtain a statute authorizing his action? On the other hand, the Constitution impose significant must upon restrictions the President’s ability, by invoking treaty-implementation Article II author- ity, ordinary to legislative processes circumvent pre- and to empt state law he does so.

Previously this question. Court has said little about this It has held that the authority President has a fair amount of implement to make agreements, and to executive at least in respect to international claims settlement, and that this au- thority require contrary can state law to be set See, aside. g., supra, e. Pink, at 223, 230-231, 233-234; United States v. (1937). Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 326-327 It has made clear principles foreign sovereign immunity trump state law operating and that explicit legis- the Executive, without authority, lative principles can assert those in state court. (1943). parte See Ex Peru, 318 U. 578, S. It has also made clear power that the bring Executive has inherent to carry treaty obligations.” lawsuit Sanitary “to out Disk Chicago (1925). States, U. S. But it scope has reserved toas “the of the Presi- power preempt pursuant dent’s authority state law del- egated by treaty” helps explain ... a ratified fact that —a majority’s inability support precedent find for its Barclays own conclusions. Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994). Cal., U. S. comparative expertise foreign Given the Court’s lack given importance foreign affairs; rela- Nation’s given difficulty finding proper tions; constitutional among legislative, balance federal, state and executive and powers given likely impor- in such future matters; and very tance of so, this Court’s efforts to do I would much implicitly concluding that the Constitution hesitate before (or permissions) this prohibitions area. sets forth broad holding (stating is ante, 523, Court’s Cf. at n. 13 (1) by is non-self- this facts “limited” executing international tribunal of an involved). in the constitu- I be the matter would thus content leave my emerged. view of it tional shade from which has Given question. I shall not And case, this I need not answer the try be taken as silence, however, cannot to do so. That agreement majority’s III conclusion. with the Part

IV together practi- majority’s holdings produce The two taken They unnecessarily complicate the Presi- cal anomalies. example, they foreign in- as, for dent’s affairs task insofar Security Avena enforcement crease the likelihood of Council neighbor worsening proceedings, with Mex- relations our putting precipitating at risk ico, of actions other nations have misfortune to be arrested American citizens who diminishing repu- traveling while or of our Nation’s abroad, failure to follow “rule tation abroad as a result our holdings principles preach. also encumber law” that we legislation) Congress (postratification that, in re- awith task may spect many it tribunals, decisions of international supra, may See want it find difficult execute. and which case-by-case legisla- (discussing problems tion). holdings today’s make time, At the same insofar judgments international it more enforce the difficult to non-politieally-controversial including technical tribunals, judgments, holdings law which that rule of those weaken Foreign Hughes Poli- Defends our Cf. Constitution stands. p. Lodge, 1, 1, col. Times, Y. Oct. cies in Plea for N. Hughes (then-Secretary p. Evans Charles State col. always an favored, inter- stating have favor, “we justice according national of court the determination judicial justiciable disputes”); standards of international Mr. Root Discusses International N. Problems, Times, Y. (former July p. Secretary section 6, book review 276 “ of stating State and U. S. Senator Elihu Root ‘a court justice general obligation international with a to submit justiciable questions jurisdiction all to its to abide and its judgment primary requisite any is a real restraint of law’”); Obligation Mills, of the United States Toward the Academy World Court, Annals American Political (Congressman Ogden and Social Science 128 describing then-Secretary Mills John the efforts of of State Hay, support others, to establish a court, world therefor).

These institutional considerations make it difficult rec- majority’s holdings oncile the workable Constitution envisaged. They impor- the Founders reinforce the practice principle, asking tance, in and in Chief Justice question: treaty provision Marshall’s Does a address the “Judicial” rather Branch than “Political Branches” of they Government. See Foster, Pet., at 314. And show precedent the wisdom of the well-established that indicates question “yes.” that the answer to the here See Parts I supra. and II,

V strong precedent, likely reflecting In sum, a line treaty provisions views of the Founders, indicates that the before us and the International Court of Justice address themselves to the Judicial Branch and conse- quently self-executing. contrary reaching are a conclu- proper prec- sion, the has of that Court failed to take account may edent its and, result, well break word Nation though up even the President seeks to live to that word and contrary. Congress suggest nothing done has respectfully For the set forth, reasons I dissent. APPENDIXES

A considering decisions Court of Supreme Examples indicate Parentheticals self-executing. to be provision applied that the Court asterisk indicates matter; an subject law or territorial state contrary to invalidate the provision or policy. Airways Olympic Husain, 540 U. S. 649, 657 644, v.

1. (2004) (air-carrier liability) Tseng, 525 Yuan Tsui Airlines, Ltd. v. El Al Israel 2. (same)* (1999) 161-163, 176 155, U. S. Co., Lines Korean Air 217, Zicherman v. 516 S. U.

3. (same) (1996) 221, 231 Aerospatiale Industrielle v. Nationale

4. Société Dist. Dist. Southern Court United States (international Iowa, (1987) 524, 533 522, 482 U. S. rules) discovery Avagliano, 457 Shoji Inc. v. America,

5. Sumitomo (1982) practices) 176,181,189-190 (employment U. S. Corp., Franklin Mint Airlines, Inc. v. 6. Trans World (air-carrier (1984) liability) 243, 245, 252 466 U. S. Oregon, 198 191, 6, 7. Kolovrat v. n. 187, 366 U. S. inheritance)* (1961) and rights (property Allen, 331 U. S. 507-508, 517-518 503, 8. Clark v. (1947) (same)* Domenech, 311 U. S. Corp. America v. Bacardi

9. (trademark)* (1940) 161 150, 160, 9, and n. Harvard, 281 U. S. Bank State 10. Todok v. Union inheritance) (1930) rights 449,453,455 (property (1929) Johnson, 279 U. S. 58 47, 50, 11. Nielsen v. (taxation)* Tashiro, 278 U. S. 1, 128- 126-127, n. 123,

12. Jordan v. commerce) (trade (1928) 129 Seattle, 265 U. 340, 343-344 332, 13. Asakura S. v. (same)* (1924)

569 14. Maiomno v. Baltimore & Ohio Co., R. 213 U. S. 268, (1909)

273-274 (travel, courts) trade, access to 15. Johnson Browne, v. (1907) U. S. 309, 317-322

(extradition) Geofroy Riggs, v. 133 U. 258, (1890) S. 267-268, 273

(inheritance)* 17. Wildenhus’s Case, (1887) (crim- U. S. 1,11,17-18

inal jurisdiction) 18. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 410-411, (1886)

429-430 (extradition) Lynham, 19. Hauenstein 100 U. S. 485-486, 490- (1880) inheritance)* (property rights and 20. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, (1828) (property) 21. United States v. Percheman, Pet. 88-89

(land ownership) 22. United States v. Arredondo, Pet. 697, 749

(1832) (same) Hodgson, 23. Orr v. 4 (1819) Wheat. 453, 462-465 (same)*

24. Chirac v. Lessee Chirac, 2 259, Wheat. 270-271,

274, (1817) (land 275 inheritance)* ownership and Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 25. Fairfax’s (1813) (land 626-627 ownership) Hannay Eve, 26. v. 3 (1806) Cranch 242, 248 (monetary

debts) Hopkirk v. Bell, 27. (1806) 3 Cranch 457-458 454,

(same)* Hylton, 28. Ware v. (1796) 3 199, 203-204, Dali. 285 (same)* Georgia Brailsford, (1794)

29. (same) 3 1, Dali. 4

B United States treaties in force containing provisions the submission of to the International treaty-based disputes Court of Justice. Parentheticals indicate matters subject 570 adjudication subject that are

that can be the of ICJ self-executing. has found sort this Court Agreements Cooperation Economic Agreement Aid Between the 1. Economic of America and Spain, Sept. 26, 1953, ^[1953] (prop- 1903, 1920-1921, 4 T. I. A. S. No. 2851 U. S. T. contract) erty and Agreement the Between

2. for Economic Assistance America and

Government of the United States of to the General Government of Israel Pursuant May Agreement Cooperation, 1952, for Technical ^[1952] 3 U. S. T. T. I. A. No. S. 2561 (same) Agreement Cooperation Between

3. Economic Portugal, America 62 Stat. United States of (1948)(same) 2861-2862 Agreement Cooperation 4. Between Economic Kingdom, of America and the United United States (same) Stat. Agreement Cooperation Between Economic Republic of Tur- United States of America and (1948)(same) key, 62 Stat. 2572 Agreement Cooperation 6. Economic Between Sweden, of America and Stat. United States (1948)(same) Agreement Cooperation Between

7. Economic Norway, of America and Stat. United States (1948) (same) Agreement Cooperation Between

8. Economic and of America of the United Governments States Kingdom 2500 Netherlands, 62 the the Stat. of (1948)(same) Agreement Cooperation Between

9. Economic Duchy of America the Grand States of and United (same) Luxembourg, 62 2468 Stat.

571 Cooperation Agreement 10. Economic Between the Italy, United of States America 62 and Stat. 2440 (1948)(same) Cooperation Agreement

11. Economic Between the United of States America 62 Iceland, and Stat. 2390 (1948)(same) Cooperation Agreement

12. Economic Between the United of States America 62 Greece, and Stat. 2344 (1948)(same) Cooperation Agreement

13. Economic Between the United of States America 62 France, 2232, and Stat. (1948)(same) 2233 Cooperation Agreement

14. Economic Between the United of States America Denmark, and 62 Stat. (1948)(same) Cooperation Agreement 15. Economic Between the Kingdom of States America and of Bel- (1948)(same) gium, 62 Stat. Cooperation Agreement

16. Economic Between the United (1948)(same) of States America Austria, and Stat. 2144 Bilateral Consular Conventions

1. Consular Convention Between United Kingdom Belgium, Sept.

America 2,1969, ^[1974] 25 U. S. T. 41, 47-49, 56-57, 60-61, (domestic-court jurisdiction T. I. A. S. No. authority officers, over consular taxation of consular notification) officers, consular 2. Consular Convention Between United States Republic Korea, America and Jan. ^[1963] U. T. S. 1637, 1641, 1644-1648, T. I. A. S. (same) No.

Friendship, Navigation Commerce, and Treaties Treaty Amity Between and Economic Relations Togolese of America and Re- United States

572

public, Feb. 8, 1966, ^[1967] 18 U. S. T. 1, 3-4, 10, (contracts property) and I. A. S. 6193 T. No. Navigation Friendship, Treaty and Establishment of 2. of America and Between the United States Kingdom of Belgium, Feb. 21,1961, ^[1963] 14 S. U. T. (same) T. I. A. S. No. 5432 1284, 1290-1291,1307, Navigation Treaty Friendship, and of Establishment 3. and the of America the United States Between Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, ^[1963] (con- T. I. S. No. 5306 251,254-255,262, T. A. U. S. property) and notification; sular contracts Navigation Treaty Friendship, and of Commerce 4. and the of America Between the United States Kingdom of Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, ^[1961] U. S. T. (contracts 935, T. I. A. S. No. 908, 912-913, property) and Treaty Friendship Between of and Commerce

5. 12, Pakistan, and States of America Nov.

1959, ^[1961] 12 U. S. T. 110, 113, 123, T. I. A. S. (same) No. 4683 the United Between of Establishment

6. Convention States America of and France, Nov. 25, 1959, ^[1960] S. 2401-2403, T. I. A. No. 2398, 2417, 11 U. S. T. (same) Navigation Treaty Friendship, and

7. of Commerce and the Re- of America Between the United States public Korea, Nov. 28,1956, ^[1957] 8 U. S. T. (same) T. I. No. 3947 A. S. 2221-2222, Navigation Treaty Friendship, and 8. Commerce America and Between the United States [1957]8 Kingdom 27, 1956, Netherlands, Mar. 2082-2083, T. I. A. S. 2043, 2047-2050, T. U. S. (freedom notification, travel, consular No. property) contracts and Treaty Amity, and Relations, Consular Economic Rights America States of the United Between Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, ^[1957] 8 U. T. S. 899, 903, 913, T. I. A. S. No. 3853 (property freedom of commerce)

10. of Treaty Commerce Friendship, and Navigation

Between the United States of America and the Fed- eral Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, ^[1956] 7 U. S. T. 1839, 1844-1846, 1867, T. I. A. S. No. 3593 contract) and (property

11. of Treaty Commerce Friendship, and Navigation

Between the United States of America Greece, and Aug. 3, 1951, ^[1954] 5 U. S. T. 1829, 1841-1847, 1913- 1915, (same) T. I. A. S. No. 3057 12. of Treaty Commerce and Friendship, Navigation

Between the United States of America Israel, and 23, 1951, Aug. 5 550, [1954] U. S. T. 555-556, 575, T. I. (same) A. S. No. 2948 13. Treaty and Amity Economic Relations Between

the United States of America and Ethiopia, 7, Sept. 1951, ^[1953] 4 U. S. T. 2134, 2141, 2145, 2147, T. I. A. S. No. 2864 and freedom of (property commerce)

14. Treaty Commerce and Friendship, Navigation

Between the United States of America and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, ^[1953] 4 U. S. T. 2063, 2067-2069, 2080, T. I. contract) A. S. No. 2863 and (property 15. Treaty Commerce Friendship, and Navigation

Between the United States of America and Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, ^[1950] 1 U. S. T. 785, 792-794, 801, (same) T. I. A. S. No. 2155 16. Treaty Commerce and Friendship, Navigation

Between the United States of America and the Ital- ian 2262, Republic, 2284, Stat. (prop- commerce) and freedom of erty Multilateral Conventions

1. Patent 19, 1970, June Cooperation Treaty, [1976-77]

28 U. 7645, 7652-7676, 7708, S. T. T. I. A. S. No. 8733 (patents) 24, 1971, Convention, July

2. Universal Copyright ^[1974] 25 U. S. T. 1345, 1366, T. I. A. S. No. (copyright) Relations on Diplomatic

3. Vienna Convention Set- Concerning Compulsory Protocol Optional 23 U. S. T. 18,1961, [1972] tlement of Disputes, Apr. 7502 (rights I. A. S. No. 3227, 3240-3243, 3375, T. nations) in foreign diplomats Industrial the Protection of Paris Convention Property, July 14,1967, ^[1970] U. S. T. 1583,1631- 1665-1666, (patents) T. I. A. S. No. Immunities of Privileges 5. Convention on Nations, Feb. 13,1946, ^[1970] 21 U. S. T. No. 6900 T. I. A. S. 1426-1428,1430-1432,1438-1440, officials) of U. N. and diplomats (rights Acts Other on Offences Certain 6. Convention Aircraft, 14,1963, [1969] on Board Sept. Committed 6768 2952, T. I. A. S. No. 2941, 2943-2947, 20 U. S. T. (airlines’ treatment of passengers) International Circu- 7. Agreement Facilitating an Educa- lation of Materials Auditory Visual Character, 15, July tional, and Cultural Scientific 1949, ^[1966] 17 U. S. T. 1578, 1581, 1586, T. I. A. S. films (customs duties on importation No. 6116 and recordings) 1952, Convention, Sept. Copyright Universal

[1955] U. S. T. 2733-2739, 2743, T. I. A. S. No. 3324 (copyright) 8, 1951, [1952] of Peace With Japan, Sept.

9. Treaty T. I. A. S. No. 3181-3183, 3188, U. S. T. (property)

10. Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 19, 1949, ^[1952] A. No. 3020, T. I. S. 3008, 3012-3017, 3 U. S. T. drivers) and obligations (rights 11. Convention on International Aviation, Civil 61 Stat. (1944) (seizure of aircraft to satisfy patent

claims)

Case Details

Case Name: Medellin v. Texas

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Mar 25, 2008

Citation: 552 U.S. 491

Docket Number: 06-984

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS