People v. JohnsonPeople v. Johnson
As to his count 5 conviction (based on the statement to his family that he would blow his brains out), Johnson contends there was insufficient
As to his count 2 conviction (based on the statement to his wife that they would both be dead if his wife called the police), Johnson contends the court committed instructional error by incorrectly stating the law under
In addition, we conclude that Johnson’s count 2 conviction was improperly classified on his abstract of judgment as a violent felony. We also conclude that any unpaid balance of the booking fee imposed on Johnson must be vacated based on recent legislation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of May 26, 2019, Johnson entered the two-story Antioch house where his wife, Jane Doe 1, lived with their four daughters: P., S.J., S., and Jane Doe 2, who ranged in age from 22 to 15 years old. At the time, Johnson and Doe 1 were married but separated. That morning, the couple got into an argument that became so heated it woke the house. Someone called the police, and Johnson was later arrested.
On July 31, 2019, an information was filed charging Johnson with one felony count of first-degree residential burglary (
Johnson’s jury trial disclosed the following evidence:
A. Prosecution’s Case
1. May 26, 2019
On May 26, 2019, Doe 2 called 911 from her bedroom closet on the second floor of the house. A recording of the call was played to the jury. On the call, Doe 2 explained that she woke up when she heard her mother screaming and said her father was hitting her mother. Johnson could be heard yelling expletives in the background. When asked if her father had been drinking or doing drugs, Doe 2 responded, “I’m not sure. He doesn’t live here anymore.” She twice repeated that her father no longer lived at the house and that she did not know where he was living. After the operator stated officers were on the way, Doe 2 stated she thought her father had a gun because “a second ago he just said that if the police come here he’s gonna – he’s gonna blow his brains out.” The 911 operator ended the call when she heard officers talking to Johnson downstairs.
Officer Robert Ibanez, one of the multiple responding officers who testified at trial, had been dispatched to the Antioch house because the reporting party had called and said her father Johnson was out of control, he possibly had a gun, and if police came he would blow his brains out. When Doe 1 opened the door for the officers, she was crying and appeared to be in
Officers Denny Barrera and Kevin Tjahjadi, both of whom testified at trial, located Doe 2 upstairs. Officer Barrera thought she looked upset, scared, and timid. She appeared hesitant to speak to the officers in the open hallway but agreed to speak in her bedroom and did so in a whisper. Their recorded conversation was played to the jury. Doe 2 explained that her father did not live at the house and was not there when she went to bed the night before. She woke up around 5 a.m. when she heard her mother screaming. She ran into the master bedroom and saw her father choking her mother. Seconds later, her older sisters P. and S.J. came into the room and tried to get their father off their mother. In the tussle, Johnson punched S.J. in the face. He also hit Doe 2 with his palm and struck the right side of her chin. Her mother ran out of the room with her father in pursuit.
Doe 2 returned to her room and called 911 from the closet. From there, she heard more yelling. She confirmed her father said that if the police came he would blow his head off. When Officer Barrera followed up about her belief that her father had a gun, she responded, “I’m pretty sure he does. . . [¶] . . . I’ve seen it before.” She had last seen the gun a week or two earlier. She thought the gun might be in her mother’s room, and pleaded, “Y’all can get him outta here. Right? . . . [¶] . . . I just had to be sure ‘cause he’s, like, really manipulative.” At the end of the exchange, Doe 2 repeated, “I really wish I weren’t scared. . . [¶] . . . I wish I weren’t scared.”
During Doe 2’s interview, Officer Tjahjadi, who was standing near her bedroom door, saw S.J. pacing in the hallway and attempting to peek into
After they finished speaking with Doe 2 and removed Johnson from the house, Officers Tjahjadi and Barrera made their way to the downstairs bedroom and found a loaded handgun atop a laundry bin filled with clothes.
Officer Barrera subsequently interviewed S.J. Their conversation was recorded and played to the jury. Asked about the firearm they found, S.J. said she saw it “[w]hen [her father] told [her] if [the police] came he was going to blow his brains out.” Her father had come downstairs and pointed the gun at himself. S.J. and another sister ran downstairs and asked him to put the gun away because they did not want him to shoot himself or their mother. She saw him deposit the handgun on the clothes in the downstairs room.
Officer Daniel Fachner, another responding officer who testified at trial, spoke with Doe 1 that morning. Doe 1 was crying throughout the recorded interview, which was played to the jury. Doe 1 explained she and Johnson were married but in the process of separating. Johnson had not been to the house in over a month. The day before, he sent her threatening texts and she responded that if he came over, she would call the police. That morning, he showed up unexpectedly at 4 a.m. and walked into her bedroom drunk, argumentative, and threatening. He was angry because she had spoken to someone he considered his enemy. At some point, the argument got physical. Johnson grabbed her neck and tried to hit her as she tried to
This incident was not the first time they had a physical altercation. The police had been called before, but Johnson had never been arrested. Johnson regularly threatened that if he ever got arrested, he would return and kill her. Doe 1 said she needed to relocate because a protective order would just make him angry and he would disregard it. She did not know where Johnson was living at the time. Asked whether she would cooperate with the District Attorney if Johnson were charged, she replied, “I’m afraid.”
2. Further Investigation
A couple of days after Johnson’s arrest, Doe 1 spoke with an Antioch Police Department detective, who recorded the interview, which was played to the jury. Doe 1 noted that she had actually called the police earlier because she wanted to confirm that Johnson was still being detained. She needed to know his whereabouts because she was trying to relocate before his release since she knew “he’s gonna come back.”
Asked to explain what happened two days earlier, Doe 1 recounted that Johnson entered the house around 4 a.m. She was lying in her bed when he came into her room, and he threatened that both of them would be dead if she contacted the police. He accused her of betraying his trust by talking to his mistress’s husband. Since he had been drinking, Doe 1 did not understand much of what Johnson was saying.
While Doe 1 was still in bed, Johnson picked up her phone and shoved it in her face. When she jumped out of bed and tried to run out of the room, he grabbed her by the neck. She started screaming. Johnson then pressed his forearm on her neck, strangling her. She was in pain and could not breathe. Hearing the commotion, their children rushed into the room. When
Days later, Doe 1 and the detective spoke again, and this interview was also recorded and played to the jury. Doe 1 confirmed that Johnson had come into the room and told her that if she called the police she would be dead before they got there. Asked why he would say this, she explained that he was angry because they had broken up and she refused to reconcile. A couple of days before he came to the house, they had spoken on the phone. Johnson told Doe 1 that he did not want to break up and was not going to let her go. Doe 1 told him if he came over to the house, she would call the police. When he came over without her permission, he continued to threaten her, repeating that if she called the police, she or they would both be dead before the police arrived.
3. Recorded Jailhouse Calls
Four recorded jailhouse calls involving Johnson were played to the jury.
In a May 30, 2019 call with Doe 1, Johnson asked who called the police on him. Doe 1 claimed the neighbors did, but Johnson did not believe her because someone told the police about the gun, about which the neighbors would not have known. Johnson believed Doe 2 made the call. He wished he could put whichever child had called “back in [his] nuts.” When Doe 1 reminded Johnson that he had been yelling and screaming about how he was going to shoot her, Johnson responded, “I said myself. That’s what I said.”
In a July 28, 2019 call with one of his daughters, Johnson complained that Doe 2 said he had hit her. He stated, “You know I ain’t never hit y’all.” The daughter responded, “You did dad.” She also reminded Johnson that he hit both S.J. and Doe 2 that morning. He claimed that it was an accident, he did not try to hit anyone, and he was just talking with his hands.
In a September 20, 2019 call with L.J., Johnson revealed that he had “sent out instructions to everybody” to study so they could have “matchin’ lines in [his] play.” He explained that he “outlined every single detail” and the script disposed of “every single thing except for that one thing.” He noted that “the play has to be well-orchestrated and read.” Johnson said that if everyone “play[ed] ball” and rehearsed, then he felt great about it.
4. Family Members’ Trial Testimony
At Johnson’s trial, which took place mid-October 2019, Doe 1, Doe 2, and S.J. testified, often inconsistently with their prior statements to police.
Doe 2 testified that in May 2019, she was living in the family’s Antioch house with her mother, father, and sisters. She confirmed that it was her testimony that Johnson was living at the house the day he was arrested.
Around 4 a.m. on May 26, a very loud noise from her mother’s room woke her. When she went over there, she saw her father, mother, and S.J. She was not surprised to see her father, nor was she scared to enter the room.
When she got to her room, she called 911 from her closet. She made the call because she was angry and “[t]here was just a lot going on. Chaos, I guess.” She said there had been a lot of yelling, and that alone made for a chaotic environment. Because she was angry, she wanted her father out of the house that morning. While on the 911 call, she did not hear anything her father may have said. She did not remember her father ever saying that if the police came he would blow his brains out.
Doe 2 denied that she was ever fearful. She never thought her father had a gun and did not remember if she told the 911 operator he did. Later, she acknowledged it was possible her father had a gun but did not know or could not remember the basis for this belief. She had never seen her father with a gun before. She declined to describe her father as manipulative. She never saw him being physically violent with her mother.
Doe 1 testified that she had known Johnson for over two decades. They were married but separated, having broken up about a month prior to the May 26 incident. Johnson still had belongings in the Antioch house and periodically stayed there.
Two days before he came over on May 26, Doe 1 and Johnson spoke over the phone. She could not remember what they spoke about and “[could not] say for sure” whether Johnson indicated his desire to visit the house. At
In the early morning hours of May 26, Doe 1 was sleeping in her upstairs bedroom. She woke when Johnson opened the door and walked in the room. She told him not to come over, but it was his place of residence. He was drunk, rambling, visibly upset, and angry but not violent or belligerent. She was angry he was there at that hour starting an argument. She did not recall Johnson ever saying to her that if she called the police, they would be dead before officers arrived. At some point, he pushed her phone towards her, and Doe 1 got out of bed to leave the room. Johnson grabbed her by the arm to keep her there. He got behind her and put his forearm on her neck. In that position with his hand close to her mouth, she bit him and was able to get away. As she was leaving, the children entered the room. Johnson and the children screamed and yelled, making for a chaotic scene. Doe 1 went downstairs to the kitchen to keep her distance from Johnson. Eventually, Johnson also came downstairs. Around that time, the police arrived, and she opened the door.
Doe 1 could not recall if Johnson ever struck or swung at her. She could not say that Johnson strangled her at any point. Nor could she say he did anything to deliberately impede her breathing, though she remembered having trouble breathing in her struggle to leave the room. She did not see Johnson strike any of their daughters.
Doe 1 added that the statement she gave the police that morning probably was not completely accurate because it was “heat of the moment.” Twice, she stated she was not fearful of Johnson that night, only angry. She did not recall asking an officer for an emergency protective order. She only
S.J. testified that on the day her father was arrested, she had been awake getting ready for work when she heard her parents yelling and arguing loudly in the master bedroom. She considered her father to be living with them at the time. She walked down the hall to the master bedroom and found her parents still arguing, so she placed herself between them. Nothing physical occurred between her parents, and her mother walked out of the room. S.J. never saw her father hit her mother. He never touched her or her sisters.
After Doe 1 left, S.J. and P. went into the hallway with her father. Doe 2 was standing in one of the doorways. Her father, who was in the hallway, and her mother, who was at the top of the stairwell, continued to yell at each other. Eventually, they went downstairs. S.J. saw lights from outside and her mother went to the door. She heard her father from the guest bedroom say he was going to shoot himself. At no point, however, did she see him with
S.J. never saw her father holding a gun but later saw the gun when talking with the police. She never approached an officer to get his attention or told anyone there was a gun in the house. Rather, she had been approached by an officer who told her that he knew there was a gun in the house. She brought him to the downstairs bedroom and told him if there were a gun it would be there. She thought as much because her father was in that room when she heard him say he was going to hurt himself. She told the officer she did not know where in the room the gun might be. When the officer pointed to a bucket, she replied that he could check there but she would not touch anything.
B. Defense Case
Johnson testified on his own behalf. On May 26, he was living at the Antioch house and had been living there for about five years. He spent the night there about six nights that month, usually sleeping in the master bedroom. His belongings were there as well.
He acknowledged that Doe 1 had told him a couple of days earlier to not come by the house, but she had said similar things before and he had still been over. Besides, he had a plan to clean himself up and attend church with his daughters as a surprise. If the opportunity arose, he would also try to clear things up with Doe 1.
After Johnson let himself in the house, he walked towards his bedroom. The door was ajar, and he walked right in and saw Doe 1 awake. They exchanged greetings. He then addressed the “elephant in the room.” He had been having an affair, and his mistress’s husband was furious and had contacted Doe 1. The mistress’s husband had told Doe 1 lies which Doe 1
Their argument became very loud. When Johnson turned he saw his two oldest daughters, P. and S.J., yelling in the doorway. His other two daughters also came over. He said, “It was just so much chaos. Everybody’s just yelling back and forth. Yelling, yelling, yelling, yelling, yelling.” He screamed for everyone to shut up. He tried to explain what was happening but could not due to all the yelling.
Doe 1 left the room, passing her daughters standing in the doorway. Johnson pushed his way through his daughters and followed Doe 1. In the hallway, he kept yelling at Doe 1, who stood atop the stairwell. Eventually, Doe 1 went downstairs, the children scattered, and he went into the downstairs bedroom, “the only sanctuary [he] knew in the house.” There, he thought about taking his life. He explained, “I was really, really, really
Johnson did not recall or did not remember what he said to Officer Ibanez that morning. He likely denied saying he was going to shoot himself because it was embarrassing, and he did not want anyone to know. He also knew it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. He did not remember telling the officer that he never got physical with anyone that morning.
Johnson stated that he never threatened Doe 1’s life in the master bedroom, nor did he ever threaten his daughters. The only life he threatened was his own. He denied stating that he would be dead before the police came. He denied telling Doe 1 days before his visit that if she called the police, the two of them would be dead before they arrived. He also denied ever stating that he would blow his brains out if the police came.
Johnson acknowledged that he sent his family certain instructions, which he described as a “play” as to how to act, and that he wanted everyone to study the play and know their lines. He sent the instructions because he wanted to “make sure that everything was . . . presented properly.” He wanted the jury – and everybody – to know that he lived in the Antioch house. It was “kinda creepy sounding” for his family to say that he did not live in a house he had been living in forever. He also told his family to use
C. Rebuttal
On rebuttal, Officer Ibanez testified that in his unrecorded conversation with Johnson in the living room that morning, Johnson did not say that Doe 1 hit him. Johnson indicated that he and Doe 1 had a purely verbal argument and denied that anything physical happened between them. Johnson denied having a gun or ever saying that he was going to shoot himself if the police came.
D. Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
The jury found Johnson guilty as charged on all counts. As to count 1 (first-degree residential burglary), the jury found true the allegation that Johnson was armed with a firearm during the commission of the burglary. As to count 5 (dissuading a witness by force or threat), the jury found true the allegation that Johnson personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense. On December 16, 2019, the trial court denied Johnson probation and sentenced him to state prison for three years. Johnson appealed.2
DISCUSSION
A. Count 5 – Substantial Evidence
Johnson raises as his first issue on appeal a substantial evidence challenge to his count 5 conviction for dissuading a witness under
1. Applicable Law
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, “ ‘the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496.)
“Section 136.1 criminalizes trying to dissuade a [witness] from reporting a crime. The offense can be either a misdemeanor or felony; if the perpetrator tried to dissuade by using force or the threat of force, it is a felony.” (People v. Ortiz (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 410, 415–416.)
Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) (“section 136.1(b)(1)”), which defines the basic crime, provides in part: “Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by a imprisonment in county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison: [¶] (1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer . . .” (
Section 136.1(c)(1), which defines the aggravated form of the crime and subjects the perpetrator to higher penalties, provides in relevant part: “Every person doing any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b) knowingly and maliciously under any one or more of the following circumstances, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years under any of the following circumstances: [¶] (1) Where the act is accompanied by force or by an express or implied threat of force or violence, upon a witness or victim or any third person or the property of any victim, witness, or any third person.” (
Thus, under
2. Analysis
Johnson contends he cannot be guilty of felony dissuasion under
The People acknowledge that Johnson’s conviction for count 5 was not based on any threat to shoot another person. Nor do the People dispute that his count 5 conviction was based on his act of pointing a gun to his head and threatening to blow his brains out. Rather, they argue Johnson’s threat of self-harm constituted threat to a “third person” within the meaning of
Thus, Johnson’s substantial evidence argument raises an issue of statutory construction concerning the meaning of “third person” in
“In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056 (Lopez).) “ ‘The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.’ ” (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) “If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 1056.)
“ ‘If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider “a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” [Citation.] Using these extrinsic aids, we “select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than
Here, we need not look beyond the statute’s plain meaning to determine whether the Legislature intended a threat of harm to oneself to constitute a threat to a “third person” to be guilty of attempted dissuasion. Section 136.1(c)(1) unambiguously requires that a felonious act of attempted dissuasion be “accompanied by force or by an express or implied threat of force or violence[] upon a witness or victim or any third person.” (
Applying these dictionary definitions in a reasonable and common-sense manner, we conclude that “third person” as used in
For count 5, the prosecution presented no argument or evidence that Johnson threatened anyone else beyond himself, relying solely on his statement that he would blow his brains out if the police were called to support the charge. Because there was no substantial evidence of harm to a third person, we conclude that substantial evidence did not support the count 5 conviction of attempting to dissuade a witness in violation of
The People’s arguments do not compel us to go beyond our plain meaning analysis or to adopt a different construction. The People do not identify any ambiguities in the statutory text, nor do they seek to present any extrinsic materials relevant to the construction of the statutory language.3
Assembly Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) (“AB 2909“) revised California‘s witness intimidation statutes by (among other things) adding
The People further argue that had the Legislature intended for defendants to be excluded, it could have easily stated that the act of dissuasion becomes a felony when it is accompanied by a threat of force or violence upon a witness or victim or “anyone other than the defendant.” This, too, is not persuasive. The Legislature could have chosen to explicitly include a threatened act of self-harm within the ambit of
Finally, the People argue excluding harm to oneself from threats upon “third persons” would lead to absurd results. They assert, “The Legislature could not possibly have intended to exclude a situation where, as here, the defendant threatened suicide in order to manipulate his family members into refraining from calling the police.” We acknowledge the force of this argument, especially on the facts of this case where the threat of self-harm could be used to exploit close family connections and a child‘s affection for her parent. Nonetheless, we do not consider the result absurd in light of the
If Johnson‘s attempts to dissuade a witness by threatening to harm himself and no one else should be considered only as a felony, it is for the Legislature to say. We ” ‘may not rewrite statutes to supply omitted terms or to conform to an assumed, unexpressed legislative intent.’ ” (People v. Harper (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 520, 524.)
Because we conclude there was insufficient evidence to support Johnson‘s count 5 conviction as a straight felony under
B. Count 2 – Instructional Error
Next, Johnson turns to his count 2 conviction for dissuading a witness under
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM 2623 as follows: “If you find the defendant guilty of intimidating a witness, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegations that the defendant acted maliciously and used or threatened to use force. [¶] To prove these allegations, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant acted maliciously; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant used force or threatened, either directly or indirectly, to use force or violence on the person of a witness, victim, or any other person.”
Johnson claims the instruction incorrectly states the law with respect to dissuading a witness under
We agree with the People‘s contention that Johnson forfeited this argument by not objecting to or requesting modification of CALCRIM 2623 in the trial court. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260 [defendant‘s failure to object to jury instruction generally forfeits appellate review]; People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 498 (Campbell).)
Here, we find that Johnson‘s substantial rights were not affected because it is not reasonably probable that he would have achieved a more favorable result if the trial court had not given the challenged jury instruction.
First, we have already reversed Johnson‘s conviction on count 5, ante, which was based on a statement that only threatened harm to himself (i.e, he would blow his brains out if police came to the house). Accordingly, any CALCRIM 2623 instructional error has no impact on his count 5 conviction.
Second, we harbor no reasonable doubt that the outcome on count 2 would have been better for Johnson had he secured a clarifying instruction that threats of self-harm do not violate
Additionally, there is no dispute that count 2 was based on Johnson‘s statement to Doe 1 that they would both be dead if she called the police. The jury found Johnson made the statement because it convicted him on count 2, as well as the count 3 criminal threats charge which was based on the same statement. Based on this evidence, the jury could not have concluded that Johnson threatened to kill himself without also concluding he threated to kill Doe 1 if she called the police. Thus, in light of the threat to Doe 1 encompassed by Johnson‘s statement that they would both be dead, his count 2 conviction could not have been based solely on a threat of self-harm.
Moreover, the prosecution‘s closing arguments to the jury on count 2 emphasized the threat to Doe 1 in Johnson‘s statement. Discussing the count 2 charge in conjunction with the count 3 criminal threats charge, the prosecutor noted Johnson‘s statement “willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to (Jane Doe 1).” The prosecutor described the fear Johnson attempted to instill in Doe 1 by coming into her room that night “saying, If you call the police, you‘ll be dead.” The prosecutor did not invoke Johnson‘s threat of self-harm as a basis for Doe 1‘s fear.
C. Count 2 – Classification as “Violent” Felony
Johnson‘s abstract of judgment classifies his count 2 conviction for dissuading a witness by force or threat in violation of
Under
Under
The parties agree none of these situations are applicable to Johnson‘s count 2 conviction. The People further recognize that for count 2, the prosecution neither alleged nor proved that Johnson used a firearm in the commission of that crime. We agree with the parties. Thus, Johnson‘s conviction in count 2 should not be classified a violent felony within the meaning of
D. The Booking Fee
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $564 “booking fee” pursuant to
AB 1869, which took effect on July 1, 2021, was enacted by the Legislature “to eliminate the range of administrative fees that agencies and courts are authorized to impose to fund elements of the criminal legal system and to eliminate all outstanding debt incurred as a result of the imposition of administrative fees.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 2.) Among other things, AB 1869 repealed Government Code sections 29550.1, 29550.2, and 29550.3, which authorized trial courts to impose a criminal justice administration fee, generally known as a booking fee (People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 865). (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, §§ 24–26.) It also added
Under
The People do not dispute that the unpaid balance of the booking fee became unenforceable and uncollectible when AB 1869 went into effect. They argue, however, that the fee “need not be vacated because under the express terms of AB 1869,” the fee “automatically became uncollectible . . . without the involvement of the courts.” This argument has been rejected by numerous courts in light of the clear statutory language declaring such fees to be “unenforceable and uncollectible” and that “any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” (
DISPOSITION
Johnson‘s count 5 conviction under
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Petrou, J.
WE CONCUR:
Tucher, P.J.
Rodríguez, J.
Trial Judge: Hon. Christopher Bowen
Counsel: Office of Attorney General, Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney general, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Teresa Torreblanca and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
First District Appellate Project, Jonathan Soglin; Law Offices of Tiffany J. Gates, Tiffany J. Gates, for Defendant and Appellant.