People v. MatthewsPeople v. Matthews
Defendant Melvin Dwayne Matthews appeals from judgments issued by the Humboldt County Superior Court in three cases brought by the Humboldt County District Attorney in 2017 and/or 2018. Matthews was sentenced to a stipulated total of 10 years in state prison in a single negotiated disposition of all three cases. He contends that we should strike the four one-year terms imposed under the resulting plea agreement based on a revision to
We first determine that we have jurisdiction to consider these appeals even though Matthews did not seek a certificate of probable cause for any of them. We agree that the four one-year enhancement terms must be stricken. We further conclude that, based on the express terms of the plea agreement,1 the court should leave the remainder of the sentences imposed intact.
The district attorney charged Matthews in the first case, number CR1702609 (Case 1), with felony grand theft (
In May 2019, Matthews and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement in which they stipulated to specific sentences in all three cases. Matthews filled out a change of plea form for each case in which he wrote the sentences agreed to for that case, which form also was executed by his attorney, the prosecutor and the court. In each instance, he indicated there was no sentencing decision left to the court‘s discretion by not initialing the section on the form stating that his was an “open plea.”
Specifically, Matthews indicated on his change of plea form for Case 1 that he would plead guilty to felony grand theft and admit the prior strike allegation, for which he would be sentenced to six years, consisting of a three-year upper term that would be doubled to six years because of the prior strike. Further, he would admit four of the five allegations that he had suffered prior prison terms, for which he would be sentenced to four one-year terms under
As indicated on his change of plea form for Case 2, Matthews would plead guilty to resisting arrest (
The trial court found Matthews guilty of the charges to which he pleaded, found the allegations admitted true, and sentenced Matthews to the sentences
DISCUSSION
Under the version of
I. We Have Jurisdiction to Consider Matthews‘s Appeal.
Before we address the merits of Matthews‘s appeals, we address whether we have jurisdiction to consider them even though he appeals from judgments resulting from a negotiated disposition without obtaining any certificates of probable cause from the trial court.
A certificate of probable cause is required where the claim raised on appeal “is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus rendering
Regarding the retroactive application of changes in the law, “the general rule in California is that a plea agreement is ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy.’ ” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 73 (Doe); Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 990-992 [prosecution cannot withdraw from plea agreement calling for specified term following retroactive application of new law reducing offense to a misdemeanor] (Harris).) Thus, “requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of [a] plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction. To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law.” (Doe, at pp. 73-74.) The Legislature acknowledged the authority of Doe in
People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Hurlic) is particularly instructive. The Hurlic court reasoned that a general contract rule applied to plea agreements; that is, that future changes in law are incorporated into such agreements absent an express agreement to the contrary. (Id. at p. 57; see also People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767 [“A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles“].) The Hurlic court also concluded the underlying purposes of the certificate of probable cause requirement—to encourage and facilitate plea agreements, and to ” ‘weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals’ “—were not served by requiring the defendant to obtain a certificate in cases where the defendant‘s entitlement to retroactive application of a new law was undisputed. (Hurlic, at pp. 57-58; see also People v. Baldivia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1079 [concluding, among other things, that the defendant‘s claim to procedural entitlements provided by Proposition 57 was not an attack on the validity of his plea and did not require a certificate of probable cause].)
The reasoning and holdings of those cases do not apply here because the cases involved laws that changed a court‘s mandatory imposition of a sentence to a discretionary one. (People v. Fox, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127; Galindo, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 604.) They held that under such a circumstance, a defendant‘s challenge of the previously mandatory sentence was a challenge to the underlying plea agreement itself and, therefore, required a certificate of probable cause. (E.g., Galindo, at p. 670.) Here, Senate Bill No. 136 does not allow a court‘s discretionary modification of a sentence. Rather, it entirely eliminates application of the sentence enhancement called for in the previous version of
II. The Enhancements Must Be Stricken.
Regarding the merits of Matthews‘s appeal, we conclude the
Absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, when an act of the Legislature lessens or eliminates the prescribed punishment for a criminal offense or a sentencing enhancement, such a penalty reduction must be applied retroactively to all judgments not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-748; accord, People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 792 (Nasalga) [“The rule in Estrada has been applied to statutes governing penalty enhancements, as well as to statutes governing substantive offenses“]; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323 [courts assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended an “amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute‘s operative date“].) “[F]or the purpose of determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed.” (Nasalga, at p. 790, fn. 5.)
In People v. Millan (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 450, the appellate court addressed a circumstance similar to the one here. It considered whether, under In re Estrada, a new law that “remove[d] a number of prior convictions from the list of prior convictions that qualify a defendant for the imposition” of an enhancement under the Health and Safety Code applied retroactively to non-final judgments. (Millan, at p. 454.) The court concluded the law applied retroactively because it was “undisputed that the amendment . . . lessens punishment for a person . . . whose prior convictions no longer qualify for the . . . enhancement. Rather than being subjected to a three-year enhancement for each prior conviction, such persons are no longer subject to any enhanced punishment pursuant to the amended statute.” (Id. at pp. 455-456.)
Similarly, the Legislature‘s change to
Regarding the remedy, Matthews argues we should remand to the trial court with instructions to strike the four one-year enhancement terms imposed under the previous version of
A plea agreement is a binding contract. “[T]he process of plea negotiation ‘contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. [Citations.] Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged. [Citation.] This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the imposition of such clement punishment [citation], by the People‘s acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that charged . . . , or by the prosecutor‘s dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-count indictment or information. Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the “bargain” worked out by the defense and prosecution. [Citations.] But implicit in all of this is a process of “bargaining” between the adverse parties to the case—the People represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his counsel on the other—which bargaining results in an agreement between them.’ ” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929-930 (Segura).)
“Because a negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,’ it is interpreted according to general contract principles. [Citations.] Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement. [Citations.] ’ “When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of
Furthermore, ” [a] negotiated plea agreement . . . is interpreted according to general contract principles. . . . ‘If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (
Here, the express provisions of the plea agreement, as evidenced by the forms filled out by Matthews and executed by the parties and the court for all three cases, plainly provide for stipulated sentences. Specifically, the forms reflect that Matthews was to receive, besides the prior prison term enhancements, a six-year term for felony grand theft with a prior strike conviction in Case 1 and concurrent three-year sentences in Cases 2 and 3. Each of the plea forms indicates the plea was not an “open plea,” and the court‘s sentencing minute orders indicate Matthews was sentenced to the “stipulated” terms. Under these circumstances, contract law binds the parties and the court to the stipulated sentences. (See People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992 [trial court could not change a sentence clearly and unequivocally stipulated to in a plea agreement even though a codefendant had received a lesser sentence]; People v. Rodriguez (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1569 [under
In addressing a slightly different question, Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th 984 noted a similar legislative intent regarding Proposition 47. Harris entered into a plea agreement under which he had pleaded guilty to grand theft and admitted an enhancement allegation in exchange for a fixed term and dismissal of a robbery charge and other enhancement allegations. (Id. at p. 987.) Subsequently, Harris sought to have his grand theft conviction resentenced as a misdemeanor under a new law, Proposition 47. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court, concluding that Proposition 47 applied to Harris, considered whether its application entitled the prosecution to unilaterally withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the original charges. (Id. at pp. 989-993.) It concluded the People could not withdraw, both based on contract law and Proposition 47‘s purposes, as indicated by its terms and as expressed in the voter information guide. (Ibid.) Regarding the initiative‘s purposes, the court reasoned, “One of Proposition 47‘s primary purposes is to reduce the number of nonviolent offenders in state prisons, thereby saving money and focusing prison on offenders considered more serious under the terms of the initiative. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 2, p. 70; [citation].) Accepting the People‘s position would be at odds with that purpose. As Justice Mosk observed in dissent below, ‘If a reduction of a sentence under Proposition 47 results in the reinstatement of the original charges and elimination of the plea agreement, the financial and social benefits of Proposition 47 would not be realized, and the voters’ intent and expectations would be frustrated.’ ” (Id. at 992.)
Here, similarly, the purposes of Senate Bill No. 136 would be frustrated if the trial court were allowed to unilaterally alter agreed-to terms of a plea agreement after striking enhancement sentences as required by Senate Bill No. 136. The author of that bill noted that ” ‘evidence shows that longer and overly-punitive sentences are extremely expensive and increase the chances that someone will reoffend’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 13, 2019, p. 3)
We conclude the trial court cannot, in striking the enhancements invalidated by Senate Bill No. 136, reconsider other aspects of the sentences Matthews and the People specifically agreed to under the plea agreements.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is ordered to strike Matthews‘s four one-year sentences imposed under
STEWART, J.
We concur.
KLINE, P.J.
MILLER, J.
People v. Matthews (A157723)
Trial Court: Humboldt County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Kaleb V. Cockrum
Counsel:
Stephanie Clarke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, René A. Chacón, Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.