THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN DWAYNE MATTHEWS, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
No. A157723
Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two
April 15, 2020
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Humboldt County Super. Ct. Nos. CR1702609, CR1801307, CR1803214)
We first determine that we have jurisdiction to consider these appeals even though Matthews did not seek a certificate of probable cause for any of them. We agree that the four one-year enhancement terms must be stricken.
BACKGROUND
The district attorney charged Matthews in the first case, number CR1702609 (Case 1), with felony grand theft (
In May 2019, Matthews and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement in which they stipulated to specific sentences in all three cases. Matthews filled out a change of plea form for each case in which he wrote the sentences agreed to for that case, which form also was executed by his attorney, the prosecutor and the court. In each instance, he indicated there was no sentencing decision left to the court‘s discretion by not initialing the section on the form stating that his was an “open plea.”
Specifically, Matthews indicated on his change of plea form for Case 1 that he would plead guilty to felony grand theft and admit the prior strike
As indicated on his change of plea form for Case 2, Matthews would plead guilty to resisting arrest (
The trial court found Matthews guilty of the charges to which he pleaded, found the allegations admitted true, and sentenced Matthews to the sentences the court stated were “stipulated” by the parties. Matthews timely appealed from the judgment in each case. He did not request a certificate of probable cause in any of the cases. We asked, and the parties filed, supplemental briefing, including regarding whether we have jurisdiction to consider Matthews‘s appeals despite the absence of any certificates of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Under the version of
I. We Have Jurisdiction to Consider Matthews‘s Appeal.
Before we address the merits of Matthews‘s appeals, we address whether we have jurisdiction to consider them even though he appeals from judgments resulting from a negotiated disposition without obtaining any certificates of probable cause from the trial court.
Regarding the retroactive application of changes in the law, “the general rule in California is that a plea agreement is ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy.’ ” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 73 (Doe); Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 990-992 [prosecution cannot withdraw from plea agreement calling for specified term following retroactive application of new law reducing offense to a misdemeanor] (Harris).) Thus, “requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of [a] plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction. To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law.” (Doe, at pp. 73-74.) The Legislature acknowledged the authority of Doe in
Some recent appellate courts have required certificates of probable cause in order to consider whether changes in the law applied to cases resolved by negotiated disposition. For example, in People v. Fox (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1135, review granted July 31, 2019, S256298, the appellate court held that a certificate of probable cause was required where a defendant entered a plea after the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 620, and an attorney‘s argument at sentencing indicated the defendant would not benefit from the change in the law. (See also People v. Galindo (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 658, 670 (Galindo), review granted Aug. 28, 2019, S256568; People v. Williams (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 602, 605, review granted Sept. 25, 2019, S257538 [both regarding Sen. Bill No. 1393]; contra, People v. Stamps
The reasoning and holdings of those cases do not apply here because the cases involved laws that changed a court‘s mandatory imposition of a sentence to a discretionary one. (People v. Fox, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127; Galindo, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 604.) They held that under such a circumstance, a defendant‘s challenge of the previously mandatory sentence was a challenge to the underlying plea agreement itself and, therefore, required a certificate of probable cause. (E.g., Galindo, at p. 670.) Here, Senate Bill No. 136 does not allow a court‘s discretionary modification of a sentence. Rather, it entirely eliminates application of the sentence enhancement called for in the previous version of
II. The Enhancements Must Be Stricken.
Regarding the merits of Matthews‘s appeal, we conclude the
Absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, when an act of the Legislature lessens or eliminates the prescribed punishment for a criminal offense or a sentencing enhancement, such a penalty reduction must be applied retroactively to all judgments not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-748; accord, People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th
In People v. Millan (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 450, the appellate court addressed a circumstance similar to the one here. It considered whether, under In re Estrada, a new law that “remove[d] a number of prior convictions from the list of prior convictions that qualify a defendant for the imposition” of an enhancement under the Health and Safety Code applied retroactively to non-final judgments. (Millan, at p. 454.) The court concluded the law applied retroactively because it was “undisputed that the amendment . . . lessens punishment for a person . . . whose prior convictions no longer qualify for the . . . enhancement. Rather than being subjected to a three-year enhancement for each prior conviction, such persons are no longer subject to any enhanced punishment pursuant to the amended statute.” (Id. at pp. 455-456.)
Similarly, the Legislature‘s change to
III. The Trial Court Cannot Alter the Sentences Agreed to Under the Plea Agreement.
Regarding the remedy, Matthews argues we should remand to the trial court with instructions to strike the four one-year enhancement terms imposed under the previous version of
A plea agreement is a binding contract. “[T]he process of plea negotiation ‘contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. [Citations.] Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged. [Citation.] This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by
“Because a negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract,’ it is interpreted according to general contract principles. [Citations.] Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement. [Citations.] ’ “When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 930-931.) “Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, ‘a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain. [Citation.] “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.” [Citation.] Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly.’ ” (Id. at p. 931; accord, (K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 303-304.) “[I]n the context of a negotiated plea the trial court may approve or reject the parties’ agreement, but the court may not attempt to secure such a plea by stepping into the role
Furthermore, ” [a] negotiated plea agreement . . . is interpreted according to general contract principles. . . . ‘If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (
Here, the express provisions of the plea agreement, as evidenced by the forms filled out by Matthews and executed by the parties and the court for all three cases, plainly provide for stipulated sentences. Specifically, the forms reflect that Matthews was to receive, besides the prior prison term enhancements, a six-year term for felony grand theft with a prior strike conviction in Case 1 and concurrent three-year sentences in Cases 2 and 3.
In addressing a slightly different question, Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th 984 noted a similar legislative intent regarding Proposition 47. Harris entered into a plea agreement under which he had pleaded guilty to grand theft and admitted an enhancement allegation in exchange for a fixed term and dismissal of a robbery charge and other enhancement allegations. (Id. at p. 987.) Subsequently, Harris sought to have his grand theft conviction resentenced as a misdemeanor under a new law, Proposition 47. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court, concluding that Proposition 47 applied to Harris, considered whether its application entitled the prosecution to unilaterally withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the original charges. (Id. at pp. 989-993.) It concluded the People could not withdraw, both based on contract law and Proposition 47‘s purposes, as indicated by its terms and as expressed in the voter information guide. (Ibid.) Regarding the initiative‘s
Here, similarly, the purposes of Senate Bill No. 136 would be frustrated if the trial court were allowed to unilaterally alter agreed-to terms of a plea agreement after striking enhancement sentences as required by Senate Bill No. 136. The author of that bill noted that ” ‘evidence shows that longer and overly-punitive sentences are extremely expensive and increase the chances that someone will reoffend’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 13, 2019, p. 3) and that the bill would, among other things, ” ‘save California tax payers tens of millions [of] dollars each year,’ and ‘keep families together, redirect funds to evidence-based rehabilitation and reintegration programs, and move California away from our failed mass incarceration policies.’ ” (Ibid.) These benefits would not be fully realized if the trial courts and the People could abandon a plea agreement whenever a defendant seeks retroactively to obtain elimination of an enhancement invalidated by Senate Bill No. 136.
We conclude the trial court cannot, in striking the enhancements invalidated by Senate Bill No. 136, reconsider other aspects of the sentences Matthews and the People specifically agreed to under the plea agreements.
The trial court is ordered to strike Matthews‘s four one-year sentences imposed under
STEWART, J.
We concur.
KLINE, P.J.
MILLER, J.
People v. Matthews (A157723)
Trial Judge: Hon. Kaleb V. Cockrum
Counsel:
Stephanie Clarke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, René A. Chacón, Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.