People v. GarciaPeople v. Garcia
OPINION
DIBIASO, J.
This court has recently experimented in selected cases with memorandum opinions—that is, opinions with little or no reference to the evidence or the procedural history of the action and with an abbreviated discussion of the relevant legal issues and authorities. We take the opportunity presented by appellant Steven Anthony Garcia‘s petition for rehearing to confirm the propriety of memorandum opinions in unpublished cases and to signal the bar that it will likely see an increase in the frequency of such opinions, civil and criminal, from this court.1
DISCUSSION
I.
Review by the Courts of Appeal can serve three purposes—the determination of the legal correctness of the challenged trial court action, the progressive development of the law, and, to some degree but less so than review by the Supreme Court, the uniformity of the law in the jurisdiction. (See People v. Rojas (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 278, 289; Aldisert, Opinion Writing (1990), § 2.9, p. 21; Cal.
An opinion which has none of these attributes furthers only the “review for correctness” function of the Court of Appeal, and, as such, does not merit extensive factual or legal statement.4(People v. Rojas, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 289.) A meticulously crafted but unpublished legal essay, replete with extended analyses of law and expositions of reasoning and which distinguishes authorities and responds to every nuance of argument in the parties’ briefs, requires the devotion of a share of the Court of Appeal‘s limited human and material resources far out of proportion to the utility of the effort. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 682, pp. 715-716.) An unpublished opinion has a limited audience, for the most part only the parties, and, beyond the ultimate disposition, is of little worth even to the parties. The parties already know (or should know) the facts of the case and its procedural history, and it is likely the winner does not care about how the court arrived at the favorable result and the loser probably would not be convinced by the reasoning no matter how long or specific it is, or, more to the point, how persuasive the court might think it is.
To the extent an unpublished opinion may have a lingering legal significance to the parties or other affected persons or entities (see rule 977(b)), a comprehensive decision is still unneeded. Whether a prior memorandum opinion establishes the law of the case can be resolved by reference to the issues and reasons expressed in the opinion as dispositive of the appeal; any unmentioned issues would arguably be unbinding dicta. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 838 P.2d 250; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 399, 197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720 [applying doctrine to issues “implicitly decided” in prior case]; Quackenbush v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal. App.4th 867, 874, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 [doctrine does not apply to dicta]; Muktarian v. Barmby (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 966, 968, 70 Cal.Rptr. 903 [doctrine does not apply to facts]; see Ninth Circuit Rules, rule 36-3(b).) If more information is necessary, resort can be had to the trial and appellate records. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,
Whatever interest an appellate opinion may have to the parties or persons or entities legally affected by the decision, it has essentially no value beyond them, because it provides no useful—or perhaps more accurately, no usable—guidance to the bench, bar, or public. (Rule 977(a).)
The late Bernie Witkin long ago said what is even more compelling today:
“Why do appellate courts write opinions in nearly all the appeals that come before them? Judges and lawyers have been asking this question with increasing concern, and no one has come up with a satisfactory answer. We plow and replow the fields of precedent, burying leading cases in an incredible mass of repetitive churnings of settled law, exhausting the appellate justices and the appellate lawyers, because it has always been done this way. But we are now faced with the realization that the individually prepared legal essay, the product of countless hours of precious judicial time, is an impossible procedure for handling today‘s monstrous caseload, and in the majority of appeals it serves no useful social purpose. [¶] ... [¶]
“This is the heart of the problem: There is no reason and no time for legal essays to be written on all appealed cases, whether the essays are long or short. The full-scale opinion, stating the nature of the action, the issues, the facts, the law, and the reasoning that leads to the decision, should be reserved for cases in which that opinion will add something of significance to the law— new principles or rules, or new applications of old principles or rules.” (Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) § 131, pp. 255-256.)
Memorandum opinions may vary in style, from a stereotyped checklist or “fill in the blanks” form to a tailored summary of the critical facts and the applicable law. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 681, pp. 714-715; Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions, supra, §§ 142, 143, pp. 265-266; Aldisert, Opinion Writing, supra, § 2.8, p. 20.) The briefest formats are appropriate in cases where the result is controlled by an admittedly constitutional statute and which present no special question of interpretation or application, cases where the result is controlled by an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of California, or, in the absence of either, where the result is consistent with an intermediate federal or state appellate decision with which the court agrees, cases where the factual contentions are subject to the routine application of the substantial evidence rule, cases decided by applying the authority of a companion case, cases in which the result is mandated by the United
A memorandum decision does not automatically violate the constitutional mandate that appellate opinions state the reasons for the disposition. (
Of course, an adequate abbreviated opinion must not mask an inadequate abbreviated appellate review. A memorandum opinion, no matter its format, should represent the end-product of an internal evaluation by the court and its staff sufficient to ensure that the disposition reflects the correct legal result. Ordinarily, the process will include substantiation of the material facts cited by the parties and confirmation of the controlling law, whether or not cited by the parties, and a thorough analysis of the arguments of the parties based upon the material facts and the applicable law. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 682, p. 716.) When appropriate, the court always has the option of requesting supplemental briefing on any issue, raised or not by the briefs, the court believes might be dispositive. (See
Finally, a memorandum opinion does not impede a party‘s ability to secure review by the California Supreme Court. First, the Supreme Court generally acts only where necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle an important question of law in matters of statewide impact. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a); In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 912, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 265, 872 P.2d 1190 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 431, fn. 3, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 491, 841 P.2d 1011.) Issues of this scale are not appropriate for memorandum dispositions, and thus likely will not be candidates for Supreme Court attention. (Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1264, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 85, 970 P.2d 872; People v. Groves (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 317, 321-324.) Second, if a party disagrees with the Court of Appeal‘s selection of the material facts or identification of the applicable law, the party can petition for a rehearing and point out the deficiencies in the court‘s opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(2); see Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1000, 30 P.3d 57, fn. 2; People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1083, fn. 6, 112 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 32 P.3d 1073; Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1264, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 85, 970 P.2d 872; Artiglio v. Corning, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 608, fn. 2, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 479, 957 P.2d 1313; People v. Groves, supra, 9 Cal.App.2d at pp. 321-324.)6
II**
DISPOSITION
The sentence as to count 8 is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing on that count alone. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ARDAIZ, P.J., and HARRIS, J.