*1 No. 31780. Dec. [L.A. 1983.] al.,
LESTER E. OLSON et Plaintiffs and Appellants, CORY, al., KENNETH Controller, as State et Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel Levit, Silberberg, J. Lavan, Henry H. & Stroock & William Stroock Chernick for Gibson, and Richard Dunn & Crutcher A. Nagle, Margaret Plaintiffs and Appellants. Larson, County Shuman, H. John Gercovich, Robert D.
Lawrence E. Moore, Counsel, J. Richard Counsel, Melom, County Halvor Deputy S. Siemsen, County Delbert M. Counsel, and Daniel Blackstock County Viau, Counsel, County R. B. Counsel, Clausen, Floyd County John B. Counsel, Curiel, County Counsel, and Robert D. W. Schneider Raymond Counsel, Jordan, Jr., Counsel, County Harmon, B. County Ralph James H. Counsel, County Maloney, J. Douglas County John R. Irby, Deputy R. Counsel, Ralph Counsel, Koch, DeLay Paul County Russell M. Counsel, Adrian Hackett, Kuchler, Counsel, County W. Stephen County County Counsel, Geerlings, and Gerald J. James H. Angelí County Kuyper, Counsel, Marks, Counsel, Elam, County Counsel, Alan K. County Lee B. Attorney, Counsel, City P. Clark, Agnost, George Donald L. County Lindholm, Jr., Sherwin, Counsel, County James P. A. County Gerald Counsel, Fox, P. George Counsel, County James P. Keith C. Sorenson and Levine, Nelson, Counsel, Chief Marvin County Kenneth L. Kading Counsel, Jr., Brown, Clair Counsel, County V. I. County Selby Assistant Lamoree, Counsel, and Charles O. Carlson, Milton Goldinger County A. Counsel, Botz, W. Counsel, Boyne, Gilbert County James P. County Counsel, Larsen, E. Baldwin Counsel, Calvin County Darrell W. County Schechter, Counsel, Bowman, County L. County Dorothy D. and Thomas Counsel, and John Counsel, Mack, Deukmejian County George Charles R. Radosh, General, Deputy and Richard M. Attorneys K. Van de Kamp, General, for Defendants Attorney Respondents.
Opinion
REYNOSO,
claim interest on
and judicial pensioners
Plaintiff judges
J.
entitled in
and
to
court held them
salary
pension
the
increases which this
636 P.2d
Olson v.
We reach conclusions: The plaintiffs following (Cal. courts of record on amounts due as increases in salaries of of judges Const., VI, 1) in under the Retirement Judges’ art. and pensions payable §
396 (Gov. Code, Law et 75000 The trial order was not seq.).1 court’s ap- nonetheless, under the pealable; unusual circumstances of this case we reach the merits by as a a of treating appeal for writ mandate. petition 1, 1977,
Before in being amended January effective Government (hereafter Code section 68203) section that jus- salaries of provided tices of Court Supreme and of and of judges Courts of Appeal and courts were superior municipal increased on of 1st September each with year accordance the California consumer index.2 The price 1976 amendment that provided the salaries should be increased according 1, 1978, index each July with and that each in- beginning July crease should not exceed percent.3 3, 1977,
Plaintiffs this action on brought August were alleging they and court and superior municipal judges of under the recipients pensions Judges’ Retirement Law and praying for declaration that the 1976 amend- ment was unconstitutional and that therefore were entitled and they to salary pension increases accordance with section 68203 the amendment. prior named as defendants complaint the State Controller and the An- Los geles County Auditor-Controller and declared that the action was being on behalf of all brought judges California courts of and all record retired and judges widows judges’ entitled to filed By Febru- pensions. stipulation 17, 1978, the ary was amended to complaint also for con- pray damages sisting and retirement salary benefits due under section 68203 prior amendment, together with interest “at lawful rate” and fees attorney under (sought theories). various On ren- February trial court dered that the judgment 1976 amendment to declaring section 68203 was unconstitutional and over all reserving jurisdiction other matters including certification, interest, class fees. attorney any interest, 1 To possibility disqualifying avoid of a conflict each of. member this court hearing this case waived has all to receive of the interest sought herein by plaintiffs. amendment, 2 Before provided: the 1976 section . . “. effective date of the [o]n September year 1969 amendments to this salary section and on of each thereafter the inclusive, justice judge each named in Sections shall be increased produced by that amount which is multiplying justice judge the then current each *7 by percentage by the figure representing price which the the consumer California index as compiled reported by and Department the of Industrial Relations has in California increased 1969, (Stats. 1507, 1.) previous year.” the calendar ch. § 1, 1978, 1977, 1, January 3 Asof provided: July July and section 68203 “On on 1 of each year 68202, salary justice thereafter the in judge each and named Sections 68200 to inclusive, by by shall be increased that produced multiplying amount which is the then salary justice figure current judge percentage representing each or which price compiled the California consumer index reported Department as and the California previous year, of Industrial but Relations has increased in calendar not to exceed five (5%).” (Stats. 1976, 1183, 4.) percent ch. § modification, and, be- 27, 1980, after filed March Cory Olson v. was amend- that the 1976 27, The concluded final on June 1980. opinion came (1) or judge be constitutionally applied ment to section 68203 “cannot of a office, predeces- term of office term of or unexpired justice during term’) (a thereof sor, ‘protected if some portion served judge justice benefits are whose 1977, (2) a judicial pensioner to 1 and January prior judge justice of the salary amount of based on some proportionate extent, the 546.) judgment that (27 at To that office.” Cal.3d p. occupying affirmed; in other it was reversed. respects filed a 18, 1980, court judges complaint On three municipal April auditors or controllers in intervention the intervention as defendants naming relief similar (in asking of some counties addition to Los thirty Angeles) in the to that sought principal complaint. the trial court of plaintiffs,
In at August September request the back salaries defendants from more than enjoined percent paying but is inferred (Such order is not in the record due under Olson v. I. an briefs.) The in later trial and in the apparent from references proceedings of plaintiffs’ attorney of the order or orders was to secure payment purpose fees. Public 8, 1980, of the Employ-
On October the Board of Administration aby reciting ees’ Retirement was made a defendant System stipulation Controller, 1, 1979, as administrator it had succeeded the July Code, fn. (See post.) Retirement Fund. Gov. Judges’ date, for “an order de- On the filed a motion same October plaintiffs are entitled that there is no substantial controversy plaintiffs termining pension interest at the rate on the retroactive legal to recover Court of the California Supreme due them pursuant opinion that the motion was action.” The memorandum stated accompanying this 437c, for an order to Code of Civil Procedure section made “pursuant without issues substantial controversy.” specifying as a class certified suit plaintiffs’
On December trial court and all judicial courts of record action on behalf of all of California judges under the Retirement Law. Judges’ pensioners 7, 1981, denied month, the trial court following January without to interest as an issue their right
motion for an order specifying for the period “no interest is It ruled that payable substantial controversy. and that “no became final” 27, 1980, to June when prior I] [Olson *8 interest is due on amounts withheld under the court order of September 1980, which amounts cannot be until further order of court.” paid
Plaintiffs filed a notice of from the trial court’s denial of timely appeal the motion.
Appealability Treating Appeal of Order: as
Petition
for Writ of Mandate
one of
Though
the briefs
that the
court’s
suggests
trial
was not
ruling
defendants,
all the
well
appealable,
as
that we
principal
plaintiffs, urge
Nonetheless,
review the
on its merits.
since the
ruling
question
our
appealability goes to
we are
to consider
jurisdiction,
dutybound
it
our
(Collins
own motion.
137];
v. Corse
provides summary judgments. After prescribing showing necessary a motion for support the section in subdi summary judgment, provides (f): vision it that the appears of such proof granting supports “[I]f motion as to some action, but not all the in issues involved ... shall, order, court that such issues are specify without substantial con At the troversy. ... trial the action the issue so shall be deemed specified established and the action shall as to the issues Sub proceed remaining.” (i) division where a provides: “Except separate judgment may properly action, awarded in the no final shall be entered on a motion for judgment action, termination to the summary judgment but the final prior judg shall, action, ment addition to matters determined award judg ment as established herein summary proceeding provided for.”
No motion, was entered on the trial court’s order judgment denying and the record makes clear that further were proceedings contemplated. Thus, action, 30, 1980, notice of class filed December explains relief, that the but also con- complaint declaratory sought only damages benefits, interest, sisting attorney retirement fees. The notice characterizes the that the 1976 trial court’s 1978 amendment ruling to section 68203 interlocutory was unconstitutional as “an declaratory judg- ment” and states that this court “rendered a decision” in Ol- subsequently I, son v. in detail. The notice conclusions that are reaching explained further “If who does not states: are a member of the class you request in, of, exclusion and wish to be included obtain the benefits and be you
399 do noth- action, need in this class you bound the entered judgments final (Italics ing.” supplied.) more final one or
Thus, entry that of it is apparent plaintiffs anticipated to subclasses) (i.e., subsequent final as to various judgments plaintiffs therefore taken. The ruling the which was from ruling present appeal was not a final judgment. is a closer order after judgment
Whether the was as an ruling appealable 904.1, (b), requires Code of Civil Procedure section subdivision question. In Olson that after a that was itself appealable. the order made judgment I, declaratory of the v. this court did not consider the Cory appealability that it affirmed in and reversed and judgment part part, apparently held with was court has of never raised. This question appealability declaratory judg to the and of respect finality, consequent appealability, test, ments be said that where no issue is it general may ... “[a]s left for of compliance noncompliance future consideration the fact except final, decree, with is but where anything the terms of the first that decree further of is in the nature of on the the court essential judicial part action to a is interlocu final determination of the the decree parties, rights 659, 11].) (1942) Goss 670 P.2d this tory.” (Lyon By 19 Cal.2d [123 test, the trial court Olson v. was not since judgment appealable class, had to award certify reserved jurisdiction plaintiff past expressly interest, to due and and fees and attorney award salary litigation expenses counsel. plaintiffs’ established, however, under the to have been appears
Appealability law of the of law of “Generally, doctrine case. the doctrine does not extend to which been but were points might case law have not and determined in As an presented prior appeal. excep [Citation.] rule, tion the doctrine . held general is . . applicable questions but to the decided decided because were essential expressly implicitly they Lodge, decision on the Nevcal Cal-Neva appeal Enterprises v. prior [citing Hor (1963) (32 106)].” (Estate Inc. 217 804 Cal.Rptr. of accord; 785]; (1971) man 5 Cal.3d 485 P.2d Wood Elling Corp. Cal.3d 289].) 755]; Edmonds P.2d
P.2d Davis v. 218 Cal. 358-359 [23 I, the was In Olson v. that the declaratory judgment proposition the decision” decided because . . . essential to appealable “implicitly rule. became the law the under the therefore case foregoing Since, case, this the declaratory judgment purposes was final were entitled back plaintiffs pension payments follow a declaration does it that the appealable, present ruling denying interest on those was an “order made after [an *10 (Code appealable Proc., 904.1, Civ. judgment” (b))? subd. final] § To be as appealable an order after the order must either affect judgment, the by relate to it it judgment enforcing (Williams its execution. staying v. Thomas (1980) 81, 108 141]; Witkin, 84 Cal.App.3d 6 Cal.Rptr. [166 Cal. (2d 1971) Procedure ed. 81.) rule, Under that an order Appeal, § interest denying on funds into court to a condemnation paid pursuant judg- ment has been held order appealable “any to enforcement of a relating judgment” by analogy (Rede- to a order costs. postjudgment determining velopment Agency (1975) 424,. v. Goodman 53 429 Cal.App.3d [125 818].) Cal.Rptr. the
Here trial court’s refusal to to interest for uphold plaintiffs’ rights (Code of Proc., 437c, purposes subsequent (f), (i)) trial Civ. subds. was not an order to relating enforcement aof the judgment because declaratory in I judgment adjudicated Olson v. was in Cory itself enforceable. The of relief “to purpose is the to declaratory enable their parties shape so conduct as to (Babb avoid a breach.” (1971) v. Court 3 Cal.3d Superior 841, 848 179, 379].) 479 Cal.Rptr. P.2d relief Though declaratory [92 may properly accompanied (see, relief Staley coercive v. Board by e.g., of Medical (1952) Examiners 61]), 109 6 P.2d the Cal.App.2d judg [240 in ment Olson I It contained no purely declaratory. enforceable such as provision, one a directing particular party a pay sum specified Hence, to another the party. trial court’s order now before us related not to enforcement the Olson v. only but judgment whether there should be a new declaration that have further plaintiffs rights in addition to those declared the order did judgment. Accordingly, not affect the or relate to judgment its enforcement and was not appealable as an order after onor judgment other basis. however,
It is urged, instead treat we dismissing appeal, it as a an for petition extraordinary writ. We are referred to cases in which Courts of have Appeal (See (1980) followed that course. Barnes v. Molino 786]; 103 51 Cal.App.3d (1978) v. Cimarusti 81 Cal.Rptr. People [162 421]; 320 Cal.App.3d (1977) Estate Hearst 67 Cal.Rptr. [146 821]; 781 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. Branham v. State Farm Mut. [136 Auto Ins. Co. Denial of Cal.App.3d 304]. for motion summary (Roman is reviewable writ of mandate. judgment by Catholic Archbishop Court Superior 338].) To wait for resolution of require parties
interest claim until all matters to be the trial disposition yet resolved since, court lead to might trial for unnecessary proceedings example, award of fees well be influenced final determination of attorney might lack of Thus, demonstrates sufficiently record interest claim. of the writ. for issuance at law remedy necessary adequate elements nec- include substance and briefs before us records an consists of “Ap- The record for writ of mandate. to a essary proceeding and the provisions in Lieu of Clerk’s Transcript,” pellant’s Appendix Court, (i)) rule 5.1 (Cal. Rules of its designed accuracy sanctions assure Code of Civil the verification required are the functional equivalent not a the trial court is 56(a). rule The fact that Procedure section 1086 and *11 that the court is no indication is not an obstacle since there party insuperable nominal more than a or become would separately respondent appear Cimarusti, 314, 320; Finan- U.S. 81 v. (People supra, party. 18].) 5, 12, fn. 6 (1974) Cal.Rptr. cial v. Sullivan 37 Cal.App.3d [112 for as a have to treat the appeal petition we thus Though power purported mandate, under unusual we not exercise that power except writ of should con- here. we have Though circumstances. Such circumstances are present was not reasoning cluded that the trial court’s ruling appealable, was far demonstrates that the issue of appealability led us to conclusion Moreover, from its ruling from clear in advance. even though appears of and to have been made history anticipation basis statutory procedural and counsel by a trial and we are assured judgment, by plaintiffs, subsequent defendants, that all issues in this litigation most of the county speaking to this court— have now been resolved for the one now presented except that of to briefed interest. That issue has been plaintiffs’ right thoroughly and and all decide it rather than dis- that we argued, parties strongly urge our To rather than exercising power miss dismiss the appeal. appeal would, unusual under the reach the merits a mandate through proceeding ” “ (See us, and circuitous.’ circumstances before ‘unnecessarily dilatory 884, 83, 378 (1963) McLellan Cal.Rptr. v. 59 Cal.2d Shepardson [27 man- 108].) for writ of P.2d we treat the as a Accordingly, petition appeal date.
Certainty Requirements 3287, (a) Section Subdivision of Civil Code 3287, subdi- Code section
Plaintiffs base their claims to interest on Civil to recover (a). damages It who is entitled vision provides: “Every person calculation, and the certain, or of certain by made capable being is entitled also to day, recover which is vested him upon particular time as the debtor such during recover interest thereon from that day, except the debt. This law, from paying or the act of the creditor is prevented from such and interest of recovery damages section is applicable county, municipal and debtor, city, city the state or including any county, district, corporation, public or subdivision public agency, any political the state.”
Amounts or recoverable as withheld wrongfully salary are (Sanders within the of these pensions damages meaning provisions. 252, (1970) 169, Los City Angeles Cal.3d 262-263 Cal.Rptr. [90 201]; 355, P.2d City (1963) Benson v. Los 60 Cal.2d 365-366 Angeles 649]; (1976) 384 P.2d Cal.Rptr. see also Tripp Swoap [33 Cal.3d 681-683 749].) 552 P.2d Interest is recoverable (Mass each salary pension payment from the date it fell due. v. Board (1964) Education 61 Cal.2d 624-625 394 P.2d of 579].) Defendants contend that and claims were plaintiffs’ salary pension certain, made “damages certain calculation” capable being Code, (Civ. (a)). subd. that until Olson v. They argue form, filed in its final there was over uncertainty identity judges pensioners entitled back pension payments *12 the of amounts each of those payments. 3287, the of Civil
Generally, certainty Code section sub required (a), facts, division is absent when the due on amounts turn but not disputed Central, when the is confined to the dispute (Esgro rules governing liability. 1054, Inc. General (1971) Ins. Co. 20 1060-1063 Cal.App.3d 153]; (1962) McConnell v. Mutual Co. Ins. Pacific Life 469, Here, 5].) 477-480 the amount due each of member of courts of record and plaintiff judicial class—judges 1977, 27, pensioners—at time and any point between June January (when final) Olson ICory became was either of two calcu readily lable amounts: or under 68203 as it salary due section read pension before the 1976 amendment or under that due the section as amended. The question whether to or under one version of pay any pensioner judge or the statute other did not on factual or any uncertainty depend dispute but on the solely answers to the of law resolved proper ultimately questions in Olson v. I. not over those issues did Uncertainty legal prevent due amounts from “certain or made certain cal being being by capable (Civ. Code, culation” (a)). subd. By Exception: Appellate
“Prevented Law” Judges
Superior Court The (a), interest under Civil Code section subdivision is right to an such time subject arises express exception: during “except law, as the debtor is act of the creditor from prevented by paying by recovery that this exception precludes the debt.” The Controller contends before, contrary him withheld by interest salaries or pensions I that the 1976 amendment to, in Olson v. this court’s 1980 decision during and pensioners 68203 was as to certain judges section invalid his limitations on statutory He constitutional and certain relies on periods. 7, of the Constitution Thus, XVI, a state article section official. power an only appro- from the “Money Treasury through be drawn provides: may Gov- drawn warrant.” duly made law a Controller’s priation by and upon shall draw warrants ernment Code section 12440 “The Controller provides: out law to be paid on the Treasurer for the directed money payment law, but a not be unless authorized warrant shall drawn treasury; are avail- by law and unless unexhausted appropriations provided specific from to meet it.” The also that he precluded able Controller contends III, article section effect to the 68203 by 1976 amendment section giving Constitution, June which an “ad- 3.5 of the provides adopted enforce a statute on grounds ministrative has no refuse to agency” power has uncon- of constitutional unless an court declared it invalidity appellate stitutional.
Whatever of these on the Controller’s power the effect restrictions subse increases of a statute that was pay pension disregard unconstitutional, held here. quently restrictions are determinative relies, Civil Code on which he exception provided by section when from the “debtor” is law the debt. applies only paying prevented The Controller is not the debtor. The amendment of section was held invalid because it violated contractual rights judges *13 not Controller but the State of California. pensioners against the against “When state em of between the agreements employment public bodies, have been such are bind ployees agreements adopted by governing In the instant case the ing Legis constitutionally protected. [Citation.] the lature the full increase adopted provision, binding cost-of-living state to at the for their compensation pay persons employed represented I, (Olson 532, 538, terms of office.” italics supra, sup v. 27 Cal.3d plied.) moreover, debtor; it is to claims
The state is therefore subject (a), of under which states that interest Civil Code section subdivision debtor, it from any “is to of and interest such damages applicable recovery state, city, county, corpo or including any county, city municipal ration, of the district, subdivision any public public agency, political state.” be claimed to have “law” that only might plausibly prevented on which interest is
the state as debtor from debts to paying plaintiffs now claimed was the 1976 amendment to section 68203. But the adoption of that amendment was an act of the state itself that conflicted with its constitutional toward obligations the amendment’s plaintiffs. Regardless officials, effect on the duties of the Controller and other it would public anomalous to hold that voluntarily the debtor legislation promulgated by itself constitutes a “law” which the debtor is from fulfilling “prevented” its overriding obligations. is consistent with Benson Los
This conclusion
City
Angeles
649],
405 that during period. vented law from the full amounts due plaintiffs paying includ- That conclusion that of state organs government, implies component not could have made the It does Legislature, necessarily ing payments. been judicially follow that the Controller that could have during period incurred liability to make the or that he compelled personal to do so. failing
Interest Judicial Claims on Pensioners’ entitled to interest on the Defendants contend that are not plaintiffs increases in judicial mandated Olson v. because those pensions were and are of the Retirement Fund pensions out payable entirely Judges’ (Gov. Code, 75100). (1962) 211 on v. Cranston They rely Jorgensen § 297], 292 Willens v. 53 Cal.App.2d 670], that the to interest Cal.App.3d holding right the state or its not against subdivisions under Civil Code section 3287 does to “claims retirement as the Re apply against Judges’ funds public [such tirement Controller” (Jorgensen, the State reasonably challenged by Fund] Willens, at and followed in Cal.App.2d p. quoted 106). at A intent to from Civil Code p. legislative exclude such claims Controller, section 3287 was inferred from the as perceived duty Fund, trustee of the Retirement Judges’ to resolve doubts about claims the fund before against Trusts, making Rest.2d payment (citing com. c, 470).4 at p. court, however,
This has such adopted any special-fund exception of interest under Civil Code section 3287. In Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, Jorgensen Cal.2d we simply distinguished out of the inapplicable salary pension obligations payable public debtor’s fund that “the retirement fund is a general by observing judges’ trust fund special and as such not fall within the of section may meaning Education, (italics 3287” added). In Mass Board Cal.2d supra, 612, we a claim for interest on it upheld withheld “since wrongfully involves (id. a recovery at upon general underlying monetary obligation” 626) and noted p. and other cases Jorgensen “may distinguished the narrow involved mandamus actions a trustee of ground they against (Id. 8.) fund.” at fn. of interest on special p. Recoverability judicial claims under Civil Code section 3287 was thus left an pension open question court. this *15 1, 1979, July responsibilities 4 Asof most of the Controller’s for the fund were assumed by Employees’ of Administration of the Public Retirement Fund. All Board upon by” from the are Controller upon fund “made warrants drawn the State demands Code, (Gov. 75005.) that board. § in Nothing of Civil Code wording section 3287 that the suggests right to recover interest from the state in varies accordance with the particular fund out of which the As we underlying obligation payable. explained, have concluded that even the to interest on right salary increases payable out of the state’s fund is not nullified or general diminished by any obliga tion that the Controller may have to refrain from debts of paying apparent the state that are clouded by uncertainties until those uncertainties are legal Thus, removed. the existence of such an with to the obligation respect Fund, Retirement Judges’ relied on in Jorgensen, does not establish any difference between the right interest on debts out of that fund payable and the to interest on debts out of the state’s fund. payable general are Accordingly, plaintiffs entitled to interest on judicial pension payments in Olson v. adjudged Cory I. Statements to the in v. contrary Jorgensen Cranston, 292, 300-302, supra, Willens Cal.App.2d Cory, v. supra, 53 Cal.App.3d and Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Motor Vehicles Dept. of (1963) 220 688], are disapproved. Municipal Salary
Interest on Court Judicial Claims Salaries record, court unlike municipal those of other courts of judges, are Code, out of paid solely (Gov. 71220.) funds. county The county- § auditor defendants contend that therefore the increases in court municipal salaries ordered in Olson ICory were on which the county obligations need not county pay prejudgment interest before that decision was accruing rendered because during (Civ. time were law” they “prevented by Code, 3287) from paying the increases. on Sonoma They rely County § Organization Public Employees County Sonoma Cal.3d 591 P.2d 1]. Sonoma,
In this court held that a statute that to nullify wage purported increase between agreements counties) local entities public (including their employees was an unconstitutional impairment obligation contract, and we ordered the increases The claim to interest paid. however, those payments, was denied on the that the local entities ground Code, were (Civ. 3287) law “prevented by . . . from the debt” paying on account of the serious financial state through withholding hardship, funds, provided by unconstitutional statute as a penalty exceeding its guidelines. case the counties were present resembles Sonoma powerless debts in contravene an invalid before question statute order pay But in Sonoma the statute’s determined. debts invalidity was judicially counties,
were created into where- contracts entered independently based as here the claims were on state wholly court judges’ salary municipal *16 Code, (Gov. 68202-68203) to the Legislature’s statutes enacted pursuant §§ sole constitutional the number and of mu- compensation power prescribe VI, 5, (Cal. Const., 19). court The increases such art. nicipal judges §§ claimed, in Olson on which interest now were held owing is compensation, constituted a because section 68202 to its 1976 amendment prior contract between court and the state. judges municipal
“A is division of the State county largest having corporate political (Gov. Code, 23000.) conferred powers.” Counties have corporate powers § XI, by (b), 4) Constitution art. statute (e.g., by (e.g., subd. §§ Code, Thus, Gov. 23003 et on Sonoma the increase claims seq.). wage § which interest was denied emanated from the of the counties’ gov- powers (Cal. bodies to erning for the provide compensation county employees Const., XI, art. (b)) subd. contracts with through collective bargaining § Sonoma, (Gov. Code, employee organizations 3500 et 23 Cal.3d at seq.; § 304). p.
With however, court respect counties municipal judges’ compensation, function Const., XI, solely (Cal. subdivisions of the State” “legal art. (a); Code, subd. 23002) Gov. ministerial § functions. having purely § Const., VI, fix Legislature’s (Cal. art. power compensation (a), 19) subd. immune is from or §§ interference modification by boards of county officials, who have no choice but to supervisors county pay out of compensation county funds as ordered by Legislature (Gov. Code, 71220).
Earlier in this we concluded that the for interest opinion, liability on state-paid judicial salary claims is not barred by any duty right Controller to withhold that are clouded by legal uncertainty, that such liability interest on claims is not barred judicial pensioners’ the fact that the are pensions out of a retirement fund. payable special In of those light conclusions, we hold interest municipal court judges’ salary claims is barred offi neither duties fiscal county cers to withhold legally until the uncertainties are questionable payments nor judicially dispelled by the fact that the ordered the salaries state has out paid county funds. Since the salaries are prescribed exclusively by Legislature, Legislature’s 1976 amendment of section insofar I, as held in Olson v. inoperative cannot be deemed a “law” that counties from court prevented paying municipal judicial salary claims. Preliminary Injunction
Effect noted earlier As the trial court granted plaintiffs preliminary injunction which the Controller and were ordered to county auditors withhold *17 I, of the due under Olson
percent payments Cory v. secure apparently plaintiffs’ fees. As to this 25 attorney state counties percent, clearly law,” i.e., were “prevented from such injunction, making and so cannot be held liable for interest while the injunction is accruing effect. Plaintiffs contend are entitled to such interest they equitably because the debtors have had use of the Civil Code section money. however, relieves debtors of the for interest when is obligation payment law, Plaintiffs, prevented by of such considerations. regardless equitable course, do not and could not which dispute validity injunction they themselves obtained. issue,
Let a writ of mandate peremptory the trial court to vacate directing its order motion denying plaintiffs’ for an order specifying to interest is an issue without substantial and to make controversy different order consistent with this opinion. shall bear their parties own costs.
Mosk, J., Richardson, J., J., Grodin, Kaus, J., Evans, J.,* con curred.
BIRD, C. Under the of Olson Cory Cal.3d compulsion J. (Olson I), P.2d concur in Justice Cory 532] Reynoso’s well-reasoned in this case. opinion
However, I decided, believe that Olson v. I was and I view wrongly as a opinion disaster. concurrence in this is not meant legal My opinion my imply approval of the decision in Olson v. I. portion *Assigned by Chairperson Council. the Judicial