THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CAMERON FORT, Appellant.
Docket No. 118966
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
February 17, 2017
2017 IL 118966
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Freeman, Garman, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. Chief Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Kilbride.
¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether a minor who is tried in adult court under the “automatic transfer” provision of the
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 Defendant, Cameron Fort, was indicted and charged by a grand jury with 57 counts of first degree murder, 9 counts of attempted first degree murder, and 3 counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of Lee Ivory Miller on March 16, 2009. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the incident.
¶ 4 The State proceeded to trial on four counts of first degree murder and dismissed the remaining charges. Because defendant was charged with first degree murder, an offense specified in
¶ 5 Defendant elected a bench trial. A detailed recitation of the trial evidence is contained in the appellate court‘s opinion. People v. Fort, 2014 IL App (1st) 113315-U. We briefly summarize the facts here, bearing in mind that the issue presented in this appeal is one of law.
¶ 6 At trial, Keva Donaldson testified that on March 16, 2009, she met a group of friends after school at the intersection of East 64th Street and South Stony Island Avenue. Donaldson and her friends attended Hyde Park Academy. While Donaldson was talking to another girl, a boy named “Bolo” began speaking to her and tapping her on the back. When Donaldson told him to stop, Bolo hit her with a closed fist, leaving a mark on her face from his ring. Bolo and his friends, including defendant, then ran away. Donaldson borrowed a cell phone and called a male
¶ 7 Freeman testified that on March 16, 2009, he arrived at a location near 1516 East 65th Place and began walking with Sykes, Sullivan, Nichols, Miller, and other individuals. Freeman said he separated from the group and crossed the street to talk to a group of girls, then crossed back to rejoin his friends who were standing near a vacant lot. Freeman testified that his friends had surprised looks on their faces. He then saw defendant nearby pointing a gun at the group. He said defendant hesitated for about 30 seconds and then began shooting. Freeman heard two or three shots fired as he ran away but did not see defendant fire the gun. Freeman denied that he or his friends had any guns or other weapons, but he testified that he thought Miller was holding a stick in his hand.
¶ 8 Sykes testified that he was with Sullivan, Freeman, Nichols, Donaldson, and Miller on the afternoon of March 16, 2009, at the corner of East 65th Street and Stony Island Avenue. Sykes knew defendant from school and testified that defendant had been involved in a fight a week or two before the shooting. Sykes saw defendant walking toward him and his group of friends. Defendant then crossed the street and walked away from the group. Sykes testified that they lost sight of defendant. A while later, Sykes and his friends split into two groups and began to search the area for defendant. After they reached a vacant lot, they saw that defendant was standing nearby but facing away from them. Defendant turned around and appeared surprised to see them. Sykes saw defendant pull a gun out of his pocket and point it at the group. After five to ten seconds, defendant began shooting. Sykes testified that no one in the group had any weapons, sticks, or poles.
¶ 9 The parties stipulated that during an autopsy, three bullet entrance wounds were found on Miller‘s body—on his right shoulder, his upper left back, and his left buttock—and two bullets were recovered from his body. Those bullets were later tested and determined to have been fired from the same firearm.
¶ 10 The State then introduced a video recording of defendant‘s interrogation by a detective and assistant State‘s Attorney on January 9, 2010, one day after his arrest. In the video, defendant stated that he found a gun in an alley on March 14, 2009,
¶ 11 Defendant stated in the video that he pulled out a gun from his sweatshirt pocket before he reached the vacant lot. He saw Sykes and Miller standing about 10 feet away. Defendant stated that Sykes was holding a thick metal pole. He could not tell whether Miller had anything in his hands. Defendant stated that he jumped, which caused the gun to discharge accidentally. Defendant said he fired a second shot three seconds later because his ears were ringing and he thought he heard Nichols shooting at him. He stated that he just wanted to scare them so that they would leave him alone. He denied aiming at anyone and denied firing a third shot.
¶ 12 The State rested its case. Defendant did not present any evidence. Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant not guilty of two counts of murder and merged the remaining two counts. The court found that the State had proved the elements of first degree murder but also found that “at the time of the killing [defendant] believed the circumstances to be such that if they existed would have justified or exonerated the killing under the said principles of self-defense, but his belief was unreasonable.” Accordingly, the trial court reduced the offense of first degree murder to second degree murder based on the mitigating factor of an unreasonable belief in self-defense. The court entered judgment on a conviction of second degree murder (
¶ 13 Although defendant was a minor, the State never filed a written motion requesting that defendant be sentenced as an adult pursuant to
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that his adult sentence should be reversed because he was convicted of second degree murder, a non-automatic transfer offense and, thus, he should have been sentenced as a juvenile under
¶ 15 This court granted defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to
ANALYSIS
I. Plain Error
¶ 18 At the outset, we recognize that defendant failed to challenge the propriety of his adult sentence before the trial court. Defendant neither objected to his adult sentence at his sentencing hearing nor raised such a claim in his motion to reconsider sentence. Accordingly, this issue was forfeited and may not be considered on appeal unless it was plain error.
“[T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious,
regardless of the closeness of the evidence. In the first instance, the defendant must prove ‘prejudicial error.’ That is, the defendant must show both that there was plain error and that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. *** In the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant‘s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995).] Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, ‘regardless of the strength of the evidence.’ (Emphasis in original.) [People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000).] In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005).
¶ 19 If defendant is correct that the trial court was statutorily prohibited from sentencing him as an adult, this would amount to plain error pursuant to the second prong of our plain error analysis. “The imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights” and, thus, may be considered by a reviewing court even if not properly preserved in the trial court. People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998) (citing People v. Brown, 197 Ill. App. 3d 907, 918 (1990)); see also People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48-49 (2009) (plain error review is appropriate to consider the imposition of a fine in contravention of the statute because it implicates a defendant‘s right to a fair sentencing hearing). Thus, our first task is to determine whether defendant‘s adult sentence was authorized under
¶ 20 The issue presented in this appeal involves statutory construction, an issue of law which is subject to de novo review. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). The cardinal rule in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. The language of the statute is the best and most reliable indicator of the legislature‘s intent. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005). Where the language is plain and unambiguous, we may not read into it exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419. However, where the statutory language is ambiguous, a reviewing court may look beyond the language and resort to further aids of statutory construction. Id. In addition to examining the statutory language, we may discern legislative intent by considering “the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved.”
II. Statutory Analysis
¶ 22 The
¶ 23 The automatic transfer provision in
Ҥ 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction.
(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault, (iii) aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor personally discharged a firearm as defined in Section 2-15.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, (iv) armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or (v) aggravated vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.
(b)(i) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that does not charge an offense specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) the State‘s Attorney may proceed on any lesser charge or charges, but only in Juvenile Court under the provisions of this Article. The State‘s Attorney may proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961 on a lesser charge if before trial the minor defendant knowingly and with advice of counsel waives, in writing, his or her right to have the matter proceed in Juvenile Court.
(ii) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that includes one or more charges specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961.
(c)(i) If after trial or plea the minor is convicted of any offense covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), then, in sentencing the minor, the court shall have available any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(ii) If after trial or plea the court finds that the minor committed an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), that finding shall not invalidate the verdict or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of the State; however, unless the State requests a hearing for the purpose of sentencing the minor under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, the Court must proceed under Sections 5-705 and 5-710 of this Article. To request a hearing, the State must file a written motion within 10 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be given to the minor or his or her counsel. If the motion is made by the State, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the minor should be sentenced under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. In making its determination, the court shall consider among other matters: (a) whether there is evidence that the offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (b) the age of the minor; (c) the previous history of the minor; (d) whether there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court or the
Department of Juvenile Justice for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; (e) whether the security of the public requires sentencing under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections; and (f) whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon when committing the offense. The rules of evidence shall be the same as if at trial. If after the hearing the court finds that the minor should be sentenced under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, then the court shall sentence the minor accordingly having available to it any or all dispositions so prescribed.” (Emphases added.)
705 ILCS 405/5-130(1) (West 2008).2
¶ 24 Defendant contends that his adult sentence was imposed in violation of the statute, based on the fact that he was convicted of second degree murder, an uncharged non-automatic transfer offense, and not convicted of all first degree murder charges. He argues that his conviction for second degree murder was “not covered by”
¶ 25 In order to discern the legislative intent, it is necessary to consider the statute in its entirety without construing any part of the statute in isolation. See Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 184 (2007) (“a court determines the legislative intent in enacting a statute by examining the entire statute and by construing each material part of the legislation together, and not each part or section alone“). To that end, we will examine the ways in which the various provisions in
¶ 26
¶ 27
¶ 28
¶ 29 Thus, the statutory language clearly requires that a minor be tried in adult court if he is charged with one of the offenses listed in
¶ 30 The plain language in
¶ 31 In this case, defendant was charged and tried for first degree murder but was not charged with second degree murder. Second degree murder is a separate offense from first degree murder.
¶ 32 The State contends that defendant‘s sentencing posture differs from that of a minor who is charged with only a non-automatic transfer offense and is tried and sentenced in juvenile court. The State argues that defendant was not “acquitted” of
¶ 33 The State‘s argument is grounded in a faulty premise, i.e., that defendant was technically still “convicted” of first degree murder. We reject this argument as both factually and legally incorrect. The trial court considered the evidence presented by the State and found defendant guilty of second degree murder, a lesser, reduced form of murder. The second degree murder statute provides that the defendant has the burden of proving a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 34 When a defendant is charged with first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder, the State is prohibited by collateral estoppel from later retrying the defendant for first degree murder. See People v. Newbern, 219 Ill. App. 3d 333, 354 (1991); People v. Thomas, 216 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472-73 (1991); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.01S, Committee Note (4th ed. 2000). Collateral estoppel, in the criminal context, is a component of the double jeopardy clause. People v. Blue, 207 Ill. 2d 542, 549 (2003); People v. Carrillo, 164 Ill. 2d 144, 151 (1995). Accordingly, the State‘s claim that defendant was convicted of first degree murder is simply false.
¶ 35 Furthermore, the State‘s reading of the statute leads to unjust and absurd results. The process of statutory interpretation should not be divorced from consideration of real-world results, and in construing a statute, courts should presume that the legislature did not intend unjust consequences. People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 293 (2011); Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen‘s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). To illustrate the injustice of the State‘s position, it is helpful to consider a scenario in which defendant is initially charged only with second degree murder. The same evidence is introduced at trial with the same verdict rendered as in the instant case. In this scenario, defendant would have remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, affording him access to the dispositions available to juveniles under the
¶ 36 The appellate court below relied on People v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374 (2011), in support of its decision to affirm defendant‘s criminal sentence under
¶ 37 On appeal to this court, we reversed, holding that defendant was properly sentenced as an adult pursuant to
¶ 38 The facts in the case at bar do not resemble those in King. The defendant in King pled guilty to and was convicted of the charged offense of attempted first degree murder, and his first degree murder charges were not dismissed until after defendant‘s sentencing. Id. Unlike King, who was actually charged with attempted first degree murder, defendant was never charged with second degree murder. Thus, in this case, second degree murder is not a “charge[ ] arising out of the same incident” as the first degree murder charges. See
¶ 39 The State contends that, even if it was error for the trial court to impose an adult sentence in this case, it was not “clear” or “obvious” error requiring this court‘s review. See In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 431 (2009) (“the term ‘plain’ as used in the plain-error rule is synonymous with ‘clear’ or ‘obvious‘; error is not plain if the law was ‘unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear on appeal because the applicable law has been clarified’ ” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). The State‘s point is not well taken. At the time of defendant‘s sentencing, King had been decided, but no appellate court had interpreted that decision to apply to circumstances like those in the present case, where defendant was convicted of an uncharged, non-automatic transfer offense. After defendant was convicted of second degree murder, an offense “not covered by”
III. Remedy
¶ 41 Having determined that the trial court erred in imposing an adult sentence in violation of the statute and that this error was so serious that it affected the fairness of defendant‘s sentence and challenged the integrity of the judicial process (People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)), we must decide the appropriate remedy.4 The record demonstrates that, immediately following the verdict, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled a date for sentencing. The sentencing hearing took place 49 days after the verdict. The trial court considered evidence in aggravation and mitigation and proceeded to sentence defendant as an adult to 18 years in prison. At no time after the guilty verdict did the trial court suggest to the parties that defendant was subject to juvenile sentencing. The State thus had no reason to request a hearing for the purpose of sentencing defendant under the
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the lower courts are reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate defendant‘s sentence and allow the State to file a petition requesting a hearing pursuant to
¶ 44 Judgments reversed; cause remanded with directions.
¶ 45 CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting:
¶ 46 My colleagues reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that the crime for which defendant was ultimately convicted—second degree murder—was not a ” ‘charge[ ] arising out of the same incident’ ” as the first degree murder charges which warranted his prosecution under the Criminal Code of 1961 pursuant to
¶ 47 Because second degree murder is merely a variant of first degree murder and not a separate offense, Illinois law does not require, and did not require in this case, that it be charged separately. By charging first degree murder, the State was simultaneously charging defendant with second degree murder. Because the charge of first degree murder was sufficient to trigger the automatic transfer provision of
¶ 48 The majority attempts to avoid this conclusion by pointing to authority that permits the State to charge second degree murder without also charging first degree murder. I do not question that authority. It does not, however, support the majority‘s conclusions. To say that a charge may be filed separately, which is what our case law holds (People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (2008)), is quite different than holding that the charge must be filed separately to avoid the issue presented in this case. These are entirely different matters. That the State has the option of proceeding directly under second degree murder in no way alters the principle that
¶ 49 Under the majority‘s view, in order to avoid the issue here, the State would have been required to expressly and simultaneously charge first degree murder and second degree murder. Such a charging strategy, however, would be self-defeating. By charging defendant with second degree murder, the State would be conceding the presence of a mitigating factor and effectively admitting that it could not obtain a conviction for first degree murder.7
¶ 50 As this court‘s statement in Jeffries suggests, a charge of first degree murder will be reduced to a subsumed charge of second degree murder, and a resultant second degree murder conviction, where a defendant has proven a mitigating circumstance. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 118. In sum, a charge of second degree murder is incorporated in every charge of first degree murder. Defendant was thus convicted of a charged offense arising out of
¶ 52 JUSTICES THOMAS and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.