People v. Fort
2017 IL 118966
| Ill. | 2017Background
- Cameron Fort (age 16 at the time) was indicted on multiple counts including first-degree murder and, because first-degree murder is listed in the Juvenile Court Act’s automatic-transfer statute, was tried in adult court.
- The trial court found the evidence satisfied the elements of first-degree murder but also found Fort proved an unreasonable belief in self-defense as a mitigating factor, and reduced the verdict to second-degree murder. Fort was never charged with second-degree murder.
- The trial court sentenced Fort as an adult to 18 years’ imprisonment under section 5-130(1)(c)(i) of the Juvenile Court Act without the State having filed a written motion seeking adult sentencing under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii). Fort did not object at sentencing.
- On appeal the appellate court affirmed, holding a conviction for uncharged second-degree murder still fell under the automatic-transfer adult-sentencing provision.
- The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: it held that a conviction for an uncharged, non-listed offense (second-degree murder) is not “covered by” the automatic-transfer list and thus, absent a timely State motion under §5-130(1)(c)(ii), the minor could not be mandatorily sentenced as an adult.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Fort) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a minor convicted of an uncharged second-degree murder after being tried in adult court for first-degree murder may be mandatorily sentenced as an adult under §5-130(1)(c)(i) | Second-degree murder is a mitigated form of first-degree murder arising from the same incident, so the conviction is “covered by” §5-130(1)(a) and adult sentencing under §5-130(1)(c)(i) applies | Second-degree murder was not a charged offense and is therefore not “covered by” §5-130(1)(a); absent a written State motion under §5-130(1)(c)(ii) the juvenile-sentencing scheme should control | Reversed: second-degree murder (uncharged) is not “covered by” §5-130(1)(a); trial court erred in imposing mandatory adult sentence without State filing timely motion under §5-130(1)(c)(ii) |
| Whether the error was forfeited by Fort’s failure to object at sentencing | Error was not plain; prior case law (King) left uncertainty | Statutory text plainly required juvenile sentencing absent State motion | Error was plain; reviewed under plain-error doctrine and found to affect fairness/integrity of proceedings |
| Proper remedy when adult sentence imposed in violation of §5-130 | Trial court’s adult sentence stands | Sentence should be vacated and juvenile-sentencing procedure applied | Remanded: vacate adult sentence and allow State 10 days to file a §5-130(1)(c)(ii) motion; if no adult-sentencing order after hearing, discharge is required because defendant is now over 21 |
| Whether King controls (People v. King) | King supports that offenses arising from the same incident are "covered by" §5-130(1)(a) | King is distinguishable because King involved a charged offense (attempted murder) arising from the same incident | King is distinguishable; does not authorize adult sentencing where conviction is for an uncharged offense |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374 (Illinois 2011) (automatic-transfer statute covers charged offenses and other charges arising out of same incident when those other charges were themselves charged)
- People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53 (Illinois 2008) (State may charge second-degree murder without also charging first-degree murder)
- People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104 (Illinois 1995) (second-degree murder arises when defendant proves a mitigating factor after State proves first-degree murder)
- People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (Illinois 2005) (plain-error doctrine framework for forfeited claims)