People v. ChristensenPeople v. Christensen
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Paul M. Salvino, Albany, for respondent.
Duffy & Duffy, Uniondale (Michael A. Santo of counsel), for New York State Magistrates Association, amicus curiae.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ANGIOLILLO, J.
Many district attorneys of counties in New York State, when faced with inadequate resources, have lawfully delegated their authority to prosecute
Factual and Procedural Background
The District Attorney‘s Delegation and the Division‘s Policy Against Plea Bargaining
The Dutchess County District Attorney, William V. Grady (hereinafter the District Attorney), has a longstanding practice of delegating the prosecution of offenses under the
At the time of this delegation, the Division, by internal regulation 8A13 (hereinafter the Regulation), prohibited New York State Police Troopers (hereinafter Troopers) from engaging in plea bargaining of
In a letter to the District Attorney dated March 1, 2006, the Division‘s counsel acknowledged that enforcement of the Regulation had “eroded” largely because, during court proceedings, the “judges and prosecutors expected, depended [upon] and, in many cases, directed [Troopers] to meet with motorists they cited and strike a ‘bargain’ for disposition of the case, often in a private setting away from the courtroom.” The Division found “this practice to be contrary to sound public policy for ethical, operational and fiscal concerns,” and thus, the Superintendent of the Division (hereinaftеr the Superintendent) determined that the Regulation must be strictly enforced:
“[W]e believe that there is an inherent outward appearance of unfairness and duress when a motorist is forced to plea bargain his or her case with the arresting officer, the very same officer who stands as his or her accuser, and also as the primary prosecution witness . . . The result can be the perception of favoritism, prejudice or, even worse, bribery.
“Accordingly, many motorists forced to plea bargain under these circumstances have sent letters of accusation or complaint to [the Division] as well as to
other elected officials. We firmly believe that equitable considerations dictate that an accused motorist should have the opportunity in the court adjudication process to discuss and negotiate [his or her] case with an independent prosecutor, and not be required to negotiate with the arresting officer.”
Counsel for the Division further noted that pleas of “not guilty” had escalated over the past decade, causing a dramatic rise in Division overtime for court appearances, during which Troopers were rarely called to testify but routinely appeared in lieu of the prosecutor to obtain dispositions by plea bargaining, a duty which, the Division believed, should be the responsibility of a prosecuting attorney. The Division‘s counsel, thus, informed the District Attorney that a policy of “renewed enforcement” of the Regulation would be implemented effective September 1, 2006 (hereinafter the Policy). The Policy would not affect court appearances by Troopers for the purpose of testifying or trying cases if so delegated.
By memorandum dated March 9, 2006, the Superintendent informed “All Members” of the Division that he hаd communicated with district attorneys statewide regarding the Policy and that Troopers were expected to cooperate with and adhere to the Policy, effective September 1, 2006. In a subsequent memorandum dated August 28, 2006, the Superintendent wrote that any violation of the Regulation “will be handled as a Division level disciplinary action.”
On three occasions since 2006, the New York State Legislature has passed bills which would amend the
People v Carol I. Sussman
On March 25, 2007 Carol I. Sussman was charged by simplified traffic information filed in the Town of Milan Justice Court (hereinafter the Town Court) with violating
Sussman initially pleaded guilty as charged and subsequently sought to withdraw her plea and to enter a plea of not guilty. By notice dated April 9, 2007, the appellant, Town Justice Francis G. Christensen (hereinafter the Town Justice), accepted Sussman‘s plea of not guilty, set a trial date, and informed her that, “[e]ffective September 1, 2006, [the Division is] unable to enter into plea bargains, therefore, you must be prepared to go to trial.”
Prior to trial, Sussman, through her counsel, moved pursuant to
In opposition, the People, through the Division‘s counsel, argued that Sussman had failed to demonstrate a compelling consideration under the statutory factors listed in
At oral argument before the Town Justice, the People, represented by the Division‘s counsel on the motion and by Trooper Wisniewski in the event of trial, refused to negotiate or discuss Sussman‘s request to plead guilty to a reduced charge. From the bench, the Town Justice declined to dismiss the accusatory instrument in the interest of justice but reduced the charge and
The Decision of the Town Court dated August 24, 2007
The Town Court denied Sussman‘s motion to dismiss in the interest of justice pursuant to
“There is no question a prosecutor can reject a plea to a lеsser count but it should be supported by the facts. In the opinion of this Court a rejection of a plea bargain should be based on a full and fair evaluation of the evidence and defendant‘s history. A blanket policy has the effect of removing the goal of seeking justice and establishes a real or perceived goal of only obtaining convictions . . .
“This Court is granting the motion to reduce the traffic charge not because the Prosecutor will not enter into a plea bargain but because the Prosecutor will not discuss the matter and hear the Defense[‘]s reason for such plea bargain request. The Prosecution should make its decision regarding a plea bargain based on a full and fair evaluation of the evidence and defendant‘s history. As long as the [Division] refuses to plea bargain based on a memorandum of the Superintendent and not on a full and fair evaluation of the evidence and defendant‘s history[,] the defendant is denied the opportunity to receive justice in the Courts.”
After the disposition in Sussman‘s case, on October 23, 2007, the District Attorney sent the Town Justice a copy of his letter to the Division dated December 30, 2005, which confirmed his longstanding policy of delegating the prosecution of
CPLR article 78 Proceeding
Subsequent to Sussman‘s plea of guilty, the District Attorney authorized the Division to file an appeal on behalf of the People and informed the Appellate Term of the delegation. Counsel for the Division and the District Attorney‘s Chief Assistant later determined, however, that a direct appeal was not statutorily permitted (see
The Town Justice answered and asserted three purported “counterclaims” against nonparties the Division and the Superintendent. Under the first and second counterclaims, he sought a declaration that the Policy was null and void on grounds that (1) the Superintendent exceeded his authority in establishing the Policy, which circumvents the prosecutorial discretion of the District Attorney, and (2), the Policy “creates an inherent conflict of interest” for the Division, preventing it from “fairly evaluating any case.” Under the third counterclaim, the Town Justice allegеd that the Division is performing unauthorized special prosecutorial functions by bringing this proceeding pursuant to
In further opposition to the petition, the Town Justice submitted an affidavit averring that, in the Town Court, police officers have historically and routinely engaged in plea bargaining; had Sussman been ticketed by an officer from a police agency other than the Division, she would have been eligible for a charge reduction. Prior to the implementation of the Policy in September
Sussman filed an answer asserting affirmative defenses, including the alleged violation of her right to equal protection, the Division‘s conflict of interest in prosecuting her case, and the Division‘s lack of authority to bring this special proceeding.
Despite its status as a nonparty, the Division answered the Town Justice‘s “counterclaims” against it by interposing “affirmative defenses,” including its status as a nonparty, the Town Justice‘s lack of standing to challenge the Policy, and failure to state a cause of action. In reply to the Division‘s answer, the Town Justice submitted a supplemental affidavit listing seven traffic cases in which, upon defense motion, he accepted pleas of guilty to reduced charges over the оbjection of the Division without subsequent challenge by the People. In addition, the Town Justice filed a motion to join the Division and the Superintendent as parties, claiming that the petition was improperly brought in the name of the People to obscure the Division‘s own interest.
The Attorney General, as counsel for the nonparties Division and Superintendent, opposed the motion on the ground that the District Attorney had made a proper delegation to the Division to commence the special proceeding on behalf of the People, who were, in effect, the only party in interest.
The Order and Judgment Dated September 2, 2008
The Supreme Court denied the Town Justice‘s motion to join the Division and the Superintendent as parties, dismissed the Town Justice‘s counterclaims, and, in effect, granted the People‘s petition in its entirety (see Matter of People v Christensen, 21 Misc 3d 608 [2008]). Regarding the Town Justice‘s contention that Trooper Wisniewski, the Division, and the Superintendent should be joined as parties to this special proceeding, the Supreme Court held that their joinder is not necessary to determine the issue raised in the petition, namely, whether the Town Justice exceeded his statutory authority when he accepted Sussman‘s plea of guilty.
The Supreme Court dismissed the “counterclaims” seeking a declaration that the Policy was null and void on the ground that the Town Justice did not have standing to assert those claims (id. at 622). The Supreme Court determined that Sussman‘s constitutional equal protection claim was not properly before it and, in any event, the record was inadequate to evaluate that claim (id. at 619). The Supreme Court dismissed the Town Justice‘s counterclaim regarding improper delegation, holding that the District Attorney, with knowledge of the Policy, properly delegated the prosecution of
Addressing the relief sought in the petition, the Supreme Court, held that Sussman had no constitutional right to enter into a plea bargain, which is a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and the Town Justice exceeded his authorized powers by accepting Sussman‘s plea of guilty to a reduced charge without the consent of the People in violation of
Analysis
The Propriety of the District Attorney‘s Delegation
The Town Justice acknowledges that the District Attorney generally may delegate to the Division his authority to prosecute
Initially, insofar as the Town Justice is challenging the propriety of the District Attorney‘s delegation to the Division of the prosecution of Sussman‘s case in Town Court, the Town Justice does not have standing to raise that contention. “[I]n order to have standing in a particular dispute, [a party] must demonstrate an injury in fact that falls within the relevant zone of interests sought to be protected by law” (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 183 [2006]; see Silver v Pataki, 96 NY2d 532, 539 [2001]; Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148, 155 [1994]). A party “generally has standing only to assert claims on behalf of himself or herself . . . [and] one does not, as a general rule, have standing to assert claims on behalf of another” (Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d at 182; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 773 [1991]; Cardo v Board of Mgrs., Jefferson Vil. Condo 3, 67 AD3d 945, 946 [2009]). In Sussman‘s case, the person suffering injury in the event of an improper delegation is Sussman, but she did not challenge the delegation by filing a special proceeding (see Matter of Sedore v Epstein, 56 AD3d 60
The Town Justice does have standing, however, to contest the propriety of the District Attorney‘s delegation to the Division of his authority to commence this special proceeding. Since the Town Justice is a named respondent in the proceeding, he can demonstrate injury within the zone of interest protected by the law if the proceeding hаs been commenced and maintained against him under an improper delegation.
In making his arguments that the delegation is improper, the Town Justice characterizes the Division alternatively as a “special prosecutor,” and as a party “respondent” in this appeal. The People characterize the Division‘s role as that of “delegated representative of the People” with “standing” to commence this special proceeding. The Town Justice replies that the Division‘s “standing” is not at issue, but the relevant inquiry concerns the Division‘s “capacity to sue.” Many of the parties’ contentions mischaracterize the role of the Division and the issue before us. We, therefore, deem it instructive to set forth here the distinction between the real party in interest and its representative, and to distinguish the concepts of capacity to sue, standing, and special prosecutors from the relevant issue concerning the propriety of the District Attorney‘s delegation to the Division of its authority to represent the People in this special proceeding.
First, with respect to identifying the real party in interest, we note that the distinction between a district attorney and the People is often blurred in the context of proceedings pursuant to
We conclude that the Division, acting as counsel to the petitioner, correctly declined to name itself as a party and properly commenced this proceeding in the name of the People, the real party in interest. We have noted that the obligations of a prosecutor “flow . . . to the public, which is the client” (Matter of Sedore v Epstein, 56 AD3d at 67; see Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 [1935]; People v Zimmer, 51 NY2d 390, 393 [1980]). The Town Justice‘s aсceptance of the plea of guilty over the objection of the People implicates a public interest which does not aggrieve the Division as an entity. The Supreme Court, thus, properly determined that the People of the State of New York were the proper party petitioner and properly declined to join the Division as a party (see Matter of People v Christensen, 21 Misc 3d at 614-615).
Since the Division is not a party, the arguments concerning the Division‘s standing and capacity to sue are not relevant here. The People unquestionably have standing to maintain this proceeding (see Silver v Pataki, 96 NY2d at 539; Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d at 155; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 773; Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d at 182). The People also have capacity to sue. “‘Capacity’ . . . concerns a litigant‘s power to appear and bring its grievance before the court” (Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d at 155). “Capacity mаy depend on a litigant‘s status or . . . authority to sue or be
With respect to the Division, the relevant issue is not standing or capacity to sue but whether the District Attorney properly authorized the Division to represent the People in this special proceeding. In this regard, contrary to the Town Justice‘s characterization, the Division is not a “special prosecutor” but is acting by delegation of authority from the District Attorney.
The Division has no statutory or inherent authority to represent the People. The Division is part of the executive branch of state government, and the Superintendent is appointed by the governor (see
By contrast, the District Attorney is a constitutional officer chosen by the electors of a county (see
A district attorney may appoint assistant district attorneys who are subordinate to him or her, and may delegate duties to such assistants (see
Here, the Division‘s counsel does not fall within the category of special prosecutor because the Supreme Court did not appoint the Division pursuant to
The case law does not squarely address the issue before us, however, whether a district attorney‘s proper delegation of the
The Town Justice contends, however, that the authority to bring a civil proceeding is one of those “fundamental responsibilities” which may not be transferred or delegated, citing Matter of Schumer v Holtzman (60 NY2d at 53). In that case, the Court of Appeals proscribed a prosecutor‘s improper transfer of fundamental responsibilities in conducting a major investigation and prosecution by аppointing a special assistant district attorney while failing to retain any supervisory authority over the appointee (id. at 51-53). Not inconsistently, the Court of Appeals has also recognized the propriety of delegating fundamental responsibilities in the context of “the prosecution of petty crimes or offenses” where the district attorney is “kept aware” of the conduct of the prosecution and retains “ultimate” responsibility for it (People v Soddano, 86 NY2d at 728). Many of the duties performed by troopers in
Moreover, contrary to the Town Justice‘s contention, the People supplied sufficient proof that the District Attorney made an effective delegation in this case. The People contend that the District Attorney‘s initial delegation to the Division of the prosecution of
Nor was the evidence of the delegation improperly raised for the first time in a reply affirmation. In the People‘s submission in support of the
Whether the People Demonstrated Entitlement to Relief
In their petition, the People sought two forms of relief. First, they sought a judgment generally prohibiting the Town Justice from accepting pleas to lesser offenses in the absence of agreement by the People. Second, with respect to the Sussman prosecution, they sought a judgment compelling the Town Justice to vacate Sussman‘s plea of guilty and to restore the matter to its pre-pleading status. For reasons shown below, the first branch of the petition is for relief in the nature of prohibition,
The legal basis for the relief the People seek is contained in statutes governing the entry of pleas of guilty. Sussman was charged with a
The Town Justice contends, however, that
Further, the Town Justice contends that, since he has the authority to dismiss the information in the interest of justice without the consent of the People (see
In light of this showing, the question remains whether the People are entitled to the relief of mandamus to compel the Town Justice to vacate the plea in Sussman‘s case and restore the matter to its pre-pleading status. “It is well settled that the remedy of mandamus is available to compel a governmental entity or officer to perform a ministerial duty, but does not lie to compel an act which involves аn exercise of judgment or discretion . . . A party seeking mandamus must show a clear legal right to relief” (Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d 674, 679 [1994] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see New York Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 183-184 [2005]). Mandamus is available against a judicial officer when the duty sought to be commanded is mandatory and nondiscretionary; “the dispositive question . . . is whether [the court] retains any discretion” in the matter (Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d at 679; see Matter of Stortecky v Mazzone, 85 NY2d 518, 523 n [1995]; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41 [1983]; Matter of Phillips v Wieboldt, 40 AD3d 650, 650-651 [2007]; Matter of Mennella v Lopez-Torres, 229 AD2d 153, 155-156 [1997], affd 91 NY2d 474 [1998]). The extraordinary remedy of mandamus will not lie if the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law, such as direct appeal, although nonappealability alone does not guarantee entitlement to request mandamus relief (see Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d at 62-63).
The right of the People to appeal from a determination in a criminal proceeding is strictly limited by statute and does not include the right of direct appeal from the Town Justice‘s order
The People also established entitlement to relief under the branch of their petition seeking to prohibit the Town Justice generally from accepting pleas of guilty to reduced charges without the consent of the People. “Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court—in cases where judicial authority is challenged—acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers ... in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction” (Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71 NY2d at 569 [internal quotation marks omitted];
Finally we note that, even if the petitioner has shown an act in excess of power for which prohibition and mandamus lie, these extraordinary remedies are not granted as of right but only in the sound discretion of the reviewing court (see Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71 NY2d at 569; Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d at 354). The Town Justice urges us to exercise our discretion and reverse the order and judgment insofar as appealed from because the Division comes to court with “unclean hands,” having accepted the delegation to prosecute while adhering to the Policy, which removes a fundamental function of the prosecutor and impairs the prosecutor‘s duty to see that justice is done. The Division, however, is not a party to this proceeding and its refusal to plea bargain is not a defense to the Town Justice‘s action challenged by the petition.
In its amicus curiae brief, the SMA contends that the District Attorney‘s delegation of
While we are sympathetic to the inordinate burden placed on the courts by any blanket policy against plea bargaining a particular class of cases, nothing in the statutory scheme grants the Town Justice the flexibility he wishes to exercise. We are constrained by statute to find that the Town Justice exceeded his authorized powers and conclude that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the relief sought in the People‘s petition.
Accordingly, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from. MASTRO, J.P., BALKIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.