OPINION OF THE COURT
Petitioner, a community board established by the New York City Charter (NY City Charter § 2800), brought the present proceeding to challenge respondents’ right to deny it access to certain documents under the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The only issue on this appeal is whether petitioner, a legislatively created entity, has the capacity to maintain a proceeding such as this. In holding that it does not, we stress that the question of petitioner’s capacity to sue is a matter allied with but conceptually distinct from the question of its standing and that, in this case, the standards for establishing the former were not satisfied.
Petitioner community board represents a district in Manhattan that encompasses the Penn Central railyards, a tract that runs between the Hudson River and West End Avenue and is bounded by West 59th and West 72nd Streets. Under the City Charter’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), petitioner’s responsibilities include studying proposed changes in land use within its district and making recommendations to the Borough President and City Planning Commission regarding such proposals (NY City Charter § 197-c [e]).
In 1990, petitioner wrote to the Department of City Planning requesting certain material that had been prepared in connection with a proposal to erect "Trump City,” a massive office, residential and commercial complex, on the Penn Central railyards tract. Because the proposal entailed zoning and land use changes, the project was subject to ULURP review (see, NY City Charter § 197-c). In seeking the project’s draft *153 "restrictive declaration” and all correspondence relating to it, 1 petitioner invoked the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law §§ 84-90), which requires government agencies to provide the public with access to their records except in certain enumerated circumstances.
The Planning Department’s Records Access Officer denied petitioner’s FOIL request, asserting that the documents sought were exempt "inter-agency” or "intra-agency” materials and that their disclosure would "impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations” (see, Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [c], [g]). This determination was subsequently upheld by the Department’s Appeals Officer (see, Public Officers Law § 89 [4] [a]).
The Department’s decision prompted petitioner to commence the present CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel respondents to disclose the requested material. In support of its position, petitioner cited the provisions of FOIL, as well as the provisions of ULURP and the City Charter that authorize its participation in land use decisions such as this one (NY City Charter § 197-c [e]; § 2800 [d] [3], [17]; [e]). Respondents then moved for dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner did not have the "capacity” under the City Charter to bring a judicial challenge to the Planning Department’s FOIL decision.
The Supreme Court rejected respondents’ dismissal motion, concluding that petitioner had “standing” to sue. Noting that petitioner was seeking only the limited relief of document disclosure rather than "ultimate or complete relief,” the court distinguished prior cases holding that community boards lack the requisite capacity to bring suit (
The Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court’s decision, reasoning that petitioner’s request for relief was " 'within the zone of interest to be protected’ by New York City Charter § 197-c (e)” and that "there [was] no clear legislative intent to negate review of respondents’ denial of access to
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the records” (
Initially, we note that we do not deem it appropriate to dismiss the proceeding for mootness, despite the facts that the Trump City proposal has been scaled down to the less ambitious Riverside South project, petitioner has completed its review of the project and submitted its recommendations and the FOIL request for documents has been withdrawn. The issue presented here — whether a community board has the capacity to bring an article 78 proceeding to enforce its ostensible FOIL rights — is one that is likely to recur, particularly in view of the community boards’ responsibilities under ULURP. Moreover, the issue is one that will typically evade review because of the relatively short time frame in which those responsibilities must be carried out
(see,
NY City Charter § 197-c). Finally, the issue is both novel and substantial, since it has not yet been considered by this Court and has unquestionable significance for the way in which land use decisions are made within New York City. Thus, the exception to the mootness doctrine that was delineated in
Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne
(
Having concluded that the proceeding need not be dismissed for mootness, we turn now to the question presented by the parties for our review: whether petitioner has capacity to bring this proceeding. We note at the outset that the concept of capacity is often confused with the concept of standing, but the two legal doctrines are not interchangeable
(see, Matter of Pooler v Public Serv. Commn.,
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ensure that the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to "cast[ ] the dispute 'in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution’ ”
(Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, supra,
at 772-773, quoting
Schlesinger v Reservists to Stop War,
"Capacity,” in contrast, concerns a litigant’s power to appear and bring its grievance before the court. The concept of a lack of capacity, which has also occasionally been intermingled with the analytically distinct concept of a failure to state a cause of action, does not admit of precise or comprehensive definition
(see, Ward v Petrie,
Another category of capacity problems — the category at issue here — arises in the context of suits brought by artificial entities. Business corporations, for example, are creatures of statute and, as such, require statutory authority to sue and be sued
(see,
Business Corporation Law § 202 [a] [2];
see also,
§ 1005 [a] [1]; § 1006 [a] [4] [dissolved corporations]; § 1312 [foreign corporations doing business in New York]). Similarly, unincorporated associations, which are voluntary congregate entities, are accorded the capacity to bring suit through their presidents or treasurers by statute (General Association Law § 12;
see, Ayew v Hawes & Co.,
Governmental entities created by legislative enactment present similar capacity problems. Being artificial creatures of statute, such entities have neither an inherent nor a common-
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law right to sue. Rather, their right to sue, if it exists at all, must be derived from the relevant enabling legislation or some other concrete statutory predicate
(Matter of Pooler v Public Serv. Commn., supra; see, Matter of Flacke v Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Bd.,
In a recent discussion on the subject,
Matter of City of New York v City Civ. Serv. Commn.
(
It is the
City of New York
"zone of interest” test that also distinguishes this case from
Community Bd. No. 4 v Board of Estimate
(
Nonetheless, petitioner’s lack of capacity to bring this suit may readily be inferred from the terms and history of its own enabling legislation, as well as from its limited role in the land use planning process. Petitioner does not dispute that neither New York City Charter § 2800 nor the relevant ULURP provisions expressly authorize community boards to bring suit. Nor can such authority be constructed as a "necessary implication” of petitioner’s other powers, since there are clear indications in the legislation that no authority to sue for document disclosure was, in fact, intended.
The enabling statute gives community boards no power to retain independent counsel or to subpoena documents, despite a study group’s recommendation that the power to subpoena be conferred
(see,
Staff Report,
Community Boards,
prepared by Staff of State Charter Rev Commn for NY City [May 1974] [hereinafter Staff Report];
see also,
NY City Charter § 395;
see generally, Caruso v New York City Police Dept. Pension Funds,
Additionally, the legislative history of the City Charter is inconsistent with the notion that community boards were intended to have the power to sue for information. As part of the over-all 1975 Charter revision process, a study group created by the nonpartisan State Charter Revision Commission for New York City noted in its report a suggestion that a grant of the power to sue City agencies would be helpful to the community boards. The report also noted that a prior opinion by Corporation Counsel had construed the then-existing New York City Charter § 84 — the sole potential source of authority 4 5 — as not encompassing the power to sue (see, Staff Report, op. cit., at 90, n 34). Despite these observations, as well as a recommendation by the study group itself that community boards be empowered to sue (Staff Report, op. cit., at 94-105, 133-134), the power to sue was not included either in the Charter Commission’s Preliminary Recommendations or in the final proposed Charter amendments (see, Preliminary Recommendations of State Charter Rev Commn, City Government in the Community, Majority Recommendations, at 221-224 [June 1975]; Proposed Amendments to Charter for City of NY by State Charter Rev Commn, at 418-421 [Aug. 1975]; Final Report of State Charter Rev Commn, at 13, 27 [1975]).
Under these circumstances, the reenactment of former section 84 (i) in essentially the same terms under the present section 2800 (e),
5
is indicative of a legislative intent
not
to authorize community boards to bring independent judicial actions as a means of obtaining desired document disclosure. As drafted both before and after the Charter’s revision, the provision merely directs City agencies to comply with community boards’ pertinent requests for assistance and information. The adoption of this provision without substantive change should be viewed in light of the existing decisional law, with which the Legislature is presumed to be familiar
(see, Williams v Niske,
Finally, the power to bring the instant proceeding cannot be derived by "necessary implication” from the community boards’ ULURP responsibilities, which are purely advisory in nature. Unlike the policing function at issue in Matter of City of New York v City Civ. Serv. Comma, (supra, at 444), the boards’ far more limited advisory mission can readily be accomplished without according them the right to obtain whatever documents they want through a plenary judicial proceeding brought under FOIL. That conclusion is particularly apt where, as here, there is no claim that the documents referred to in New York City Charter § 197-c (b) and (i) and the accompanying ULURP regulations (62 RCNY 2-02 [a] [5]; [b] [1]) were not furnished.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that petitioner does not have the capacity to maintain the present article 78 proceeding. That conclusion obtains notwithstanding the provisions of Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (b), which confer standing upon any person denied access to government records. The Freedom of Information Law’s generous standing provisions may cast a net that is wide enough to encompass petitioner. Irrespective of its standing, however, a governmental entity such as petitioner must be able to show that it has the capacity to institute suit. Since that showing was not made here, the petition should have been dismissed.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be reversed, with costs, and the petition dismissed.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate Division brought up for review reversed, etc.
Notes
. A "restrictive declaration” is an instrument that describes a proposed development and the method by which it is to be completed. After the ULURP process has been completed and a proposed project has been approved, the declaration is filed in the office of the County Clerk and becomes a public document of record.
. Respondents’ motion for leave to appeal from the prior Appellate Division order was dismissed because the order sought to be appealed did not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution (
. Although the Court used only the term "standing,” it is evident from the opinion’s discussion that the distinct concepts of "standing” and "capacity” were separately considered.
. Former section 84 (i) provided that City agencies were to give community boards "such information necessary for their work which they shall require.”
. Section 2800 (e), which appears in the present New York City Charter, provides that an agency is to "furnish promptly” to a board "on request any information or assistance necessary for the board’s work.”