*521 OPINION OF THE COURT
Respondent is the Surrogate of Fulton County and petitioner the attorney for an estate being processed in respondent’s court. In January 1992 the executor submitted a petition for a final settlement of its account accоmpanied by waivers executed by all interested parties. Because respondent questioned some items in the account and petitioner’s fees for services, he ordered a hearing sua sponte to inquire into those questions. After the hеaring commenced, petitioner instituted this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking an order prohibiting respondent from continuing the hearing and an order of mandamus compelling him to issue a decree settling the accounts.
The issue рresented is whether respondent acted in excess of his powers as Surrogate by ordering the inquiry when no interested party objected to settlement of the executor’s accounts or the attorney’s fee. Supreme Court held that respondent had and accordingly granted petitioner the relief *522 requested and ordered respondent to enter a decree settling the accounts. The Appellate Division modified by reversing those parts of the judgment which prohibited an inquiry into attorney’s fees and directed entry of a decree awarding counsel the requested fee. On cross appeals to this Court, we conclude that a Surrogate has the power to initiate an inquiry into the propriety of accounts presented for settlement and the reasonableness of the legal fees charged the estate. We, therefore, modify the order of the Appellate Division and dismiss the petition.
I
Heinz Schmidt diеd testate a resident of Johnstown, New York, in June of 1987. He left an estate valued at approximately $1 million, the largest part of it represented by stock in Pepsico. His last will and testament, after making several specific bequеsts, created a residuary trust and directed that the income be distributed to Daniel Hannis during his life and then to the Johnstown Senior Citizens Club. If the Club ceased to exist, the income was to be distributed to the City of Johnstown. Schmidt’s will named Norstar Bank of Upstate Nеw York (now Norstar Trust Company) as executor and trustee. Norstar hired petitioner Stortecky, the attorney who had drafted Schmidt’s will, to represent it in the probate of the will and the administration of the estate.
Upon completiоn of its duties, Norstar submitted to the court a petition for judicial settlement of the final account of Schmidt’s estate. The submission included waivers executed by the bank as executor, all trust beneficiaries, and the Attorney-General on bеhalf of charitable interests. The parties executing the waivers acknowledged that they personally appeared in the proceedings, waived issuance and service of a citation and consented that a decree be entered settling the executor’s accounts. The waivers expressly recited that the petition sought executor’s commissions in the amount of $36,105.55 and counsel fees of $41,000 plus disbursements.
After reviewing the accounting, resрondent requested petitioner to produce certain vouchers and statements, the estate checkbook and an affidavit of legal services rendered. Petitioner submitted some of the documents and the requested affidavit. That information failed to overcome the Surrogate’s reservations, however, and, in May 1992, he issued an order sua sponte scheduling an evidentiary hearing and directing *523 the executor and attorney to appear with their books and records. The order itemized the subjects to be addressed at the hearing, listing various dispositions of Schmidt’s property, the manner in which the executor’s commission was computed, and the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. Beneficiaries of the estate were advisеd that they could attend. After one day of hearings, petitioner commenced the instant proceeding seeking orders of mandamus and prohibition. Supreme Court granted the petition. *
II
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, available only where there is a clear legal right to relief because a trial court has proceeded without jurisdiction or is "exceeding its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction”
(La Rocca v Lane,
The Constitution grants Surrogate’s Court jurisdiction over "all actions and proceedings relating to the affairs of decedents, probate of wills [and] administration of estates” (NY Const, art VI, § 12 [d]) and authorizes the court to exercise such equity jurisdiction as provided by law in fulfilling those responsibilities (see, NY Const, art VI, § 12 [e]; see also, SCPA 201). Respondent clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case pursuаnt to the Constitution and the statutory powers granted Surrogate’s Court by the Legislature. The question, therefore, is whether the Surrogate acted in excess of his powers by inquiring into the contents of the account and the amount of the attоrney’s fee submitted to him before approving the petition for a final accounting when the interested parties to the proceedings had raised no objection to those matters and had consented to entry of a decree.
*524 A.
The Surrogate’s Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, may exercise only the powers conferred upon it by statute and those powers incidental, inherent or necessary to do justice in a particular case to which its jurisdiction extends
(see, Riggs v Cragg,
When an application for voluntary settlement of a judicial account is submitted, SCPA 2211 (1) directs the court to: (1) take the account submitted by the fiduciary; (2) hear the proofs of the interested parties; and, as noted, (3) settle the account as justice requires. It does not expressly authorize the Surrogate to withhold judicial approval absent objections by interested parties, nor does it forbid the Surrogate from making an inquiry into account matters before decreeing settlement. However, to require the Surrogate to "rubber stamp” the account because the parties do not object to it would vitiate the third statutory directive — that the Surrogate аdminister justice in settling the accounts. Indeed, it would seem self-evident that if a Surrogate acts judicially in approving an account and may not be compelled to enter a decree, then the court must have the correlаtive power to deny a decree or, when inquiry is warranted, to satisfy itself on questions arising during the proceedings. As we said long ago: "The general jurisdiction conferred upon the Surrogate’s Court, in matters relating to the conduct of exеcutors and administrators, would seem meaningless, if not an absurdity, if it did not comprehend the right to decree intelligently, and upon equitable principles, and to order their conduct upon principles of justice and of reason”
(Matter of Wagner,
Thus, we conclude that the Surrogate’s power tо initiate an examination of the items on an account before approving them is reasonably to be implied from the Constitution, the statutes and the case law. A Surrogate need not inquire when all parties have consentеd but he or she is not foreclosed from doing so if the circumstances indicate the need for an inquiry.
The Appellate Division, in affirming prohibition, cited two of its prior decisions,
Matter of Dolan
(
B.
Similarly, neither the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act nor the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts expressly confer authority on the Surrogate to review the attorney’s fees when all parties have knowingly consented to payment of the requested fеe
(cf.,
SCPA 2307; 22 NYCRR 207.45 [b]). Nonetheless, Surrogate’s Court is authorized to exercise "all of the powers that the supreme court would have in like actions and proceedings” (SCPA 209 [10];
see generally,
Siegel and Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Boоk 58A, SCPA 209, at 182-183), and it is well established that Supreme Court has inherent power to supervise the fees attorneys charge for legal services
(see, Matter of First Natl. Bank v Brower,
III
Confirming for the first time the Surrogate’s power to initiate such inquiries sua sponte, we recognize the potential dangers of Surrogates doing sо, particularly in cases such as this which appear to be free of any hint of fraud or concealment. A. Surrogate’s actions in uncontested matters can cause the estate and its beneficiaries unnecessary exрense and delay which they are remediless to prevent. Moreover, such inquiries may seriously damage the reputation of the attorney or executor involved by creating unwarranted suspicions of overreaching or misconduct. Indeed, the appearance of meddling may diminish the dignity of the court itself. Our recitation of these dangers should serve as a caution to Surrogates generally, that though they do not act in excess of their powers by inquiring into the сontents of a settlement petition or the attorney’s fees charged an estate, they must be sensitive to the prejudice which may accompany unnecessary hearings.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by dismissing the petition in its entirety, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
Order modified, etc.
Notes
In this Court petitioner has abandoned its application for mandamus, apрarently recognizing that mandamus may issue only to compel a ministerial act, not the exercise of judicial discretion
(see, Matter of Brusco v Braun,