THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RANDOLPH DARIN ALEXANDER, Defendant and Appellant.
2d Crim. No. B296184 (Super. Ct. No.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filed 2/18/20
Katherine Mader, Judge
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County)
In recent years, the Legislature has enacted several new laws that have either rendered formerly mandatory sentence enhancements discretionary (e.g., Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2) [amending
Randolph Darin Alexander appeals from the trial court‘s postjudgment order denying his motion for resentencing pursuant to S.B. 1393. He contends we should vacate the order and remand the case to permit the court to exercise its newfound discretion to strike the four prior serious felony enhancements to his sentence. We dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2016, Alexander pled no contest to second degree robbery (
In February 2019, Alexander moved for resentencing pursuant to S.B. 1393. The trial court determined that “[Senate Bill No.] 620 and the corresponding amendments to the Penal Code do not apply retroactively to final [convictions] . . . [and Alexander] has not demonstrated that he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to some other law.” It accordingly denied his motion.
DISCUSSION
When the trial court sentenced Alexander,
Though it cited the wrong law, the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant Alexander‘s motion. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [appellate court reviews result, not rationale].) ” ’ “[A] judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 (Hernandez).)
Here, Alexander was convicted and sentenced to prison in December 2016. Because he did not appeal from the judgment, his conviction became
Citing Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, Alexander counters that the trial court did have jurisdiction to modify his sentence because the Legislature intended that S.B. 1393 apply retroactively to convictions, like his, that are already final. But the Woods defendant‘s case was on direct appeal (id. at p. 1082)—i.e., his conviction was not yet final (Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 405). The Estrada presumption of retroactivity, cited in Woods, is thus inapplicable here. (Woods, at p. 1090; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada) [ameliorative penal statute applies to all nonfinal convictions in absence of express indication to the contrary].)
Conceding that the presumption is not directly applicable, Alexander points out that the Estrada court also recognized that legislative intent determines whether a statute applies retroactively. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.) We agree. But Alexander cites nothing in S.B. 1393‘s legislative history indicating that the law applies to final convictions.
“No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” (
Alexander cites three propositions in an analysis of S.B. 1393 to support his assertion that he is entitled to the ameliorative effects of the new law: (1) that one of the Legislature‘s purposes in enacting the law was to save money; (2) that enhancements imposed pursuant to
Alternatively, Alexander argues that equal protection principles compel retroactive application of S.B. 1393 to final convictions. But “[r]etroactive application of a punishment-mitigating statute is not a question of constitutional right but of legislative intent.” (People v. Henderson (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 475, 488, fn. 5.) ” ‘A criminal defendant has no vested interest ‘in a specific term of imprisonment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) “[E]qual protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Accordingly, S.B. 1393‘s inapplicability to final convictions will “survive[] constitutional scrutiny as long as there is ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for’ ” treating final and nonfinal convictions differently. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court has recognized such a basis:
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
TANGEMAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
PERREN, J.
Katherine Mader, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
Jenny M. Brandt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Scott A. Taryle and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.