PEOPLE v SORIANO
Docket No. 167373
Michigan Supreme Court
July 7, 2026
20 NW3d 594 (2025)
Arguеd on application for leave to appeal December 10, 2025. Decided July 7, 2026. Chief Justice: Megan K. Cavanagh. Justices: Brian K. Zahra, Richard H. Bernstein, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Kimberly A. Thomas, Noah P. Hood. Reporter of Decisions: Kimberly K. Muschong.
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Zebadiah J. Soriano was convicted following a jury trial in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving penetration,
The trial court, Kevin A. Elsenheimer, J., denied defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the statements elicited following his waiver. Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an expert witness on intoxication. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and SERVITTO, J. (GARRETT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 359165). Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave, the Court ordered oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 20 NW3d 594 (2025).
In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices ZAHRA, WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court held:
-
Defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the alleged waiver, which requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the suspect’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether the suspect has the capacity to understand the Miranda warnings, their Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Additionally, because of the impact that intoxication may have on a person’s mental state, special care must be taken in assessing a waiver when there is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Defendant hаd been hospitalized and displayed erratic and confused behavior before and during the questioning by police. The parties agreed that defendant had taken a large amount of LSD prior to the interrogation and was suffering from severe hallucinations prior to and at the time he was taken into police custody. Although defendant was no longer hallucinating when he was read the Miranda warnings about one hour after being taken into custody, the question was not whether he was hallucinating but whether he had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights when he was given the warnings. The short period of time between defendant’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that defendant was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver. The officer who questioned defendant testified that defendant seemed “confused” during the questioning, and defendant testified that he did not know why he was Mirandized and did not understand the interrogating officer’s questions. Although defendant’s admitted statements evidenced that he had some understanding that he was in trouble, this did not equate to an understanding of his Miranda rights and making a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Defendant did not satisfy many of the considerations that would indicate he had the ability to exercise discretion and the competence to understand his rights. Defendant’s age, lack of experience with law enforcement, and lack of sleep contributed to the determination that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Accordingly, the prosecution did not establish that defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent by a preponderance of the evidence, and the alleged waiver was invalid.
- The prosecution did not demonstrate that the erroneous admission of the challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals concluded that any Miranda error was harmless because AC’s testimony provided more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found defendant guilty, given that a victim’s testimony can be sufficient by itself to support a CSC conviction. However, the Court of Appeals erred in its harmless-error analysis. A preserved error is not harmless simply because the reviewing court concludes that the jury reached the right result. The question is whether an averаge jury would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted testimony. That is, the prosecution must prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.
Court of Appeals judgment reversed, conviction vacated, and case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred with the majority that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid and that admission of the statements was not harmless, but disagreed that the waiver was invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent. Instead, defendant’s waiver was invalid because it was involuntary. The knowing-and-intelligent inquiry was governed by People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621 (2000), which held that the defendant in that case had made a knowing and intelligent waiver because he had the base intellectual capability of understanding his rights and an intellectual understanding of his rights, despite expert testimony that his delusions had prevented him from understanding how his Miranda rights applied to his situation. The majority did not meaningfully engage with Daoud, and it was difficult to reconcile the majority’s holding with Daoud’s holding that only a baseline understanding of Miranda rights is required. The voluntariness test asks whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of a free and unconstrained choice or whether the accused’s will has been overborne and their сapacity for self-determination critically impaired. Unlike the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry, a determination that a confession was involuntary requires that there was coercion. The police conduct here could be characterized as coercive, and an examination of the totality of the circumstances led to the conclusion that this coercion rendered defendant’s waiver involuntary.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v ZEBADIAH JOSEPH SORIANO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 167373
STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
FILED July 7, 2026
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan. Chief Justice: Megan K. Cavanagh. Justices: Brian K. Zahra, Richard H. Bernstein, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Kimberly A. Thomas, Noah P. Hood.
THOMAS, J.
A jury convicted defendant, Zebadiah Soriano, of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving sexual penetration. See
We agree that Soriano’s waiver was invalid. Voluntary intoxication does not make a Miranda waiver per se invalid. It is one factor within the totality of the circumstances courts should consider in assessing whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 634; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). However, the totality of the circumstances here undermined Soriano’s ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Moreover, the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement at issue was harmless; the statement was the most significant evidence toward proving the intent requirement of
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of November 21, 2020, Soriano, who was 18 years old at the time, was with his platonic friend, AC, at her home, where he allegedly assaulted her. AC and Soriano had spent the day together on November 20, 2020, and Soriano returned with AC to the home she shared with her mother that night. AC and her mother had agreed to let Soriano stay with them to quarantine for two weeks after Soriano and AC were both exposed to COVID-19. AC’s mother eventually went to sleep. Around midnight, AC and Soriano decided to take LSD. AC took one tab of LSD, and Soriano
Some time after the two had taken the LSD, Soriano took off his socks, pants, and underwear. AC testified that Soriano stated, “We’re going to do this,” and “[W]e’re going to do this, right?” before forcing himself on top of her and groping her. AC testified that she resisted and was able to get away, but Soriano chased her to the stairs and began choking her with his arm. She got away again and ran up the stairs. AC’s mother testified that she woke up and observed Soriano running up the stairs yelling, “I’m dead,” and “We’re all dead.” AC’s mother “reassured him that he wasn’t” dead, at which point Soriano fell down the stairs. Soriano got up and fled into the cold fall night completely “naked from the waist down.” AC’s mother described Soriano as “agitated and aggressive” and “making incoherent statements.” She briеfly went to look for him, without success, and then called the police.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., deputies from the Grand Traverse County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call from the home. The caller relayed that Soriano had taken LSD and was hallucinating. Deputies began searching for him. After Soriano had wandered around outside for about an hour and a half, one of the deputies discovered him on the side of the road at 5:30 a.m. At that point, Deputy Mike Ruggles made his way to Soriano’s location.
Soriano was still naked from the waist down when Ruggles arrived. Ruggles testified that Soriano “was definitely experiencing some sort of hallucinations and clearly under the influence of some sort of drug” when Ruggles encountered him. Ruggles arrested Soriano. While in custody, Soriano kept “saying things that didn’t make sense and had
At the hospital, staff placed Soriano in a “restraint chair” for the safety of himself and others. Soriano’s “erratic” behavior continued for a time before he slowly became still and silent. Soriano later testified that he had eventually figured out that he was at the hospital, being treated by doctors and nurses and in the company of a law enforcement officer, but he was not sure why at the time. Soriano recalled that although he was no longer hallucinating, things appeared “wavy” and time was “still moving at a weird pace.” Likewise, Ruggles observed that Soriano was “confused after coming down from [the] euphoria he was experiencing.” About an hour after he had been found by police, Soriano asked Ruggles why he was in the hospital.
At that point, Ruggles informed Soriano of the charges against him and read Soriano his rights as required by Miranda, 384 US 436. Ruggles testified that Soriano waived his rights and agreed to speak to him. Ruggles, however, could not recall what Soriano had said to indicate his Miranda waiver. There was no written Miranda waiver. Ruggles did not speak to hospital personnel or consult any medical information to conclude that Soriano was in a state to speak with him, instead relying on his own observations of Soriano’s demeanor and perceptions of Soriano’s understanding. After the alleged waiver, Ruggles proceeded to question Soriano.
During the 5- to 10-minute interrogation, Ruggles had to explain more than once why Soriano was at the hospital and asked Soriano “specific questions” because Soriano did not provide “much dialog.” Rather, there were “many long pauses” in Soriano’s
Soriano’s stepfather testified that he tried to speak with Soriano two hours after the interrogation and before Soriano was taken to jail, but Ruggles told him that “it wouldn’t do any good” because Soriano was “too out of it.” Ruggles acknowledged the conversation but testified that he did not remember what he told Soriano’s parents. Soriano was discharged from the hospital and taken to jail at 8:37 a.m., shortly after the conversation between Soriano’s parents and Ruggles. The next day, while still at the jail, police attempted to receive a waiver of Miranda and question Soriano again, and Soriano invoked his right to remain silent.
Soriano was charged with assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration,
Both Soriano and AC testified at trial, along with AC’s mother and Ruggles. Ruggles’s testimony included a recounting of Soriano’s inculpatory statement from the hospital. The jury convicted Soriano of assault with intent to commit CSC involving penetration but acquitted him of assault by strangulation. Soriano moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Soriano then appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. See People v Soriano, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 359165), p 1.
Soriano then sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave, we heard oral argument on the application, directing the parties to brief:
(1) whether the trial court clearly erred when it found that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966); (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, see People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988); and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain an expert to address the defendant’s level of intoxication while in the hospital. [People v Soriano, ___ Mich ___, ___; 20 NW3d 594, 595 (2025).]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal challenges the trial court’s deniаl of Soriano’s motion to suppress. We review the trial court’s factual findings on the motion for clear error. People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001). “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002). We review legal questions and the application of constitutional standards to uncontested facts de novo. Attebury, 463 Mich at 668.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects criminal defendants from coerced self-incrimination.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that people in custody “may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waivеr is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 444; see also Daoud, 462 Mich at 633. “[T]he prosecution has the
“First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” [Daoud, 462 Mich at 633, quoting Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986).]
These are the “voluntary” and “knowing and intelligent” inquiries, respectively. While related, the concepts are analytically distinct in important respects and have different focuses. We note that, for the “voluntary” inquiry, we and other courts have used the same framework for assessing voluntariness in the Miranda waiver context that we use to determine whether a confession was involuntary under a Fourteenth Amendment due process inquiry. Cheatham, 453 Mich at 17 (opinion by BOYLE, J.). Under both inquiries, a defendant’s ” ‘mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion.’ ” Id., quoting Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 165; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).2 We make no ruling regarding whether Soriano’s waiver was voluntary.
Rather, the focus of this case is largely on the “knowing and intеlligent” inquiry. This component “requires an inquiry into the suspect’s level of understanding, irrespective
In considering whether a Miranda waiver is valid, courts are to consider the ” ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” presented in each case. Daoud, 462 Mich at 633-634, quoting Moran, 475 US at 421. This requires a look at ” ‘all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,’ ” including the suspect’s ” ‘age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,’ ” and consideration of ” ‘whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
IV. ANALYSIS
As noted, the principal issue here is whether Soriano’s Miranda waiver was “knowing and intelligent,” considering his exhibited confusion and exhaustion related to his LSD consumption, among other relevant factors within the totality of the circumstances. We hold that the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing either
Justice BERNSTEIN expresses concern that we explicitly reference the Cipriano factors here rather than, presumably, the shorter list of factors from Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. First, we note that the lists in Cipriano and Daoud significantly overlap. Second, Daoud asserts that its list is nonexhaustive and recognizes that we apply a ” ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach” in evaluating a Miranda waiver. See id. And third, the Cipriano factors would already apply to the voluntariness inquiry. See Cheatham, 453 Mich at 17 (opinion by BOYLE, J.) (noting that the voluntariness standard as applied to a Miranda waiver is identical to that applied to confessions). Accordingly, we see no reason why we would not consider the totality of the relevant circumstances.
A. SORIANO’S MIRANDA WAIVER WAS NOT KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
A significant feature of this case is Soriano’s hospitalization and erratic and confused behavior before and during the questiоning by Ruggles, both of which stemmed from his known consumption of a large quantity of LSD. The Colorado Supreme Court has provided a helpful, nonexhaustive shorthand for assessing the impact of intoxication on a defendant’s mental state in the context of a Miranda waiver:
In considering the intoxication factor, the competence inquiry we have developed in cases involving mental incompetence or language difficulty is pertinent: whether the defendant seemed oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; whether the defendant’s answers were responsive and appeared to be the product of a rational thought process; whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her predicament, including the possibility of being incarcerated; whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police in hopes of avoiding prosecution; whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood their rights. [People v Platt, 81 P3d 1060, 1066 (Colo, 2004).]
This guidance is consistent with the analysis frequently employed by our Court of Appeals and by courts from other jurisdictions, which often consider whether the defendant appeared coherent and could hold a conversation at the time of waiver. See, e.g., People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 265-266; 787 NW2d 126 (2010);5 United States v Montgomery, 621 F3d 568, 574 (CA 6, 2010).6
Courts can look to the amount of time between ingestion of intoxicating substances and the alleged waiver and whether the suspect was exhibiting erratic behavior at or around the time of the alleged waiver, information known in this case to the officer. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Eden, 456 Pa 1, 4; 317 A2d 255 (1974). Psychological assessments and other pertinent scientific evidence regarding the effects of intoxication generally or on the specific person at issue are also relevant. See, e.g., id. (considering a psychiatric report on the defendant conducted while he was in police custody and proximate to the questioning). It bears repeating that these factors are necessarily nonexhaustive given that we consider the totality of the circumstances presented in each case when assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. The ultimate inquiry is whether the suspect’s waiver of their Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent, i.e., whether the suspect had the mental capacity to understand their rights and the ramifications of waiving those rights when they were given the warning.
In this case, the parties agree that Soriano had taken a large amount of LSD—a drug that has hallucinogenic effects. They further agree that Soriano was suffering from severe hallucinations prior to and at the time he was taken into police custody. He was taken to
Ruggles read Soriano the Miranda warning approximately one hour after Soriano had been taken into custody and while Soriano was still in the restraint chair. The parties agree that Soriano was no longer experiencing hallucinations at that time. But the question is not whether he was still hallucinating. Rather, it is whether Soriano had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights when he was given the warning. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 636-637. The short period of time between Soriano’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that he was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver. See Eden, 456 Pa at 3-4.
More specifically, Ruggles described Soriano’s affect as both “confused on why he was” at the hospital and, mоre generally, “confused after coming down from [the] euphoria he was experiencing.” The deputy described their conversation as consisting of “a lot of yes-and-no-type answers” from Soriano without “a whole lot of dialog immediately from him.” As a result, Ruggles had to “ask him specific questions” to elicit information from Soriano. For his part, as noted, Soriano testified that time was “moving at a weird pace” and that he “was kind of in [his] own world.” He further testified that he did not know why he was being Mirandized, did “not really” understand the questions Ruggles was asking, and was answering the questions “randomly.” After the conversation, Ruggles even advised Soriano’s stepfather that Soriano was “too out of it” for a conversation to do any good. This testimony does not support the conclusion that Soriano had the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights.
Soriano’s demeanor stands in stark contrast to cases in which a waiver was upheld based on the detail in the defendant’s statements, see, e.g., Jewell, 175 P 3d at 105-107; Platt, 81 P3d at 1063-1069; Walters, 485 Mass at 279, or based on the suspect’s discussions of the morality and consequences of his acts with law enforcement, see, e.g., People v Gore, 116 Ill App 3d 780, 785; 452 NE2d 583 (1983) (“The defendant admitted that he knew that what he did was not right. He understood he could go to trial and possibly be sent to prison for what he had done.“). For instancе, in Platt, the defendant provided a “two-part written statement” that “lucidly explain[ed] in detail how he committed the sexual assault and why,” that was “coherent . . . [and] rational,” and that “contain[ed] a straightforward narrative.” Platt, 81 P3d at 1067-1068. The defendant in Platt also asked for leniency. Id. at 1068. And in Jewell, the defendant—although drunk—provided officers with an accurate assessment of his physical condition after a car accident, followed orders, and “listened intently” to the Miranda warning before explicitly waiving his rights. Jewell, 175 P3d at 105.
Justice BERNSTEIN suggests that our discussion of this academic literature is at odds with the Daoud Court’s statement that our analysis “should not involve any determination whether the decision to waive those rights is actually a wise decision in terms of the defendant’s self-interest.” See Daoud, 462 Mich at 643 (emphasis omitted). In context, this discussion concerns Soriano’s ability to take in and process information—namely, whether Soriano can understand the content of his Miranda rights when provided to him and make a decision; i.e., whether he has capacity to exercise discretion. We do not suggest that this includes an analysis of whether Soriano made the “right” or a “good” decision.
Factors beyond Soriano’s intoxication support our conclusion. Consideration of Soriano’s ” ‘age . . . [and] experience’ ” also supports the conclusion that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights at the time Ruggles gave him the warning. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 634, quoting Fare, 442 US at 725; see also Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. Soriano was 18 years old at the time of the incident and his subsequent interrogation. While not dispositive of this inquiry, this suggests a diminished ability to process information in complex, stressful situations and therefore supports the conclusion
As noted above, the validity of a Miranda waiver turns on the totality of the circumstances presented to the court. Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. The prosecution had the burden to show that Soriano gave a valid Miranda waiver. Id. We conclude that it did not meet this burden with respect to the requirement that any waiver be “knowing and intelligent.” Soriano was аcting erratically and abnormally because of the effects of LSD
Justice BERNSTEIN views the facts in Daoud as foreclosing our decision today, and he expresses concern that we are modifying Daoud’s standard. However, the application of the law to the facts of the defendant’s case in Daoud does not foreclose a different conclusion when applied to the facts of this case. In Daoud, the defendant had delusions that God would prevent him from being punished for the murder he confessed to. Daoud, 462 Mich at 628. However, the experts who testified at his trial all agreed that the defendant understood the content of the Miranda warnings given to him when he was interrogated. Id. at 641-642. This was used in the Daoud Court’s reasoning, see id. at 643-644, and is, in part, how the state met its burden in that case.
Here, we hold that the prosecution did not establish that Soriano’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent by a preponderance of the evidence. We do not need to decide on the voluntariness of Soriano’s Miranda waiver or confession; it is
B. ADMITTING SORIANO’S HOSPITAL STATEMENTS WAS NOT A HARMLESS ERROR
The remedy for a Miranda violation—here, procuring a statement from a defendant without a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights—is suppression of the statements at issue. See United States v Patane, 542 US 630, 641-642; 124 S Ct 2620; 159 L Ed 2d 667 (2004); see also Vega v Tekoh, 597 US 134, 152; 142 S Ct 2095; 213 L Ed 2d 479 (2022). We also review for harmless error.
Where, as here, this Court finds a preserved constitutional error that “is not a structural defect that defies harmless error analysis,” we reverse unless the prosecution can “establish[] that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); see also Stewart, 512 Mich at 501. A court should find an error harmless only after ” ‘a thorough examination of the record’ in order to evaluate whether [the error’s harmlessness] is clear . . . beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 348; 697 NW2d 144 (2005), quoting Neder, 527 US at 19. Courts must also ” ‘determine the probable effect of [the] testimony on the minds of an average jury.’ ” People v Sammons, 505 Mich 31, 56; 949 NW2d 36 (2020), quoting People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 315; 505 NW2d 528 (1993) (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.).
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that any Miranda error was harmless because “AC’s testimony provides more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found defendant guilty,” since ” [a] victim’s testimony can be sufficient, by itself, to
The Court of Appeals erred in its harmless-error analysis. As we have explained, an error is not harmless “simply because [the reviewing court] concludes the jury reached the right result.” People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 206; 551 NW2d 891 (1996) (concerning nonconstitutional preserved error). Moreover, even in the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—where the applicable standard is more demanding than the harmless-error standard—we have emphasized that ” [s]ufficient evidence to convict does not obviate the need to make a prejudice determination.” People v Dufek, 510 Mich 957, 957-958 (2022).
To be sure, evaluating the harm caused by an “erroneous admission of evidence” involves “a comparative analysis of the likely effect of the error in light of the other evidence.” Mateo, 453 Mich at 206. But the question is whether an “average jury ‘would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted testimony.’ ” Sammons, 505 Mich at 56, quoting Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 316 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.). Put another way, the prosecution must “prove . . . that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, that a jury could convict based solely on AC’s testimony is material but not conclusive to the analysis.12
Here, Soriano was convicted of assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration under
There are three pieces of evidence supporting the intent element. The first two are (1) Soriano’s removal of his pants and underwear and (2) AC’s testimony that Soriano said, before and during the assault, “we’re going to do this,” and “we’re going to do this, right?” A jury could certainly rely on this evidence to determine Soriano’s intent. See People v Magnant, 508 Mich 151, 179; 973 NW2d 60 (2021) (” ‘ [M]inimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a defendant’s state of mind.’ “), quoting People v Nasir, 255 Mich App 38, 45; 662 NW2d 29 (2003). However, these two рieces of evidence are overshadowed by Soriano’s hospital-room declaration that he was “a rapist,” which is the third piece of evidence. This statement is tantamount to an admission that he intended to commit a penetration offense, as required by
Soriano’s hospital-room declaration, “I am a rapist and I am fucked,” is both highly prejudicial to his defense and the strongest evidence that he intended to commit CSC involving penetration. And proof of this intent was required to convict Soriano under
V. CONCLUSION
Soriano’s Miranda waiver is not valid because it was not knowing and intelligent. Soriano was no longer experiencing hallucinations at the time he received the Miranda warning; nevertheless, his behavior while being questioned by Ruggles, his age, his lack
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Kimberly A. Thomas
Megan K. Cavanagh
Brian K. Zahra
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Noah P. Hood
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v ZEBEDIAH JOSEPH SORIANO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 167373
STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I. KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER
As the majority acknowledges, People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621; 614 NW2d 152 (2000), governs the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry. In Daoud, 462 Mich at 625-626, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights three times and waived them all three times before confessing to the long-unsolved murder of his mother. Id. at 625-626. There was some question as to his
[t]he trial court found that defendant was delusional at the time of his contact with police, in that he “believed that he had no need of any protective rights as God would be releasing him from jail as a reward for confessing to his mother’s murder.” The court reasoned that this delusion “prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issue—his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination.” [Id.]
This Court reversed, finding that “a basic understanding is all that is required for a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights.” Id. at 644.
In reversing, this Court acknowledged that
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights does not require that a suspect “understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights that the police have properly explained to him.” [People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 28; 551 NW2d 355 (1996)]. Rather, a very basic understanding is all that is necessary for a valid waiver. [Daoud, 462 Mich at 642.]
This Court clarified that a knowing-and-intelligent waiver does not need to be wise or in the defendant’s best interests: “Rather, the only inquiry with regard to a ‘knowing and intelligent’ waiver of Miranda rights is . . . whether the defendant understood ‘that he did
The majority does not meaningfully engage with Daoud. Instead, the majority relies on analysis from an out-of-state opinion for the proposition that intoxication might play a role in determining whether a waiver was valid. The majority concludes that ” [t]he short period of time between Soriano’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that he was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver.” It is difficult to reconcile this holding with Daoud, where the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and was under the delusion that God would reward him for confessing to murder; in Daoud, despite the fact that the erratic behaviors persisted throughout, this Court held that this was not itself an indication that the defendant lacked the basic ability to understand his legal rights.
The majority acknowledges that defendant had some baseline understanding of what was happening during his interrogation, but summarily concludes that this is not the equivalent of a knowing-and-intelligent waiver, based on a law student’s note about the difficulty of obtaining Miranda waivers from the mentally challenged. There is nothing in Daoud that states that “exercis[ing] discretion” is the appropriate threshold for determining whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, especially when the majority quotes a
I thus dissent from the majority’s holding that defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent. While I share the majority’s underlying concerns about whether intoxication, especially to the extent that defendant seems to have experienced, changes the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry, instead of recognizing an exception to Daoud for voluntary intoxication, the majority modifies Daoud itself without explaining why or justifying such an expansion. I do not see how Daoud itself can lead to the conclusion the majority reaches in this case, given that the defendant in that case seems to have suffered an enduring break from reality that far surpasses the period of intoxication that defendant in this case suffered. Although I question whether Daoud oversimplifies the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry, defendant has not asked us to reconsider our holding in that case, and I would thus decline to do so, especially where I would find that defendant’s waiver is invalid because it was involuntary.
II. VOLUNTARY WAIVER
“If an individual’s will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, his confession is inadmissible because [it was] coerced.” Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293, 307; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963) (quotation marks
In Cipriano, this Court outlined a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether a statement is voluntary:
the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id. at 334 (emphasis added).]
This Court noted that the absence or presence of any one factor is not conclusive, and that ” [t]he ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made.” Id..
In People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472; 999 NW2d 717 (2023), this Court considered whether an 18-year-old defendant’s statements to law enforcement were voluntary. In particular, this Court considered whether the defendant’s age was meaningful when assessing voluntariness. Relying in part on the brain science recognized in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), this Court held that because “18-year-olds are still undergoing physiological and neurological maturation, meaning that their decision-making
Unlike the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry, whether a defendant’s confession was involuntary does require that there was coercion. “Coercive tactics that can overbear an individual’s will include both physical intimidation and psychological pressure.” Stewart, 512 Mich at 480, citing Townsend, 372 US at 307. The majority balks at coming to the conclusion that the police engaged in coercive tactics here. However, I agree with the partially dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals that the characterization of Deputy Ruggles as friendly and helpful is disingenuous and devoid of important context; I find no issue with characterizing this conduct as coercive.
Deputy Ruggles conducted the interrogation while defendant was fully restrained in a restraint chair, which Deputy Ruggles acknowledged was because of defendant’s condition: “Unpredictable behavior. Unpredictable statements. So, I guess, for his safety and everyone else’s safety.” When coupled with the fact that, as defendant’s stepfather testified, Deputy Ruggles would later say that defendant was still “too out of it” to receive visitors, the record establishes that there was coercive police behavior. By his own account, Deputy Ruggles engaged in an interrogation of an 18-year-old defendant whose four limbs were physically restrained for everyone’s safety and who Deputy Ruggles determined was
An examination of the totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that this coercion rendered defendant’s waiver involuntary1—defendant was sleep-deprived, as the interrogation took place in the early hours of the morning after defendant had been outside in the cold overnight; defendant was extremely intoxicated based on the amount of LSD he had taken compared to his size at the time, standing at 5’7” and weighing around 120 pounds; defendant was completely physically restrained; defendant had no prior contact with the criminal justice system; and defendant was 18 years old, which, as in Stewart, is meaningful because it suggests that defendant’s decision-making abilities were not yet fully formed and he was thus more likely to comply with Deputy Ruggles’s interrogation.
III. CONCLUSION
Because I otherwise agree with the majority that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid and this error was not harmless, I concur in the result reached by the
Richard H. Bernstein
Notes
Here, the record reflects that the restraint chair was used to protect Soriano and others given his earlier erratic behavior. We question whether there is sufficient evidence on this record that the purpose or effect of its use was to coerce Soriano. The remaining conduct described by Justice BERNSTEIN is the act of questioning Soriano given his age and intoxication. But he does not explain how the questioning of Soriano, given his age and voluntary intoxication, meets the standard of Spring and Elstad.