PEOPLE v DAOUD
Docket No. 113994
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 20, 2000
462 Mich 621
Argued March 9, 2000 (Calendar No. 7).
Docket No. 113994. Argued March 9, 2000 (Calendar No. 7). Decided July 20, 2000.
Mahir G. Daoud flagged down a Detroit police vehicle and told officers that he had killed his mother. The officers thereafter advised him of his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights at the police station, after which he made a tape-recorded confession. In all, before his preliminary examination he was advised of his rights three times. The Oakland Circuit Court, Barry L. Howard, J., ordered that the defendant be examined by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, and, after hearing testimony from three experts, suppressed the defendant‘s statements on the ground that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals, FITZGERALD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and WHITBECK, JJ., reversed in part in an unpublished order, explaining that the defendant‘s initial statements were not the product of custodial interrogation and thus were outside the scope of Miranda. However, it left standing the trial court‘s decision suppressing the defendant‘s recorded confession (Docket No. 215615). The people appeal.
In an opinion by Justice YOUNG, joined by Chief Justice WEAVER, and Justices TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in assessing the validity of defendant‘s Miranda waiver. The waiver was valid.
1. Whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary depends on the absence of police coercion. The relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. In this case, there is no question that the defendant‘s decision to waive his Miranda rights and his decision to confess were completely voluntary.
2. Determining whether a suspect‘s waiver was knowing and intelligent requires an inquiry into the suspect‘s level of understanding, irrespective of police behavior. To knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need not understand the ramifications and conse-
3. The trial court erred as a matter of law because it misread People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1 (1996), and, consequently, focused on why the defendant was confessing rather than considering whether the defendant could in fact understand and waive his Miranda rights. Viewing the objective circumstances surrounding the waiver, it clearly was knowing and intelligent.
Reversed.
Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justice KELLY, dissenting, stated that the trial court did not clearly err in its determinations that the defendant was delusional at the time he confessed and that he was unable to understand the actual consequences that could arise as a result of his confession. The legal conclusions drawn by the trial court should be affirmed because the prosecution did not bear its burden of proving that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutionally protected rights under the totality of the circumstances.
The majority opinion is incomplete to the extent that it fails to fully explore the burden of proof that must be borne by the prosecution, and fails to distinguish the factual issues from the legal issues in this case. Although the majority announces that the prosecution has the burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence, traditionally, constitutional waiver cases place a heavy burden on the prosecution. To date, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly declared that a preponderance standard should be applied in knowing and intelligent waiver cases. Although imposition of the preponderance standard in Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157 (1986), arguably extends to knowing and intelligent waiver cases, the proposition is certainly open to debate. In announcing the preponderance standard in Connelly, the Supreme Court examined cases involving the exclusion of evidence, and built upon other cases examining voluntary waiver, and its recent recognition that Miranda was a constitutional decision, lends some support to the proposition that Connelly‘s rationale should not be extended to knowing and intelligent cases.
Although the majority recognizes that the trial court‘s findings of fact must be reviewed for clear error, nowhere does it apply the standard it announces, instead proceeding with an open-ended analysis after concluding that the meaning of “knowing and intelli-
Examination of Miranda-based knowing and intelligent waiver cases must proceed with a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Mental illness fits naturally within the totality of the circumstances test, and it may be a factor tending to indicate that a defendant cannot understand the rights he is waiving or what the consequences of that waiver might be. In this case, the prosecution has proceeded under a flawed legal interpretation of Miranda in arguing that mental illness should not be factored into the totality of the circumstances equation. Thus, its case must fail, even by a preponderance of the evidence.
The authority the majority offers in support of its knowing and intelligent waiver analysis leaves open the possibility that a defendant‘s level of comprehension about the consequences of waiver will be relevant. None of the authority holds that a waiver will be valid per se if the defendant is able to literally comprehend Miranda, but is unable to apply that literal meaning to his own situation. A conclusion that a defendant need not understand every consequence of confessing is different than a conclusion that the defendant must understand the most basic consequences of confessing. In this case, the defendant misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the police. He lacked a basic comprehension of what could actually occur if he waived his rights, and the trial court‘s analysis comports with United States Supreme Court observations that a defendant must possess at least a basic understanding of his rights under the totality of the circumstances. The defendant‘s decision to confess was directly tied to his delusion that God would control the police and set him free. It is therefore questionable whether the defendant ever truly comprehended the actual meaning of the Miranda warnings.
The ultimate focus for purposes of the knowing and intelligent prong of Miranda remains on the level of the suspect‘s comprehension. The validity of a waiver does not depend on a verbatim recita-
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Anica Letica, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Robyn B. Frankel for the defendant-appellee.
Amicus Curiae:
Brian Mackie, President, John D. O‘Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
YOUNG, J. We consider in this case the trial court‘s decision to suppress defendant‘s voluntary confession on the ground that defendant did not “knowingly and intelligently” waive his Miranda1 rights. We conclude
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 21, 1994, defendant flagged down Detroit Police Officers Nevin Hughes and Linda Dickinson, who were on routine patrol in a marked vehicle, and blurted out that he had just confessed to a 911 operator that he had killed his mother, Teriza Daoud. As it turns out, in 1985, the victim‘s body had been discovered in a Dumpster in Toledo, Ohio. The victim‘s body was “hog-tied” with electrical cord and burned. An autopsy report indicated that the victim died as a result of multiple blunt-force injuries to her head. The victim had also been exposed to some source of carbon monoxide before her death. Ironically, the case had remained unresolved until defendant‘s decision to approach the police nine years later.
In response to defendant‘s roadside outburst, Officers Hughes and Dickinson pulled their patrol car to the curb, approached defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. Officer Dickinson testified at defendant‘s preliminary examination that defendant proceeded to waive his Miranda rights and tell the officers that he “took a lug wrench and he cut it in half and he hit his mother several times in the head and then he choked her and then he wrapped her up in a blanket, tied her up with some wire and he took her out to a[n] area near a school in Troy.”
In response to defendant‘s statement that the murder took place in Troy, Officer Dickinson immediately notified the Troy Police Department. Troy Police Detective Mitch Lenczewski testified at the preliminary examination that he and Sergeant Mark Tuck2 went down to the Detroit Police Department on May 21 and interviewed defendant.3 Defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights a third time. Defendant then gave a taped confession in which he explained that he repeatedly struck his mother in the head and choked her to get her to stop screaming. After killing her, defendant wrapped his mother‘s body in blankets and placed it in the trunk of his uncle‘s car. He then drove the car to a nearby school, and parked it there. Defendant returned to his mother‘s house, took her car, and drove it to the Oakland Mall in Troy to make it look like she had been shopping there.
After getting a ride from some “guys” at the mall, defendant returned to the school where he had left his uncle‘s car. Defendant bought a gasoline container, filled it, and drove to Toledo with the victim‘s body in the trunk. There, defendant threw his mother‘s body into a Dumpster and set it afire.
After defendant was bound over for trial on June 10, 1994, he filed a notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that defendant be examined by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Following a September 1994 competency hearing, the trial court determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Michigan Department of Mental Health for treatment.4 Upon defendant‘s request, the trial court further ordered that defendant be examined “relating to the issue of competency to understand his constitutional and Miranda rights prior to making a statement to the police . . . .”
Defendant was eventually examined by three experts, Drs. Robert Mogy, Charles Clark, and Thomas Grisso, all of whom submitted reports. Walker5 hearings were held on September 25, 1996, and February 7, 1997, during which the trial court
In light of the contradictory opinions rendered by Drs. Mogy and Clark, Dr. Grisso was hired to perform yet another examination. Dr. Grisso testified that defendant literally understood that the police intended to put him in jail; however, due to his religious “delusions and preoccupations,” defendant was unable to use that information and “relate it to his own situation.”
Relying on the testimony given by Drs. Mogy and Grisso, the trial court suppressed defendant‘s statements on the ground that defendant did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. The trial court found that defendant was delusional at the time of his contact with police, in that he “believed that he had no need of any protective rights as God would be releasing him from jail as a reward for confessing to his mother‘s murder.” The court reasoned that this delusion “prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issue—his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination.”
This Court granted the prosecution‘s application for leave to appeal. 461 Mich 873 (1999).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), this Court set forth the standards for our review of the trial court‘s decision in this case:
Although engaging in de novo review of the entire record, see People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), this Court will not disturb a trial court‘s factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights “unless that ruling is found to be clearly erroneous.” [People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).] Credibility is crucial in determining a defendant‘s level of comprehension, and the trial judge is in the best position to make this assessment.
Although we review for clear error the trial court‘s factual findings regarding a defendant‘s knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, we agree with the prosecution that the meaning of “knowing and intelligent” is a question of law. We review questions
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The United States Supreme Court originally followed the common-law rule pertaining to the admission of confessions: that a confession was admissible as long as it was freely and voluntarily made. See Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 584-585; 4 S Ct 202; 28 L Ed 262 (1884).7 Then, in Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 542; 18 S Ct 183; 42 L Ed 568 (1897), the Court for the first time found the voluntariness requirement to be grounded in the Fifth Amendment‘s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” However, the voluntariness requirement was limited to cases in federal court. In Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78, 114; 29 S Ct 14; 53 L Ed 97 (1908), the Court held that “exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution” (emphasis added).
Beginning with Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278; 56 S Ct 461; 80 L Ed 682 (1936), the Court introduced due process as a basis for excluding involuntary confessions in criminal proceedings occurring in state courts.8 It was held that fundamental unfairness in
The Court eventually returned its focus to the privilege against self-incrimination. In Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 6; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964), the Court overruled Twining and held that “the Fifth Amendment‘s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”9 The Court acknowledged that the Brown Court “felt impelled, in light of Twining, to say that its conclusion did not involve the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. However, the Court reasoned that any distinction “was soon abandoned.” Id. at 6-7. Thus, the Malloy Court concluded that
IV. MIRANDA v ARIZONA
Against this backdrop, the Court in Miranda addressed what it believed to be the inherent coercion present in all custodial interrogations. Beginning with the premise that, because of the “compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from [a] defendant can truly be the product of his free choice,” id. at 458, the Court fashioned a set of “procedural safeguards” in order to “permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination“:
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [Id. at 467, 478-479.]
The Court further explained that “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 444.
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court elaborated on what is required for an effective waiver of the Miranda rights. In Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), the Court explained that “[t]he inquiry has two distinct dimensions“:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his [Miranda] rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. [Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707, 725; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979); see also Cheatham, supra at 27.]
We read Fare as setting forth an objective standard for determining whether Miranda rights are validly waived. See United States v Yunis, 273 US App DC 290, 302; 859 F2d 953 (1988). While, as explained below, determining whether a defendant provided a knowing and intelligent waiver necessarily involves an inquiry into the suspect‘s level of understanding, this can only be done by examining the objective circumstances surrounding the waiver.10 Finally, the prosecution has the burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 168; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).11
A. VOLUNTARY PRONG OF THE MIRANDA WAIVER
Determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary involves the same inquiry as in the due process context. In Connelly, supra at 169-170, the Supreme Court explained that there is “no reason to require more in the way of a ‘voluntariness’ inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context.” Thus, whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary depends on the absence of police coercion. Id. at 170. The Connelly Court explained that “‘the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception . . . .‘” Id., quoting Moran, supra at 421.
In the instant case, there is no question that defendant‘s decision to waive his Miranda rights, and, concomitantly, his decision to confess, was completely voluntary. Consequently, as in Cheatham, our
B. KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT PRONG OF THE MIRANDA WAIVER
In contrast to the voluntary prong, determining whether a suspect‘s waiver was knowing and intelligent requires an inquiry into the suspect‘s level of understanding, irrespective of police behavior. See United States v Bradshaw, 290 US App DC 129, 132-134; 935 F2d 295 (1991); Derrick v Peterson, 924 F2d 813, 820-821 (CA 9, 1990). However, as we explained in Cheatham, supra at 28, “[t]o knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights that the police have properly explained to him.” See also Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564, 574; 107 S Ct 851; 93 L Ed 2d 954 (1987) (“The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of [Miranda rights]“).12 Thus, “[l]ack of foresight is insufficient to render an otherwise proper waiver invalid.” Cheatham, supra at 29. Rather,
[t]o establish a valid waiver, the state must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the accused understood that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to the presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in a later trial against him. [Id.; see also People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 558; 517 NW2d 843 (1994).]
We agree with the plurality in Cheatham that the requirement of a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights essentially forces courts to make “‘sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State.‘” Id. at 21-22 (BOYLE, J.), quoting Connelly, supra at 167.13 In light of the fact that the Fifth Amendment itself protects only against compelled self-incrimination, the requirement of a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights is puzzling.14 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Derrick, supra at 821:
[T]he Court requires that there be improper state action under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment before a confession can be suppressed, but requires no such state action in the Miranda context, even though the constitutional provision underlying the Miranda warning—the [F]ifth [A]mendment—is applied to the states through that same [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.
Although the Supreme Court has now decided that the Miranda rights are constitutionally mandated, the
V. APPLICATION
Cheatham represents our most recent attempt to apply the knowing and intelligent prong of the Miranda waiver. The trial court, in its opinion suppressing defendant‘s confession, interpreted our decision in Cheatham as requiring that a suspect be able to “apply [his Miranda rights] to himself and understand his relationship with the police.” As a result, the trial court reasoned that defendant‘s delusional belief that “God would be releasing him from jail as a reward for confessing to his mother‘s murder” prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent decision to waive his Miranda rights. We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law because it misread Cheatham and, consequently, focused on why defendant was confessing rather than considering whether defendant could in fact understand and waive his Miranda rights.
Our conclusion in this regard is supported not only by the trial court‘s written opinion focusing on defendant‘s purported delusions, but by the court‘s
To waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail. The mental state that is necessary to validly waive Miranda rights involves being cognizant at all times of the State‘s intention to use one‘s statements to secure a conviction and of the fact that
Because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining defendant’s ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, we reverse the trial court’s decision suppressing defendant’s confession. Viewing the objective circumstances surrounding defendant’s waiver, the waiver was clearly knowing and intelligent. Detective Lenczewski gave undisputed testimony that, while advising defendant of his Miranda rights, he had defendant read along from a department-issued card. Detective Lenczewski further testified that he stopped after each warning, asked defendant if he understood, and continued after defendant stated that he in fact understood. The exchange ended with defendant’s direction to “get on with it.” Such a remark clearly evidences defendant’s awareness of the events that were transpiring. Defendant eventually waived his rights and proceeded to give a detailed confession.18
Turning to the opinions proffered by the various expert witnesses, although Dr. Clark admitted that it was possible that defendant was suffering from a delusion that affected his ability to understand his actions, he believed such a notion to be “quite speculative.” Dr. Clark found no objective evidence that defendant was not capable of understanding his Miranda rights. Indeed, Dr. Clark believed that it would be a “mystery” why defendant would tell the police what he did if defendant did not understand to
Dr. Grisso testified that, while defendant’s delusion prevented him from appreciating the consequences of his actions, he clearly had a “straight forward understanding . . . of what the Miranda warnings are saying.” With regard to defendant’s understanding of the role of the police, Dr. Grisso testified that defendant would “understand that the police intend[ed] to jail him.” In his report submitted to the court, Dr. Grisso explained that defendant knew what the police were supposed to do but, because of his mental illness, “did not believe that [] it would happen.”
As stated, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights does not require that a suspect “understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights that the police have properly explained to him.” Cheatham, supra at 28. Rather, a very basic understanding is all that is necessary for a valid waiver.
The Supreme Court has made clear that a defendant need not have a wise or shrewd basis for waiving Miranda rights for the waiver to be valid. In Connecticut v Barrett, 479 US 523, 525-526; 107 S Ct 828; 93 L Ed 2d 920 (1987), the Court considered a case in which a defendant orally confessed to a crime, but refused to make a written statement without the pres
Thus, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court does not equate a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights with a wise or lawyer-inspired decision to waive those rights.20 A trial court’s determination of whether a waiver of Miranda rights is “knowing and intelligent” should not involve any determination whether the decision to waive those rights is actually a wise decision in terms of the defendant’s self-interest. Rather, the only inquiry with regard to a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights is, as stated, whether the defendant understood “that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to the presence of counsel, and that the
Here, even Dr. Mogy, who testified at length about defendant’s supposed belief that “God was going to free him,” acknowledged that defendant “did, at some point, seem to be aware that he could go to jail for making these statements.” Dr. Mogy’s basic position was that defendant simply ignored the consequences of confessing because of his delusions, not that defendant could not understand those consequences. Indeed, Dr. Mogy acknowledged that defendant could understand the literal aspects of his Miranda rights.
In its opinion, the trial court expressly found “the testimony and reports of Dr. Mogy and Dr. Grisso to accurately reflect the nature of [d]efendant‘s mental state” at the time that defendant waived his Miranda rights. The trial court also noted that “Dr. Grisso testified that while [d]efendant did have an intellectual understanding of the rights he was read, his delusions prevented him from appreciating those rights as they applied to his own situation” (emphasis added). Finally, the trial court stated that “this case presents a defendant with the intellectual capability of understanding the rights which [were] read to him.” Thus, it is plain that the trial court found that defendant understood his Miranda rights. That should have ended the trial court’s inquiry because a basic understanding is all that is required for a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. The trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s confession.21
For the reasons stated, the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that defendant’s claimed delusional belief that God would set him free prevented him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. Moreover, as in Cheatham, supra at 31, there is no evidence that, “at the time the warnings were given and during the subsequent questioning, Defendant manifested expressly or by implication from [his] words and actions any lack of comprehension of what was said to [him] or of what was occurring’” (citation omitted).22 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision suppressing defendant’s confession.
WEAVER, C.J., and TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.
CAVANAGH, J. I dissent. The majority, under the guise of applying well-established rules of law, creates an unduly restrictive rule for examining waiver of the
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
I agree with the majority that “we review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights . . . .” Ante at 629, citing People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). I further agree that questions of law are reviewed de novo. Ante at 629-630. Yet, the majority opinion is incomplete to the extent that it: (1) fails to fully explore the burden of proof that must be borne by the prosecution, and (2) fails to distinguish the factual issues from the legal issues in this case.
B. PROSECUTORIAL BURDEN
The majority announces that “the prosecution has the burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ante at 634. Although I am willing to proceed under the assumption that the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence because the prosecution failed to prove its case even by a preponderance, I do not believe that the applicable burden is as clearly established as the majority implies.
The preponderance test employed by the majority springs from Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 168; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986), a United States Supreme Court case discussing the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights protected by Miranda. Traditionally, constitutional waiver cases place a “heavy” burden on the prosecution. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938); see, also, Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564, 581; 107 S Ct 851; 93 L Ed 2d 954 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Connecticut v Barrett, 479 US 523, 531; 107 S Ct 828; 93 L Ed 2d 920 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). Our Supreme Court has also recognized that, “‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights, and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’” Johnson at 464.
To date, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly declared that a preponderance standard should be applied in knowing and intelligent waiver cases. In Connelly itself, Justice Brennan’s dissent reiterated the fact that Connelly was a voluntariness case, Connelly at 187-188, and explained why the imposition of a preponderance standard was undesirable:
In holding that the government need only prove the voluntariness of the waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court ignores the explicit command of Miranda: “If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation.” . . . In recognition of the importance of the Due Process Clause and the
Fifth Amendment , we always have characterized the State’s burden of proof on a Miranda waiver as “great” and “heavy.” [Id. at 184-185.]
Although Connelly’s imposition of the preponderance standard arguably extends to knowing and intelligent waiver cases, the proposition is certainly open to debate. In announcing the preponderance standard
The majority is correct that the Supreme Court stated that “[w]henever the [s]tate bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the [s]tate need prove waiver only by preponderance of the evidence.” Connelly at 168. The entirety of the Supreme Court’s statement was as follows, however, “We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.” Connelly at 168, referring to Lego v Twomey, 404 US 477; 92 S Ct 619; 30 L Ed 2d 618 (1972). In Lego, the inquiry focused solely on voluntariness. There, the Supreme Court held: “the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Of course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” Id. at 489.
Although the majority recognizes that the trial court’s findings of fact must be reviewed for clear error, nowhere does the majority apply the standard it announces. Instead, the opinion proceeds with an open-ended analysis after concluding that “the meaning of ‘knowing and intelligent’ is a question of law.” Ante at 629. After broadly categorizing the entire discussion as a legal issue, the majority then conducts an independent review of the trial court’s factual findings. See id. at 639-644.
Given the broad range of issues that may be considered factual, I am not prepared to summarily conclude that all questions remotely related to the knowing and intelligent inquiry are legal in nature. Rather, it is incumbent upon us to laboriously separate the factual issues from those issues that are purely legal, and to separate legal conclusions from factual inferences.
1. FACTUAL ISSUES
In the present case, the trial judge weighed the credibility of the competing witnesses and found “the testimony and reports of Dr. Mogy and Dr. Grisso to accurately reflect the nature of Defendant‘s mental state at the time,” and that “there is no question that Defendant, at the time of his arrest, was psychotic.” The trial court also expressly stated:
The nature and subject matter of Defendant’s delusions prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issue—his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. His delusional process required self-incrimination to effectuate freedom.
2. LEGAL ISSUES AND PREMISES
Because the trial judge’s findings were not clearly erroneous, the key legal question in this case is whether the defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive his rights despite the delusion causing him to believe that God would set him free as a reward for confessing. As stated previously, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Yet, the concept of de novo review does not relieve this Court of its duty to operate within the constitutional parameters.
It is well settled that our examination of Miranda-based knowing and intelligent waiver cases must proceed with a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated:
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. [Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707, 724-725; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979).]
In Fare, the Supreme Court examined whether a juvenile defendant waived his
There is no reason to assume that such courts—especially juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this area—will be unable to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination. [Id. at 725.]
The Supreme Court then went on to apply the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that “no special factors indicate that respondent was unable to understand the nature of his actions” and that “[t]here is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.” Id. at 726.
The majority summarily cites Fare for the proposition that courts should examine Miranda waivers objectively. Although the totality of the circumstances test has an objective component, I believe that Fare clearly explained that courts have the flexibility to consider special factors that may affect waiver. Mental illness fits naturally within the totality of the circumstances test, and it may be a factor tending to indicate that the defendant cannot “understand the rights he [is] waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be.” Id.
D. APPLICATION
In the present case, the prosecution argues only: (1) that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings, and (2) that the law does not require that the defendant be able to comprehend how Miranda applies to his own situation. As stated previously, I am unconvinced that the trial judge clearly erred. Similarly, I believe that the prosecutor has proceeded under a flawed legal interpretation of Miranda. The prosecution has offered nothing to persuade me that mental illness should not be factored into the totality of the circumstances equation. Thus, the prosecutor’s case must fail, even by a preponderance of the evidence.
II
Nothing in the majority opinion persuades me that only a literal understanding of Miranda is required. Not only does the majority build its case upon a shaky foundation, but it supports its substantive legal arguments with premises that are only tangentially
A. WHAT THE CASE LAW SAYS BUT THE MAJORITY DOES NOT
The majority begins its knowing and intelligent waiver analysis by stating that, though determining whether a suspect’s waiver was knowing and intelligent requires a degree of subjective inquiry,3 suspects need not understand the consequences of waiver. Ante at 637. Yet the quotations the majority selects are taken from opinions that leave open the possibility that the defendant’s level of comprehension about the consequences of waiver will be relevant. None of the authority cited by the majority holds that a waiver will be valid per se if the defendant is able to literally comprehend Miranda, even though that defendant may be unable to apply the literal meaning of Miranda to his own situation.
The majority erroneously concludes that the trial court misapplied Cheatham by requiring that the defendant be able to understand how his Miranda rights applied to his situation. The majority quotes Cheatham for the proposition that, “‘[t]o knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights that the police have prop-
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the Cheatham Court did not hold that courts need not ever determine whether a defendant understood the consequences of his actions. Rather, Cheatham held only that defendant Cheatham sufficiently understood his rights, and that he had the capacity to provide a valid waiver. Id. at 27. Unlike the present case, Cheatham focused on the defendant’s intellectual capacity, and the analysis of that intellectual capacity was implicitly tied to the defendant’s understanding of his own circumstances. The Cheatham excerpt quoted by the majority was taken from the middle of Cheatham’s totality of the circumstances analysis. When read in context, it is apparent that the Court was examining both whether the defendant literally understood the Miranda warnings, as well as whether he understood the meanings of the words as applied to his own situation.
Similarly, the majority’s citation of Colorado v Spring, supra, provides little support for the proposition that the defendant must only possess a literal understanding of the Miranda warnings in order to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver. While the Spring Court explicitly stated that “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the
The trial court’s analysis comports with Supreme Court observations that a defendant must possess at least a basic understanding of his rights under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Moran at 421. Although the defendant may have been able to understand what it means to be silent, to have a lawyer present, and to have his statements used against him, his decision to confess was directly tied to his delusion that God would control the police and set him free. It is, therefore, questionable whether the defendant ever truly comprehended the actual meaning of the Miranda warnings.
As I wrote in Cheatham, “the ultimate focus for purposes of the knowing and intelligent prong remains on the level of the suspect’s comprehension.” Id. at 56. I further agree with Justice MALLETT’S Cheatham assessment that “[t]he validity of a waiver
B. WHAT THE MAJORITY SAYS BUT THE CASE LAW DOES NOT
The majority secondarily finds support for its holding from the proposition that “a defendant need not have a wise or shrewd basis for waiving Miranda rights for the waiver to be valid.” Ante at 642. The majority accurately points to precedent providing that the defendant cannot successfully challenge a waiver as invalid on the basis that he failed to realize that his decision was imprudent. Id. at 642-644.4 However, I fail to see how wisdom is relevant to this defendant’s confession. This case differs from the cases offered in support of the majority opinion in that the defendant’s waiver defense springs not from a lack of wisdom, but from an inability to fully understand that the dictionary meaning of the Miranda warning would actually apply to his own circumstances. The trial court held that his delusions about the consequences of his actions brought about his confession. No
III
The prosecutor has failed to carry its burden that this defendant provided a knowing and intelligent waiver. Similarly, the majority has failed to persuade me that its conclusions are supportable. I am not prepared to sign an opinion that narrows Miranda’s knowing and intelligent prong to the point of near extinction, especially when the opinion only pretends to hide behind well-established principles.
I would hold that the totality of the circumstances test allows a determination whether an individual defendant’s mental illness precludes him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights. Here, the defendant’s delusional episodes vitiated his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
Notes
I further disagree with the dicta following the majority‘s conclusion. Id. at 645. As I pointed out in People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30, 57; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), the overarching consideration in Miranda-waiver cases is not deterrence, but rather the protection and vindication of constitutional rights. See also Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 481 (2000).[i]n light of the fact that the Fifth Amendment itself protects only against compelled self-incrimination, the requirement of a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of Miranda rights is puzzling. [Ante at 637.]
I am not puzzled by the Supreme Court‘s bifurcation of the Miranda-waiver analysis, because the voluntariness prong protects aspects of the defendant‘s rights distinct from the aspects protected by the knowing and intelligent prong. The voluntariness prong of Miranda seeks to protect defendants against the compulsion envisioned by the
The dissent also suggests that a higher standard is mandated by the Supreme Court‘s assorted references to the prosecution‘s “heavy burden” in proving a waiver. Perhaps the dissent has overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court in Connelly acknowledged its prior decisions referring to the prosecution‘s “heavy burden” and still adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard. Connelly, supra at 167-168.
As a final matter, we note that this Court also applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the Miranda waiver‘s knowing and intelligent prong in Cheatham, supra at 27.
Second, the Court noted that Miranda itself “is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.” Id. Finally, the Court found support for its conclusion that “Miranda is constitutionally based” in Miranda‘s “invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination.” Id. at 120 S Ct 2334.
To take the easiest case, few would dispute that a guilty individual has a moral obligation to confess when his confession is necessary to prevent an innocent person from being convicted for a crime. Similarly, even aside from the possibility of erroneous conviction, a person has a moral obligation to admit that he has falsely accused another, for only by so confessing can the person hope to remove the harm wrongly caused to the other‘s good name. [Grano, n 12 supra at 41.]
In sum, there are countless reasons why a “rational” person might decide to confess past criminal activity.