PATTY DAVIS, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Appellant, v. SHERIDAN HEALTHCARE, INC.; SHERIDAN RADIOLOGY SERVICES OF PINELLAS, INC.; LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA; and LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Appellees.
Case Nos. 2D17-829 2D17-1790 CONSOLIDATED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
October 16, 2019
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
KHOUZAM, Chief Judge; SALARIO, J., Concurs specially; BLACK, J., Dissents with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Mark R. Wolfe and Cheryl K. Thomas, Judges.
J. Andrew Meyer of J. Andrew Meyer, P.A., Redington Beach; and Christa L. Collins of Harmon Parker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Susan N. Eisenberg and Jennifer T. Williams of Cozen O‘Connor, Miami, for Appellee Sheridan Healthcare, Inc.
Carol A. Licko and James L. VanLandingham of Hogan Lovells US, LLP, Miami; and Steven F. Barley of Hogan Lovells US, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees Laboratory Corporation of America and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings.
KHOUZAM, Chief Judge.
Patty Davis filed two separate actions under
Davis was injured in the course of her employment in December 2013 and applied for workers’ compensation benefits. As part of these benefits, she had a preoperative chest x-ray taken in October 2014 by Sheridan Radiology Services of Pinellas, Inc., a subsidiary of Sheridan Healthcare, Inc. (collectively, Sheridan). In her complaint, Davis alleged that Sheridan knew she was a workers’ compensation patient and thus not responsible for paying the x-ray fees. Despite this knowledge, Sheridan sent Davis a bill in April 2015, demanding payment for the October 2014 x-ray. Over a month later, in June 2015, Davis received another bill, this time from a collection agency. In response, Davis‘s workers’ compensation carrier, Commercial Risk Management, Inc., contacted Sheridan by telephone and by letter. In both communications, the carrier informed Sheridan that Davis was not the party responsible for payment and warned that billing Davis was a violation of the WCL. Despite this warning, Sheridan sent yet another bill to Davis in July 2015. In response to this third demand for payment, Davis filed suit against Sheridan in circuit court. Her amended complaint alleges violations of the FCCPA,
The second set of defendants in this consolidated case, Laboratory Corporation of America and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (collectively, Labcorp), also provided medical testing in connection with Davis‘s work injury. Davis alleges that, like Sheridan, Labcorp billed her twice for an illegitimate debt, once in May 2014 and again in September 2014. She therefore filed a separate FCCPA claim against Labcorp for violations of
After a period of complex litigation in both lawsuits, Sheridan and Labcorp moved for judgments on the pleadings. They argued that Davis‘s FCCPA claims depend on her showing an illegitimate debt, and the law determining the legitimacy of that debt is the WCL.
The parties present two interpretations of the interaction between the WCL and the FCCPA. Sheridan and Labcorp contend that the WCL precludes Davis‘s FCCPA claims against workers’ compensation medical providers. Davis, on the other hand, argues that the WCL‘s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to a state agency over “matters concerning reimbursement” does not abrogate the FCCPA. In resolving this question, we look to legislative intent, “the polestar that guides a court‘s statutory construction analysis.” Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004).
To determine the legislative intent behind a statute, a court must first examine the plain meaning of the statute‘s text. “[T]he statute‘s text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature‘s intent.” Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 967 So. 2d 815, 820 (Fla. 2007) (quoting V.K.E. v. State, 934 So. 2d 1276, 1286 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., dissenting)). “If the plain meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, then the Court need not delve into principles of statutory construction unless that meaning leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent.” Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007); see also Dep‘t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009).
The plain language of the WCL states that the Department of Financial Services “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide any matters concerning reimbursement, to resolve any overutilization dispute under subsection (7), and to decide any question concerning overutilization under subsection (8), which question or dispute arises after January 1, 1994.”
We first note that the terms “reimbursement” and “collection” do not mean the same thing. To “reimburse” means to “repay” or “to make restoration or payment of an equivalent to.” Reimburse, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reimburse (last visited Apr. 25, 2019). The term is often synonymous with indemnification and is typically used to express repayment by a third party not directly involved in a transaction. See Reimbursement, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Indemnify, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). For example, if John does not have cash at lunchtime and Jane purchases a ten-dollar sandwich for him from a vendor, John reimburses Jane when he pays her the ten dollars she spent on his behalf. Jane does not reimburse the vendor when she buys the sandwich, nor does she reimburse the vendor if she instead buys the sandwich on credit and pays for it next
Applying the ordinary meanings of the two terms to the statutory sections at issue here, it becomes clear that Davis‘s FCCPA claims against illegal “collection” practices are not “matters concerning reimbursement.” To mirror the Jane, John, and vendor example, Davis‘s compensation carrier, Commercial Risk Management, Inc., is responsible for providing Davis‘s medical services. Sheridan and Labcorp provided those medical services on behalf of Commercial Risk Management. It follows that the only party who can reimburse Sheridan and Labcorp is Commercial Risk Management. Indeed,
The dissent appears to conflate “reimbursement” and “collection” to conclude that the phrase “matters concerning reimbursement” in
At most, the dissent‘s view of the term “concerning” introduces an ambiguity into our analysis of
It is “presumed that statutes are passed with the knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by implication.” City of Treasure Island v. Tahitian Treasure Island, LLC, 253 So. 3d 649, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003)). “[Implicit] repeals are not favored and there must be a positive repugnancy between the two [statutes] or a clear intent to repeal must be apparent.” Id. (quoting Wade v. Janney, 7 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 1942)). In the instant conflict, we find no such repugnancy or clear intent in the WCL and the FCCPA. The former regulates compensation for medical services under a government program while the latter regulates debt collection practices.
In light of the presumption against implicit repeals, we think the better view is to read both statutes in harmony by allowing courts to refer to the WCL to determine the legitimacy of debts in FCCPA actions.2 A claim under
that debt fulfills the first element necessary to trigger FCCPA liability. Thus, the debts for medical services that Davis did not owe pursuant to the WCL constitutes an element of her FCCPA claims. This rationale applies just as well to Davis‘s
In addition to the presumption against implicit repeals, the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant supports our view. “Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific governs.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657 (1997) (citing Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980)). “In Florida law, a more specific statute is considered an exception to, or qualification of, the general
The two statutes’ purposes and legislative histories further support our view of their interaction. The purpose of the WCL and its intended application is set out in
It is the intent of the Legislature that the Workers’ Compensation Law be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker‘s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer. . . . The workers’ compensation system in Florida is based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike. . . . Additionally, . . . the laws pertaining to workers’ compensation are to be construed in accordance with the basic principles of statutory construction and not liberally in favor of either employee or employer. It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker.
(Emphasis added.) In other words, the WCL is primarily intended to save time and money for injured employees and their employers. On the other hand, the legislative history for the FCCPA indicates a different purpose: “Part VI of
Based on the body of Davis‘s amended complaint and the collection letters attached thereto, Davis‘s allegations have more to do with illegal harassment by creditors and a bill collector than quick and efficient resolution of an unpaid workers’ compensation bill. Her dispute centers on practices that the FCCPA was specifically designed to address. It follows that
Finally, we are not persuaded by Sheridan and Labcorp‘s arguments relying on Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2008), and rules 69L-34.001(6), 69L-34.003(1) and 69L-34.003(4)(i) of the Florida Administrative Code. These authorities do not require an inference denying circuit court jurisdiction over Davis‘s FCCPA claims. Rather, Sanders discusses the historical trend of Florida courts interpreting the WCL to exclude circuit court jurisdiction in contexts that do not involve
We are perplexed and disappointed by the dissent‘s implication that, by resolving an apparent conflict between the WCL and the FCCPA, we are deciding an issue that has not been raised in order to reach a desired result. Properly interpreting
The dissent cites to a number of cases correctly asserting that this court cannot rule on issues not argued in the briefs. However, this case is distinguishable for the simple reason that the issues discussed in this opinion were argued in the briefs. See, e.g., Roop v. State, 228 So. 3d 633, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding that whether a witness‘s actions before calling 911 indicated reflective thought so as to negate a hearsay exception was not an issue raised by the appellant); I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583, 587-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that appellant did not raise
We do not need to go that far in this case because, unlike in D.H. the parties have presented the question of whether
Accordingly, we reverse the dismissals and hold that
DOES SECTION 440.13(11)(c) OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW PRECLUDE CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 559.77(1) OF THE FLORIDA CONSUMER COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT?
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion; question certified.
BLACK, J., Dissents with opinion.
SALARIO, Judge, Specially concurring.
I join Judge Khouzam‘s opinion except to the limited extent that it relies upon the legislative purpose statement in the Workers’ Compensation Law and a Senate Staff Analysis on the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. In my view, the broad statements of purpose in these sources (especially the staff analysis) are not useful in determining the meaning of the statutory language before us, and reliance on them is unnecessary in light of the balance of the opinion‘s correct analysis. See, e.g., Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 2008); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 198 So. 3d 852, 863 n.8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
BLACK, Judge, dissenting.
Based on the arguments presented to this court and the plain language of the FCCPA and the WCL, I would affirm the circuit courts’ dismissals of Ms. Davis‘s lawsuits; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
It is undisputed that Ms. Davis received treatment from Sheridan and Labcorp for her work-related injury under her workers’ compensation benefits and that in turn Sheridan and Labcorp sought payment from Ms. Davis for providing treatment to her. It is also undisputed that Commercial Risk Management authorized the treatment and that Sheridan and Labcorp violated the WCL by seeking reimbursement for their services directly from Ms. Davis. See
jurisdiction to adjudicate her claims and that the FCCPA and the WCL must be read in harmony.
The issue before this court is whether the circuit courts had jurisdiction over Ms. Davis‘s claims against Sheridan and Labcorp. The majority‘s resolution of this jurisdictional issue, as well as the arguments of Ms. Davis and Sheridan and Labcorp, presuppose that WCL health care bills are consumer debts under the FCCPA, a legal
The WCL, on the other hand, is “meant to systematically resolve nearly every workplace injury case on behalf of both the employee and the employer,” Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cty., 888 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2004), “without the necessity of any legal or administrative proceedings,” Fla. Erection Servs., Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So. 2d 203, 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (citing A. B. Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)). “The [D]epartment [of Financial Affairs], [the Agency for Health Care Administration], the Office of Insurance Regulation, and the Division of Administrative Hearings shall administer the [WCL] in a manner which facilitates the self-execution of the system and the process of ensuring a prompt and cost-effective delivery of payments.”
Clearly and unequivocally, any matters that concern chapter 440 reimbursement fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department. The phrase “any matters concerning reimbursement” is unambiguous. In fact, Ms. Davis does not argue that her claims do not concern reimbursement or payment for medical treatment. Instead she relies on the WCL‘s definition of “reimbursement dispute” and argues that because a “reimbursement dispute” refers to a dispute between a health care provider and a carrier and not a dispute between a health care provider and an injured worker the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department is not invoked in this case.6 See
(en banc) (“[T]he legislature does not ordinarily use different words to mean the same thing.“). And the “courts of this state are ‘without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.’ ” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). Moreover, “[a]ll Article V courts that have been presented with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving workers’ compensation matters have uniformly held in very broad, general, and generic terms that Article V courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving workers’ compensation issues.” Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. 2008).
As Ms. Davis suggests, it is entirely possible to harmonize the FCCPA and the WCL. “[T]he [l]egislature is presumed to have intended that both laws are to operate coextensively and have the fullest possible effect.” Stevens, 127 So. 3d at 669 (quoting Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000)). Given that the specific statute will govern over the general, “the specific statute is seen as an exception to the general statute.” Id. (citing McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994)). The Stevens case is analogous and instructive. In that case the appellants filed suit against the appellees, comprising various parties in the financing, sale, and securitization of mortgages, seeking to hold them accountable under Florida‘s False Claim Act (FFCA) for allegedly failing to pay Florida documentary sales taxes associated with various assignments
Because
courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 101 (Fla. 2000)). To the extent that such consideration is necessary in this case, it is apparent that giving effect to the related statutory provisions of the WCL further supports affirmance.
“The Department of Financial Services Division of Workers’ Compensation“); see also Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-34.003(4)(i) (“Supportive documentation of a specific violation may include . . . [c]opies of collection letters sent to the injured worker from the Provider or a collection agent acting on behalf of the Provider, seeking payment for covered medical services authorized by the Carrier.“). Reading these sections of the statutes and rules together leads to the singular conclusion that the legislature intended for the Department to police the practices of workers’ compensation health care providers, serving as the exclusive authority for imposing penalties when violations occur, including violations involving collection practices. The legislature, through the statutory language and by giving the Department the power to promulgate rules, has “plainly laid out . . . the only remedies it conceived for those occasions when” health care providers seek reimbursement from an injured employee who has received treatment for work-related injuries under his or her workers’ compensation benefits. Cf. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P‘ship v. Horowitz, 895 So. 2d 484, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). And “[a]bsent an indication of legislative intent to create a private cause of action for a violation of [section 440.13], such a remedy may not be judicially engrafted onto the FCCPA.” See Ramos v. CACH, LLC, 183 So. 3d 1149, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Thomas v. Commercial Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1104-T-23MAP, 2008 WL 5246296, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2008)). “Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violating [section 440.13], it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a
The majority makes much ado about the dictionary definitions of “reimbursement” and “collection.” But the majority fails to recognize not only that the WCL is the specific law governing Ms. Davis‘s claims but that the distinction between reimbursement and collection is relevant only when the person seeking to collect is not also the person entitled to reimbursement. The majority also fails to recognize that the “debt” sought to be collected or reimbursed is the same medical payment. See, e.g.,
In any event, Ms. Davis has not argued that the ordinary meanings of the terms reimbursement and collection dictate the resolution of this case; nor she has argued that her claims cannot be “matters concerning reimbursement” or that the FCCPA is the more specific of the two laws as concluded by the majority. These are arguments only of the majority‘s creation. Cf. Roop v. State, 228 So. 3d 633, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (explaining that in reaching the opposing conclusion regarding the issue on appeal—whether the portion of the 911 call concerning identity was properly admitted as an exited utterance—the dissenting opinion relied on an argument not presented “for our decision because [the appellant] ha[d] not made the argument anywhere in his brief“); I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583, 587-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (explaining that in reaching the opposing conclusion regarding the issue on appeal—whether the consent to search was voluntary—the dissenting opinion improperly relied on an argument not presented by the appellant, namely, that because the consent to search was obtained during an unlawful detention the consent is tainted and therefore deemed involuntary).10 Ms. Davis instead argues that the FCCPA does not contain clear exceptions or exclusions for actions predicated upon the unlawful collection practices of a health care provider for medical debts under the WCL and that none of the provisions in the WCL usurp the circuit court‘s jurisdiction over her claims. As to the latter part of the argument, Ms. Davis asserts that Sheridan and Labcorp‘s contention that the Department has exclusive jurisdiction over her claims pursuant to section 440.13(11)(c) “is belied by the plain language of Section 440.13(1)(q),” which defines “reimbursement dispute” as “between a medical provider and a carrier.” The majority contends that the proper interpretation of section 440.13(11)(c) “is at the heart of [Ms.] Davis‘s appeal,” and yet Ms. Davis devoted a mere four sentences to section 440.13(11)(c) in her initial brief. Ms. Davis argues for the first time in her reply brief that her claims do not concern reimbursement and even then does not resort to the
dictionary definitions of the terms in support of her assertion. Similarly, Ms. Davis does not contend that the WCL is ambiguous. Rather, relying on the proposition that there is no need to resort to statutory construction where a statute is unambiguous, Ms. Davis argues that there is no need to look beyond the plain language of either the FCCPA or the WCL. She even contends that “[t]here must be a hopeless inconsistency before the rules of construction are applied to defeat the plain language of one of the statutes” and that in this case no such inconsistency exists based on the plain language of the FCCPA and the WCL.
The majority‘s determination that we should reverse on grounds not argued by an appellant is “at odds with the structure of the appellate process which requires that a reviewing court ordinarily reverse only on the basis of the specific arguments presented by the appellant.” Roop, 228 So. 3d at 642 (quoting I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). By reversing on the grounds explained in the majority, we have granted relief on unraised arguments and exceeded our powers of review. See id. (“Since this argument has not been presented to us as a ground for reversal, we ought not to be reversing because of it.“). Contrary to the majority‘s assertion, it is not this court‘s function to correctly resolve the issue before us even if doing so requires us to reverse based on an unraised argument; this court simply cannot create arguments for a party in order to reach its desired result when it deems the arguments actually raised to be unpersuasive. See Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 103 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The tipsy coachman doctrine does not permit a reviewing court to reverse on an unpreserved and unargued basis.“). An argument for reversal must be both specifically preserved in the circuit court and specifically raised and briefed in order for the appellate court to consider it. See D.H. v. Adept Cmty. Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 870, 888 (Fla. 2018) (Canady, C.J., dissenting) (“This requirement of specific argument and briefing is one of the most important concepts of the appellate process. Indeed, it is not the role of the appellate court to act as standby counsel for the parties.“). “[A]ny arguments not expressly included” in the brief are waived. See Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1117 n.14 (Fla. 2006). It is not this court‘s role to rebrief an appeal; “[t]o take this step would require us to depart from our role as a neutral tribunal and to become an advocate by developing arguments that the [appellant]—for whatever reason—has chosen not to make.” Manatee Cty. Sch. Bd. v. NationsRent, Inc., 989 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); accord Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“This Court will not depart from its dispassionate role and become an advocate by second guessing counsel and advancing for him theories and defenses which counsel either intentionally or unintentionally has chosen not to mention. It is the duty of counsel to prepare appellate briefs so as to acquaint the Court with the material facts, the points of law involved, and the legal arguments supporting the positions
In sum, based on the unambiguous language of the FCCPA and the WCL I believe that the circuit courts correctly determined that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Davis‘s claims. Moreover, it is inappropriate for this court to theorize about what Ms. Davis might have argued, successfully or not, below and on appeal. It is Ms. Davis‘s “duty to make error clearly appear,” see Manatee Cty. Sch. Bd., 989 So. 2d at 25, and in my opinion, she has failed to do so. Accordingly, I would affirm the orders on appeal.