281 So.3d 1259
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2019Background:
- Patty Davis, injured at work, received workers compensation medical care (including an Oct 2014 chest x-ray) authorized by her carrier; Sheridan Radiology and LabCorp later sent billing notices demanding payment from Davis.
- Davis alleged Sheridan and LabCorp knew she was a workers compensation patient and therefore not liable, but they nevertheless sent bills and collection notices; her carrier warned the providers that billing the employee violated the WCL.
- Davis sued each provider in circuit court under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), asserting violations of section 559.72(9) (attempting to collect an illegitimate debt) and 559.72(5) (disclosing false information to a collection agency).
- Sheridan and LabCorp moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that section 440.13(11)(c) of the Workers Compensation Law (WCL) grants exclusive jurisdiction over "any matters concerning reimbursement" to the Department of Financial Services, which precludes circuit court jurisdiction over Davis's FCCPA claims.
- The trial courts dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; on appeal the majority reversed, holding the WCL does not preclude circuit court jurisdiction over FCCPA claims against WCL medical providers and that courts may consult the WCL to determine debt illegitimacy; a question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (Sheridan/Labcorp) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §440.13(11)(c) precludes circuit court jurisdiction over FCCPA claims | §440.13(11)(c) does not abrogate the FCCPA; collection by providers is distinct from reimbursement and may be litigated in circuit court | §440.13(11)(c) grants exclusive jurisdiction over any matters concerning reimbursement, so FCCPA claims based on WCL-covered bills must be heard by the Department | Reversed: §440.13(11)(c) does not categorically preclude circuit court jurisdiction over FCCPA claims against WCL medical providers; circuit courts may adjudicate such claims |
| Whether collection under the FCCPA is the same as "reimbursement" under the WCL | Collection (demands to the consumer) is distinct from reimbursement (payment by the carrier); courts can apply the WCL to determine whether a debt is illegitimate but still entertain FCCPA claims | The disputed bills are reimbursement matters; the phrase "any matters concerning reimbursement" plainly covers Daviss claims and places them exclusively with the Department | Courts may treat reimbursement law as relevant to the FCCPA element of an illegitimate debt, but collection conduct remains independently actionable under the FCCPA |
| Whether appellate court relied on unraised arguments / preservation | Davis raised that §440.13(11)(c) does not divest circuit courts of jurisdiction; majority may refine reasoning to resolve statutory meaning | Dissent: majority reversed on theories Davis did not adequately brief and thus improperly created arguments for appellant | Majority: considered §440.13(11)(c) squarely presented and resolved it; dissent would affirm for lack of preservation |
Key Cases Cited
- Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004) (statutory construction: legislative intent and plain meaning govern interpretation)
- Sanders v. City of Orlando, 997 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2008) (Florida courts have generally found Article V courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over workers compensation matters)
- Stevens v. State, 127 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (harmonizing specific statutory scheme with a more general private remedy; specific controls)
- Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (U.S. 1997) (canon that specific statute governs over a general one)
- Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (U.S. 1980) (same principle regarding specificity versus generality)
- McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994) (Florida precedent that a specific statute controls over a general one)