STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, vs. PETER PERAZA, Respondent.
No. SC17-1978
Supreme Court of Florida
December 13, 2018
This case is before the Court for review of State v. Peraza, 226 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). In Peraza, the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified that its decision directly conflicts with State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2012), on the same question of law. The Fourth District also ruled upon and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WHO WHILE MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST, USES DEADLY FORCE WHICH HE OR SHE REASONABLY BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMMINENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM TO HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR ANOTHER OR TO PREVENT THE IMMINENT COMMISSION OF A FORCIBLE FELONY, IS LIMITED TO INVOKING A DEFENSE UNDER SECTION 776.05(1), OR IS ALSO PERMITTED TO SEEK IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER SECTIONS 776.012(1) AND 776.032(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2013), MORE COMMONLY KNOWN AS FLORIDA‘S “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAW.
Peraza, 226 So. 3d at 948. We have jurisdiction. See
BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of July 31, 2013, Jermaine McBean purchased an air rifle from a pawn shop and proceeded to carry it uncovered as he walked back to his apartment complex. A concerned citizen called the police to report that McBean appeared distraught and was acting in an aggressive manner as he walked with a weapon, reported as a firearm. It would later be revealed that McBean suffered from mental health disorders and had been hospitalized a week earlier after experiencing a mental breakdown.
Deputy Peter Peraza of the Broward County Sheriff‘s Office responded to an emergency police dispatch alerting officers to McBean‘s demeanor while walking down a highly trafficked public street displaying what appeared to be a shotgun or rifle. Deputy Peraza and another deputy quickly arrived at McBean‘s location and, walking closely behind him, issued loud and repeated commands for McBean to stop. Ignoring the commands, McBean turned into a nearby apartment complex and continued walking toward the apartment‘s gated pool. McBean finally stopped alongside the pool area but kept holding the weapon while facing away from the officers. He then brought the rifle over his head, turned towards the deputies and pointed the weapon directly at them. When Deputy Peraza perceived that McBean was aiming the weapon at him, Peraza fired his gun
After being indicted for manslaughter with a firearm, Deputy Peraza moved to dismiss the indictment, citing immunity from prosecution under sections
The State appealed, arguing that law enforcement officers are not eligible to assert immunity pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law because they are already provided a defense pursuant to
The Fourth District disagreed with Caamano and held that a police officer making a lawful arrest may claim Stand Your Ground immunity and thereby secure a pre-trial immunity determination, just like any other person acting in self-defense in Florida. Peraza, 226 So. 3d at 947.1
ANALYSIS
The certified question presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). The starting point for any statutory construction issue is the language of the statute itself—and a determination of whether that language plainly and unambiguously answers the question presented. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.“) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). This Court is “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).
a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another . . . .
[a] person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force . . . .
Because these statutes plainly and unambiguously afford Stand Your Ground immunity to any “person” who acts in self-defense, there should be no reason for further analysis. See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219. Put simply, a law enforcement officer is a “person” whether on duty or off, and irrespective of whether the officer is making an arrest. Although neither of the two statutes defines the word “person,” it must be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). In common understanding, “person” refers to a “human being,” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1993 ed.), which is not occupation-specific and plainly includes human beings serving as law enforcement officers.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Second District Court of Appeal reasoned:
In construing a statute, a court‘s purpose is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction. In order to determine legislative intent, one must first look to the actual wording of the statute and give it its appropriate meaning. Then, the doctrine of in pari materia applies. This doctrine is a principle of statutory construction that requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent. Consequently, related statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole and where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions in harmony with one another.
Further, when construing multiple statutes addressing similar subjects, the specific statute . . . covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms. In this situation the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.
Caamano, 105 So. 3d at 20-21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Fourth District criticized the Caamano court‘s analysis, explaining:
The source of our disagreement with Caamano appears to arise from the following statement from that case: “In order to determine legislative intent, one must first look to the actual wording of the statute and give it its appropriate meaning. Then, the doctrine of in pari materia applies.” 105 So. 3d at 20 (emphasis added). Respectfully, to suggest that the doctrine of in pari materia applies in every case is incorrect as a matter of law. As the circuit court correctly found in this case, because sections 776.012(1)‘s and 776.032(1)‘s plain language is clear and unambiguous, Caamano “need not have gone into the doctrine of in pari materia at all.” See English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016) (“When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, this Court need not look behind the statute‘s plain language
or employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent.“) (emphasis added).
Although we generally agree with the Fourth District‘s analysis, we also recognize that the Second District was attempting to harmonize arguably related statutes. As the Second District‘s analysis recognizes, given the question presented in this case and the arguments made, some consideration of
More importantly, what Deputy Peraza is asserting here is not simply a defense. Deputy Peraza is asserting immunity from prosecution. Therefore, the real question, clearly and precisely framed, is whether Deputy Peraza is “immune from criminal prosecution” such that he is entitled to a pretrial immunity determination. That immunity is addressed only in
We also recognize that the Second District‘s analysis reflects a good faith attempt to ferret out what the Legislature “intended” when it enacted a defense that partially overlapped a pre-existing defense. Although this Court has at times heralded the search for legislative “intent” as the first step and ultimate goal of all statutory analysis, see, e.g., Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987), we have also treated inquiry into the Legislature‘s “intent” as a secondary analysis to be employed
Court has held that “[e]ven where a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.” St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 694 (Fla. 1918)). Because even a clearly discernible Legislative intent cannot change the meaning of a plainly worded statute, it would only confuse matters to focus on what the Legislature might have intended rather than what the statute actually says. As recently explained in Shepard v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly S546, S547-48 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2018), “where the Court is tasked with construing a statute, our first (and often only) step . . . is to ask what the Legislature actually said in the statute, based upon the common meaning of the words used.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Here, the plain language of
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we resolve the certified conflict and answer the certified question by holding that law enforcement officers are eligible to assert Stand Your Ground immunity, even when the use of force occurred in the course of making a lawful arrest. Based upon the trial court‘s findings of fact, Deputy Peraza is entitled to that immunity and is therefore immune from criminal prosecution. Accordingly, we approve the Fourth District‘s decision and disapprove the Second District‘s decision.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION. NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions and Certified Great Public Importance
Fourth District - Case No. 4D16-2675
(Broward County)
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Melanie Dale Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Eric T. Schwartzreich and Anthony J. Bruno of Schwartzreich & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #31