Panilag v. ContrerasPanilag v. Contreras
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
MANUEL PANILAG, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARMANDO CONTRERAS, Defendant and Appellant.
In the underlying civil proceedings, plaintiff Manuel Panilag has alleged various real property and tort causes of action, including a claim for financial elder abuse, against Armando Contreras arising out of the transfer of Panilag’s residential property. Contreras appeals from a right to attach order (RTAO) granted in favor of Panilag pursuant to Panilag’s cause of action for financial elder abuse.
Contreras argues that the trial court erred in issuing the RTAO because Panilag failed to present “substantial evidence of wrongdoing or incapacity” nor was there substantial evidence of the probable validity of Panilag’s claims.
As we explain below, Contreras has failed to meet his burden on appeal. We will affirm the order.
On April 2, 2024, Panilag filed a verified complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court (Case No. 24CV434290) asserting causes of action for quiet title, fraud in the inception, conversion, cancellation of deed, financial elder abuse, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and imposition of a constructive trust. In his complaint, Panilag alleged that he suffered from dementia and other cognitive impairments, and due to those issues failed to make his monthly mortgage payments on his residence. In 2023, Panilag’s mortgage lender recorded a notice of default and initiated foreclosure proceedings. Contreras learned of the notice of default and, under the pretense of assisting Panilag with paying the approximately $32,000 due on his mortgage, instead had Panilag execute a grant deed transferring his property to Contreras’s business entity, New Chance LLC. Panilag alleged that, at the time of this transfer, his property was worth approximately $1 million, and he had over $600,000 in equity in that property. In exchange for executing the grant deed, Panilag received $3,000.
On July 30, 2024, Panilag applied for an RTAO, seeking an attachment under
J. Robert Taylor’s declaration set forth his qualifications and experience regarding real estate transactions and valuations. In Taylor’s opinion, Panilag’s property was worth $995,000 in February 2024.
In her declaration, Ng stated that Panilag was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and dementia in 2021 and his “ability to understand and process information” was “severe[ly] impair[ed].” Ng declared that her father always planned on remaining in his home for the rest of his life. She stated that he does not remember signing documents to transfer title to his property and does not recall discussing a sale of the property with anyone. Ng further declared that emails—purportedly from her father related to the sale of the property—originated from email addresses that do not belong to her father, and he has never used those addresses to communicate with her or anyone else she knows. Ng also points out that, in one document executed by Contreras, he falsely claims that he is related to Panilag. To her knowledge, her father does not know Contreras.
In his personal declaration, Panilag stated that he never intended to sell his home, does not recall meeting with or talking to anyone about such a sale, and does not remember signing documents to effectuate a sale of his home. When Panilag was shown the grant deed and notice of default purchase agreement, he does not remember signing those documents and does not understand them. If he did sign those documents, Panilag states that it was because he was “tricked” into doing so.
Hifai, Panilag’s attorney, authenticated the exhibits attached to his declaration, including among other things, documents produced by a title company in which Contreras certified that the property transfer was a “gift to [a] family
Dr. Nguyen’s declaration3 stated that Panilag had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and dementia in 2021 and continued to suffer from those impairments. Dr. Nguyen averred that, due to these conditions, Panilag was “substantially unable to manage his financial resources or resist fraud or undue influence from at least August 2023 to date.” Specifically, Dr. Nguyen opined that Panilag “could not understand and appreciate the consequences of signing documents contemplating selling his home, or the rights, duties and responsibilities created or affected by such an action; or the risks, benefits and alternatives to the same.” When Dr. Nguyen evaluated Panilag, he had no memory of selling his home, having discussions relating to selling his home, or signing any documents effectuating such a sale.
In his opposition, Contreras argued that the application for an RTAO should be denied for the following reasons: (1) Panilag failed to demonstrate that the amount of his claim is “readily ascertainable,” (2) Panilag failed to demonstrate that Contreras engaged in financial elder abuse, (3) Panilag failed to demonstrate that Contreras is indebted to him in any way, and (4) the application is supported only by “conclusory or generalized statements.” Contreras did not submit any declarations or other evidence in support of his opposition.
Contreras timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Panilag’s motion for summary affirmance or, in the alternative, to augment record on appeal
After Contreras filed his opening brief in this appeal, Panilag filed a motion for summary affirmance or, in the alternative, to augment the record on appeal. In his motion, Panilag argues that Contreras failed to include any of the evidence submitted to the trial court in support of Panilag’s application for the RTAO and therefore this court should summarily affirm the RTAO due to Contreras’s failure to provide an adequate record. In the alternative, Panilag asks that this court augment the record to include the documents set forth in the Respondent’s Appendix, which consist of the declarations and other evidence submitted in the trial court regarding the RTAO.
Contreras opposed both the motion for summary affirmance and the request to augment the record. As to the motion for summary affirmance, Contreras argues that his appeal “raises substantial, meritorious questions of law concerning” the RTAO. As to Panilag’s request to augment, Contreras argues that the “certified Clerk’s Transcript already contains the orders, filings, declarations, and evidentiary materials the trial court actually relied upon in issuing the RTAO.” He asserts that the request to augment consists of “documents that were never
This court deferred ruling on Panilag’s motion for consideration with this appeal.
Litigants are required to provide the appellate court with pertinent legal arguments and appropriate references to the record. (
When a party fails to follow the rules of appellate procedure, the reviewing court may impose various consequences, including treating an appellate claim as abandoned, or summarily affirming the trial court’s judgment. (See, e.g., Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706, 710–711 [treating appellate claim as abandoned]; Copfer v. Golden (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 623, 634–635 [discussing summary affirmance].) We may also disregard the noncompliance, and we elect to do so here. (
When Contreras filed this appeal, he elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings in the superior court but elected to file both an appendix and a clerk’s transcript. For unexplained reasons, Contreras did not file an appendix and the clerk’s transcript did not include a copy of the RTAO, but instead included a copy of a notice of entry of an order granting Panilag’s motion to compel
Because the documents included in Panilag’s Respondent’s Appendix were before the trial court and are relevant to our consideration of the issues raised on appeal, we grant Panilag’s request to augment the record. As discussed in more detail below, those documents, along with Panilag’s brief in support of the RTAO, are relevant to our assessment of whether Contreras’s claims lack substantive merit.
B. Contreras’s request for judicial notice, motion to augment record on appeal
On December 17, 2025, Contreras requested that this court take judicial notice of 167 documents “pursuant to
These documents are part of the trial court record, are official acts of the executive branch, or are records whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Judicial notice is proper and necessary for full consideration of the issues raised in this appeal.” On that same day, Contreras filed a motion to augment the record on appeal with the same 16 documents that are attached to his request for judicial notice. By separate order, this court deferred ruling on Contreras’s request for judicial notice and motion to augment the record for consideration with this appeal.
1. Applicable law
A request for judicial notice in the court must be served and filed in a separate motion with a proposed order. (
“Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons Companies, Inc.).) Judicial notice should be taken only of relevant matters. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135, fn. 1 (Ketchum); Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569.)
2. Analysis
Contreras contends judicial notice or augmentation is appropriate as to RJN-1, RJN-2, RJN-3, RJN-4, and RJN-5 because those documents consist of Panilag’s “own communications with his lender” and “his written authorizations and emails to [r]ealtor [Sahand] Malaki.” RJN-1 is a notice of trustee’s sale notifying Panilag that his deed of trust was in default and his property was scheduled to be sold on March 25, 2024. RJN-2 and RJN-3 are loan reinstatement summaries issued by Panilag’s mortgage loan servicer, Gregory Funding, dated April 27, 2023, and August 22, 2023, supposedly at Panilag’s request. RJN-4 is an email dated September 19, 2023 from Malaki to Panilag asking if Panilag had located his “lender contact info” as Malaki needed to talk to them to “see how much time we have for selling the property or doing the loan modification.”8
RJN-5 is a document entitled “Lender/Loan Service Provider Letter of Authorization,” dated September 19, 2023, and purportedly signed by Panilag, authorizing Malaki to act as his agent. Contreras fails to explain whether these documents were presented to the trial court in the first instance as required by
RJN-6 consists of a copy of Panilag’s driver’s license, which was renewed on January 16, 2024, and which indicates that there are no “restrictions” on his license. Contreras contends that judicial notice of these documents is appropriate since they are “official act[s] of the California Department of Motor Vehicles, a state executive agency” and thus fall within the judicial notice provisions of
RJN-8, RJN-9, and RJN-10 consist of declarations submitted by Panilag in support of his application for an RTAO, specifically the declarations of Dr. Nguyen (RJN-8), Panilag (RJN-9), and Ng (RJN-10). We have already augmented the record to include these documents—all of which should have been included in the clerk’s transcript—as part of Panilag’s motion to augment and therefore deny as moot Contreras’s RJN and motion to augment as to these documents.
In RJN-11, RJN-12, and RJN-13, Contreras seeks augmentation or judicial notice of deposition subpoenas and “evidence of [Panilag]’s counsel obstructing compliance.” RJN-11 is a deposition subpoena served on Dr. Nguyen, RJN-12 is a deposition subpoena served on Ng, and RJN-13 consists of transcripts of Nguyen’s and Ng’s depositions reflecting their nonappearance as well as Panilag’s objections, post-dating the dates of deposition, to the deposition subpoenas. Contreras fails to explain how these documents are relevant to the issue on appeal, namely whether the trial court erred in issuing the RTAO. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1135, fn. 1.) We do not see how these documents are relevant to this
RJN-14 and RJN-15 consist of declarations submitted by Contreras with his reply in support of his motion to compel arbitration. RJN-14 is a declaration of a realtor, Thomas Hutchins, describing his interactions with Panilag in connection with the sale of his residence to Contreras and attesting to Panilag’s competence. RJN-15 is a declaration of Josie Martinez, who referred Panilag to Contreras and arranged to have a mobile notary go to Panilag’s house to execute the sales documents. She also attested to Panilag’s understanding of the transaction. While these documents were filed in the trial court, they were filed as part of Contreras’s motion to compel arbitration and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Contreras either submitted them with his opposition to Panilag’s request for an RTAO or asked that the trial court take judicial notice of them in relation to that proceeding. (Vons Companies, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3.) Consequently, we do not see how these documents are relevant to the issue on appeal (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th. at p. 1135, fn. 1), and we again decline to take judicial notice of these documents or augment the record to include them.
RJN-16 is a
C. Substantial evidence supports the RTAO
Contreras argues that Panilag did not meet his burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was entitled to an RTAO. In essence, Contreras contends that the trial court erred by crediting Panilag’s evidence in
We disagree.
1. Applicable legal principles and standard of review
The procedure for obtaining writs of attachment is delineated in
Under the Elder Abuse Act, financial abuse occurs when a person: (1) takes (appropriates, obtains, etc.) real or personal property of an elder “for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both” (
“The trial court must issue a right to attach order if it finds, among other things, that ‘[t]he plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.’ ” (Pech v. Morgan (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 841, 854, quoting
Under the substantial evidence standard, reviewing courts do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) Instead, “the appellate court’s power begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582, (Schmidt))—that is, “ ‘ “evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) In determining whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]” (Schmidt, at p. 582.) Consequently, a party arguing that a finding is not supported by substantial evidence faces a “ ‘ “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Padideh v. Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418, 438.)
a. Contreras’s arguments
In his opening brief, Contreras identified the following two issues for appellate review: “1. The lower Court reversibly erred because the [RTAO] [w]as [i]mproper and there is insufficient evidence to support the probable validity of [Panilag]’s claims against … Contreras. [¶] 2. Whether the lower court reversibly erred when it granted [Panilag]’s [RTAO] when it is not likely that [Panilag] will obtain a judgment against … Contreras on his claims?”9
Contreras argues that Panilag failed to meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his right to an order of attachment. In support of this argument, Contreras challenges the evidentiary sufficiency of: (1) Panilag’s verified complaint, describing it as “replete with boilerplate recitation[s] of financial elder abuse”; and (2) Dr. Nguyen’s declaration for failing to provide Dr. Nguyen’s “medical credentials,” his “medical license number,” his “medical office address,” his “board certif[ications],” if any, or his “area of specialization.” Contreras also challenges Panilag’s Alzheimer’s diagnosis by proffering evidence that Panilag “completed a competency test at the DMV and renewed his driver’s license in January 2024, approximately 30 days prior to knowingly executing and notarizing a real estate contractual agreement.”
Pointing to his memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the RTAO, Contreras avers that he “presented uncontested evidence” to the trial court demonstrating that: (1) Panilag had been in default on his mortgage since 2009 and sold the property to avoid foreclosure; (2) Contreras paid “over $59,000 in arrears and approximately $10,000 in closing costs” so that Panilag and his family could continue to live on the property; and (3) that Panilag’s “statements at the time, as well as third-party witnesses, confirmed that [Panilag] was lucid and understood the nature of the transaction.”
To the extent that Contreras is arguing that the trial court failed to consider the “significant evidence” he presented in opposition to Panilag’s request for an RTAO, the register of actions shows that he presented no evidence with his opposition briefing. Nor can he rely on the arguments made in his opposition points and authorities, because those are not evidence. “Citing points and
Contreras makes a number of other arguments in his briefing that rely on purported facts outside the record but it is well-settled that statements in appellate briefs based on such unsupported facts are to be disregarded by an appellate court. (Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625.) Because Panilag’s evidence was uncontroverted, Contreras cannot now argue that it was insufficient to support any of the findings required under the Attachment Law (
Furthermore, Contreras’s claims are speculative and unsupported by the record. The record does not show that the trial court failed to perform its duty to consider the evidence presented in ruling on the request for an RTAO. (Cf. In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 518 [rejecting appellant’s complaints, unsupported by citations to the record, concerning juvenile court’s conduct, including assertions it “acted as an advocate, … attempted to prevent the expert witness from testifying, mischaracterized witness testimony, and relied on speculation rather than evidence to ignore [testimony of] a witness”].)
b. Substantial evidence supports the RTAO
An application for an attachment must include a statement of the “amount to be secured by the attachment.” (
Panilag’s evidence also supported the “probable validity” of his financial elder abuse cause of action, specifically the declarations from his daughter and his treating physician attesting to his diminished mental capacity, his inability to understand the nature of the documents he signed, as well as the use of falsified email accounts to make it appear that Panilag intended to sell his property. Based on this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Panilag had shown it was more likely than not he would prevail on his claim of financial elder abuse, as these declarations tended to prove that Contreras took or assisted in taking Panilag’s real property “for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud” (
Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that Panilag established the probable validity of his claim for financial elder abuse as well as the amount of the claim upon which the attachment is based.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Panilag shall recover his costs on appeal.
WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
GROVER, ACTING P. J.
LIE, J.
Panilag v. Contreras H052685