OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent. OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
Nos. 87-1468, 87-1575
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
May 25, 1989
Argued Oct. 18, 1988
876 F.2d 960
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. The denial of review, by an equally divided court,3 has the effect of invalidating a congressional enactment—as well as a longstanding, vigorously supported agency program—designed to address the dearth of minority voices within the nation‘s broadcast media. The Congress and the FCC deserve the consideration of the full court on such a serious matter.
sion among public administrators in a wide range of settings—most notably in education.
Moreover, all nine Justices in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), concluded that
William R. Tobey, Atty., Federal Labor Relations Authority, with whom William E. Persina, Acting Sol., Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for respondent. Susan Berk and Jill A. Griffin, Attys., Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., also entered appearances for respondent.
Before SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, STARR and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
Concurring opinion by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY, with whom Circuit Judge STARR joins.
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.
Invoking the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act,1 the Overseas Education Association (OEA) submitted proposals to the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) with a view to mitigating the impact of changes by DODDS in the working conditions of teachers and other professionals employed overseas. DODDS refused to negotiate with OEA on the propositions at issue here, and on each of two administrative appeals2 the Federal Labor Relations Authority sustained the agency‘s position.3 We conclude that the Authority‘s construction of pertinent provisions of the Act improperly restricted the scope of management‘s duty to bargain. Accordingly, we reverse the Authority‘s decisions in the respects challenged, and remand the cases for further proceedings.
I. THE BACKGROUND
A. The Statutory Framework
The Act reflects a comprehensive effort by Congress to balance the interest of the Government in efficient operation with the interest of employees in decisions affecting them.4 The Act declares broadly that “[e]ach employee shall have the right ... to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through representatives chosen by employees....” 5 This right is enlivened by an
Section 7106(a) of the Act, however, removes from the duty to bargain management functions which Congress deemed essential to effective conduct of agency business.7 Union proposals that would interfere directly with an exercise of rights reserved to management by Section 7106(a) are presumptively nonnegotiable.8 But Section 7106(b) authorizes bargaining over proposals in either of three categories, notwithstanding some intrusion on Section 7106(a) prerogatives.9
Centrally involved in the cases before us are the Section 7106(a) reserved management right to direct work, and assign employees, and the Section 7106(b)(3) sanction of bargaining over proposals of “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under [Section 7106(a)] by ... management officials.”10 By the terms of the Act, tensions between powers asserted by management and union officials are resolved by the Authority on negotiability appeals,11 and the Authority‘s decisions are reviewable by the courts of appeals.12
B. The Facts and Procedural History
DODDS, a unit of the Department of Defense, operates more than 250 schools for dependents of American servicepersons stationed in twenty countries abroad. OEA is the collective bargaining representative of all teachers, counselors and other professionals employed at these schools.13
In 1984, DODDS administrators announced changes in work assignments of overseas personnel. Hiring of substitute teachers would be reduced; whenever possible, full-time teachers, during what otherwise would be their planning and lunch
OEA advanced a number of proposals designed to minimize the effect—primarily, loss of planning and lunch breaks—of these changes upon teachers and professionals.14 DODDS bargained on some of these proposals but declined to do so on others. OEA appealed to the Authority for determinations on whether the rejected proposals were negotiable.15
Later, in 1987, DODDS modified the structure of compensatory education programs at its schools in such ways as to increase the workloads of compensatory education teachers.16 OEA recommended three methods of easing the transition to the heavier workloads. DODDS spurned bargaining over one of these proposals, which sought more preparation time for compensatory education teachers handed additional duties.17 OEA solicited the Authority‘s decision on this refusal as well.18
In separate opinions, the Authority upheld DODDS on the proposals under review.19 By its estimate, OEA‘s proposals interfered directly with management‘s reserved right to assign work, and therefore were nonnegotiable unless they fell within one of the categories specified in Section 7106(b).20 OEA contended, however, that its submissions qualified for bargaining under Section 7106(b)(3) as proposals of arrangements appropriate for adversely affected employees.21 It argued that its members were impacted, primarily because the changes wrought by DODDS forced them to perform, without additional compensation, some of their work on their own time at home.
The Authority assumed the accuracy of these representations but disposed of the union‘s petitions solely on the grounds that the proposals concerned no more than “the effects of management‘s establishing job requirements,” and that “[t]he establishment of job requirements, however, does not by itself adversely affect employees.”22 Dissatisfied, the union brought the litigation here.
Our review of an agency‘s construction of its enabling statute is guided by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and its progeny. “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”24 “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue,”25 “that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”26 “The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”27 “If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,”28 “the ques-
Our examination of the pivotal provisions of the Act, the legislative history of those provisions, and the legislative scheme leads us to conclude that Congress made clear enough the meaning to be ascribed to the words “adversely affected” in Section 7106(b)(3), and did not intend the reading the Authority gave them. Since the Authority‘s interpretation does not survive the first phase of the Chevron inquiry, we do not reach the second. Thus we neither defer to nor abide the decisions under review.
III. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The Authority argues here that employees are not adversely affected by management‘s specification of new job requirements unless and until an adverse personnel action30 is taken against someone for failing to perform adequately under those requirements.31 As the Authority puts it, adverse effects within the sphere of Section 7106(b)(3) can only be unfavorable
job actions such as removals, demotions and reductions in pay.32 This position is rested, not on statutory structure, language or history, but on an extrapolation of decisions dealing with promulgation of performance standards.33
The statutory words do not themselves import any such limit. Webster‘s defines “adverse” as including “acting against or in a contrary direction” or “in opposition to one‘s interests,”34 and “affect” as including “to produce an effect ... upon.”35 Taken together, these expansive words do not confine themselves to employees subjected to serious adverse personnel actions.
Moreover, we hardly need to do more than to examine the structure of Section 7106 to obtain a clear idea of the meaning of “adversely affected.” Section 7106(a), as we have said, enumerates the prerogatives reserved to management,36 but the immunity of these rights from the duty to bargain is “[s]ubject” to Section 7106(b)(3).37 The latter section, in plain English, authorizes negotiation of “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected,” not by a firing, demotion or pay cut, but by “the exercise of any
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 710639
While we all are satisfied that the statutory text itself demonstrates the error in the Authority‘s construction of Section 7106(b)(3), I have also examined the legisla-
tive history,40 and there I find abundant support for the conclusion that Congress intended the words “adversely affected” to convey a much broader meaning than the Authority thought. More specifically, the history demonstrates overwhelmingly that Section 7106(b)(3) was designed to enable employees impacted by any application of reserved management rights to negotiate on proposals promising some mollification of the consequences. This is the objective with which the Authority‘s construction of “adversely affected” collides fatally.41
Section 7106(a) codified the management rights provision of Executive Order 11491,
These considerations exert equal force when the technique of interpretation becomes an issue in a Chevron-type context, as it does here. As has been stated, the initial step the Chevron analysis is an examination of the statutory language to ascertain whether Congress manifested an intention on the question presented. See text supra at notes 24-27. This court has explained that “[t]his examination should begin with the language of the statute, but the court may also inspect legislative history and past administrative practice for any light these sources may shed on congressional intent.” Abourezk v. Reagan, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 365, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (1986) (citation omitted) aff‘d, 484 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 252, 98 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). This advice is fully authenticated by Supreme Court caselaw. At the first Chevron phase, the court is to “employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction,” see text supra at note 25, and the legislative history is one of these tools, whether the statutory words are unambiguous or not. So it was in the Chevron trilogy. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra note 23, 467 U.S. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783, 81 L.Ed.2d at 704 (first-stage determination “[b]ased on ... examination of the legislation and its history“); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 24, 480 U.S. at 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. at 1213 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d at 448 n. 12 (since “the plain language of the statute appears to settle the question before us[,] ... we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is ‘clearly expressed legislative intention’ contrary to the language,” but, “far from causing us to question the conclusion that flows from the statutory language, the legislative history adds compelling support to our holding“); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, supra note 24, 484 U.S. at —, 108 S.Ct. at 421, 98 L.Ed.2d at 442 (first-stage inquiry extends to “[the words, structure, and history of the” statute). So it has been in our decisions. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 271 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 98, 850 F.2d 788, 791 (1988) (“[w]e ... turn to the language and to the history of the [statute] respectively, in order to do ‘our first job’ of determining Congress‘s intent“); Costello v. Agency for Int‘l Dev., 269 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 49, 843 F.2d 540, 542 (1988) (doing “our first job,” we resort to “[t]he words, structure, and history of the” statute). So, also, I think it should be here.
My colleagues’ reservations about legislative history extend even to committee reports, C.Op. at 974, which, as they concede, have traditionally been considered to be the most reliable of historical aids to statutory interpretations. E.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585-586, 77 S.Ct. 529, 538, 1 L.Ed.2d 563, 574-575 (1957); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 16, 365 F.2d 939, 949 (1966). Their already dim view of the history generally becomes dimmer when it comes to statements by sponsors of legislation. C.Op. at 975. But no one can gainsay the overwhelming judicial support for the proposition that explanations by sponsors of legislation during floor discussion are entitled to weight when they cast light on the construction properly to be placed upon statutory language. This principle is firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-527, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1920-1921, 72 L.Ed.2d 299, 311 (1982) (“remarks ... of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted[] are an authoritative guide to the statute‘s construction“); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 71 L.Ed.2d 715, 724 (1982) (sponsor‘s statements entitled to weight); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63, 100 S.Ct. 915, 919, 63 L.Ed.2d 198, 207-208 (1980) (same); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass‘n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 640, 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1266, 18 L.Ed.2d 357, 375 (1967) (“[i]t is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt“) (quoting, Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395, 71 S.Ct. 745, 750-751, 95 L.Ed. 1035, 1047-1048 (1951)); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 n. 22, 76 S.Ct. 349, 361 n. 22, 100 L.Ed. 309, 323 n. 22 (1956) (same); our circuit, e.g., Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guar. Bd., 216 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 84-85, 670 F.2d 238, 242-243 (1981) (sponsor‘s remarks “some evidence of Congress’ views“); AFGE v. Donovan, 244 U.S.App.D.C. 255, 277 & n. 17, 757 F.2d 330, 352 & n. 17 (1985) (sponsor‘s remarks deemed relevant); City of New York v. Train, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 120, 494 F.2d 1033, 1039 (1974), aff‘d 420 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (views of legislation‘s sponsors are of “particular importance“) and sister circuits, e.g., Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 116 n. 7 (2d Cir.1984) (“[w]hile the views of a sponsor of legislation are by no means conclusive, they are entitled to considerable weight, particularly in the absence of a committee report“); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep‘t of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 423-426 & n. 13 (9th Cir.1979) (“[c]ourts look to the statements by the initiators or sponsors of
proposed legislation when the meaning of the words used in the statute is in doubt“); Kansas ex rel. Stephan v. Adams, 608 F.2d 861, 865-866 (10th Cir.1979) (statements of one of bill‘s sponsors “deserve to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute“). Representatives Udall and Clay, upon whom I draw for enlightment, were first-rate sponsors—authors, committee members and active collaborators—of the provision that became Section 7106(b)(3) of the enacted measure and clearly were authoritative spokesmen on the meaning it was intended to have. Their explanations are fully consistent with the statutory language, the structure of the Act and the remaining legislative history. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1840, 90 L.Ed.2d 248, 257-258 (1986) (when statements of sponsor of legislation “are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent“). It is noteworthy that in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13, 98 S.Ct. 909, 913, 55 L.Ed.2d 70, 77 (1978), eight justices accepted the explanation of the sponsor of an amendment notwithstanding a dissent expressing objections similar to those my colleagues voiced here. Id. at 13, 17-18, 98 S.Ct. at 913, 915, 55 L.Ed.2d at 77, 80. The Court‘s majority characterized this statement as “clearly probative of a legislative judgment” and “certainly entitled to weight.” Id. at 13, 98 S.Ct. at 913, 55 L.Ed.2d at 77.
The concurring opinion also claims that the legislative history places a gloss on the statutory text which could “[i]n time ... supplant the plainest statutory meaning.” C.Op. at 975-76. They are concerned that the comments I quote “might threaten the balance Congress has struck between federal employees’ rights and management‘s prerogatives.” Id. This criticism rests upon a misreading of my purpose in citing legislative history. I do so, not to probe the relationship between §§ 7106(a) and 7106(b)(3)—indeed, our decision in AFGE v. FLRA, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 446, 451, 702 F.2d 1183, 1188 (1983) has already established the subordination of § 7106(a) management rights to § 7106(b)(3)‘s demand for negotiation—but rather to portray the legislative atmosphere in which § 7106(b)(3) was composed and adopted. See text infra following note 60. At any rate, sponsors’ statements can be taken only as found, and can be utilized only as warranted by the principles shaping their role in statutory construction. They are not controlling; they are merely aids to interpretation. But ordinarily they do bear significance—just how much varies from case to case. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 70 n. 26 (2d Cir.1977) (“[t]he weight to which the views of any particular congressman is entitled will vary, of course, with the legislator‘s familiarity with, and participation in the shaping of, the legislation“). It is a far cry, however, to say, as my colleagues do, that sponsors’ statements should have no significant role at all.
the range of topics appropriate for collective bargaining was to enlarge.44 Key legislators criticized the propensity of the Authority‘s predecessor, the Federal Labor Relations Council, to stretch the management rights language of the executive order,45 and left no doubt that any tendency in that direction was to be shed whenever the Act became the subject of interpretation.46
In drafting a revision of HR 9094 as title VII of this bill, Mr. Clay and I attempted to alleviate these problems with the Executive order in three ways.... Second, we expressly provided in the language of title VII itself that negotiations may occur over the adverse impact caused by the exercise of any of the management rights in title VII and that procedures may be negotiated for the exercise of those rights. Third, we attempted to make clear that the purpose of the management rights clause is to preserve the ultimate exercise of the management functions listed. As such, the management rights clause operates as an exception to the general obligation to bargain in good faith over conditions of employment.47
Representative Udall further explained that Section 7106 “will adequately protect genuine managerial prerogatives,”48 and as long as it is “construed strictly, such a clause will also allow the flexibility that is the hallmark of a successful labor-management program. Thus, although management has the right to direct the work force, proposals aimed at lessening the adverse impact on employees of an exercise, perhaps arbitrary, of that right are fully negotiable.”49 Representative Clay was in full accord:
read to favor collective bargaining whenever there is doubt as to the negotiability of a subject or a proposal. H.R.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1978).
Although more management rights have been added [in Section 7106(a)], the section has been revised to make clear that the exercise of any management rights in the section does not preclude negotiations over procedures or adverse effects involved in [the exertion of] those rights.50
The Senate bill deviated somewhat from the House measure in wording of the provision ultimately enacted as Section 7106(b)(3). Like the House, the Senate listed prerogatives reserved to management, but then specified that this tabulation “shall not preclude the parties from negotiating agreements providing appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological change.”51 The message conveyed by this language is unmistakable, and in harmony with the spirit and purpose of its broader counterpart in the House. As the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs explained, the Senate version would “except[] certain enumerated matters from the obligation to negotiate ... in effect rendering bargaining on those matters optional or permissive,” but “recognize[d] that there is an obligation to negotiate over the impact of realignments of work forces and technological change.”52 The Senate never indicated any disagreement with the Committee‘s reading.53
Both Houses, then, manifested a desire to subject, though to varying extents, pro-
As Section 7106(b)(1) states, some such proposals are, “at the election of the agency,” negotiable in their entirety.58 As Section 7106(b)(2) directs, whenever the agency decides to exercise a right reserved to management, the “procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in” doing so become negotiable.59 And, by the terms of Section 7106(b)(3), “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any” reserved management right may always be negotiated by such employees.60 Both the
text and the legislative history of the latter provision—the one bearing critically upon the cases at bar—elucidate its prominance in the legislative scheme.
I cannot believe that Congress, so tightly wedded as it was to impact negotiation over any exertion of Section 7106(a) management rights, contemplated an interpretation of “employees adversely affected” which would drastically curtail that opportunity. On the contrary, every guidepost observed in the legislative history points in the opposite direction. The scope of collective bargaining was to expand. Nonnegotiability of management rights was to be a narrow exception to the general duty to bargain. Section 7106(a) management rights themselves were to be strictly construed, and any doubt was to be resolved in favor of negotiability. Every exercise of any of these rights was potentially to be subject to impact negotiation. So spoke Congress, emphatically and clearly. The legislative history reinforces my conclusion that Congress did not intend to confine the availability of Section 7106(b)(3) to employees encountering such awesome adversities as removals, demotions or pay reductions.
V. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
Our quest for congressional intent has led us not only through the statutory text and history, but also to an important structural feature of the Act.61 Congress provided two distinct processes to which, in particular circumstances, disgruntled employees may alternatively resort. One, of course, is collective bargaining;62 the other
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act was adopted as Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,63 a comprehensive overhaul of laws pertaining to the federal workforce. Besides regulation of labor-management relations in Title VII, the Civil Service Reform Act addresses, among other things, adverse personal actions against federal employees.64 Adverse actions are removals, suspensions for more than 14 days, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs of 30 days or less.65 An adverse personal action against an employee triggers a panoply of procedural safeguards,66 including judicial review.67 As is evident, adverse-action proceedings focus upon individual cases.
Section 7106(b)(3), on the other hand, is a collective bargaining measure. It enables employees adversely affected by an exercise of Section 7106(a) management rights, though entirely proper, to bargain over arrangements appropriate to ease the impact of management‘s action. It thus allows these employees to combine their views and their voices in a concerted responsive effort.
The Authority‘s interpretation of the words “employees adversely affected” in Section 7106(b)(3) would produce pernicious consequences. In the cases before us, the Authority ruled unequivocally that employees are not adversely affected by changes in job requirements, but become so only when action—obviously, adverse personnel action—is taken against them on grounds of noncompliance with such requirements.68 The benefit of Section 7106(b)(3) is thus seriously diluted. Of course, an individual
employee confronted by an adverse personnel action may invoke the procedures referable specifically to such actions. But when employees as a group are affected by some action of management, Section 7106(b)(3), by the Authority‘s construction, is of little or no value; group efforts are foreclosed unless and until adverse personnel actions are launched. Even then, it seems, the group could be no larger than those subjected to such actions.
Congress specified that adverse personnel actions be reviewed in individual disciplinary proceedings, not through collective bargaining. At the same time, Congress ordained in Section 7106(b)(3) that the interests of adversely affected employees in arrangements appropriate to an exercise of management rights be advanced through collective representation. Personnel reviews and collective bargaining are distinct, and Congress did not intend that either be denied its proper role. The Authority‘s interpretation stands the statutory scheme on its head, and is not entitled to deference by the courts.
VI. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALE
The Authority felt that the union could not resort to Section 7106(b)(3) because “these proposals do not concern ‘arrangements’ for adversely affected employees.”69 Rather, the Authority said, “[t]he establishment of job requirements, however, does not by itself adversely affect employees,” and that was all that was involved.70 As a general proposition, this concept of adverse affect is far too cramped, and in its particular application here it is untenable.
The only judicial precedent which the Authority tendered as support for its stance was HHS v. FLRA,71 decided in the Fourth
We also reject the implicit claim that employees are “adversely affected” by changes and clarifications in the SSA operations manual, or by an evaluation of their ability to learn the new material. We think § 7106(b)(3) permits the union to propose appropriate arrangements for terminated or demoted employees, for example, not employees whose job becomes more demanding because its requirements change. See, e.g., American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C.Cir.1983) (involving employee demotions).74
This, the Authority argues, buttresses its position. Read in context, we think it does not. The agency action involved in HHS was simply a substitution of new procedures for some theretofore in vogue. There was no indication that the substitution would exact from employees more than aptitude and willingness to adapt to and utilize the new procedures. So, those procedures did not call for more than the ability—which employees usually are expected to have—to react promptly and efficiently to new demands of the job. To be sure, the revised procedures raised the specter of lower performance ratings until employees gained enough experience to master them, but, here again, that risk did not differ fundamentally from the normal exposure of employees to appraisals of the caliber of their work. Given this, it is hardly surprising that the court concluded that the employees were not adversely affected by either the changes in the agency‘s operations manual or the anticipated evaluation of individual adjustments thereto.75 We thus do not attribute to HHS the meaning of “adversely affected” which the Authority urges us to adopt here.
The Authority draws attention, however, to the Fourth Circuit‘s statement on “adversely affected“—that Section 7106(b)(3) authorized the union to submit proposals of suitable arrangements “for terminated or demoted employees,” but “not employees whose job becomes more demanding because its requirements change.”76 We read this observation, not as the prescrip-
served management right necessitates close analysis of the relevant facts. Not every change in work requirements, or every added burden of job performance, will present an occasion for Section 7106(b)(3) collective bargaining. The factual scenarios and impact gradations possible are myriad, and a commonsense approach is indispensable. The Authority, to which the responsibility of administering the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act has been entrusted, has the duty in the first instance to carefully explore the factual basis of each proposal contested, and to evaluate the proposal in light of its accumulated experience in federal labor-management relations.
In the cases before us, the Authority never measured the impact of management‘s changes upon the unit employees. Instead, it ruled that the union‘s proposals really addressed no more than the end result of new work requirements, and that, solely on this account, employees could not be adversely affected. In so doing, the Authority missed the point completely. There were the addition of another class daily, the increased workloads of compensatory education teachers, the lengthening of the work day, and the undisputed fact that on any particular day some teachers must forego their planning or lunch periods, or both, in order to cover the classes of absent teachers, or to monitor the lunch-
VII. CONCLUSION
The question whether employees are adversely affected by an exercise of a re-
The orders under review are reversed, and the cases are remanded to the Authority for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So Ordered.
BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge STARR joins, concurring:
We concur in all but Part IV of our colleague‘s fine opinion. We find its references to legislative history unnecessary, and we cannot accept the use of these extra-statutory materials to place a restrictive gloss on the plain meaning of section 7106(a)‘s “management rights” provisions. Before discussing these concerns, we will summarize the basic principles of statutory construction that inform our analysis.
A court‘s task in interpreting a statute is to determine its meaning as understood by the legislative body that voted the bill into law. The most reliable evidence of that meaning is the text of the act itself. As the Supreme Court has recently emphasized, a judicial determination that statutory language is clear ordinarily forecloses further inquiry into legislative intent: “‘Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, [w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.‘” Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm‘n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (“where ... the statute‘s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms‘“) (citation omitted).
An exception to this “plain meaning” rule arises in those “rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1031 (citation omitted). For example, a reference to committee reports may reveal that a seemingly unambiguous word or phrase has a specialized or technical meaning that Congress intended to incorporate into the statute. Such a use of legislative materials, however, must be sharply distinguished from the treatment of legislative history as a source of the law itself—that is to say, as expressing a congressional intent that supplants the statute. See In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir.1989), (Easterbrook, J.).
In the past, courts have often failed to perceive this critical distinction and, more generally, the questionable validity of many of these legislative “aids.” In recent years, however, this Circuit and others have expressed increasing concern over the reliability of legislative history as a tool of statutory construction. See, e.g., cases cited in In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342-43. This caution extends even to committee reports, which are generally conceded to be the most authoritative sources of information about a particular statute. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712-15 (D.C.Cir.1987); id. at 712 (while committee report may be used to interpret unclear statutory language, it “cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law“) (emphasis original); id. at 715-20 (Buckley, J., concurring) (discussing dangers of judicial reliance on statements included in committee report for political purposes); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 & n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1986) (decrying “spurious” staff-created legislative history
Far less reliable, as sources of statutory meaning, are remarks made during floor debate—even “authoritative” explanations offered by a bill‘s sponsors. While a sponsor‘s statements may reveal his understanding and intentions, they hardly provide definitive insights into Congress’ understanding of the meaning of a particular provision. Few of his fellow legislators will have been on hand to hear the gloss the sponsor may have placed on a particular provision. Thus members of Congress, in voting on a measure, must be presumed to have relied on the meaning of the words read in context on a printed page. Moreover, a statute‘s sponsor may well be pursuing a political agenda in his floor discussion that judges are ill-equipped to detect. See International Bhd., 814 F.2d at 715-18 (Buckley, J., concurring).
In short, legislative history contains too many pitfalls to warrant consultation when there are no ambiguities to be resolved. Here, as our colleague himself acknowledges, the meaning of the statutory language, as it applies to this case, is absolutely clear. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute requires government employers to bargain over “conditions of employment,”
In this case, DODDS‘s changes in work assignments clearly had an adverse impact on the teachers, who had the right to respond; and, equally clearly, the FLRA had the statutory duty to determine whether the arrangements proposed by the teachers’ union were appropriate. Thus, we agree unreservedly with the careful analysis of the statutory text presented by Judge Robinson in Part III and his conclusion that section 7106(b)(3), “in plain English, authorizes negotiation of ‘appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected,’ not by a firing, demotion or pay cut, but by ‘the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials.‘” Judge Robinson‘s opinion at 965 (emphasis in original).
With all respect, as the English is plain, we find our colleague‘s further reference to legislative history and the inferences he draws from it to be inappropriate. We are particularly concerned by his reliance, in Section IV, on the floor remarks of even such careful legislators as Representatives Udall and Clay. These comments are used to support the conclusion that the management rights specified in (and expanded by) section 7106(a) were to be “strictly construed,” their negotiability treated as “a narrow exception” to the duty to bargain, and “any doubt” resolved in favor of negotiation. Id. at 970-971 (emphases added). These qualifications could easily have been written into the statutory text had that been deemed necessary to achieve Congress’ purpose, but they were not. This court has no authority to engraft restrictions onto the statute that its drafters did not choose to use, and that the members voting it into law never had the chance to consider.
We take exception to Section IV not only because we believe it ignores the Supreme Court‘s instruction that when “the terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete,” Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. at 1860, but also because the insertion, by judicial fiat, of adjectives and adverbs into straight-forward legislative language can prove mischievous over time. Judges trained in the common law tradition tend to look to the most recent opinion, rather than to its text, for guidance in determining a statute‘s meaning. In time, the chain of interpreta-
In sum, we conclude that the statutory provisions at issue unambiguously express Congress’ intent to exempt specified management rights from an agency‘s duty to bargain, but to allow negotiations over “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected” by any exercise of such management authority. As the Act speaks for itself, reference to legislative history is unnecessary, and we cannot agree with our colleague‘s use of legislative materials to modify the plain meaning of the statute. Accordingly, we concur in all but Part IV of the opinion.