SIMPSON ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
No. 76-5761
Supreme Court of the United States
February 28, 1978
Argued November 1, 1977
*Together with No. 76-5796, Simpson v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court.
H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Assistant Attorney General Civiletti, and John J. Klein.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The punishment for bank robbery of a fine of not more than $5,000 and imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both,
I
On September 8, 1975, petitioners, using handguns to intimidate the bank‘s employees, robbed some $40,000 from the East End Branch of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro,
Petitioners received a separate jury trial for each robbery. After the trial for the first robbery, they were convicted of both aggravated bank robbery, in violation of
During the sentencing proceedings following each conviction, counsel for petitioners argued that the imposition of cumulative penalties for the two crimes was impermissible because the
II
Quite clearly,
Cases in which the Government is able to prove violations of two separate criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing, as here, raise the prospect of double jeopardy and the possible need to evaluate the statutes in light of the Blockburger test. That test, the Government argues, is satisfied in this litigation.6 We need not reach the issue. Before an
III
First is the legislative history of
“For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies.” Id., at 22232.
This statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of
Second, to construe the statute to allow the additional sentence authorized by
Finally, our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was enacted later. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973). Cf. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.05 (4th ed. 1973). This guide to statutory construction has special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions. In this context, the principle is a corollary of the rule of lenity, an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative
Obviously, the Government has since changed its view of the relationship between
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the Court‘s conclusion in this litigation that petitioners, upon being convicted and sentenced under
The canon of construction which the Court purports to follow is like all other canons, only a guide to enable this Court to perform its function. As the Court said in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 31 (1948):
“The canon of avoidance of constitutional doubts must, like the ‘plain meaning’ rule, give way where its application would produce a futile result, or an unreasonable result ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.‘”
While legislative history as well as the language of the statute itself may be used to interpret the meaning of statutory language, United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940), the decisions of this Court have established that some types of legislative history are substantially more reliable than others. The report of a joint conference committee of both Houses of Congress, for example, or the report of a Senate or House committee, is accorded a good deal more weight than the remarks even of the sponsor of a particular portion of a bill on the floor of the chamber. See, e. g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840, 858 n. 36 (1976); United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 585-586 (1957). It is a matter of common knowledge that at any given time during the debate, particularly a prolonged debate, of a bill the members of either House in attendance on the floor may not be great, and it is only these members, or those who later read the remarks in the Congressional
The Court‘s disregard of this plain meaning is inappropriate in this litigation both because of the circumstances under which the Gun Control Act was passed in June 1968, and because of the gauzy nature of the constitutional concerns which apparently underlie its reluctance to read the statutes as they are written. Several different bills dealing with firearms control, which had been bottled up in various stages of the legislative process prior to June 1968, were brought to the floor and enacted with dramatic swiftness following the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy in the early part of that month. Senator Kennedy‘s assassination, following by less than three months the similar killing of Reverend Martin Luther King, obviously focused the attention of Congress on the problem of firearms control. It seems to me not only permissible but irresistible, in reading the language of the two statutes, to conclude that Congress intended when it enacted
The Court expresses concern, however, that if this construction were adopted problems of double jeopardy would be raised by virtue of our decision in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). Blockburger, of course, was not based on the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, but simply upon an analysis of relevant principles of statutory construction for determining “whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 166 (1977); ante, at 11. To speak of a congressional provision for enhanced punishment for an offense, as
“[T]he double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.” 432 U. S., at 165 (footnote omitted).
Petitioners in this litigation were separately tried for two separate armed bank robberies, and were found guilty of both aggravated bank robbery in violation of
Notes
“(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
“Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny—
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
. . . . .
“(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.”
“(c) Whoever—
“(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
“(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
“shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of such person or give him a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.”
On the other hand, although the overriding purpose of
“[The language of
“. . . In order to give lawful meaning to Congress’ enactment of the aggravating elements in
