RENNAE ELIZABETH OTT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 17-2047
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Decided: November 28, 2018
PUBLISHED. Argued: September 27, 2018. Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gibney wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Floyd joined.
Rennae Elizabeth Ott asks us to determine the statute of limitations for claims she brought against Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS” or “Department“) pursuant to the
To avoid this result, Ott invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling. Unfortunately, she does not meet the doctrine’s exacting standard, and cannot avoid the bar.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ott’s Rehabilitation Act claims.
I.
Ott worked for DPSCS as a parole officer. In 2010, she learned that a pediatrician had molested her daughter, causing Ott to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD“) and severe anxiety. Her difficulties forced her to take medical leave and to transfer to a different location.
While still employed, Ott filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). Ott’s charge proceeded slowly through the EEOC, but eventually the agency found reasonable cause for Ott’s claims and referred them to the Department of Justice (“DOJ“). On July 26, 2016, the DOJ issued Ott a right to sue notice.
Ott filed her complaint in this case on October 10, 2016, asserting claims arising under the
II.
We review de novo dismissals pursuant to
While we typically review a district court’s equitable tolling decision for abuse of discretion, we review de novo when the court denied equitable tolling as a matter of law. Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 2014). In this case, the district court’s decision turned on a question of law—whether undisputed facts excused Ott’s failure to bring a timely claim—so we review the tolling decision de novo. See id.
A.
Ott argues that Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations governing civil actions applies to her Rehabilitation Act claims. When a federal statute, like the Rehabilitation Act, does not set forth a statute of limitations, federal courts “borrow the state statute of limitations that applies to the most analogous state-law claim.” Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017). Federal district courts should borrow the limitations period from the state in which the district court sits, Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1972), as long as doing so “is not inconsistent with federal law or policy.” McCullough v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 35 F.3d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985)).
The Rehabilitation Act protects against and provides redress for employment discrimination based on disability. McCullough, 35 F.3d at 130. Although we have not reviewed the revised MFEPA to determine whether it provides the statute of limitations for Rehabilitation Act cases, we have considered similar statutes in Virginia and North Carolina. The Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (“Virginia Act“) prohibits disability discrimination in programs receiving state funding, so we found it “almost identical to the Rehabilitation Act.” Wolsky, 1 F.3d at 224. Virginia “seemingly intended its legislation to track the federal [Rehabilitation] Act and provide its citizens with the same rights and remedies.” Id.
Similarly, we deemed the North Carolina Persons With Disabilities Protection Act3 (“North Carolina Act“) analogous to the Rehabilitation Act. McCullough, 35 F.3d at 130. Like the Rehabilitation Act, the North Carolina Act protects a “very specific group of
Finding the state laws analogous to the Rehabilitation Act, we elected to apply their limitations periods instead of the states’ general personal injury time limits. McCullough, 35 F.3d at 130; Wolsky, 1 F.3d at 224.
In contrast, in the past, Maryland had no analogue to the Rehabilitation Act, so we applied Maryland’s general civil three-year statute of limitations to Rehabilitation Act claims. Jeandron v. Bd. of Regents, 510 F. App’x 223, 226 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished table decision). Amendments to the MFEPA, however, now make it an appropriate analogous statute to provide the statute of limitations for Rehabilitation Act claims.4
We start with an enactment in 2007. At that time, the Maryland legislature added to the MFEPA a private right of action for employment discrimination based on disability. H.B. 1034, 2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006) (codified as amended at
Recently, we examined the MFEPA amendments in an ADA case involving a commuter bus.6 Semenova, 845 F.3d at 566. We decided that the MFEPA was not analogous to the ADA in that context because the MFEPA amendments did not expand rights for individuals who suffered disability discrimination in public services. Id. at 567–68. We noted, however, that the amended MFEPA created a cause of action for disability discrimination in the employment context. Id. at 568.
Unlike the plaintiff in Semenova, Ott alleges employment disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The MFEPA, as amended in 2007 and 2009, provides a right of action for the employment practices Ott cites in her complaint, including retaliation and failure to accommodate. See
The MFEPA, therefore, is the most analogous Maryland cause of action to Ott’s Rehabilitation Act claims, and its two-year statute of limitations governs her case. Ott’s allegations of wrongful conduct end with her resignation on March 6, 2014. She filed her complaint on October 10, 2016, outside the two-year period. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Ott’s Rehabilitation Act claims as time-barred.
B.
Ott further argues that if a two-year statute of limitations governs her claims, we should apply equitable tolling to save them from dismissal. The discretionary equitable tolling doctrine applies when (1) a defendant wrongfully prevents a plaintiff from asserting her claims, or (2) extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control prevent her from filing on time. Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). We apply the doctrine infrequently, so that “individualized hardship” and “subjective notions of fair accommodation” do not “supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Id. In other words, equitable tolling “must be reserved for those rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Id.
Ott further argues that DPSCS caused the delay by withholding its sovereign immunity defense to her ADA claims during the administrative process. Believing DPSCS would consent to suit, Ott waited for a right to sue letter. Under these circumstances, we do not find it “unconscionable to enforce the limitation period.” Harris, 209 F.3d at 330. Ott could have timely filed her Rehabilitation Act claims without completing the administrative process as to her ADA claims; the Rehabilitation Act does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
In sum, Ott fails to meet the high bar for equitable tolling. The district court did not err by declining to apply equitable tolling to her case.
Although we find the facts in this case disturbing and sympathize with Ott’s circumstances, the district court correctly dismissed her Rehabilitation Act claims. We affirm the district court’s application of the MFEPA’s two-year statute of limitations and its denial of equitable tolling.
AFFIRMED