909 F.3d 655
4th Cir.2018Background
- Ott, a Maryland DPSCS parole officer, developed PTSD and severe anxiety after her daughter was molested in 2010; she took medical leave and transferred assignments.
- A co-worker allegedly harassed Ott about her daughter and mental health for about a year; DPSCS did not stop the harassment and Ott resigned on March 6, 2014.
- Ott filed an EEOC charge while employed; the EEOC found cause and the DOJ issued a Rehabilitation Act right-to-sue notice on July 26, 2016.
- Ott sued under the Rehabilitation Act (and ADA claims, later conceded as barred by sovereign immunity) on October 10, 2016; district court dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claims as time-barred.
- The Fourth Circuit considered which Maryland limitations period to borrow for Rehabilitation Act claims given amendments to Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) expanding disability employment protections.
- The court held the amended MFEPA is the most analogous statute, so its two-year limitations period applies; Ott’s suit was untimely and equitable tolling did not excuse the delay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which Maryland statute of limitations governs Rehabilitation Act claims? | The general Maryland three-year civil statute applies. | The amended MFEPA, with a two-year limit for employment discrimination, is the most analogous. | MFEPA is most analogous; two-year limitations period applies. |
| Was Ott’s complaint timely under the two-year MFEPA period? | Filing after DOJ right-to-sue was timely because of administrative process. | Ott’s alleged wrongful conduct ended March 6, 2014; filing Oct 10, 2016 is untimely. | Untimely: complaint filed outside two-year period. |
| Should equitable tolling excuse Ott’s late filing? | Ott argued ignorance of the MFEPA’s applicability, reliance on administrative process, PTSD prevented timely filing. | Defendant argued ignorance and attorney delay do not justify tolling; administrative delay not extraordinary. | Equitable tolling denied; Ott failed to show extraordinary circumstances or mental incapacity. |
| Did federal law/policy forbid borrowing the MFEPA period? | N/A — Ott argued for longer general period. | Defendant asserted borrowing MFEPA is consistent with federal law. | Borrowing the two-year MFEPA period is consistent with federal law/policy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2012) (standard for Rule 12(b)(6) review)
- Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013) (plausibility pleading standard quoting Twombly)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Dean v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005) (statute-of-limitations dismissal where time bar is evident on complaint)
- Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for equitable tolling determinations)
- Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 2017) (borrow most analogous state limitations period analysis)
- McCullough v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 35 F.3d 127 (4th Cir. 1994) (borrow state statute unless inconsistent with federal law)
- Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Rds., 1 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1993) (state statute nearly identical to Rehabilitation Act is appropriate analogue)
- Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2000) (equitable tolling reserved for extraordinary circumstances)
- United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2004) (ignorance of law and attorney mistake do not warrant tolling)