ORSON, INC. t/a ROXY SCREENING ROOMS vs. MIRAMAX FILM CORP. Orson, Inc., d/b/a/ Roxy Screening Rooms, Appellant
No. 95-1399
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
April 1, 1996
1996 Decisions Paper 187
1996 Decisions
Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
4-1-1996
Orson Inc v. Miramax Film Corp
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-1399
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Recommended Citation
“Orson Inc v. Miramax Film Corp” (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 187. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/187
Argued January 22, 1996
Before: MANSMANN and LEWIS, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge, Court of International Trade.*
(Filed April 1, 1996)
Paul R. Rosen, Esquire (Argued)
Jeffrey M. Goldstein, Esquire (Argued)
Spector, Gadon & Rosen
1700 Market Street
29th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Thomas E. Zemaitis, Esquire (Argued)
Barbara T. Sicalides, Esquire
James W. McGarry, Esquire
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
18th & Arch Streets
3000 Two Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
This antitrust case arises out of a business arrangement in the motion picture industry. The plaintiff, Orson, Inc., the owner of the Roxy Screening Rooms, a movie theater, alleged that the defendant, Miramax Film Corporation, a film distributor, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,
We hold that Orson failed to present evidence sufficient to show that Miramax engaged in an antitrust conspiracy or that the licenses were unreasonable restraints of trade. We further hold that the district court erred in interpreting
I.0
In January of 1992, Orson assumed the operations of the Roxy, a movie theater located in downtown “Center City” Philadelphia. The Roxy exhibited “art films,” as opposed to movies that may be characterized as “commercial” or “mainstream,” on two screens, each with a 130 person seating capacity. The Roxy charged between $3.50 and $5.50 for tickets.
The Ritz theaters, consisting of two separate five-screen facilities, the Ritz Five Theaters and the Ritz at the Bourse (collectively, the “Ritz“), also exhibited art films in Center City. The Ritz Five Theater, which opened in 1976 with about 1,125 seats, was owned and operated by the Posel Corporation; the Ritz at the Bourse, opened in 1990 with approximately 710 seats, was owned and operated by the Raysid Corporation. Ramon L. Posel was the President of both corporations. The Ritz‘s admission prices typically ranged from $3.50 to $6.00.
In addition to the Roxy and the Ritz, there were six other theaters in Center City; four theaters with a total of 20
Miramax, a nationwide distributor of feature-length motion pictures, including art films, distributed movies to all of the theaters located in Center City and to theaters in the greater metropolitan Philadelphia area.
In the motion picture industry, film distributors license films to theaters for exhibition for a given amount of time. Frequently, the license is exclusive, providing that during its duration, the film will not be licensed to other exhibitors in a prescribed area. Such licenses are called “clearances.”
In the usual case, films are licensed for a sum which consists of a film rental amount and a house allowance. Under this system, the distributor and the exhibitor agree on a separate dollar amount which represents the exhibitor‘s weekly expenses. The exhibitor retains a percentage of the weekly gross from ticket receipts above the house expense allowance; the remaining percentage inures to the distributor. Typically, the license provides that the distributor will receive a minimum percentage of the exhibiting theater‘s box office gross. A film distributor‘s revenues, therefore, depend directly upon a theater‘s capacity to attract the public. Thus, the decision to license a movie to one theater or another is premised in considerable measure on a distributor‘s assessment of a theater‘s grossing ability.
Between January of 1992, when Orson began operating the Roxy, and February of 1994, the close of discovery, Miramax licensed about 28 films on a first-run basis and one film on a subsequent-run basis to the Ritz. By comparison, during this period, Miramax licensed one film on a first-run basis and approximately 14 films on a subsequent-run basis to the Roxy. Miramax also granted eight first-run licenses to the theaters in Center City operated by either United Artists or American Multi-Cinema0 and six first-run licenses to theaters in the suburbs of Philadelphia.
At this same time, a number of other distributors also licensed films to the exhibitors in Center City. From the Roxy‘s opening in January of 1992 until March of 1994, Orson was granted about 73 first-run, exclusive licenses by 59 different distributors. According to Orson‘s President, Max L. Raab, art film distributors included, in addition to Miramax, three
All of the first-run licenses for films that Miramax granted to the Ritz were exclusive; that is, they provided that the films would not be licensed to another Center City theater while playing there. The licenses were established quite informally. Typically, Posel of the Ritz telephoned Martin Zeidman, Miramax‘s Senior Executive Vice President and head of domestic distribution, to discuss the Ritz‘s desire for a first-run license on a particular Miramax film. Having done business with one another for several years, Posel and Zeidman understood that the license would be exclusive and include standard terms. Once the parties agreed upon an opening date, Zeidman completed a “Theatrical Booking Worksheet,” which set forth the title of the film and the opening date, listed the Ritz Five Theaters or the Ritz at the Bourse as the exhibitor, identified Posel as the buyer, marked the rental percentage terms, and designated the shipping territory as “Phila[delphia].” A day or two later, the booking worksheet was telefaxed from Zeidman‘s office in Los Angeles to Miramax‘s office in New York, which was responsible for shipping Miramax film prints to theaters in time for the opening date.
On occasion, Orson‘s film buyer, Jeffrey Fox Jacobs, asked Zeidman for a first-run, non-exclusive license on a Miramax film, indicating that Orson was prepared to offer Miramax a higher percentage of the Roxy‘s box office receipts and a lower
From time to time, Miramax held trade screenings for the movies it distributed in Philadelphia. Miramax would send a notice to exhibitors, inviting them to attend the trade screening of a certain film on a certain date. Most of the notices stated that “[w]e expect to avail this film for first run Philadelphia on or about [date], for an exclusive or non-exclusive run. After the first run theater or theaters have exhibited the film for 42 days we will consider offers for subsequent runs.” The notice requested that a “written offer” be submitted by interested exhibitors by a specified time and day.
With respect to some of the clearances that Miramax granted the Roxy, the booking worksheet that Zeidman completed memorializing the clearance bore a date that was prior in time to the date of the trade screening notice that Miramax sent to exhibitors.0
Fifteen of the films that Miramax licensed to the Ritz played there for a period of more than 42 days. Of these, nine expanded to other Philadelphia area theaters outside of Center City before the 42 days expired; six, however, ran at the Ritz, without expanding to other theaters.
On or about August 2, 1993, Orson commenced this action against Miramax. On August 19, 1993, Orson filed an amended complaint in three counts: Count I alleged that Miramax violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by, inter alia, conspiring with the Ritz to exclude the Roxy from the art film market by making the Ritz its “exclusive Philadelphia exhibitor for first-run art film features” and by granting the Ritz “exclusive first-run rights to those of Miramax‘[s] films which the Ritz want[ed] to exhibit . . . .”0 Count II alleged that Miramax violated Pennsylvania‘s
On October 8, 1993, Orson filed a “Motion for Injunctive Relief to Restore the Status Quo during Pendency of Litigation.” On November 9, 1993, the district court denied Orson‘s motion, Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 836 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1993); on January 12, 1994, the court denied Orson‘s motion for reconsideration.
On March 22, 1994, Orson filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its common law restraint of trade claim and its Pennsylvania Act claim. Miramax filed a motion for summary
On October 5, 1994, the district court denied Orson‘s motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1390 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
As for Miramax‘s motion, the district court granted summary judgment to Miramax on both Orson‘s federal and state antitrust claims.0 Id. Characterizing the Miramax-Ritz agreement “by which Miramax grant[ed] exclusive licenses to the Ritz for the exhibition of its art films” as “clearly a vertical agreement between a distributor and an exhibitor,” the court applied the rule of reason to the “restraint at issue.” Id. at 1385-86. Focusing on the competitive effects of the exclusive
[T]his Court holds that the clearances at issue here are reasonable. First while the clearances stifle intrabrand competition to a small degree--no Miramax art film playing at the Ritz can play contemporaneously at the Roxy, the clearances serve to stimulate competition between art films distributed by Miramax and art films originating with other distributors. As a result, art film-goers in Center City Philadelphia are offered a wider array of selections from which to choose. Further, it is apparent that the Ritz and the Roxy are in substantial competition. By Orson‘s own admission, the Ritz and the Roxy are the only two art houses in Center City Philadelphia. Thus, if the Ritz and the Roxy were to exhibit the same film on the same dates, not only would the overall degree of choice be reduced, but the Ritz would assuredly lose income as a result. At its core, Orson‘s complaint asks the Court to compel Miramax to lease its films to Orson for exhibition at the Roxy. The antitrust laws were not enacted to achieve such ends.
With regard to Miramax‘s summary judgment motion on Orson‘s section 203-7 Pennsylvania Act claim, the district court concluded that Miramax was not liable for the nine films that were expanded to suburban Philadelphia theaters on or before the forty-third day of their runs at the Ritz, reasoning that section 203-7 only required that Miramax expand the films to other theaters in the Philadelphia area, not to other theaters located within Center City. Id. at 1387-88. As to the six films that were licensed exclusively to the Ritz without expanding to other theaters within 42 days, the court denied Miramax summary
Finally, agreeing with Miramax that a party may not be granted summary judgment on claims that are not set forth in its complaint, the court granted Miramax‘s cross-motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1388-90. At the same time, however, the court granted Orson leave to amend its complaint to add claims under sections 203-4 and 203-8 of the Pennsylvania Act. Id. at 1390.
After filing a second amended complaint on October 19, 1994, which added section 203-4 and section 203-8 Pennsylvania Act claims in Counts IV and V respectively, Orson sought certification of the district court‘s October 5, 1994 order pursuant to
Ultimately, based on its rulings on summary judgment and the parties’ stipulation, the district court issued a final
This timely appeal by Orson followed. It involves the district court‘s decision to grant summary judgment to Miramax on Orson‘s antitrust claims and on Orson‘s Pennsylvania Act section 203-7 claim with respect to the nine subsequent-run Miramax films that played in Philadelphia theaters located outside of Center City on or before the forty-second day of their first-run at the Ritz,0 as well as the court‘s denial of Orson‘s request for preliminary injunctive relief. We will first address the federal antitrust issues this appeal raises, and the state statutory law question second.
II.
Summary judgment must be granted where no genuine issue of material fact exists for resolution at trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”
Virtually all business agreements restrain trade to some extent; section 1, therefore, has been construed to make illegal only those contracts that constitute unreasonable
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
In rule of reason cases, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the alleged combination or agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods and services. Id. Due to the difficulty of isolating the market effects of the challenged conduct, however, such proof is often
If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual anticompetitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective. Id. at 669. To rebut, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective. Id.
Agreements between entities at different market levels are termed “vertical restraints.” See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). The Supreme Court has instructed that vertical restraints of trade, which do not present an express or implied agreement to set resale prices, are evaluated under the rule of reason. Business Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
The Supreme Court has also repeatedly confirmed in vertical restraint cases that interbrand competition, as opposed to intrabrand competition, is the primary goal of the antitrust laws. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722-23 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and
IV.
We now address the antitrust issues raised by the business arrangement in this case. We note at this point that Miramax conceded for purposes of summary judgment that the relevant product market was art films and that the relevant
The first issue we consider is the precise nature of the agreement between Miramax and the Ritz. Orson alleges in its second amended complaint that Miramax committed to make the Ritz its “exclusive Philadelphia exhibitor for first-run art film features. . . .” Based on our careful review of the evidence, we disagree. The record is devoid of any proof of a promise on Miramax‘s part that it would grant first-run licenses on its films in Center City to the Ritz only. Moreover, the evidence is to the contrary; the Roxy received a first-run license from Miramax, as did the theaters operated in Center City by United Artists and American Multi-Cinema. The record shows, instead, a series of clearances granted by Miramax to the Ritz, based on an understanding between the parties’ respective principals that any time the Ritz was showing a first-run Miramax film, its license would be exclusive.
Before we consider the antitrust significance of the clearances, however, we will address the alleged conspiracy that we believe lies at the heart of Orson‘s second amended complaint. As we understand it, Orson‘s antitrust theory does not primarily challenge the clearances themselves; but rather, claims that the clearances were mere vehicles that Miramax and the Ritz used to further a secret conspiracy to drive the Roxy out of business by denying that theater first-run Miramax films.
A.
As to our first enumerated element, the Housers asserted that the distributors had acted against their economic interests by consistently choosing to license films to the Fox Theaters rather than the Colonial. They argued that “`[o]n a purely objective basis, the Colonial was a better theater than any of the five Fox theaters‘” in view of its “large seating capacity, elegant and well-maintained condition, and its location
Orson makes similar assertions here. It contends that given its willingness to pay a higher percentage of the Roxy‘s gross for first-run Miramax films than paid by the Ritz, Miramax acted contrary to its economic well-being by choosing to grant clearances to the Ritz; it further maintains that Miramax was coerced into favoring the Ritz because the Ritz had made it clear that unless it was granted an exclusive arrangement it would use its clout and refuse to play Miramax films.
We do not find sufficient evidence in the record for either assertion. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that the clearances were consistent with Miramax‘s business interests, granted by the distributor to, as between the Roxy and the Ritz, the theater it reasonably predicted would generate greater income. The record demonstrated that the Ritz had ten screens at two locations with seating capacities of 1,125 and 710 respectively, while the Roxy had two screens with a seating capacity of 130 each. The Ritz had a solid history of box office receipts; by comparison, the Roxy was not nearly as profitable. The theaters which comprised the Ritz had been in continuous operation since their inception; the Roxy, on the other hand, had ceased operations from time to time over the years. The Ritz marketed the films it exhibited and was known to have outstanding sound and projection equipment. Simply put, “[i]n light of the broad discretion that must be given to film distributors in making complex licensing decisions,” id. at 1233, Orson‘s
Moreover, the deposition testimony that Orson offered to support its assertion that the Ritz had unduly pressured Miramax in its licensing decisions, even when viewed in Orson‘s favor, shows nothing of the kind. The testimony of Raymond Posel and Martin Zeidman demonstrates only that there existed a mutual understanding between the representatives of Miramax and the Ritz that the Ritz first-run licenses on Miramax films would be exclusive. Thus, we also conclude that Orson failed to show that Miramax had a motive to conspire with the Ritz to drive the Roxy out of business.
Lastly, we observe that Orson expended considerable effort describing the “trade screening charade” and the “sham bidding” in which Miramax and the Ritz allegedly engaged, contending that these practices were perpetuated by the parties to conceal their unlawful scheme. We have concluded, however, that Orson failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Miramax and the Ritz conspired to drive the Roxy from the market; we need not, therefore, consider Orson‘s allegations of a cover up on their part. Further, Orson‘s assertions about improper bidding, without more, lack antitrust significance in this case. As we recognized in Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978),
Therefore, we conclude that Orson failed to sustain its burden on summary judgment regarding the essential elements of its antitrust conspiracy claim.
B.
Our inquiry does not end here. The fact remains that clearances existed between Miramax and the Ritz, and that Orson contends that they violated
We begin our analysis of this aspect of Orson‘s case with a general discussion of clearances. We first observe that clearances, which involve entities at different levels of the
Clearances have undergone antitrust scrutiny. Some time ago, in Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court decree which resolved an antitrust action brought by the Department of Justice against several producers, distributors and exhibitors of motion pictures for various
Because the two theaters were in substantial competition, Pacific [the exhibitor] was properly concerned that exhibiting first runs at TMT‘s theater simultaneously with the Galleria would diminish the Galleria‘s income. Pacific wanted to recoup its investment in the Galleria and advertising, rather than allow TMT‘s theater to “free ride” on its advertising.
The distributors had a legitimate business interest in the revenue generated by the theaters they licensed, because the distributors were paid, in part, out of each movie‘s gross profits. The distributors wished to reach the largest number of viewers with the smallest number of movie prints, to recoup quickly their own investment.
Id. at 1399-40 (citations omitted).
Guided by applicable rules of federal antitrust law and the cases we have reviewed, we conclude that the reasonableness of a clearance under
Turning to the touchstone of the rule of reason, the clearances’ competitive effects, the uncontroverted facts of record reveal a market in which competition thrived at both the distributor and exhibitor levels. In Center City, the Roxy, the Ritz, and the theaters owned by United Artists and American Multi-Cinema vied for the films of at least 59 distributors. Indeed, it is the indisputable existence of alternative sources of supply for the Roxy which negates the existence of anticompetitive effects in this case. Although the Miramax-Ritz clearances most certainly reduced intrabrand competition to some degree by disallowing the Roxy from showing on a first-run basis any Miramax film that the Ritz had selected, they undeniably promoted interbrand competition by requiring the Roxy to seek out and exhibit the films of other distributors, which it consistently accomplished. Thus, in our view, the record conclusively establishes that the clearances did not produce the anticompetitive effects the
We thus conclude that Orson failed to present sufficient evidence to support its claim that the Miramax-Ritz clearances were unreasonable restraints of trade.
V.
We turn now to Orson‘s state law claim brought under
On summary judgment, Miramax argued that it complied with
At any rate, we have already rejected a facial challenge to
Pennsylvania abides by well-known rules of statutory construction. When construing a statute, the Pennsylvania courts must ascertain and effectuate the Pennsylvania Legislature‘s intent.
With these principles in mind, we conclude that the district court‘s interpretation of
[to] benefit the movie going public by limiting the long and extensive first runs so that additional theaters, in a given area, may also exhibit the same feature motion picture and at possibly a lower admission price . . . .
We therefore conclude that
Thus, we conclude that Miramax was not entitled to summary judgment on Orson‘s
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on Counts I and II of the second amended complaint in Miramax‘s favor. We will vacate the district court‘s order granting summary judgment to Miramax on Count III as to the nine films that expanded to Philadelphia theaters outside of Center City on or before the forty-second day of their runs at the Ritz and remand for further proceedings on Orson‘s claim that Miramax‘s actions as to these nine films violated
Notes
§ 203-7. Length of run
No license agreement shall be entered into between distributor and exhibitor to grant an exclusive first run or an exclusive multiple first run for more than 42 days without provision to expand the run to second run or subsequent run theaters within the geographical area and license agreements and prints of said feature motion picture shall be made available by the distributor to those subsequent run theaters that would normally be served on subsequent run availability.
§ 203-10. Actions against distributors and exhibitors
Any exhibitor may bring an action against a distributor or exhibitor or both in the respective courts of common pleas wherein the exhibitor‘s business is located to recover damages sustained by reason of a willful and intentional violation of his act and, where appropriate, shall be entitled to injunctive relief. Such exhibitor, if successful, shall also be awarded the costs of the action include, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees.
In addition to the traditional rule of reason and the per se rules, courts sometimes apply what amounts to an abbreviated or “quick look” rule of reason analysis. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993). This abbreviated rule applies where per se condemnation is inappropriate, but where a full-blown industry analysis is not required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect restraint. Id. For example, in cases involving agreements not to compete in terms of price or output among members of professional associations, the Supreme Court did not apply a per se analysis, opting instead for an abbreviated rule of reason test where “`no elaborate industry analysis [was] required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.‘” FTC v. Indiana Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986)(quoting Professional Eng‘rs, 435 U.S. at 692).
Asserting in its brief that “[t]he restraint‘s negative effect on competition is manifest given the abundance of record evidence showing that the Miramax-Ritz boycott of the Roxy ha[d] the effect of decreasing output and increasing prices in the Center City art-film market,” Orson suggests that an abbreviated rule of reason market analysis should be used here. Orson failed, however, to substantiate its assertion with facts. We have stated that arguments made in legal memoranda are not evidence. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986). We, therefore, need not consider Orson‘s suggestion further. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), a television manufacturer entered into franchise agreements which prohibited the sale of its products from other than specified locations. Discussing the application of the rule of reason to vertical restraints, the Supreme Court explained the difference between interbrand and intrabrand competition:Id. at 52 n.19. We do not suggest that allegations concerning the bidding process lack antitrust significance in all contexts. For example, in Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Communications, 909 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1991) and 502 U.S. 1039 (1992), the plaintiff, a movie theater, alleged that two competing motion picture exhibitors and 19 national film exhibitors participated in an illegal “split agreement” in violation ofInterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product -- television sets in this case -- and is the primary concern of antitrust law. The extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors -- wholesale or retail -- of the product of a particular manufacturer.
The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand competition exists, as it does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product.
Id. at n.7. Miramax contends that Orson also failed to show that it suffered antitrust injury. Since Orson did not meet its burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate that competition was suppressed, we need not address this issue.“Some licenses granted clearance to sell to all theatres which the exhibitor party to the contract might thereafter own, lease, control, manage, or operate against all theatres in the immediate vicinity of the exhibitor‘s theatre thereafter erected or opened. The purpose of this type of clearance agreements was to fix the run and clearance status of any theatre thereafter opened not on the basis of its appointments, size, location, and other competitive features normally entering into such determination, but rather upon the sole basis of whether it were operated by the exhibitor party to the agreement.”
We also note that Orson did not allege nor did it present evidence to show that Miramax was a monopolist or that only Miramax films constituted the relevant product market. See Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 723 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is also true that a well-defined submarket may constitute a relevant product market and so under certain circumstances a relevant product market could consist of one brand of a product, placing intrabrand competition at issue.“), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992). We make these points because Orson‘s antitrust theory frequently seemed premised on an analysis of a market which was limited to Miramax‘s product.
Believing that Orson is “apparently contending that [s]ection 203-7 compels distributors to terminate a first run at one theater, such as the Ritz, after 42 days and open another run at a competing theater, such as the Roxy,” Miramax argues that, if interpreted this way, the