OHIO RENAL ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. KIDNEY DIALYSIS PATIENT PROTECTION AMENDMENT COMMITTEE ET AL.
No. 2018-1047
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
August 13, 2018
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3220
CHALLENGE under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio Renal Assn. v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3220.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3220
OHIO RENAL ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. KIDNEY DIALYSIS PATIENT PROTECTION AMENDMENT COMMITTEE ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio Renal Assn. v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Commt., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3220.]
Elections—Initiative-proposal petition—Challenge under
(No. 2018-1047—Submitted August 9, 2018—Decided August 13, 2018.)
CHALLENGE under
{¶ 1} In this original action under
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
{¶ 2} To qualify its proposed amendment for the ballot, the committee must gather valid signatures from at least 10 percent of the number of electors who voted in the last gubernatorial election.
{¶ 3} To facilitate the review of the signatures obtained,
{¶ 4} ORA first contends that we must invalidate the committee‘s petition because, it argues, several circulation managers failed to comply with
(1) Any person who will receive compensation for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures * * * for a statewide initiative petition * * * shall file a statement to that effect with the office of the secretary of state before any signatures are obtained for the petition or before the person is engaged to supervise, manage, or otherwise organize the effort to obtain signatures for the petition, whichever is later.
(2) Any person who will compensate a person for supervising, managing, or otherwise organizing any effort to obtain signatures * * * for a statewide initiative * * * petition shall file a statement to that effect with the office of the secretary of state before any signatures are obtained for the petition or before the person engages a person to supervise, manage, or otherwise organize the effort to obtain signatures for the petition, whichever is later.
{¶ 5} In the alternative, ORA argues that the summary of the part-petitions, which the committee filed pursuant to
II. FACTS AND EVIDENCE
{¶ 6} On July 4, 2018, the committee filed with Secretary Husted an initiative petition that proposes to add its amendment as
{¶ 7} ORA does not allege that any person required to file a disclosure under
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standards for review
{¶ 8} In this petition challenge, ORA has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the committee‘s petition does not meet the requirements of Ohio law. S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.01(B). In deciding the challenge, we are guided by several rules of construction. We must “liberally construe” the people‘s initiative power “to effectuate the rights reserved” in the Ohio Constitution. State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 24. And we “must avoid unduly technical interpretations that impede the public policy favoring free, competitive elections.” State ex rel. Ruehlmann v. Luken, 65 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 598 N.E.2d 1149 (1992). But when an election law is clear, “the settled rule is that [it is] mandatory and require[s] strict compliance.” State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 539, 757 N.E.2d 319 (2001). Substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election provision expressly states that it is. Id.
B. ORA‘s challenge is ripe for review
{¶ 9} As an initial matter, the committee argues that we cannot reach the merits of ORA‘s challenge because it is not yet ripe. According to the committee, ORA‘s challenge depends on the certification of the petition for the ballot, and
{¶ 10} The language of
{¶ 11} This year, the initial deadline for filing an action in this court was August 3 (95 days before the election). Although a later action could be filed on or before September 12 (55 days before the election), under Section 1g, any later action would be limited to challenging “the additional signatures” filed. Id. Thus, under the timeline imposed by Section 1g, to challenge the committee‘s original filing, ORA had no choice but to file its action before Secretary Husted certified the petition for the ballot.
{¶ 12} This case, like Jones and Quinn, involves the possibility of a contingent future event. But the nature of the contingency is different here. In Jones and Quinn, the claims would become necessary only if a future event occurred. Therefore, they were not ripe. See State v. Loving, 180 Ohio App.3d 424, 2009-Ohio-15, 905 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.) (a case is not yet ripe “if it rests on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or may never occur at all”), citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998).
Here, in contrast, the challenge will become unnecessary if a future event occurs—that is, if the committee fails to cure the deficiency. Thus, the committee‘s concern is not actually one of ripeness but one of potential mootness. See State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 125 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-1844, 928 N.E.2d 728, ¶ 10 (a case becomes moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant the requested relief; under such circumstances, there is no longer a “live” issue that demands resolution). Because ORA‘s challenge is ripe and currently not moot, we address it on the merits.
C. R.C. 3501.381 requires invalidation of the petition
1. R.C. 3501.381(A) applies to the managers
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} But the committee suggests that ORA has not shown that the managers even were required to file the disclosures. According to the committee, if the managers did not need to file Form 15s, there can be no violation of
{¶ 15} In arguing that ORA has not presented sufficient evidence in support of its claim under
{¶ 16} We need not address whether the managers were required to file Form 15s under
2. R.C. 3501.381(A) prohibits signature collection before an applicable disclosure form has been filed
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} The committee does not dispute that
{¶ 19} Secretary Husted argues that ORA has not presented sufficient evidence to prove a violation, because no evidence shows that the managers were paid or engaged to supervise, manage, or organize an effort to collect signatures before they filed the Form 15s. Secretary Husted seems to suggest that there can be no violation of
{¶ 20} Secretary Husted also argues that there can be no violation of
{¶ 21} We therefore reject Secretary Husted‘s arguments and conclude that it is a violation of
3. Because R.C. 3501.381(A) was violated, we must invalidate the petition
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. The committee argues that
{¶ 24} We agree with ORA.
{¶ 25} Therefore, because ORA has demonstrated violations of
D. The committee‘s constitutional arguments
{¶ 26} The committee claims that
E. We need not address ORA‘s claim under R.C. 3519.16(B)(2)
{¶ 27} Because we hold that the committee‘s petition is invalid under
Challenge sustained.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, and DEGENARO, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur in judgment only.
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, Maria J. Armstrong, Nelson M. Reid, and James P. Schuck, for relators.
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, Derek S. Clinger, and Ben F.C. Wallace, for respondents Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Committee, Anthony Caldwell, Mary Jo Ivan, and Samara Knight.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Tiffany L. Carwile and Ann Yackshaw, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted.