NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS AND WATER
No. W2017-02551-COA-R3-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
September 13, 2018 Session
FILED 12/13/2018
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P. J., W.S.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County, No. CT-001740-17, Rhynette N. Hurd, Judge
Plaintiff/Appellant Nationwide appeals the trial court‘s grant of Defendant/Appellee‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant‘s motion was based on the argument that Plaintiff‘s claim was time-barred pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and that
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed
Russell C. Rutledge, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
Lang Wiseman and Will Patterson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Memphis Light, Gas and Water.
OPINION
Background
This case was initiated after a fire damaged the home of Freddie and Linda Lavallais on August 5, 2015. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide” or “Appellant“) insured the Lavallais home and is the subrogee under the Lavallais‘s insurance policy. As such, Nationwide now brings this action as the real party in interest.
Nationwide filed its original complaint against Brass-Craft Manufacturing Company
In response to the allegations against MLGW, Nationwide filed an amended complaint on July 24, 2017. Therein, Nationwide added allegations as to MLGW, averring that MLGW was the owner and operator of the electrical distribution system that delivered and supplied power to the Lavallais home at the time of the fire. Nationwide alleged that MLGW was responsible for Nationwide‘s damages in that MLGW “failed to remove, repair and/or otherwise correct [a] dangerous condition existing within their electrical supply . . . [which] ultimately resulted in the losses alleged” by Nationwide. Nationwide also noted that the amended complaint was filed in a timely manner pursuant to
After the amended answer was filed, Nationwide filed a notice of intent to nonsuit Brass-Craft on September 13, 2017. Thereafter, MLGW filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to MLGW under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA“) had lapsed, thus foreclosing Nationwide‘s claim. In its motion, MLGW noted that Nationwide‘s claim was subject to two different statutes of limitation, the first being the three-year statute for property damage as alleged against Brass-Craft,1 the second being the one-year GTLA statute applicable to MLGW. According to MLGW, Nationwide “did not commence [its] action within the statute of limitations applicable to its claims against MLGW; therefore, Nationwide cannot rely on the 90-day grace period” found in
The Circuit Court for Shelby County (“trial court“) granted MLGW‘s motion to dismiss on December 1, 2017. In its final order, the trial court noted that the legal issue facing the court was how to construe the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” found in
[Nationwide‘s] original claim against the original defendant Brass-Craft, or to the one year GTLA statute of limitations applicable to [Nationwide‘s] new claim against MLGW?” In answering this question, the trial court adopted MLGW‘s interpretation of
Based on its analysis of the text of the statute and applicable case law, and the fact that the GTLA must be strictly construed, this Court finds that the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” found in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 refers to the 1-year statute of limitations applicable the new claim [Nationwide] sought to assert against MLGW, and since [Nationwide‘s] original complaint was not within the one (1) year of the date of the damage-causing incident, [Nationwide] cannot rely on Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 to add MLGW as a defendant. Accordingly, any and all claims asserted against MLGW are time-barred and hereby dismissed.
From this order, Nationwide appeals.
Issue Presented
As we perceive it, this appeal involves a single issue: whether Nationwide properly added MLGW as a defendant pursuant to
Standard of Review
Nationwide appeals from the trial court‘s grant of MLGW‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
Moreover, when an issue on appeal requires statutory interpretation, we review the trial court‘s decision de novo with no presumption of correctness. Wade v. Jackson-Madison Cty. Gen. Hosp. Dist., 469 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). We must determine the Legislature‘s intent and purpose by reading the words of the statutes using their plain and ordinary meaning in the context in which the words appear. When the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning. Further, this Court‘s goal in construing a statute is to “give full effect to the General Assembly‘s purpose, stopping just short of exceeding its intended scope.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tenn. 2010); In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009)). This Court seeks to construe statutes in a manner that “avoids conflict and facilitates harmonious operation of the law.” Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).
Discussion
The legal issue presented for review involves the interplay of two Tennessee statutes. First, the one-year statute of limitations enshrined in the GTLA, which mandates that an action under that section must be commenced within twelve months after the cause of action arises.
The second salient statute, the comparative fault statute, provides that:
(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in an answer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action against that person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first answer or first amended answer alleging that person‘s fault, either:
(1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant pursuant to
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person; or(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a summons and complaint. If the plaintiff elects to proceed under this section by filing a separate action, the complaint so filed shall not be considered an original
complaint initiating the suit or an amended complaint for purposes of this subsection (a).
(b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, nor shall this section permit the plaintiff to maintain an action against a person when such an action is barred by an applicable statute of repose.
(c) This section shall neither shorten nor lengthen the applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as provided in subsection (a).
constitutes “the applicable statute of limitations” for determining the timeliness of the original suit and the concomitant ability of the plaintiff to rely on the ninety-day grace period is therefore usually not in doubt. The dispute in this case arises because, even though the claim is the same, the statutes of limitations applicable to the original claim against the private defendant, Brass-Craft, and the claim against the comparative tortfeasor, MLGW, are different. If the timeliness of the initial complaint rests on the statute of limitations applicable to Brass-Craft, there can be no dispute that the ninety-day grace period was triggered. If, however, the timeliness of the initial complaint is determined by reference to the statute of limitations applicable to MLGW, the ninety-day grace period is unavailable and the trial court was correct to dismiss the action.
Thus, the central dispute between the parties is the meaning of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” as used in section 20-1-119(a), and whether the statute allows the joinder of a governmental defendant even where the one-year statute of limitations in the GTLA had lapsed at the time original complaint was filed. Appellant argues that “applicable statute of limitations” as first used in subsection (a) refers to the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff‘s original claim against the original defendant. According to the Appellant, the claim against MLGW survives because the original complaint was filed within the three-year property damage statute of limitations applicable to the claim against Brass-Craft,3 and because the Appellant added MLGW as a defendant within ninety days of Brass-Craft naming MLGW in its answer.
In contrast, MLGW argues that all three occurrences of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” in section 20-1-119(a) refer to the same statute of limitations and that this use of the phrase must mean the statute of limitations applicable to MLGW as that comparative tortfeasor. Because the Appellant filed its complaint more than one-year after the cause of action arose, and therefore outside the statute of limitations applicable to MLGW under the GTLA, MLGW contends that Appellant cannot benefit from the grace period provided in section 20-1-119(a). Appellee
The parties in this appeal insist that the dispute is an issue of first impression for this Court; such is not the case. Indeed, this Court addressed a similar question in Queen‘s Tree Surgery v. Metro. Gov‘t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., No. M2003-00228-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768689 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2003). In Queen‘s
Tree Surgery, an accident that resulted in property damages occurred on June 27, 2000. Id. at *1. Rather convoluted procedure thereafter followed. Within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to property damage, the plaintiff filed suit against several defendants, including the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Nashville“). Id. Nashville filed a motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the GTLA statute of limitations. A few days later, a different defendant filed an answer claiming that the damage was caused by Nashville. Id. Within ninety days of the answer alleging comparative fault, the plaintiff nonsuited its original action against Nashville and was permitted to file an amended complaint again naming Nashville as a defendant pursuant to
Part of Nashville‘s argument on appeal was that “since any suit brought under the GTLA must be brought within twelve months after the cause of action arises,” allowing the plaintiff to name Nashville as a party in this manner would “frustrate the purposes of the GTLA.” Id. at *3. In response, we held that ”
Although not controlling, see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(G)(1),5 the decision in Queen‘s Tree Surgery is highly persuasive, as it addresses the exact situation presented in this case: an original defendant subject to a three-year statute of limitations and a comparative tortfeasor subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Additionally, the Queen‘s Tree Surgery panel expressly rejected Appellee‘s argument that allowing the claim to go forward would impermissibly expand the GTLA. Id. The strict statutory construction argument raised by Appellee in this case, however, does not appear to have been addressed by this Court in Queen‘s Tree Surgery. As such, we will proceed to consider Appellee‘s contentions in that regard.
The bulk of Appellee‘s argument on appeal is premised upon strict statutory construction of the comparative fault statute.
[T]he phrase “applicable statute of limitations” is used three times in the comparative fault statute—all within a single sentence—and yet under Nationwide‘s interpretation, those exact same words would have different meanings . . . .
In context, it is the final occurrence of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” that conclusively forecloses Nationwide‘s argument before this Court. That occurrence creates the grace period and confirms that a plaintiff may assert a claim notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations that would otherwise be applicable to the claim to be asserted against the prospective defendant, not the statute applicable to the original defendant. Indeed, the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” in that instance is quite clearly referring to the statute of limitations that would otherwise bar the claims against the prospective defendant (or, in this case, MLGW). No other reading of that provision would even make sense.
Appellee essentially argues that the “90-day grace period should only be triggered if the initial suit was likewise filed within the same ‘applicable statute of limitations’ as the claims to be asserted against the prospective defendant.” Based on the Appellee‘s assertions, a reiteration of Tennessee‘s rules of statutory construction is helpful here.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that statutes are “not always clear” and that in the face of confusion over a statute, “we must resort to the rules of statutory construction and other external sources to ascertain the General Assembly‘s intent and purpose.” Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527 (internal citations omitted). In the event that a statute creates ambiguity, “the courts should endeavor to give effect to the entire statute” and should “avoid basing their interpretation on a single sentence, phrase, or word.” Id. This Court seeks to construe statutes in a manner that “avoids conflict and facilitates harmonious operation of the law.” Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 527 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). In doing so, we may “employ a number of presumptions with regard to the legislative process.” Id. We may, for example, “presume that the General Assembly used every word deliberately and that each word has a specific meaning and purpose . . . [we] may also presume that the General Assembly did not intend to enact a useless statute, and that the General Assembly did not intend an absurdity.” Id. Finally, in interpreting the language in statutes, “this Court is also bound by the general rules of grammatical construction.” Hawkins v. Case Mgmt., Inc., 165 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Melton v. State, 160 Tenn. 273, 23
S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1930); McCollum v. Huffstutter, No. M2002-00051-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31247077 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002)).
The apparent confusion in the present case stems from the use of the term “applicable statute of limitations” in
Here, Appellee insists that “applicable statute of limitations” must refer to the same statute of limitations at all three points the phrase is used in the statute. Under this interpretation, the “applicable statute of limitations” in this case must refer to the one-year statute provided for in the GTLA. To Appellee‘s credit, it is correct that “[i]n the absence of statutory language indicating that the definition of the phrase differs from one sentence, or subsection, to the next, we decline to assign inconsistent definitions to the same phrase.” Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Tenn. 2012).
This ignores, however, that the legislature has chosen to modify the three uses of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” in different ways. Indeed, the first two uses of the phrase are modified by the article “the,” while the third use of the phrase is modified by the article “any.” Again, in construing statutes, we must consider the grammar employed by the legislature. See Hawkins, 165 S.W.3d at 300. In our view, the addition of the adjective “any” typically denotes the use of a plural, while the use of the article “the” denotes a singular. Compare Bryan A. Garner, Garner‘s Dictionary of Legal Usage 65 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that while “any” may be either singular or plural, the singular is rare and “really is an elliptical for any one“); Webster‘s New College Dictionary 64 (5th ed. 2014) (defining “any” as “one, no matter which, of more than two“), with Webster‘s New College Dictionary at 1501 (defining “the” as, variously, “that (one) being spoken of or already mentioned” or “that (one) which is present” or “referring to that one of a number of persons or things which is identified by a modifier“). Considering only the language of the statute, then, the statute simply does not
foreclose the possibility that the General Assembly intended different definitions to apply to the different uses of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations.” Indeed, the plain language utilized by the legislature suggests that while the first two uses of the phrase “applicable statute of limitations” was meant to be limited to only a single statute of limitations, the third use of the phrase encompasses the consideration of additional statutes of limitations. This language therefore directly contradicts Appellee‘s argument that consideration of only a single statute of limitations, the statute applicable to the comparative tortfeasor, was intended by the legislature.
We are also mindful that we must not determine the meaning of a statute by considering only a few words without considering the statute as a whole. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd. of the Metro. Gov‘t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 950 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1997) (“[I]t is improper to take a word or a few words from its context and, with them isolated, attempt to determine their meaning.“). Here, it important to consider the context of each use
Finally, we must consider the statute as a whole in light of its purpose. See Mann, 380 S.W.3d at 50 (“We have repeatedly held that section 20-1-119 must be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose.“); see also Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 806 (Tenn. 2015) (“Section 20-1-119 should not be construed narrowly
because it is an integral part of a comparative fault system that is built on the concepts of fairness and efficiency.“) (citing Becker v. Ford Motor Co., 431 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. 2014)); Grindstaff v. Bowman, No. E2007-00135-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2219274, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2008) (section 20-1-119 must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with notions of fairness and efficiency). Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that the enactment of
[W]e anticipated that allowing a defendant to shift some or all of the fault to a nonparty would result in a “predicament for some plaintiffs because a defendant could plead the fault of a nonparty after the statute of limitations had run against that nonparty, thus preventing the plaintiff from adding the nonparty to the suit.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tenn. 1998). In such situations, “[a]ny fault attributed to the time-barred nonparty would then not be recoverable by the plaintiff.” Id. In response to this problem, the General Assembly enacted
Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 .
Mann, 380 S.W.3d at 47 (emphasis added).
Bearing in mind the language of the statute, the 1999 amendment, and the statute‘s remedial purpose, it appears the legislature‘s intent would be frustrated in many cases were we to adopt the Appellee‘s interpretation of
courts may presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurdity or a useless statute). Consequently, we cannot with agree with the Appellee‘s proposed construction of
Appellee‘s next contention on appeal is that the Appellant‘s interpretation of the statute is at odds with the holding in Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn. 2015). According to the Appellee, Moreno stands for the proposition that ”
In Moreno, the plaintiff was injured when a tree that was growing on state property fell onto his car as he drove by. 479 S.W.3d at 798. Within one year of the accident, the plaintiff filed a notice of a claim with the division of claims administration. Id. The notice was transferred to the claims commission and eventually the plaintiff received an order from the claims commission directing the plaintiff to file a formal complaint against the state within thirty days. Id. By the time the plaintiff filed this formal complaint, however, over a year had passed since the accident. Id. Thus, when the state alleged fault on the part of the City of Clarksville and the plaintiff attempted to bring suit against the city, the city argued that the original complaint was not timely. Id. at 799. The trial court agreed with the city and dismissed the plaintiff‘s claim; this Court, however, reversed, finding that a notice of complaint was essentially a complaint for purposes of section 20-1-119. Id. at 801.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, noting that section 20-1-119 should be read naturally and reasonably, and concluding that a notice of complaint to the division of claims administration is simply not the same as filing an “original complaint” as required in section 20-1-119. Id. at 808. Although the court
Based on the foregoing, Appellee asserts that section 20-1-119 must be strictly construed: “the Supreme Court made clear that the words in a statute have consequences, and that courts do not have authority to deviate from the plain language simply because it produces what might be considered an unfair result, or otherwise creates consequences that may not have been fully contemplated by the legislature.” In the present case, however, the Appellee is the party conflating the plain language of the statute and mischaracterizing the precedent in a results-oriented fashion.
Indeed, while there is explicit language in Moreno affirming the principle that the statute is not to be construed narrowly, Appellee states several times in its brief that section 20-1-119 must be strictly construed. See Moreno, 479 S.W.3d at 805 (“The purpose of this statute was to provide a plaintiff with a fair opportunity to bring before
the [trial] court all persons who caused or contributed to the [plaintiff‘s] injuries. . . .
Further, the Appellee analogizes Moreno to the case at hand in a misleading manner, arguing that “[Moreno] was predicated on the notion that the only way the City might be added as a party under
Other case law from our supreme court supports our conclusion that the timeliness of the complaint for purposes of triggering the ninety-day grace period to add a comparative tortfeasor is not governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the new party. In Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2012), the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff‘s contention that the term “applicable statute of
limitations” included the ninety-day grace period allowed by
Based on the foregoing, we remain unconvinced by the Appellee that
Although the legislature was under no obligation to act, it voluntarily chose to amend
grace period simply does not “shorten nor lengthen the applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as provided in subsection (a).”
Instead, we conclude that a plain and ordinary reading of
Conclusion
The order of the Circuit Court of Shelby County granting Memphis Light, Gas and Water‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reversed, and this cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to MLGW.
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE