Calvin Gray MILLS, Jr., et al. v. FULMARQUE, INC.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, Western Section, at Jackson
Feb. 24, 2012
360 S.W.3d 362
Nov. 2, 2011 Session.
Irma Merrill Stratton, Memphis, Tennessee, and J. Houston Gordon, Covington, Tennessee, for the appellees, Calvin Gray Mills, Jr. and Linda Mills.
OPINION
CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. GARY R. WADE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the phrase “a defendant named within the applicable statute of limitations” in
Because this case was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, only a statement of the relevant procedural history is necessary to our determination of the issues presented.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 24, 2002, Calvin J. Mills, Jr., fell from the chair in which he was sitting while making a business call at the Allen Stone Box Cоmpany in Halls, Tennessee. On December 20, 2002, Mr. Mills and his wife (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “the Millses“) timely filed a personal injury lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.1 Plaintiffs’ original complaint named two defendants, N & M Investment, L.P.2 and The Royal Group, Inc. d/b/a The Allen Stone Box Company (“The Royal Group“).
On January 2, 2004, The Royal Group filed a second amended answer that alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. (“Aaron Rents“), the company that sold the chair. After obtaining leave of court, the Millses amended their complaint on January 26, 2004, adding Aaron Rents as a defendant. The one-year statute of limitations applicable to their personal injury cause of аction had expired before The Royal Group filed its amended answer naming Aaron Rents. As a result, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint within ninety days of The Royal Group‘s amended answer, relying upon
(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, . . . alleges in an . . . amended answer to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action against that person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the . . . first amended answer alleging that person‘s fault . . . [a]mend the complaint to add the person as a defendant. . . .
(b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. . . .
In its April 4, 2004 answer to the Millses’ amended complaint, Aaron Rents alleged fault against Fulmarque, Inc. (“Fulmarque“), the company that manufactured the chair Aaron Rents sold to The Royal Group. In response, the Millses again obtained leave of court and filed a second amended complaint on April 30, 2004, naming Fulmarque as a defendant. The Royal Group thereafter filed an amended answer also alleging comparative fault against Fulmarque.
The addition of Fulmarque, a Tennessee corporation, destroyed diversity jurisdiction, so the federal litigation was dismissed on December 9, 2004. On November 10, 2005, the Millses refiled their lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, this time naming Aaron Rents and Fulmarque as defendants.3 On January 26, 2006, Fulmarque filed its answer, asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. On February 5, 2007, Fulmarque moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had not been sued within the applicable statute of limitations. The triаl court denied Fulmarque‘s motion for summary judgment by an order entered May 18, 2007; however, on January 15, 2008, the trial court granted Fulmarque permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 9. The Court of Appeals denied Fulmarque‘s Rule 9 application on February 19, 2008, and Fulmarque did not seek an appeal to this Court.
When the trial court proceedings resumed,4 Fulmarque filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on March 18, 2009. On October 16, 2009, the Millses entered an order of voluntary dismissal as to Aaron Rents. The trial court, by an order entered on March 2, 2010, granted Fulmarque‘s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. In so deciding, the trial court pointed out that the Millses did not file suit against Aaron Rents or Fulmarque within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury suits. See
Wе granted Fulmarque‘s application for permission to appeal.
Standard of Review
This case has been appealed from the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment to Fulmarque. Summary judgment is proper only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. As the parties do not disagree concerning any material fact in the case, the issue presented is purely a question of law. We review the trial court‘s decision as to summary judgment de novo with no presumption оf correctness. Hall v. Haynes, 319 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Tenn.2010); Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 226 (Tenn.2010). This appeal also involves an issue of statutory construction, which we also review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tenn.2007).
Analysis
In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn.1992), we abrogated our long-held principles of contributory negligence and adopted a system of modified comparative fault for the resolution of tort claims. Under the McIntyre system, “so long as a plaintiff‘s negligence remains less than the defendant‘s negligence the plaintiff may recover; in such a case, plaintiff‘s damages are to be reduced in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 57. “In adopting this system, we attempted to reconcile a plaintiff‘s interest in being made whole with a defendant‘s interest in paying only those damages for which he or she is responsible.” Jones v. Prof‘l Motorcycle Escort Serv., L.L.C., 193 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tenn.2006). To attain this goal, we recognized:
[F]airness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations in negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought. In cases where such a defense is raised, the trial court shall instruct the jury to assign this nonparty the percentage of the total negligence for which he is responsible. However, in order for a plaintiff to recоver a judgment against such additional person, the
plaintiff must have made a timely amendment to his complaint and caused process to be served on such additional person. Thereafter, the additional party will be required to answer the amended complaint.
McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58. However, we anticipated that allowing a defendant to shift some or all of the fault to a nonparty would result in a “predicament for some plaintiffs because a defendant could plead the fault of a nonparty after the statute of limitations had run against that nonparty, thus preventing the plaintiff from adding the nonparty to the suit.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tenn.1998). In such situations, “[a]ny fault attributed tо the time-barred nonparty would then not be recoverable by the plaintiff.” Id.
In 1993,6 the Legislature addressed this problem by enacting
(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in an answer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action against that person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first answer or first amended answer alleging that person‘s fault, either:
(1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person; or
(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a summons and complaint. If the plaintiff elects to proceed under this section by filing a separate action, the complaint so filed shall not be considered an original complaint initiating the suit or an amended complaint for purposes of this subsection (a).
(b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, nor shall this section permit the plaintiff to maintain an action against a person when such an action is barred by an applicable statute of repose.
(c) This section shall neither shorten nor lengthen the applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as provided in subsection (a) . . . .
(f) As used in this section, “person” means any individual or legal entity . . . .
In this appeal, the parties dispute whether “a defendant named . . . within the applicable statute of limitations” means only a person sued within the original one-year limitation period for personal injury actions, or whether it also applies to persons not sued within the original one-year period, but added as defendants during the ninety-day period provided by
Our resolution of this issue is guided by the familiar rules of statutory construction. See Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn.2010). Our role is to determine legislаtive intent and to effectuate legislative purpose. Id. at 526; In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn.2009). The text of the statute is of primary importance, and the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute‘s general purpose. See Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 526; Hayes v. Gibson Cnty., 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn.2009); Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn.2008). When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts look no farther to ascertain its meaning. See Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527; Green v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 507 (Tenn.2009). When necessary to resolve a statutory ambiguity or conflict, courts may consider matters beyond the statutory text, including public policy, historical facts relevant to the enactment of the statute, the background and purpose of the statute, and the entire statutory scheme. Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527-28. However, these non-codified external sources “cannot provide a basis for departing from clear codified statutory provisions.” Id. at 528.
Fulmarque contends that “applicable statute of limitations” refers exclusively to the statute of limitations for the plaintiff‘s cause of action, which in this case is one year from the date of injury.
In contrast, the Millses argue that, even thоugh Aaron Rents was not sued within the one-year statute of limitations, its addition to the suit pursuant to the ninety-day period provided in
We conclude that the Millses’ arguments are inconsistent with the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase “applicable
Indeed, construing the phrase to include the ninety-dаy period would be clearly inconsistent with its usage in the second clause of subsection (a)-“if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations . . . .”
We further note that, by its own terms, subsection (a) plainly distinguishes the ninety-day period from the phrase “applicable statute of limitations.” See
Additionally, courts have consistently characterized “applicable statute of limitations” to mean the statute of limitations applicable to a plaintiff‘s claim.9 In contrast, courts have chаracterized the ninety-day period, not as a statute of limitations,
Commentators also have described
To use an example, assume that Plaintiff sues Defendant 1 within the statute of limitations, Defendant 1 blames a non-party, and Plaintiff timely adds the non-party (now Defendant 2) as a party defendant after the statute of limitations has expired but utilizing the 90-day grace period of
T.C.A. § 20-1-119 . Later, Defendant 2 blames another nonparty. Plaintiff is prohibited from utilizingT.C.A. § 20-1-119 to add that nonparty to the action. Why? BecauseT.C.A. § 20-1-119 says that the defendant alleging comparative fault against the nonparty must have been sued within the statute of limitations.
Id.
We agree with these courts and commentators that
Because we hold that “applicable statute of limitations” does not include the ninety-day period and that
GARY R. WADE, J., dissenting.
Because I would have affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not interpret
I.
(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations, alleges in an аnswer or amended answer to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action against that person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing of the first answer or first amended answer alleging that person‘s fault, either:
(1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person; or
(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a summons and complaint. If the plaintiff elects to proceed under this section by filing a separate action, the complaint so filed shall not be considered an original complaint initiating the suit or an amended complaint for purposes of this subsection (a).
(Emphasis added).
Thus, if a defendant named “within the applicable statute of limitations” identifies in his answer another tortfeasor against whom a cause of action would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations, a plaintiff can either add the comparative tortfeasor to the current suit or file a separate actiоn against that individual or entity within ninety days of the filing. Subsection (a)(2) provides that if a plaintiff chooses to file a separate action against the newly-identified tortfeasor, “the complaint so filed shall not be considered an original complaint initiating the suit or an amended complaint for purposes of this subsection (a).”
Subsection (c) offers further support for the interpretation made by our Court of Appeals in this case. This subsection provides that
Of course, the ninety-day window is not a statute of limitations in and of itself. Like the Court of Appeals in McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, 106 S.W.3d 36, 46 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), I view
The majority relies on a treatise indicating that “the 90-day grace period . . . does not apply to allegations of fault against nonparties made by a defendant who was not sued within the original statutе of limitations applicable to the claim.” 17 John A. Day et al., Tenn. Practice: Tennessee
II.
At a minimum, the language in subsections (a)(2) and (c) makes the statute ambiguous as to whether it permits only one ninety-day window. When a statute is ambiguous, our courts must examine other sources for assistance in the interpretation. See Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn.1998). The “objective and spirit behind the legislation” is often a controlling guide. Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tenn.2000).
In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn.1992), the landmark decision on comparative fault, this Court observed that “fairness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations in negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought.” This doctrine, however, resulted in a “predicament for some plaintiffs because a defendant could plead the fault of a nonparty after the statute of limitations had run against that nonparty, thus preventing the plaintiff from adding the nonparty to the suit.” Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tenn.1998).
[i]t is neither fair nor efficient in a comparative fault scheme to permit a defendant to identify a financially or legally responsible nonparty after the statute of limitations has run against that nonparty, yet deny the plaintiff an opportunity to join them as a defendant . . . . To require as a matter of law that such non-parties be left out of the suit after being identified by a defendant is not consistent with notions of fairness and efficiency, as the plaintiff will be forced to bear the loss for any liability that it fails or is unable to assert and any judgment that cannot be enforced.
Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 312 (footnote omitted).
The legislative history also sheds light on this issue. Speaking in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Keith Jordan explained that the statute permits plaintiffs to “amend the pleading to add as an additional defendant the individual identified by the original defendant or a defendant sued appropriately.” Hearing on S.B. 32 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 98th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn.1993) (statement of Sen. Jordan, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.) (emphasis added). In my assessment, а party added as a defendant by application of the ninety-day window qualifies as a “defendant sued appropriately.” Hence, based on the comments of Senator Jordan, when this appropriately-sued defendant identifies even another potential tortfeasor,
Conclusion
The language of subsections (a)(2) and (c), the respective goals of the statute and the comparative fault scheme, and the legislative history, lead me to conclude that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted
James Eric CRAIN v. CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC.
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, at Knoxville.
March 9, 2011 Session.
May 11, 2011.
Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court Sept. 21, 2011.