*1 M. Martha In re ESTATE OF
TANNER, deceased. Tennessee,
Supreme Court of
at Nashville. 5, 2009 Session.
Feb. 7, 2009.
Oct. *2 Jr., Cooper, Attorney E. General
Robert Williams, Dep- and L. Vincent Reporter & General, uty Attorney appellant, for the Bureau of TennCare. The Tennessee from The Tennes- ceived medical benefits Rogers Helen Lawrence Sfikas (“Bureau”) Tennessee, Kamm, Nashville, in the see Bureau of TennCare James $248,508.77. Tanner’s son Thomas Tanner. amount of Ms. appellee, *3 Tanner, law, and heir at Thomas had acted OPINION during of her estate her as the conservator conservatorship the years later and closed WADE, J., R. delivered the GARY after on June some five months court, in M. opinion of the which JANICE death. Ms. Tanner had an estate com- her C.J., CLARK, HOLDER, A. CORNELIA $2,000 prop- residential prised of cash and LEE, JJ., joined. and SHARON G. residence, erty County. in Davidson The KOCH, JR., J., C. filed WILLIAM $123,000 proper- which was assessed at for concurring opinion. ty purposes, tax had an estimated value of Tanner, decedent, Martha M. died The $167,000. Tanner did not Although Mr. nursing of a intestate while resident af- initiate an administration of the estate later, Bu- facility. Nineteen months a re- ter his mother’s he did file in complaint filed a reau of TennCare quest recovery for release with the estate County Chancery seeking Court Davidson receiving unit of the Bureau. After of an administrator of her appointment Mr. Tan- request, responded the Bureau to estate. The case was transferred 18, 2004, ner letter dated November court, son, probate and the decedent’s provided pertinent part which as fol- Tanner, appointed Thomas adminis- lows: trator. The Bureau of TennCare then seeking recovery filed a claim of “medical Human Department Services correctly on paid” assistance behalf has informed The Bureau of TennCare An- pursuant decedent to Tennessee Code your respon- name was listed as the (1995 Supp. notated section 71-5-116 & for Martha party sible Tanner. Pursu- 2002) United States Code section ant to State law TCA 71-5-116 and fed- (2003 Supp.2009). probate 1396p & 1396p, eral law USCA Section and, untimely, court dismissed the claim as Tennessee have a claim State of for upon appeal, Appeals direct the Court of nursing payments against home es- for granted application per- affirmed. We tate Martha Tanner. appeal in order to consider mission please copy Enclosed find a of Fre- procedurally whether the claim is barred. Questions quently Asked About Estate places Because section 71-5-116 an obli- Recoveryl,] the release form and instruc- gation representative on the of an estate to completing tions for the release form. obtain a waiver or release from the Bu- complete Please and return this form reau, subject the claim is not to a 8, 2004 to the address December judgment statute of limitations. The above.... is, therefore, re- Court versed, and the cause is remanded to the added.) Tanner (Emphasis When Mr. nei- probate court. responded completed ther to the letter nor request- and returned the release form as
Facts ed, the Bureau filed claim the conser- 14, 2004, later, January Days vatorship On Martha M. Tanner action. on Decem- 20, 2004, ninety-six. rejected clerk age died intestate ber life, During years proceeding the last eleven of her claim because the had been Tanner, resident, nursing Ms. home re- closed. place August further took until notice of Ms.
Nothing Tanner’s death within twelve 17, 2005, passing, statutory nineteen months after Ms. months of her had no some exemption from the period and nine months after the limitations Tanner’s death set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sec- when the Bureau correspondence, initial 30-2-307(a)(l) 30-2-310(b). tions County complaint filed a the Davidson application permission its appeal Chancery seeking appointment Court ruling, the Bureau presented argu- several of an administrator of her estate. See ments that the claim was not barred: first- (2007 §§ Ann. TenmCode 30-1-301 -311 ly, that the began only limitations Supp.2008). & The Bureau claimed that (a) personal when there was a representa- as a creditor of the it was entitled *4 (b) capable being tive sued and there appointment to the of an administrator. was a present right creditor with the initially Edwards was appointed Monica sue; secondly, that the Bureau was not administrator, 2005, but in December subject one-year to the statute of limita- a probate after the case was transferred to tions because it not is a “creditor” as de- court, probate the court determined that statute; by thirdly, fined that the statuto- chancery subject the court had not had ry superseded by limitation thus, jurisdiction; ap- matter the order 71-5-116; and, terms of section fourthly, as set pointing Edwards administrator was proceedings that the below constituted an aside. “insolvency” proceeding that excepted is 19, 2006, January appoint- On before requirements by from timeliness Tennes- by probate ment of administrator see Code Annotated section 30-2-501. Be- court, Mr. Tanner filed a motion to dis- conflicting opinions cause of by the Court miss, arguing that the Bureau’s claim was Appeals as to the applicability of the by time-barred Tennessee Annotated Code one-year statute of limitations to Bureau 2—310(b)(2007). 6, On March 30— claims, granted we the Rule 11 application 2006, probate court entered an order presented. to consider the issues appointing Mr. Tanner as administrator denying but the motion to dismiss. Short- Statutory of Review and Standard thereafter, order, ly separate pro- in a Interpretation granted bate court the Bureau’s motion to presented by ap The issues 25, 2006, complaint. July amend its On peal interpretation involve the of state Tanner, administrator, Mr. filed another Statutory ques statutes. construction is a motion to dismiss on the basis that tion of law that is renewable on a de novo untimely, having claim the Bureau was any presumption basis without of correct than been filed more twelve months after ness. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit later, days his mother’s death. Three 799, (Tenn.2000); Corp., 15 S.W.3d 802 Bureau filed a formal claim Ms. Co., 920, Myint v. Allstate Ins. 970 S.W.2d court, estate. The how- Tanner’s (Tenn.1998). dealing 924 When with statu ever, dismiss, granted motion to hold- tory interpretation, precepts well-defined ing only that the Bureau had one objective carry apply. primary Our is to from the of death within which to file date broadening intent legislative out without its claim. The court that a claim observed restricting beyond the statute its in or only exception for taxes was the Houghton v. Aramark scope. tended of limitations. statute (Tenn. Res., Inc., 678 Educ. S.W.3d 2002). appeal, construing legislative On direct the Court of In enact Bureau, ments, in a presume every actual word held that which had we program, the meaning purpose inception has and the of the federal statute full if the obvious given expanded should be effect Medicaid services of states Assembly intention of the General is fering their own tax dollars as a more of C.K.G., In doing. violated so re increasing means of the federal contribu (Tenn.2005). 714, 722 When a S.W.3d tion. F. Blumstein & Frank A. See James clear, apply plain is we mean Sloane, Through Health Care Reform ing complicating without the task. East Managed Medicaid Care: Tennessee Johnson, man Chem. Co. S.W.3d (TennCare) Study a Para as a Case (Tenn.2004). obligation Our 125, 140 digm, 53 Vand. L.Rev. language. simply to enforce written to bolster the effectiveness of Medic order Indus., Inc., Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie costs, programs constraining aid while (Tenn.2006). It is adopted procedures states various for con ambiguous when a statute is we trolling recouping costs associated with scheme, statutory reference the broader program. Engel, See Jonathan Poor history legislation, or other People’s Medicaid and Ameri Medicine: League Parks v. Tenn. Mun. sources. Charity can Care Since at 62 *5 Pool, 677, Mgmt. Risk 974 S.W.2d 679 (observing predicted, early that “[a]s (Tenn.1998). Further, language of a programs began to run [Medicaid] state vacuum, statute cannot be considered in a years budget over within two of their construed, if practicable, but “should be so describing early start” and efforts in Cali component parts its are consistent fornia and New York to deal with cost Henderson, and reasonable.” Marsh v. overruns). As one such cost-control mech (1968). 42, 193, 221 Tenn. 424 S.W.2d 196 anism, the Tennessee Medical Assistance Any interpretation of the statute that “adjustment Act of 1968 authorized or re “would render one section of the act re covery” from the estates of deceased Med pugnant to another” should be avoided. recipients sixty-five icaid who had been Tenn. City Elec. Power Co. v. Chatta of years they at older the time received 505, 441, nooga, 172 Tenn. 114 444 S.W.2d “correctly paid” benefits. Tenn. 1968 Pub. presume We also must 496, 502-03; Virginia Acts see v. West Assembly any prior General was aware of Servs., Dep’t Health & Human 289 F.3d of legislation enactments at the time the (4th Cir.2002) (“Before 281, 1993, 284 State, 923, passed. v. Owens permitted Medicaid Act did not [but re (Tenn.1995). 926 states, circumstances, quire] under certain paid recover medical costs Medicaid History estate.”). beneficiary’s pro from the 1965, government federal estab- vision, however, affirmatively did not re program lished the Medicaid as a of means quire the State of Tennessee to seek recov providing coverage health for low-income ery. through Americans the use of both federal provided by As the services the federal appropriations.
and state 42 See U.S.C. time, government grew and the cost of medical At that govern- 1396. the federal increased, responsibili- services this state’s every ment contributed two dollars for dol- escalated, also than expended by lar ties from less billion the State of Tennessee. $1 Pope State ex v. dollars 1987 to over billion Healthplan rel. Xantus $2.8 Tenn., Inc., Sloane, & at No. M2000-00120-COA-R10- Blumstein 53 Vand. L.Rev. * CV, part Budget at 1 150. As a (Tenn.Ct.App. WL the Omnibus 2000). May During after Act Reconciliation United legislation requir- only enacted and then after the death of Congress States to recover costs from if ing surviving spouse, the states such individual’s of certain Medicaid beneficiaries. any, estates at a time when such indi- (codified 103-66, Pub.L. No. 107 Stat. 312 surviving vidual has no child who is un- 1396p(b)(l)(B) (18) as amended U.S.C. eighteen years of age der or who is (2003 Virginia see v. Supp.2009)); & West permanently totally blind or dis- (4th 475 F.3d Cir. Thompson, abled. 2007); Virginia Dep’t Health & West (1) To facilitate and compliance enhance Servs.,
Human 289 F.3d 284-85. (c), with this subsection the department affirmatively obligates states program promptly notify of health shall the bu- correctly “medical assistance to recover TennCare, reau of in a format to be help offset the cost of medical paid” to bureau, specified by the of the death of 1396a(a)(18). care. U.S.C. United (55) any fifty-five years age individual 1396p(b) Code section describes States or older. Such notification shall include the situations in which a state must detail name, birth, the decedent’s date of recovery. seek security legisla- social number. It is the 1, 1994, January On TennCare estab- (c) tive intent this subsection that the managed designed lished a care model vigorously bureau TennCare strive of control over the costs gain measure recoup expended TennCare funds Medicaid, moving more associated a decedent the date death. after 800,000 recipients than Medicaid into a any probate estate Later, part as a program. state Before *6 30, pursuant respect closed to title with 2002, Act of our TennCare Reform General who, death, to a decedent at the time of reaffirming Assembly legislation enacted program, was enrolled the TennCare authority the State’s to recover “medical personal representative the estate correctly from un- paid” assistance estates of shall with the clerk the court plan expanding der the state on the file of exercising jurisdiction a for recov- release existing procedural framework evidencing the bureau TennCare ery correctly paid of medical assistance. from of (codi- 2422, payment all medical assistance bene 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 2425-26 of fits, premiums, or other such costs due fied Ann. 71- as amended Tenn.Code 5-116(c) (1995 law, the estate under unless Supp.2002)); & see also waived the bureau.1 1396p(b). U.S.C. At the time of Ms. death, provided Tanner’s the statute as 71-5-116(c) (emphasis Ann. TenmCode
follows:
added).
death,
After her
the estate of Ms.
(c)
adjustment
There shall be no
or re-
qualified
Tanner
as one from which recov-
covery
any payment
of
for medical assis-
ery
sought
could be
under this statute.
correctly
any
on
paid
tance
behalf
2006,
Assembly
enacted a
part, except
individual under this
General
fifty-five
significant
who
amendment to Tennessee Code
case of
individual
(55)
71-5-116(d)(l)(D), add-
years
age
or older when such Annotated section
explicitly
ing
such medical assis-
two new subsections to
ad-
individual received
services,
relationship
from such
dress the
between that sec-
tance or
individual’s
Code
the death of Ms. Tanner.
Tennessee
Annotated section
1, 2007,
116(c)
January
was amended on
after
71-5-116(d)(l)(D)
claim- Teim.Code
Ann.
and the title 30
requirements
tion’s
(Supp.2008).
filing process.2 Although that amendment
1, 2007, and,
January
on
became effective
Analysis
therefore,
proceed-
to the
applicable
below,
provides helpful
content
ings
Although
variety
its
Bureau submits a
review,
case. The
purposes
context for the
of this
the essential
issue
questions
for
requires
personal
first
amendment
is whether the claim the Bureau
timely
a decedent who received
filed. Re-
representative of
the Tanner estate was
Bureau.
provide
cently, panels
notice to the
of our Court of
TennCare
Then,
provided
to creditors is
a notice
reached different results on claims
“[i]f
bureau,
correctly
file a claim
for
the bureau shall
Bureau
“medical assistance
recovery
paid,”
though
in accordance with the re-
even
the circumstances
practically
each instance were
identical.3
chapter
part
of title
3.”
quirements
subsections,
recovery
contain both
a claim for
in accordance
2. The new
which
requirements
chapter
title
provisions
provisions that
new
had exist-
read,
71-5-116(c),
part 3.
ed in section
in full:
(2)
legislative
It is the
intent of subdivision
(d)(1)
compliance
and enhance
To facilitate
that,
death,
(d)(1)
date
the bu-
after the
(c),
following
notices
with subsection
vigorously
reau of TennCare
to re-
strive
provided:
shall be
coup any
expended
TennCare funds
for a
(A)
(30)
thirty
days
receipt of
Within
during
decedent
the decedent’s lifetime.
person's
depart-
notice of
(e)
publish a
The bureau of TennCare shall
notify
ment of health shall
the bureau of
pursuant
of notice to be
to subdi-
form
used
TennCare,
specified by
in a format to be
(d)(1)(A)
(B),
visions
with instructions
bureau,
any
of the death of
individual
plain
lan-
for use of
form written in
(55)
fifty-five
years
age
or older. Each
guage. The
and instructions shall be
form
notification shall include the decedent’s
any
available at the office of
clerk of court
name,
security
date of birth and social
exercising probate jurisdiction,
well as
number;
available on the bureau’s web site. Notice
(B)
sixty
days of.the date of
Within
provided
shall be
via certified mail or in
issuance
either letters of administra-
designated by
other
the bu-
manner
testamentary,
personal
tion or letters
reau.
*7
representatives
provide
of decedents shall
any
age
notice of the death of
individual
cases,
Henkel,
In two
No.
In re Estate of
(55)
fifty-five
years
age
of
or older to the
M2006-02641-COA-R3-CV,
2007 WL
TennCare,
bureau of
in a format to be
Nov.16, 2007),
(Tenn.Ct.App.
4117791
and In
bureau,
specified by the
shall state wheth-
Anderson,
re Estate
No. M2006-02303-
recipient
er the decedent
awas TennCare
COA-R3-CV,
(Tenn.Ct.
Bowden, than one from the n. 3. Pursuant sued more S.W.3d date of death.” decedent’s section 30- Tennessee Code Annotated however, 2-306(e), notice re public the pertinent to our The second if the letters quirement apply “shall not Annotated sec analysis is Tennessee Code (2007),5 which establishes are is tion 30-2-307 testamentary or of administration sonally pro the on a rata basis if court text of the statute is as follows: liable 5. The full proper and the creditor finds the claim is (a)(1) arising against the All claims estate appropriate the notice. did not receive decedent shall be barred from a debt of the (b) by any claim evidenced a writ- When is prescribed within the in unless filed instrument, photo- the instrument or a ten published posted in accor- the notice or filed; copy of the instrument shall be when 30-2-306(b). dance with However: decree, copy by judgment the due or (A) a creditor receives actual notice If by judgment decree certified the clerk of (60) or expira- sixty days before the less than filed; where rendered shall be court period prescribed in tion of the account, 306(b) by open an and when due itemized expiration peri- or after the of the filed; 30-2-306(b) prescribed statement of the account shall be and more od (60) every days claim shall be verified affidavit of sixty before the date that is than (12) the decedent's the creditor before an officer authorized to twelve months from death, oaths, which affidavit shall state date of the creditor's claim shall administer correct, (60) just sixty barred unless filed within that the claim is valid be decedent, receipt obligation days the date of actual of the estate of the from notice; any person neither the claimant nor other or (B) pay- a creditor receives actual notice on the claimant’s behalf has received If claim, (60) sixty days part, than before the date ment of the whole or less thereon, (12) except and that that is twelve months from the dece- such as is credited received, notice, security date of death receives no no for the claim has been dent's or except the creditor's claim shall be barred unless as thereon stated. (12) (c) No claim shall be filed the clerk nor filed within twelve months from trip- decedent’s date of death. deemed to be filed unless submitted in licate, (2) expiration period pre- copies need After the but the second and third 30-2-306(b), §in but before the not be verified. scribed (12) (d) clerk file date that is twelve months from the The shall all received death, (12) decedent's date of the court not later than twelve months from the However, permit personal representative death. to dis- decedent's date of tribute the balance of the estate in accor- of claims shall not create an clerk 30-2-701, are dance with make final settle- inference as to whether the claims valid discharging timely ment and an or were filed. The clerk shall return enter order personal representative. any appoint- If creditor files claim submitted before permit- personal representative its claim after the estate is closed as ment of a or re- (12) preceding ted in the sentence and before ceived more than twelve months from the date that is twelve months date death. decedent’s (e)(1) personal rep- timely decedent's date of A creditor who has filed a personally any resentative shall not liable to claim estate shall file thirty the creditor whose recourse will be amendment to its claim no later than (30) days the distributees of the each of whom from the later of: (A) liability propor- exception shall share on the claim in The date filed; tion to the claimant’s share of the residue. (B) proof expiration exception peri- on burden issue as to whether a creditor was known to or reason- od. *9 (2) ably by personal represen- jurisdiction ascertainable the Unless the court with over tative, grants probate or as to whether actual notice the of the decedent's estate properly § sent in accordance with an extension of time for amendment on the upon claiming showing extraordinary shall be the of circum- creditor creditor’s cases, stances, any entitlement actual amendment filed the time notice. In such after per- prescribed the distributees of the estate shall be shall be void. filing time on the of claims. If plicitly by limitations addresses claims made the State sixty against a creditor receives actual notice or of Tennessee an estate: days more the close of the four- before (a) All and claims demands not filed notice, the period month listed the cred probate clerk, with the court required as peri itor must file within that four-month §§ by 30-2-309, or, later, if 30-2-306— 30-2-307(a)(l); od. Ann. see Tenn.Code in which suit has not brought been or Boivden, (discussing ap S.W.3d (12) revived the before end of twelve of plication period of the six-month limita months from the date of of death the appeared tions which in earlier version of decedent, shall be forever barred. statute). 2—307(a)(1) Section ex 30— (b) (a), Notwithstanding subsection all period tends the for creditors who do not claims by and demands not filed notice, period timely caps receive but clerk, state with the court year: at one required 30-2-309, or, §§ 30-2-306— later, if (A) in which suit has been If a creditor receives actual notice (60) brought or revived before the end of sixty days less than the expi- before (12) twelve months from the date of period ration prescribed 30- decedent, 2-306(b) death of the shall forever of be expiration or after 30-2-306(b) barred. This statute period §in limitations prescribed of (60) shall not apply claims state taxes. sixty more than before days (12) Claims for state taxes shall continue to date from that is twelve months governed be 67-1-1501. decedent’s date of the creditor’s claim shall barred filed within be unless Tenn.Code Ann. (emphasis 30-2-310 (60) sixty from days receipt the date added). notice; actual Tolling Absent Estate (B) If a creditor receives actual notice Administration (60) sixty days less than before date matter, preliminary As a the Bu (12) that is twelve months the de- argues reau that the time limitations im cedent’s of death date or receives no 30-2-310, posed by gov the statute notice, the creditor’s shall claim state, erning claims are tolled as to barred unless filed within twelve during claims estates months from the decedent’s date of delay death between the of the decedent death. appointment of an administrator. 30-2-307(a)(l)(B) Section “for an provides specifically This Court has not addressed one-year absolute limit on the issue, this and there has been some dis limita- among the of our agreement sections period applies tions the creditor whether Appeals. Compare Court Estate Di proper has received notice or no notice at Co., vinny Bonding No. M Wheeler Thus, all. [i]s re- [the creditor’s] 1999-00678-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL quired year to be filed within a of [the 2000) Mar.31, (Tenn.Ct.App. at *3 In re decedent’s] death.” Estate Jen- (holding subject to that claim was not one- kins v. n. Guyton, S.W.2d probated year bar where estate was not (Tenn.1995). elapsed until after from date of had (Tenn. death), statutory provision, perm. A third Dec. app. Tennessee denied 2000), Luck, (2007), Code Annotated section 30-2-310 with In re Estate No. W2004-01554-COA-R3-CV, reiterates the limitation and ex- 2005 WL *10 2005) (12) months from the decedent’s (Tenn.Ct.App. at *7 June twelve (“While death,” any claim date of but “shall return recognize the court’s we than months ... received more twelve duty precedents the set forth follow the Each decedent’s date of death.” Court, our decision in Estate Divin- of provisions supports proposi- of these the ny progeny and its have misconstrued the one-year period that limitations tion the applicable of limitations to a credi- death, begins regardless on the date of of excep- tor’s claim an estate. ap- 30-2-307(a)(l)(B) whether an administrator has been tion in section of found the Court of ob- pointed.6 As the and unam- expressly Tennessee Code Luck, in only logical that is the served that biguously states a ‘creditor’s interpretation light of 30-2- section unless filed within twelve shall barred 306(e) (then 30-2-606(f)), es- section which (12) months from the decedent’s date of ” requirements that the notice of tablishes omitted)). (citation view, In death.’ our 30-2-306(a) do “if the apply section not Luck, the decision wherein the Court of testamentary or letters of administration applies the Appeals held that limitation (1) year than one from the are issued more a regardless representative of whether view, of death.” In our decedent’s date interpreta- the most natural appointed, is there no reason the would be to eliminate statutory of tion scheme. See also requirement after if claims year notice one Robinson, al., W. Sr. Jack et Pritchard not of period were also barred after that on Wills and Administration Estates of Luck, time. See 2005 WL at *8. (6th 2007) (“The maximum ed. time Finally, legislative we have reviewed the event for a claim is twelve history 30-2-310(b), particularly section death.”). months from the decedent’s Assembly in the proceedings General First, language section 30-2- plain enactment, original associated with its 310(b) provides period that limitations have that we concluded the limited context begins the date “from of death that supports available our conclusion decedent,” with no mention of the date on one-year begins bar of death the date a representative appointed. which Simi- upon appoint- and is not conditioned 30-2-307(a)(l)(B) larly, imposes section of an ment administrator.7 one-year period beginning limitations on death,” “the decedent’s date even if a summary, plain of sec- language Further, 30-2-310(b) creditor no “receives notice.” tion that the one- establishes amendment, due to a recent year period begins limitation the date of on 307(d) provides regardless representa- now clerk shall “[t]he whether Moreover, all file not later has appointed.8 claims received than tive been prior suggest period 6. Some versions of the statute limita- that the limitations began tions for claims estates on the date does run from the of death. creditors, date of notice without addi- tional bar calculated from the date of death. however, argued, 8.The Bureau has (1955); E.g., Tenn.Code Ann. 30-513 Tenn. “or, phrase inclusion in sec- if later” Supp. Code 8196.4 If the General (b) 30-2-310(a) requires tions somehow Assembly explicitly wished to define the one- interpretation. disagree. Al- different We limitations in reference though ambiguous language is somewhat date of date representative’s notice or the of a modifies, "or, as to what if later” both the appointment, easily it could do so simi- statutory legisla- scheme as whole and the explicit language. lar history tive lend credence to the notion that such, peri- the date death initiates the limitation understandably 7. As cases that relied on Divinny they Estate are overruled insofar od.
621 history supports an identical in- legislative Tanner’s the statute included “Max- terpretation. es and imposed by assessments the federal government state or subdivision
2. The Bureau as Creditor
thereof’
listing
its
of “claims or de-
As an alternative to the claim of mands.”
TenmCode Ann.
administration,
tolling absent estate
317(a)(3) (2001).
then,
Since
the statute
argues
Bureau
that the limitations of 30- has been amended to more
in-
explicitly
apply
2-310 do not
because the Bureau is
by
clude “claims
the Bureau of TennCare
disagree.
plain
“creditor.” We
pursuant to
71-5-116.” TenmCode Ann.
of
language
sections 30-2-306 to 30-2-310
30-2-317(a)(3) (2007).
Similarly, section
demands,
applies to all claims or
unless
30-2-307(b) contemplates claims arising
excepted,
right
and the Bureau’s
to recov
contracts,
from means other than
including
meaning
er fits the
of “claim or demand”
those
judgment
“due
or decree.”
statutory
the context of the
scheme.9
30-2-307(b) (2001).
TenmCode Ann.
Although some of the
addressing
cases
alternative,
The Bureau
argues,
earlier statutes
language
sup-
include
that sections 30-2-306 to
apply
30-2-310
see,
ports the Bureau’s interpretation,
e.g.,
only to debts or demands that would have
In re
Thompson,
Estate
314 S.W.2d at
of
against
been enforceable
the decedent dur-
8,
plain language
of
irrefutably
title 30
life,
claims,
ing her
rather than
such as the
establishes that a “claim” is not restricted
Bureau’s, that arose at the time of her
obligations arising
out of contracts.
Nothing
statutes,
death.
in the text of the
30-2-310(b)
example,
For
creates a
however, supports
interpretation.
such an
specific exception for “claims for
tax-
state
Although the Bureau
Gillespie,
cites
68
course,
es.” Of
there would be no need for
481,
support
S.W.2d at
argument,
for its
exception
such an
if “claim”
only
extended
that case
statutory pro-
was decided under
to a contractual cause of action. Section
visions,
30-2-316,
superseded,
since
which
priority
which sets forth the
of
distin-
guished
between
contemplates
also
action ac-
“cause[s]
“claims or demands” other than those
crued in the
aris-
lifetime of the deceased” and
ing out of contracts. At the time of Ms.
those that did not accrue until later.10 Id.
9. The Bureau relies on several cases for the
Estate Darwin was decided before section
proposition
30-2-310(b)
that the limitations of section
general
30-
extended the
limitations
"creditors,”
apply only
2-306 to 30-2-310
periods
for estate claims to claims filed
state,
parties seeking payment
which it defines as
only
and thus considered
whether the
obligations arising out of contracts. See Es-
statute of limitations for tax claims in Tennes
Snow,
(Tenn.
tate
v.
Russell
scheme distinction, not make such Gil- and does apply. not We thus conclude lespie does (B) In case of an individual who was that, plain language to the of pursuant years age 55 or older when the indi- of Code Annotated sections 30-2- Tennessee assistance, medical vidual received such 30-2-310, right of 307 to Bureau’s adjustment or re- State shall seek
recovery constituted a claim or demand covery from the individual’s but the statute of limitations. subject to only consisting for medical assistance of— “Belt 3. Section 71-5-116 (i) services, nursing facility home and Suspenders” and services, community-based and relat- The Bureau that even if contends hospital prescription drug ed ser- limitation would other vices, or Anno applicable, wise be Tennessee Code (ii) State, any option at the 71-5-116, as it existed at the tated section plan. under the items or services State of Ms. Tanner’s an time established (b)(1) added). (emphasis 42 1396p recovery correctly U.S.C. exception paid for the course, legislation, The general to the 1993 federal TennCare claims to claims. does that the Bureau pertaining require guaran- limitations estate not cases, agree. recovery” tee or “adjustment We all nor that the require exempt does it state places an obligation Federal law on requirements procedural Bureau from recovery pursue Bureau to of certain cor- that in the might result forfeiture of the rectly paid medical assistance: simply claim. 1396p(b)(l) imposes Section (1) adjustment recovery any or No to an on the Bureau ad- obligation “seek correctly paid medical assistance on be- justment recovery.”11 or half of an individual under the State however, made, Bureau, argues The that Ten- plan may except that the State adjustment any nessee Annotated section 71-5- recovery shall seek Code 116(c)(2), correctly places duty assistance on be- which on a paid medical dece- Federalisms, Rehnquist procedural Two Tex. stalute limitations was a Court’s 83 1, change. (2004) ("Even Rehnquist L.Rev. as the sought Court has to revive other doctrinal "legislation that It has been said enacted Congress, leading Spending limits its on spending power pursuant [federal] is Dole, precedent, Clause Dakota v. [483 South in the of a in return much nature contract: U.S. 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 171 funds, comply agree the States for federal to (1987),] permissive as a landmark of stands federally imposed conditions.” Penn deference.”). not, ness and This case does Halderman, Hosp. & hurst State Sch. however, present opportunity with the to us 1, 17, U.S. 101 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 694 dilatory recovery prac consider if or when power impose to condi such might tices violate its obli Bureau tions, unlimited, though not is broad. See gations government pursuant the federal to to Bagenstos, Spending Litiga Samuel R. Clause present 1396p(b)(l). duty Our is Court, in the Roberts Duke LJ. tion statutes, to the relevant and section construe (discussing pitfalls existing 356-84 1396p(b)(l) require the General As does proposed constitutional limits on the fed ordinary sembly exempt Bureau power impose shared to eral to conditions on predicting procedural requirements States funds the United in its efforts to re unlikely aggressive Supreme Court will be cover benefits. restrictions); ly impose Young, Ernest A. representative personal place dent’s responsibility for recoupment of —in case, apply Mr. Tanner12—to for a payments release these on all parties. involved benefits, establishes, or seek a waiver of Consequently, personal since the repre- by implication, exception to the statute sentative obligated pro- show the of limitations set out in section 30-2-310. bate court interest of TennCare *13 At the time of Ms. Tanner’s section has been addressed before the estate 71-5-116(c)(2) provided that may closed, be regardless of whether a any has been in probate probate [b]efore estate a Tenn- filed the pro- [of ..., ceeding, recipient] may clearly Care be closed reimbursement is the an ob- ligation of personal representative personal of the the representative estate that exists shall file with the clerk of the whether or not court TennCare has filed a claim. exercising probate jurisdiction Since it a release is an obligation the personal from the bureau representative, of TennCare evidencing and there payment is no requirement all medical assistance that a filed, bene- claim be fits, the code premiums, or other such sections establishing costs due statutes of law, the estate under limitations unless waived an estate are applicable. the bureau. added.) added). Id. at *4 (Emphasis (emphasis In In re Estate other words, Roberts, 71-5-116(e)(2) because section Appeals the Court of im- concluded poses an ongoing provision, responsibility pay combined with Tenn- the debt, responsibility and that authority Care’s to file a claim cannot against an be dis- “ charged without a waiver or set forth a ‘belt release suspenders’ even after a approach” elapsed, has the recovery correctly section 30-2- paid 310(b) benefits; bar words, is tolled until a other the release or waiv- General As- er is obtained. sembly placed responsibility par- on both ties—the Bureau as well as the decedent’s Mr. Tanner offers an reading alternative personal representative assure that re- —to 5—116(c)(2). of section He submits that 71— coverable benefits are repaid. 2008 WL the waiver provisions and release 2415520, at *4. approach, This according to apply only to medical benefits “due Roberts, the Court of precludes law,” and, because, from the estate under application of the statute of limitations according to interpretation, his the limita- in section 30-2-310: 30-2-310(b) tions in section barred claim,
The Bureau is to pursue claim, the Bureau’s the benefits were no personal representative Thus, longer likewise due. when the peri- obligated to end, determine if reimbursement od came to an longer the Bureau no appropriate. TennCare Bureau is had impede basis to closure Clearly, legislature attempting Tanner estate. " representative,’ applied 'Personal when olution and the Future the Law Succes-
12. decedent, represent sion, to those who includes (1984). 97 Harv. L Rev administrators, executors and unless the con- expeditiously When an estate is not moved implies text heirs and distributees.” Tenn. probate, into claimants such as the Bureau 1-3-105(22) Code (Supp.2008). Ann. We option appointment have the to seek the of an that, although note proceed- formal administrator, as the Bureau did here. See ings eventually opened were for Ms. Tanner’s - 30-1-106, -301, -302, §§ Tenn.Code Ann. estate, many probated estates are not at all. Langbein, Nonprobative See John H. Rev- assistance, correctly paid medical these ner’s which of to determine
In order
“belt and sus-
Appeals’
the Court of
controls,
then
we
interpretations
competing
two
must fail.
rationale
Roberts
penders”
analysis of
conduct a careful
must
continuing
If, however,
Tanner had a
Mr.
5—116(c)(2)and 30-2-
of sections
texts
71—
evidencing
a release
obligation to secure
in inter-
step
always,
As
“first
medical as-
correctly paid
payment of the
is to determine whether
preting a statute
sistance,
right
then the Bureau
un-
plain
at issue has
language
excepted from
implicitly
it was
regard
ambiguous meaning
period.
limitation
Robinson
in the case.”
particular dispute
Co.,
519 U.S.
v. Shell Oil
observation,
preliminary
As a
(1997). Be-
L.Ed.2d 808
S.Ct.
clarity
as to whether
there is a lack
‘relating to the same sub-
*14
“statutes
cause
the estate under law”
phrase “due from
...
purpose’
a common
ject
having
or
applies only to “other
section 71-5-116
together,” Lawrence
should be construed
costs,”
applies
it also
or whether
such
County
v. Lawrence
County Educ. Ass’n
“premi
and
“medical assistance benefits”
(Tenn.
Educ.,
302, 309
244 S.W.3d
Bd. of
statutory
general
It is a
maxim of
ums.”
Rasar,
2007)
v.
(quoting Lyons
“the ‘rule of the
interpretation that under
(Tenn.1994)),
895,
we must determine
antecedent,’
or
limiting
...
‘a
clause
last
of sections 71-5-116
whether the content
ordinarily be read as
...
should
phrase
regard
any ambiguity
leave
and 30-2-310
that it
phrase
the noun or
modifying
right
Bureau’s
to recover
ing the
States v.
immediately follows.’” United
filing of a
absent the
Ms. Tanner’s estate
—
U.S. —, —,
129 S.Ct.
Hayes,
of her death.
twelve months
within
(quoting
assistance benefits that are limitations and statutes of repose. As rel- that are due and other such costs that are case, evant to this we have stated Otherwise, there would no due. reason of repose “[statutes are substantive and circumstances, for a these release. Under extinguish right remedy both the and the we are convinced that the General Assem- 5—116(c)(2)(A), while statutes of limitations are bly procedur- intended section 71— al, it extinguishing only remedy.” read at the time of Ms. Tanner’s Cala payment premiums way Schucker, to refer to of all Calaway ex rel. (Tenn.2005) medical assistance benefits “due ... under S.W.3d (quoting *15 law,” implicitly either Healthcare, because last v. Jones Methodist 83 S.W.3d apply. antecedent rule does not 739, (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)). 743 Section 30- 2-310(b) explicitly refers to the one-year correctly Whether the medical benefits requirement as a “statute of limitations.” paid to Ms. Tanner before her death were Palmer, In 474, Woods v. 496 S.W.2d 476 law,” “due from the estate under even (Tenn.1973), predecessor we held that stat one-year period after the of limitation for addressing utes claims es estates ques- is another affecting tablished of limitation “statute[s] they tion. Mr. Tanner contends that were only remedy.” Although not, any claim that because the Bureau Woods, issue has been amended since subject could have made was to the timeli- 2—310(b). specific reference to the term “statute of requirements ness of section 30— provides limitations” response, support the Bureau that for our con contends sec- 30-2-310(b) only only tion clusion that the limitation is proce- upon establishes and, ap- remedy. dural bar to certain remedies if (1997) (re- convention, Federal and the Courts Law 26-28 convention as it is to choose one sponding Llewellyn, it,” N. Karl Remarks on following and stick to there are benefits to Theory Appellate Decision and the Rules “unrealistic”). canons even when or Canons About How Statutes are to be Con- strued, 395, (1950)); 3 Vand. L.Rev. 401-06 adopted 14. The courts of Tennessee have Ditslear, Brudney Corey James J. & Canons apply "we traditional rule that will not Quest Construction and the Elusive Neutral particular interpretation for to a statute if 1, (2005) (“In
Reasoning, 58 Vand. L.Rev. 112 interpretation yield would an absurd result.” end, only many the canons are one of 195, (Tenn. Flemming, State v. 19 S.W.3d 197 interpretive judges engaged tools available to 2000). arguably The risk of such an absurd process. they in the deliberative Whether interpretation significantly mitigated has been reasoning depends serve as a form of neutral 71-5-116, in the current version of section ....”); they ... on how are used but see release, which allows for the of either a Eskridge, Philip Frickey, William N. Jr. & P. waiver, or "statement ... that no amount is Equilibrium, Foreword: Law as 108 Harv. 71-5-116(c)(2)(A)- § due.” Tenn.Code Ann. 26, that, (suggesting L.Rev. 67 because (C) (2008). important “often it as is not choose the best 626 however, removed as That language, text of application of the
Whether 30-2-310(b) modification of the sweeping render a debt part would pur- for ... under law” that occurred longer no “due Tennessee Code is determinative. phrase of section 71-5-116 poses ambiguous the more leaving 30-2-310(b) all provides Supp. Section Tenn.Code “forever barred.” not filed the state claims and demands (1950); § § Tenn.Code Ann. 30-5- 8196.4 be time “shall prescribed within the barred,” phrase appearing forever dictionaries, upon Our reference our repeatedly throughout slight variations rely widely-accepted typically which we 7-32-124(b) §Ann. Tenn.Code code. See terms, individual words and definitions of (2005 Ann. Supp.2008); Tenn.Code & See, ambiguity. e.g., not resolve the does 28-2-110(a), 28-3-102(a), 28-2-102, §§ 28- Meeks, 710, 719-20 v. 262 S.W.3d State 3-114(a) (2000 Supp.2008); & Tenn.Code (Tenn.2008) R.App. P. (interpreting Tenn. (2007 2008); Sup. & §
Ann. 32^4-108 3(c)(1)); v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Walker 41-2-148(d)(l), §§ Ann. 41-3- Tenn.Code (Tenn. Truck, Inc., 106(d)(1)(2006); §Ann. 43-38- TenmCode 2008) §Ann. 47- (interpreting Tenn.Code 1027(a) (2007); Tenn.Code Ann. 47-13- Edmondson, 18-109(a)(l)); State v. 120(b) (2001); §§ Tenn.Code Ann. 50-6- (Tenn.2007) (interpret 927-28 S.W.3d 50-6-306(a) 6—203(f), 203(b)(l)-(2), 50— 39-13-404(a)); Ann. ing TenmCode (2008); Ann. Tenn.Code Pickett, S.W.3d State 126(b)(3)(D)(2008); §Ann. 69- TenmCode (Tenn.2007) (interpreting Ann. Tenn.Code 4-105(e) (2004). Its use in section 30-2- 39-17-1003(a)). specifically We have chapter can traced to section 3 of Dictionary Law identified Black’s Acts, imple- which 175 of the 1939 Public *16 Edmondson, 231 reliable source. S.W.3d statutory for a broad framework mented (‘When Legislature does not at 928 provided the administration of estates and statutory for a provide specific a definition sources, term, may to other this Court look [ajll-claims not and demands filed for including Dictionary, Black’s Law clerk, Act or in required by as this At the time of both the 1939 guidance.”). brought not have been which suit shall revision, as the 1950 enactment as well of one or revived before end was the most re 1933 edition Black’s to creditors from the date of the notice cent, defining “barred” as “[o]bstructed ... shall be barred asser- forever bar; subject a to hindrance or obstruction personal representative tion which, while if payment interposed, and from out of assets a or barrier bar hands, as, per- in recovery; the same are his or prevent legal will redress may, liabili- representative sonal without it that a claim or cause of when is said ty payment, for the distribute the assets by a of limita action is ‘barred ” (3d the administra- of the estate and close Dictionary 197 tions.’ Black’s Law tion. 1933). 1947 edition of Funk & ed. Dictio Wagnalls College New Standard 6, 1939, Tenn. Pub. Act of March however, definition of added). nary, offered this Notably, (emphasis Acts. “bar,” legal as used in a context: the verb barred “claims and de- provision this an action stopping or preventing “The being paid asserted or mands” from either plaintiff right that the has no Further, by showing an assets. it ex- out of estate’s Wagnalls College New of action.” Funk & the estate to be closed plicitly allowed (1947). These Dictionary 96 elapsed. after the limitations had Standard contradictory guidance way definitions offer on result from a construction one or the other.” Scheele v. Underwriters question underlying of whether debt Hartford Co., Ins. (Tenn.2007) may “claim or demand” still “barred” S.W.3d Bennett, Presley pur (quoting ... under law” for the exist as “due (Tenn.1993)). mandatory or A poses of a waiver release. 860-61 Federal finan- “[ojwing pay support absolutely sum is “due” when it is or cial is essential a debt.” Black’s Law state’s able; constituting ability to administer TennCare. As (8th 2004). Dictionary previously ed. explained, Whether section 116(c)(2) “subject cause of action is to hindrance or in was enacted furtherance of the hand, obstruction,” on one and whether the obligation recovery State’s to seek of costs underlying “owing payable,” on under 42 debt United States Code section other, questions. 1396p. detail, are distinct We do not need to in this judicial opinion, the time and effort plausible are thus faced with two We state has invested in order to fund its constructions the relevant statutes. share of the program. We are thus in- first, adopted by of Appeals Court presume clined to that the General Assem- Henkel, this case but bly meant provide a robust and effective Hare, Anderson, interprets recoup mechanism to both expenses its 2—310(b) establishing a bar to recov- 30— fulfill obligations its to the federal claims, ery including any of all non-tax view, government. interpreta- our for repayment debt due the Bureau tion that favors the ability Bureau’s correctly paid medical benefits. Under recover faithfully medical benefits more reading, while section 71-5-116 advances the policy serious considerations procedural create additional hurdles to the Assembly motivated the General (because closing of an estate it would still enact the provisions waiver and release require representative to file a “release” section 71-5-116. Whereas construc- balance), of its zeroed it would not enable adopted by tion Appeals the Court of pursue the Bureau to its claim after one Henkel, Anderson, and Hare would extend year. opinion The second is the protections mandatory minimal in Roberts. Court of ac- While provisions waiver and release in the stat- knowledging that section 30-2-310 estab- *17 ute, Rob- the interpretation advanced general lishes a framework for when erts would offer that “correctly assurances filed, claims an estate must be paid medical assistance” should be reim- Roberts adopted an panel interpretation bursed to the state. (as section 71-5-116 it existed at the time death) entitling Ms. Tanner’s the Bu- Moreover, posi Mr. Tanner’s until a reau to recover waiver or release is tion runs afoul of an established rule of representative obtained of the es- ambiguity construction: when there is an tate, time, regardless of the passage of a claim by as whether the state has specific because the provisions more subject been limita made statute of 71-5-116(e)(2) established an im- tions, the relevant statutes must be con plied exception general rule of sec- in recovery. strued a manner favorable to 30-2-310(b). tion County Hamilton v. See Bd. Educ. As (Tenn. bestospray Corp., In our effort to determine which of the 909 783 S.W.2d 1995). intended, that, legislature two courses the we Such rule assures unless Assembly clearly consider the statute’s “nature and General intended other wise, purpose, consequences public and the that would “the should not suffer because Moreover, although recognize we of its officers and negligence of the post- State ex rel. value of agents.” (quoting interpretive Id. at 785 limits of the Andrus, events, v. University Bd. & Sch. Lands enactment statements and (8th Cir.1982)). “[W]e 671 F.2d proceedings related amendment and the lim repeatedly stated that statutes of have Assembly limit- provide the General some in upon are looked with disfavor itation support ed additional context in State, will not brought actions amendment, That position. Bureau’s in the absence of clear and be enforced which, earlier, as we stated became effec- authority Id. explicit statutory to do so.” 1, 2007, applica- January tive on and is Sons, (citing Dunn v. Jameson & W.F. case, that the Bu- ble to this established (Tenn.1978); Inc., 799, situations, must, reau in at least some Mills, 175 Tenn. Anderson Sec. claim-filing pro- comply with the title 30 (1939)). can This substantive S.W.2d 11, 2006, April hearing At an cess. ap been typically on of construction15 has Committee, Judiciary House the bill’s it unclear from plied instances where is ex- sponsor Representative Kim McMillan the text of a statute of limitations itself that, plained under the law as it existed applies whether it to the state. Id. We “[tjhere amendment, prior to the 2006 believe, however, principles that the same problem some with these estates remain- applicable determining are when we are time, ing open long period for a and the ambiguous statutory provision whether an intent of the bill is to make that the sure exempts type a certain of state state is treated like other creditor as ground thus statute of limitations. This far as the one [limitation] [was] also favors the Bureau. added.) (Emphasis referenced earlier.” Finally, history and con- legislative Describing Budget the bill to the House support interpreta- text of the statute 19, 2006, April Represen- Subcommittee on espoused by tion the Bureau. have We “simply tative it McMillan stated closely in the proceedings reviewed the ability deals with the to treat TennCare Assembly General when the waiver and equitably respect to other creditors adopted were in 2002. provisions release processing decedents’ es- provisions adopted Because the were tates.” These and other 2006 statements just piece one of the broad revision of that, provide very confirmation many aspects program of the TennCare least, some members of the As- General the TennCare Reform Act of sembly were concerned that the 2002 stat- recovery provisions estate did not receive effectively ute had allowed the Bureau to extensive attention. The limited discus- period. circumvent the limitations occur, provisions sion of the that did how- conclusion, therefore, that at the Our example, during ever—for the June *18 death, time of Ms. Tanner’s section 71-5- supports balance Senate Session—on 116(c) adjustment recovery permitted or proposition the that the waiver and release from an estate until a waiver or release provisions were intended to assure recov- Bureau, regardless of ery granted in the event that the Bureau did not was the actively any ordinary imposed claim. limitations on pursue the only provide pre- provide presumptions 15. antecedent Substantive canons rule—which syn- interpreting ambiguous sumptions interpreting for statutes that ex- words and for plicitly Spiropoulos, tax. C. A consider the substance of the law See Andrew Defense Construction, being interpreted. These canons stand in Substantive Canons language Utah L.Rev. contrast with canons'—like the last 934. 30-2-310(b).16 further hold ute which repealed. section has been See We Tenn. that, right pay- its to 30-2-501, incident to demand §§ Code Ann. 30-5-102 to -144 pursuant ment to the release and waiver (1984). Prior any to “at time after” permitted the Bureau was to provisions, suggestion insolvency, a creditor or an against de- file a formal estate’s representative could file a new bill spite the fact that claims of most other chancery in § court. Tenn.Code Ann. 30- types would have been barred. 5-106. The administration of the estate was then transferred from Insolvency chancery § court. TenmCode Ann. Finally, for the com purposes of statutes, however, 107. Under current in- pleteness, we will address the Bureau’s solvency give does not proceed- rise to new argument that it excepted should be from ings in a different court. TenmCode Ann. pro the statute of limitations because the §§ Instead, 30-5-101 to 30-5-105 ceedings insolvency below constituted an insolvency is addressed the course of proceeding. Tennessee Code Annotated already-initiated probate proceedings 30-2-501(a) (2001)provides: by way filing insolvency only a notice of by filing Other than of claims or the filing the time for “[a]fter claims has ex- pending against revivor of actions pired, 30-2-310, § provided by if the decedent at the time of the decedent’s pay estate is unable to all of its creditors.” brought no suits shall be or other § Tenn.Code Ann. 30-5-102. The notice by any action taken creditor insolvency must contain' “an accounting (3) expiration estate until the of three of assets which have come into the hands letters, months from the issuance of personal representative pro- and a nothing herein shall be so construed as posed plan of distribution accordance permit filing of claims or revivor 30-2-317.” TenmCode Ann. 30- actions, pending or institution of suits 5-103(a). objections “If no are filed within personal representative after thirty-day waiting period [after twelve months from the date insolvency], person- of a notice of however, decedent, except, death of the may al representative pro- execute the insolvency proceedings or claims posed plan of distribution and close the by creditors period pre- within the filed estate, relieving personal representa- published posted scribed in the notice liability tives of further the estate.” 30-2-306(c). in accordance with 30-5-103(c). TenmCode Ann. added.) (Emphasis argues The Bureau case, provision this extends the statute of insolvency no notice of has insolvency limitations for proceedings and been The Bureau filed. has raised that, likely because its claim exceeded the timely the likelihood that if it has filed a assets, value of the Tanner estate’s claim, insolvency a notice of will be neces- proceedings below be should treated as sary. failing That be so. After to file insolvency proceedings. claim, however, timely a party would not advantage insolvency free to take “insolvency
The reference to proceed- brought might that claim have about. ings” section 30-2-501 can be traced to earlier, separate statutory Because the trial court held that the Bu- procedure *19 estates, time, administering for insolvent a reau claim in stat- did not file its express opinion regarding appli- 16. We no either statutes other than 30-5-306 to section cability of constraints on timeliness based in 30-5-310 or on the common law. -310(a) (2007) 30-2-307(a)(l), §§ do not trigger treating for the estate
procedural notice of filing of the the Bureau of TennCare from re- prevent as insolvent —the insolvency never occurred. We con- correctly medical benefits covering paid —has therefore, that, clude, if even section 30-2- the late Martha M. Tanner’s estate. 501(a) exception create an to the ordi- does My purpose preparing sep- in this two-fold limitations,17 excep- nary statutes of opinion explain my arate is to understand- apply in this case. tion does not liability ing of the basis for the estate’s statutory application to address the
Conclusion recovery procedures when a TennCare re- 30-2-310(b) general creates a Section family against probating cipient’s decides of limitations on state recipient’s the deceased estate. estate, except an for against claims claims 71-5-116(c), however, im- taxes. Section I. an poses duty representative on the may The Bureau of TennCare recover actively to seek a release or waiver estate Assembly this case because the General correctly paid,” “medical assistance given legal rights has the Bureau more § 1396p, owed under the Tenn- U.S.C. A than other creditors have. decedent’s Mr. Tanner did program. Care Because creditors must file their claims so, no waiver or release has not do applicable statutory estate within the time issued, empowered the Bureau was under periods.1 If the decedent’s estate has not statute, applicable as then the terms probate admitted to within six been
written, beyond to file the claim the one- death, months after the decedent’s Tenn. year limitation. At least until period of 30-1-106, §§ Code Ann. 30-1-303 day January, the first when the creditors, permit one of the decedent’s on effect, most recent amendment took creditors, probate behalf of all to initiate a subject the Bureau were not to a one- proceeding. proceeding Once this is com- limitations, regardless statute of menced, may file their claims creditors it whether received notice to creditors. against the decedent’s estate. is, judgment of the Court of therefore, and the re- reversed cause is Unlike claims of a decedent’s creditors manded to the Circuit Court for Davidson governed by which are the nonclaim stat- County proceedings accordance with utes, there is no limitation to opinion. are assessed to the Costs However, petition probate an estate. appellee. though even a creditor file a petition the decedent’s estate after the KOCH, JR., J., WILLIAM C. filed a anniversary first of the decedent’s concurring opinion. most debtors have little incentive to do so KOCH, JR., J., WILLIAM C. because, in the absence of fraud or other concurring. personal representa- misfeasance tive, their claims will be
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that barred fact, Ann. nonclaim Tenn. the nonclaim statutes TenmCode statutes. Code al., effect, Robinson, any, question of what if 1. See 2 Jack W. Sr. et Pritchard. 30-2-501(a) requirements has on timeliness the Law and Administration on Wills subject that are Estates, (6th 2007) for claims estates at 389-90 ed. insolvency post-1989 notice of under law is ("Pritchard'’). not before us. *20 30-2-307(d) § the clerk of the Ann. directs tension with each other. The policy first to return claim submit- probate passage court favors the prop- the decedent’s by a creditor more than one after erty ted to his or her heirs and beneficiaries anniversary the first of the decedent’s the timely most and cost-efficient manner filing death it. without possible. See Alamo Dev. Corp. v. Thom- as, 631, 633, 186 Tenn. creditors, other the Bureau of Unlike (1948) (noting that the nonclaim statutes good petition TennCare has reason to file a promote “the orderly, expeditious, and ex- probate recipi- to deceased TennCare decedents”). act settlement of estates anniversary estate after the first ent’s policy promotes The second economic effi- recipient’s probate the death. Once the ciency by encouraging prompt pay- commenced, proceeding the nonclaim ment of the decedent’s debts. See creditors, all statutes will still bar in- Pritchard, 385; § at Elaine H. Ga- Bureau, cluding gliardi, Remembering the Creditor at However, the estate. the com- Aligning Death: Nonprobate Probate and probate proceeding mencement of the im- Transfers, 41 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. poses statutory obligation on the de- (2007). 819, 826-27 recipient’s personal representatives ceased fact, claim. In resolve Bureau’s time, generally At one it was accepted cannot probate proceeding, opened, once probating a decedent’s estate was the recipient’s personal rep- be closed until the preferable way most carry efficient resentative files “with the clerk of the policies. out both of these 2See Pritchard exercising probate jurisdiction court a re- 11, 513, However, § at at 12. today lease from the bureau of TennCare evi- property most of the that changes hands dencing payment of all medical assistance at death does through nonprobative so benefits, premiums, or other such costs means. John H. Langbein, Nonpro- law, from the due estate under unless bative Revolution and the Future waived the bureau.” Tenn.Code Ann. Succession, Law 97 Harv. L.Rev. 71-5-116(c)(2) (2004).2 The estates of deceased No creditor other than the Bureau of recipients among types TennCare are advantage take TennCare of Tenn. likely of estates that are the least to be 71-5-116(c)(2). Thus, Code Ann. Thus, probated recipient’s family. light of the absence of a statute of limita- question regarding arises the fairest governing tions the commencement of a and most efficient means resolve out- probate proceeding, appropriate it is to standing TennCare claims consistent with construe the nonclaim statutes and Tenn. both federal and law. state that, §Ann. in a way Code 71-5-116 question This must be considered in two Court, words of the “favors the Bureau’s circumstances. The first circumstance ability to recover medical benefits.”
arises when either recipient’s family II. timely a creditor commences circumstance, person’s proceeding. of a property distribution the Bu- TennCare, following implicates important death two reau of in the absence fraud times, can, public policies be in or misfeasance personal representa- 2008). requirement. 2. Current law contains a similar 71-5-116(c)(2) (Supp. See Tenn.Code Ann. *21 III.
tive, timely a must file so, do its estate. If the Bureau fails to decision this case rests Court’s claim is “forever barred.” TenmCode that the Assem- recognition on its General 30-2-310(b). §Ann. § 71-5- bly enacted Tenn.Code Ann. 116(e)(2) provide “to a robust and effective circumstance arises when
The second expenses recoup mechanism to both its recipient’s family nor a credi- neither the obligations fulfill its to the federal proceeding. a probate tor commences I concur with the Court’s government.” circumstance, family recipient’s §Ann. 71-5- because Tenn.Code decision an to resolve the Tenn- obligation still has 116(c)(2) to resolve imposes obligation § claim under TenmCode Ann. 71-5- Care properly paid claims for TennCare benefits 116(c)(2). places the obli- personal representative on the of the de- gation recipient’s “personal repre- on the of whether a recipient, irrespective ceased sentative” to resolve the claim. While probate proceeding has been commenced. normally “personal representative” term it judicial proceedings, can associated with a “heirs or distrib-
also refer to decedent’s 1-3-105(22) §
utees.” TenmCode Ann. Accordingly, a TennCare re-
(Supp.2008).
cipient’s heirs or distributees have an obli-
gation under Tenn.Code Ann. 71-5-
116(c)(2) a claim even to resolve TennCare if probate petition no has been filed. This In re ESTATE OF Ruthie any claim obligation independent exists Mae BOYKIN. proceeding commenced asserted Bureau. Raymond Boykin obligation recip- In addition to the of the ient’s to resolve an heirs distributees Rubystein Casher. claim, outstanding TennCare the Bureau may open petition of TennCare file Tennessee, Court of probate proceeding peti- file this Section, Western at Jackson. year recipi- tion more than one after the death. Ann. 30-2- ent’s TenmCode Aug. 2008 Session. 310(b), terms, express applies its Dec. 2008. payment to claims for the of debts filed Appeal Permission to Denied probate It not create a proceeding. does Supreme Aug. Court a petition open statute of limitations for probate proceeding accordance with Likewise, it Tenn.Code Ann. 30-1-106. case, holding
does not alter our in this on Ann.
based Tenn.Code
116(c)(2), peti- that the Bureau’s of a
tion to a deceased TennCare re-
cipient’s estate more than one after recipient’s triggers death the obli- represen-
gation recipient’s personal claim.
tative to resolve the TennCare