578 S.W.3d 26
Tenn. Ct. App.2018Background
- On August 5, 2015 a fire damaged the Lavallais residence; Nationwide (the insurer and subrogee) sued Brass‑Craft on April 19, 2017 alleging a defective gas flex line caused the fire.
- Brass‑Craft’s answer blamed alternative causes, including electrical issues and tree branches, and alleged Memphis Light, Gas & Water (MLGW) was an indispensable party.
- Nationwide amended its complaint on July 24, 2017 to add MLGW, asserting MLGW’s electrical system caused the loss and relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 20‑1‑119 (the comparative‑fault statute) to add MLGW within 90 days of the answer.
- MLGW moved to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), arguing the GTLA’s one‑year limitations period (Tenn. Code Ann. § 29‑20‑305(b)) had expired before Nationwide filed any complaint, so § 20‑1‑119’s 90‑day add‑on cannot apply.
- The trial court agreed and dismissed MLGW; Nationwide appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the 90‑day grace period is triggered if the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations applicable to the original defendant/claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 20‑1‑119 permits joinder of a governmental defendant whose GTLA (one‑year) limitations period had expired when the original complaint was filed | Nationwide: "applicable statute of limitations" refers to the statute governing the original claim (here, three‑year property‑damage limit), so filing within that period triggered § 20‑1‑119’s 90‑day window to add MLGW | MLGW: the phrase must mean the same statute each time; because the GTLA one‑year period had expired, Nationwide cannot rely on § 20‑1‑119 to add MLGW | Reversed trial court. Court held the original complaint must be filed within the statute applicable to the original claim; that timely filing (three years) triggered § 20‑1‑119’s 90‑day period to add MLGW despite the GTLA one‑year period having lapsed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d 42 (Tenn. 2012) (§ 20‑1‑119 is remedial and construed liberally to allow joinder of comparative tortfeasors)
- Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2012) (the ninety‑day period in § 20‑1‑119 does not become part of the ‘‘applicable statute of limitations’’ for the initiating complaint)
- Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn. 2015) (§ 20‑1‑119 must be read naturally and its ‘‘original complaint’’ requirement interpreted according to statute language)
- Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (statutory interpretation principles: give effect to legislative purpose and avoid absurd results)
- Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853 (Tenn. 2001) (legislature amended § 20‑1‑119 to make it apply to governmental entities)