MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, a Florida limited liability company, SERIES PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, THE HANOVER AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-12029, 19-12085, 19-12091, 19-12092, 19-12357, 19-12358, 19-13024
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
April 30, 2021
[PUBLISH]
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20507-MGC
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, a Florida limited liability company, SERIES PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, THE HANOVER AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20465-FAM
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS SERIES LLC, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LLC, SERIES PMPI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus THE TRAVELERS CASUALTY COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20510-FAM
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, a Florida limited liability company, SERIES PMPI, A DESIGNATED SERIES OF MAO-MSO RECOVERY II LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20872-FAM
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, SERIES PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO RECOVERY II LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, versus NORTHLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20709-FAM
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, A Delaware Series Limited Liability company, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, A Florida Limited Liability Company, SERIES PMPI, A DESIGNATED SERIES OF MAO-MSO RECOVERY II LLC, A Delaware Series Limited Liability Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-21029-JAL
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, SERIES PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO RECOVERY II LLC, a Delaware series limited liability company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus IDS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20665-DPG
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware series LLC, MSPA CLAIMS 1, LCC, a Florida limited liability, SERIES PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO RECOVERY II LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(April 30, 2021)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal consolidates seven separate cases that three related corporate entities—which we will refer to jointly as “MSP“—originally filed in Florida state court against seventeen insurance companies. After the insurance companies removed their respective cases to federal court, MSP filed timely motions to remand and for attorney‘s fees and costs. The district court granted the motions to remand but declined to order the insurance companies to pay MSP‘s attorney‘s fees and costs. MSP appealed the district court‘s orders denying attorney‘s fees and costs. The Travelers, Northland, and Owners insurance companies cross-appealed the remand orders in their respective cases.
These appeals and cross-appeals require us to answer two questions. First, do we have jurisdiction over the cross-appeals? Second, did the district court abuse its discretion in denying MSP‘s motions for
I. BACKGROUND
MSP has been assigned claims that may entitle it to recover reimbursement or payment from the insurance companies under Florida law. MSP sued the insurance companies in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, and filed its complaints as “pure bills of discovery.” These bills of discovery sought evidence that would “confirm the proper defendant and the appropriate legal theory of relief” for a future lawsuit aimed at collecting on the assigned claim.
The insurance companies removed these cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida based on diversity jurisdiction under
The district court remanded the cases to state court but denied MSP‘s motions for attorney‘s fees and costs. MSP timely appealed the district court‘s denials. The Travelers, Northland, and Owners insurance companies in cases 19-12085, 19-12092, and 19-12357, respectively, then cross-appealed the district court‘s remands.
II. DISCUSSION
These appeals and cross-appeals raise two questions. In its appeals, MSP argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying its motions for attorney‘s fees and costs. Specifically, it contends that the insurance companies lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal because the district court had previously remanded similar cases. In their cross-appeals, the Travelers, Northland, and Owners insurance companies argue that the district court erroneously remanded the consolidated cases to state court.
A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Cross-Appeals
We begin with the cross-appeals because MSP‘s own appeal is moot if the insurance companies are correct that the district court erroneously remanded their cases. The litigation below focused on whether each “pure bill of discovery” lawsuit
We conclude that we cannot address these arguments because we lack jurisdiction over the cross-appeals. To begin, remand orders are ordinarily not appealable.
Here, the insurance companies argue that we may review the remand orders because the district court sua sponte remanded each case for a non-jurisdictional procedural defect. The problem for the insurance companies, however, is that the district court did not remand the underlying cases sua sponte. Instead, in every case, MSP filed a motion to remand that was timely under
Despite this unambiguous procedural history, the Travelers, Northland, and Owners insurance companies insist that the remands in their cases were sua sponte because, they say, the district court‘s stated reasons for remanding were not precisely the same as the grounds listed in MSP‘s timely motions to remand. The insurance companies then contend that by remanding for reasons different than those asserted in MSP‘s timely motions, the district court remanded the cases sua sponte.
We have never engaged in this kind of analysis in the past, and we will not engage in it now. Our appellate jurisdiction over remand orders is narrow; it cannot be premised on purported disparities between the arguments in a timely motion to remand and the reasoning in a district court‘s order granting that motion. See Schexnayder v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the defendant‘s argument that the district court‘s remand order was “logically indistinguishable from a sua sponte motion” when it “remand[ed] a case for reasons that are not listed in the original motion for remand“). Instead, when a plaintiff files a timely motion to remand that the district court grants, we will presume that it granted the motion because of the plaintiff‘s arguments and
Instead, the proper analysis is outlined in our decision in Hunter v. City of Montgomery, where we held that we had jurisdiction to review a remand order because the district court sua sponte remanded for a procedural defect. First, we asked whether the district court‘s remand order was sua sponte. We held that it was because (1) “[t]he district court itself raised the possibility that a [certain statutory] exception required remand,” (2) “the remand was not done on motion,” and (3) “a motion would not have been timely ... anyway because the thirty-day deadline had passed ten times over before the district court raised the possibility of the case being subject to remand.” Hunter, 859 F.3d at 1333-34. Second, after deciding that the remand was sua sponte, we examined whether the remand was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect. In answering that question, we explained that “we are not bound by a district court‘s characterization of the basis of a remand; it is our responsibility to determine whether the remand was based on a jurisdictional defect or some other issue.” Id. at 1334 n.2. Thus, although the district court thought that it had sua sponte remanded for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we held that the problem was instead a defect in procedure. Accordingly, we had jurisdiction over the appeal.
We relied on similar reasoning in Artjen. There, the case was removed based on diversity jurisdiction, but the citizenship of one of the parties was not properly alleged in the notice of removal. See Artjen, 561 F.3d at 1295-96. Accordingly, the district court “concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction” and remanded the case to state court without a motion having been filed. Id. at 1296. After observing that the district court‘s remand was “because of a perceived procedural defect in the removal process without waiting for a party‘s motion,” we evaluated whether the alleged defect was truly one of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. We held that it was not. Because the remand in Artjen was ordered sua sponte and on a basis other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we had jurisdiction over the appeal. Id.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Hunter and Artjen, MSP timely filed its motions to remand, and the district court granted them. The district court‘s remand orders do not state that it remanded for reasons not identified in the motions. To the extent that the orders discuss the motions at all, they focus on MSP‘s argument that the amount-in-controversy requirement was not satisfied. We therefore conclude that the district court did not remand sua sponte.
Because the district court remanded by granting MSP‘s timely motions, we need not address whether the district court remanded for procedural or jurisdictional reasons. The orders fall within the scope of
Because we do not have jurisdiction to review the underlying remand orders, we must determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it declined to award attorney‘s fees and costs under
Here, MSP does not accuse the insurance companies of factual misrepresentations, making frivolous legal arguments, or anything similar that might have rendered their removals objectively unreasonable. Instead, MSP argues that their removals were objectively unreasonable because they had “clear and undeniable notice” of prior remand orders that had rejected similar legal arguments for removal. In other words, MSP argues that a district court must impose attorney‘s fees and costs when a defendant removes a case in the face of adverse district court precedent.
We disagree. A district court‘s decision does not bind this Court, the district court issuing the decision, or even the judge who made the decision. See McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). Instead, as a general matter, district courts may give their opinions the weight that they believe is warranted. It therefore makes very little sense to say that a defendant must necessarily pay attorney‘s fees and costs when it removes a case in the face of an adverse district court precedent. Despite its many decisions remanding on materially identical facts, the district court here decided that the insurance companies had an objectively reasonable basis to remove, and no precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court barred removal. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in declining to award attorney‘s fees and costs.
Of course, by saying that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we do not address whether another or even the same district court could properly decide to award attorney‘s fees and costs when faced with a substantially similar removal. “[T]he abuse of discretion standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (cleaned up) (quoting Rasbury v. I.R.S., 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)). By definition, “under the abuse of discretion standard of review there will be occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call.” Id. (quoting Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168). We hold only that it is not an abuse of discretion for a district judge to decline to award attorney‘s fees and costs under
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we DISMISS the cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction
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