Charles HUNTER, individually and on behalf of a class of persons who were issued tickets for running a red light at those intersections within the City of Montgomery where automated photographic equipment is in use, Mike Henderson, individually and on behalf of a class of persons who were issued tickets for running a red light at those intersections within the City of Montgomery where automated photographic equipment is in use and who have not paid the civil fine, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, American Traffic Solutions, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-15861
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
June 14, 2017
859 F.3d 1329
In short, I struggle to see what, if any, interest in finality would be served by granting the Corps‘s preferred sovereign-immunity ground for dismissal that would not be served just as effectively as dismissing the case on the Rulе 19(b) ground. To the extent the Corps is seeking an interest not in the finality of this particular litigation but rather an interest in having a court declare that it is immune from all litigation of this sort, such an interest is inapposite to determining how best to sequence threshold grounds for dismissal in any particular case. In line with the case-by-case nature of these determinations, which will necessarily result in nonmerits rulings, courts should be careful not to credit such far-reaching and speculative conсerns. This is especially true when, as is the case here, the party seeking the broader ruling attempts to do so to the potential detriment of an absent sovereign entity whose absence is itself an independent ground warranting dismissal.
The general preference for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and the concern for the finality of judgments cited by the Corps are insufficient, taken alone and taken together, to counterbalance the considerations that оverwhelmingly tip in favor of dismissing the Conservationists’ suit under Rule 19(b). Whatever the precise outer boundaries of the discretion to sequence threshold nonmerits grounds for dismissal may prove to be in other cases, a question which we do not today determine, it is clear that the District Court exceeded those bounds here.
Charles HUNTER, individually and on behalf of a class of persons who were issued tickets for running a red light at those intersections within the City of Montgomery where automated photographic equipment is in use, Mike Henderson, individually and on behalf of a class of persons who were issued tickets for running a red light at those intersections within the City of Montgomery where automated photographic equipment is in use and who have not paid the civil fine, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, American Traffic Solutions, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-15861
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
(June 14, 2017)
Robert E. Poundstone, IV, Rudy Hill, George R. Parker, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, Montgomery, AL, Marc James Ayers, John Thomas Richie, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, Birmingham, AL, Kim M. Boyle, Allen C. Miller, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, New Orleans, LA, William E. Shreve, Jr., John Day Peake, III, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM and HIGGINBOTHAM,* Circuit Judges.
ED CARNES, Chief Judge:
The City of Montgomery has a red-light camera program that is managed by American Traffic Solutions, Inc. Under that program Charles Hunter and Mike Henderson were ticketed and required to pay civil fines. They are the named plaintiffs in a would-be class action that was filed in Alabama state court claiming that the program and fines violate state law. (The complaint included a federal law claim but it was later dropped.)
The defendants, the City and Traffic Solutions, removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act,
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true for present purposes, in 2007 Traffic Solutions approached the City and offered to install and manage a system of red light cameras within the city limits. The City liked the idea and enacted an ordinance authorizing a system of “Automated Photographic Enforcement of Traffic Control Device Violations.” Under the system Traffic Solutions sends photographs of potential red light violations to the Montgomery Police Department. Those photographs are viewed by police officers. If the officers determine that the red light was run, Traffic Solutions sends out a notice of violation to the owner of the vehicle that was driven through the red light. The resulting fine is paid to Traffic Solutions, which keeps a portion of it and remits the remainder to the City.
Under generally applicable law, Alabama classifies running a red light as a criminal misdemeanor. But in 2009, to accommodate Montgomery‘s program, the Alabama Legislature enacted a law creating a new “non-criminal category of state law called a civil violation.” That category is the opposite of a generally applicable one because it applies only to red light violations detected by cameras within Montgomery‘s city limits.
After receiving a notice of violation based on a photo taken by onе of Traffic Solutions’ red light cameras, Hunter brought this lawsuit as a class action in Alabama state court. His complaint contended that the Legislature‘s creation of the category of “civil violations” violated the Alabama Constitution, and that the City‘s ordinance violated state law. It also claimed that the defendants intentionally made yellow lights too short so that drivers would not have enough time to stop before the light turned red, leading to more violations and more revenue. Finally, the complaint contained a claim under
The relief sought was: a declaration that the red light camera program was unlawful; a judgment requiring the City to refund all red light violation fines it had collected as a result of the program; an injunction directing both defendants to stop issuing tickets based on the progrаm; an award of attorney‘s fees under
Traffic Solutions, with the City‘s consent, removed the lawsuit to federal court based on the § 1983 claim, the request for attorney‘s fees under § 1988, and CAFA diversity jurisdiction. Hunter then amended his complaint to drop the § 1983 claim and his reliance on § 1988 for attorney‘s fees. The amendment also added as a second named plaintiff Henderson, another Alаbamian who had received a red light ticket because of a Traffic Solutions camera. The amended complaint sought the same types of relief as the original one, except that its request for attorney‘s fees relied on the common fund doctrine alone.
About ten months after the case had been removed to federal court, without prompting the district court ordered supplemental briefing on whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. The order doing that noted the plaintiffs had dropped the § 1983 claim, which was the sole federal claim, and it mentioned that one of CAFA‘s exceptions to the exercise of federal jurisdiction might apply and require a
The district court agreed, finding that both exceptions applied so that “[j]urisdiction over this case [was] not appropriate under ... the Class Action Fairness Act.” The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims (a part of its order the defendants do not challenge). This is the defendants’ appeal from the remand order.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
We start with whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court‘s order. See Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass‘n, 594 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that even where “[n]either party сhallenges our jurisdiction to entertain” an appeal, “we are obligated to address jurisdictional questions“). As a general matter, remand orders are reviewable as final decisions under
But our analysis cannot end with that general principle supporting jurisdiction because some of what § 1291 giveth, § 1447 taketh away. Section 1447(c) reads, in relevant part:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must bе made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under
section 1446(a) . If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
Sеction 1447(d), in turn, provides in relevant part that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”
The district court itself raised the possibility that a CAFA exception required re-
As to the second ground for a § 1447(d) jurisdictional bar to our review, the remand in this case was not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the CAFA exceptions that the remand was based on do not go to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction; instead they go to whether jurisdiction may be exercised in a рarticular circumstance. CAFA, through
But if the local controversy exception or the home state exception applies, CAFA requires that the district court “decline to exercise jurisdiction.” Id.
For those reasons, a remand order based on CAFA‘s local controversy exсeption or home state exception does not fall within either of § 1447(d)‘s categories, and review of it is not barred. We do have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.3
Having decided that we have jurisdiction, we turn now to the issue of whether the remand was proper. “Congress enacted CAFA to address inequitable state court treatment of class actions and to put an end to certain abusive practices by plaintiffs’ class counsel.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2007). One way the statutе does that is by “broadening federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with interstate implications.” Id.
As we have already explained, the allegations of the amended complaint in this case, as supplemented by a stipulation in the district court, are adequate to give the district court subject matter jurisdiction over it. See p. 1334, above. The district court may not, however, exercise the CAFA jurisdiction it has if either the local controversy exception or the home state exception applies.
The home state exception applies if “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.”
That leaves, as the dispositive question, whether Traffic Solutions is a “primary defendant[]” under CAFA. If it is, then one of the primary defendants is not a citizen of the state where the action was filed, the home state exception to the exercise of jurisdiction does not apply, аnd the remand cannot be justified under that exception. On the other hand, if Traffic Solutions is not a primary defendant under CAFA, the City is the sole primary defendant and it is a citizen of the state where the action was filed. As a result, the home state exception to the exercise of CAFA jurisdiction will apply, and the remand was proper.
What are primary defendants for CAFA home state exception purposes? The statutory language provides little guidance. The term “primary defendants” is undefined, and there are no contextual clues as to its meaning. The dictionary does not help much either. It tells us that a “primary” defendant is one “of first rank, importance, or value.” Primary, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2009); see also Primary, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993) (defining “primary” as “first or highest in rank or importance; chief; principal“). That seems to mean there can be only one primary defendant because оnly one of a type, set, or group can be of first rank, of first importance, or chief, or principal. But we know from the statutory language itself that cannot be correct because the statute uses the plural: “primary defendants,” not “primary defendant.”
In this situation, absent any other source of guidanсe, we reluctantly and cautiously turn to legislative history materials. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1391, 118 L.Ed.2d 39 (1992) (“To begin, we note that appeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve
The Senate Judiciary Committee‘s report on CAFA contains this statement about the meaning of the key term in the case before us:
[T]he Committee intends that “primary defend[a]nts” be interpreted to reach those defendants who are the real “targets” of the lawsuit—i.e., the defendants that would be expected to incur most of the loss if liability is found. Thus, the term “primary defendants” should include any person who has substantial exposure to significant portions of the proposed class in the action, particularly any defendant that is allegedly liable to the vast majority of the members of the proposed classes (as opposed to simply a few individual class members).
S. Rep. No. 109-14 at 43 (2005).4 A report issued by the House Judiсiary Committee regarding an earlier version of CAFA contains materially identical language. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-144 at 38 (2003). The explanation in the committee reports makes the primary factor in answering the primary defendant question the potential monetary loss that defendant faces—whether it is the real target of the claims seeking damages, has substantial exposure to damages if liability is found, and would incur most of the loss if damages are awarded.
The Third Circuit has stated that the House Judiciary Committee‘s report and other legislative history supports “constru[ing] the words ‘primary defendants’ to capture those who are directly liable to the proposed class, as opposed to being vicariously or secondarily liable based upon theories of contribution or indemnification.” Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2013). Along the same lines, the Vodenichar opinion suggests that courts assessing whether a defendant is a “primary defendant” ask “whether, given the claims asserted against the defendant, [the defendant] has potential exposure to a significant portion of the class and would sustain a substantial loss as compared to other defendants if found liable.” Id. at 505-06. We agree with that reasoning and rule, at least where monetary relief is sought, as it is in this case.
It is not difficult to apply this potential monetary loss standard in this case. The
The plaintiffs do seek injunctive relief against Traffic Solutions, but that is not monetary relief. And where monetary relief is sought, it is monetary relief—not injunctive, dеclaratory, or any other kind of relief—that matters.5 The plaintiffs seek no monetary relief at all from Traffic Solutions. It is not a “primary defendant” for purposes of the home state exception. That leaves the City as the only “primary defendant” in this case, and the City is a citizen of Alabama.
Because the only primary defendant is a “citizen[ ] of the State in which th[is] action was originally filed,” and the other requirements are met, the home state exceptiоn to CAFA jurisdiction applies. See
AFFIRMED.
ED CARNES
CHIEF JUDGE