MORGAN HONOMICHL, ROBIN HONOMICHL, TIMOTHY HONOMICHL, DEB CHANCE, KARA CHANCE, KAREN JO FRESCOLN, MIKE MERRILL, and Q.H. v. VALLEY VIEW SWINE, LLC and JBS LIVE PORK, LLC
No. 16-1006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed June 22, 2018
Annette J. Scieszinski, Judge
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Annette J. Scieszinski, Judge.
Defendants appeal the district court ruling on various motions, including their motion for summary judgment, which denied their statutory immunity defense under
William H. Roemerman and Gerald T. Sullivan of Elderkin & Pirnie, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant Valley View Swine, LLC.
Jacob D. Bylund, Scott L. Halbur, Shannon L. Sole, and Ryan P. Howell of Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Des Moines, for appellant, JBS Live Port, LLC.
Jennifer H. De Kock, Steven P. Wandro, and Kara M. Simons of Wandro & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, and David E. Sykes, Fairfield, for appellees.
Thomas W. Lipps of Peterson & Lipps, Algona, and David J. Stein Jr. (until withdrawal) of Stein Law Office, Milford, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.
Eldon L. McAfee and Julia L. Vyskocil of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des Moines, for amici curiae Iowa Pork Producers Association and Iowa Farm Bureau Federation.
The plaintiffs are the owners and/or residents of real estate located near the confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) owned and operated by the defendants. The plaintiffs have brought suit against the defendants, claiming the defendants are negligent in their operation of the CAFOs. The plaintiffs also contend the CAFOs constitute a nuisance that entitles the plaintiffs to damages for the loss of use and enjoyment of their property due to the odors, pathogens, and flies that allegedly emanate from the CAFOs. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claims alleging
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. In doing so, the district court found
We now reverse the district court ruling granting the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the district court found that
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This case centers around two CAFOs located in Wapello County, Iowa, which are known as Valley View Site 1 (Site 1) and Valley View Site 2 (Site 2). Defendant Valley View Swine, LLC, is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Iowa that has three members: Nicholas Adam, Shawn Adam, and Jeffrey Adam. In 2013, Valley View Swine entered into discussions with defendant JBS Live Pork, LLC, (JBS)—then operating as Cargill Pork—to establish CAFOs at Site 1 and Site 2. JBS is authorized to contract with Iowa swine producers for the care and feeding of JBS-owned swine pursuant to a consent decree filed on January 19, 2006, between the State of Iowa and Cargill Pork, LLC, which transferred its ownership to the company that now goes by JBS Live Pork, LLC.
In April 2013, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued Valley View Swine construction permits to implement CAFOs on Site 1 and Site 2 in accordance with Iowa DNR rules and regulations. These rules and regulations required Valley View Swine to meet certain conditions and requirements both during and following construction. Some of these conditions and requirements included implementing an approved manure management plan and following proper waste management procedures to protect soil and waterways. Construction on these sites was also required to comply with all local, state, and federal requirements applicable to CAFOs. These requirements included the need to maintain the minimum separation distances between the CAFOs and “residence[s] not owned by the owner of the confinement feeding operation” or a commercial enterprise, bona fide religious institution, or an educational institution” under
Valley View Swine complied with the applicable setback distances in constructing the CAFOs. At the time of construction in 2013, the necessary setback distance between the CAFOs and the residences at issue was .36 miles or 1875 feet.
On August 1, 2013, near the completion of the construction, Valley View Swine and JBS entered into hog-feeding agreements for Valley View Swine to raise and care for JBS-owned hogs at Site 1 and Site 2. JBS agreed to pay Valley View Swine $3.3334 for each of the 9920 pig spaces on the combined Site 1 and Site 2. This provides Valley View Swine with annual payments exceeding $396,000. Pursuant to the agreements, Valley View Swine is required to “comply with all local, state, and federal laws, regulations, permits, and orders” pertaining to the agreements. Moreover, Valley View Swine must uphold the JBS Swine Welfare Policy and allow JBS to conduct periodic audits. This includes abiding by the JBS Wean-to-Finish Manual detailing the necessary procedures Valley View Swine must follow for biosecurity, preplacement, pig care and management, feed and water management, health, barn environment, safety, waste management, and maintenance of the CAFOs.
To fulfill these agreements, Valley View Swine contracts with a third-party barn manager, Brandon Warren, who works as an independent contractor to manage the operation of the CAFOs. Since Valley View Swine commenced operation of the CAFOs, the Iowa DNR has not found Valley View Swine to be in violation of any statute or regulation governing its operations. The JBS periodic audits have likewise not found Valley View Swine in violation of any applicable statutes or regulations.
In the same month that the defendants entered into their hog-feeding agreements, the Iowa DNR authorized the use of Site 1 and Site 2 to serve as CAFOs, finding they were both constructed in accordance with the Iowa DNR requirements. Site 1 began operation that month, and Site 2 followed suit in September. In November, seventy individuals, including the current plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit against Valley View Swine, the Adams, Cargill Pork (now JBS), Tri-L Farms, Inc., Larry Hickenbottom, Josh Hickenbottom, and Richard Warren. The petition alleged negligence and temporary nuisance based on the odors, pathogens, and flies they alleged stem from the CAFOs, as well as defendants’ alleged failure to use prudent management practices to reduce these odors, pathogens, and flies. However, the plaintiffs failed to fulfill the mediation requirement established in
On April 2, sixty-nine plaintiffs, including the current plaintiffs, refiled the suit making the same claims against the same defendants. In September, the district court severed the case into three divisions—classified as Divisions A, B, and C—based upon the various plaintiffs’ allegations against the different defendant groups. From those sixty-nine plaintiffs, Deb Chance, Jason Chance, Kara Chance, Karen Jo Frescoln, Robin Honomichl, Timothy Honomichl, Morgan Honomichl, Q.H., C.H., and Mike Merrill were among those placed in Division A, which is the only division at issue in this case. Division A plaintiffs brought their claims against Valley View Swine, the Adams, and Cargill Pork (JBS). The district court joined all of the divisions for discovery purposes.
On September 30, Division A plaintiffs filed an amended petition and jury demand on behalf of all original sixty-nine plaintiffs claiming temporary nuisance, permanent nuisance, and negligence against Division A defendants due to the odors, pathogens, and flies that allegedly emanate from the CAFOs. The Division A defendants filed an answer, which invoked
Since 2013, plaintiffs’ counsel have filed numerous nuisance suits against JBS involving large groups of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ counsel have litigated these suits until shortly before trial, at which time the plaintiffs dismissed them. For example, Division A plaintiffs have filed four versions of their petition, eliminating plaintiffs along the way. C.H. was dismissed without prejudice in August 2015, and Mike Merrill dismissed his claims against the defendants in June 2016.
Similarly, Division C plaintiffs eliminated twenty-six plaintiffs during the course of litigation, which included filing six petitions against Division C defendants prior to trial. Division B plaintiffs dismissed their suit in its entirety in November 2014. Following the dismissal of Division B, the district court consolidated Divisions A and C for discovery and deadline purposes with another group of fifteen plaintiffs suing JBS, among others, for negligence and nuisance in Poweshiek County. The district court ordered the Division C case to be tried first, followed by the Poweshiek County case and the Division A case.
The defendants in all of the divisions filed a motion for summary judgment in their respective cases on October 6, 2015, maintaining
The Division C trial took place in February 2016, and the jury returned defense verdicts that found no nuisance on the properties of any of the plaintiffs. JBS subsequently filed a motion for costs and expenses, alleging three of the Division C plaintiffs filed frivolous claims under
In June 2016, the district court ruled on the summary judgment motions at issue in this case surrounding Division A. The district court denied Division A defendants’ summary dismissal of the claims and granted Division A plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, declaring
In its ruling, the district court noted the statutory immunity established in
There are no material facts in good-faith dispute that demonstrate that the plaintiffs suffer a disqualification from remedy under a premise that they, as individuals, benefit from the immunity statute greater than those in the general public who benefit from the immunity protection of
Iowa Code section 657.11(2) . JBS‘s Motion seeking summary dismissal of all claims for a disqualification from remedy, drawn from analysis of the economic impact of the Iowa pork industry, is denied.
On June 13, the defendants applied for interlocutory appeal and stay, which we granted and retained. On appeal, the defendants argue the district court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment by finding
II. Standard of Review.
“We review a district court ruling granting a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law.” Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray v. Baldi, 880 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Rathje v. Mercy Hosp., 745 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Iowa 2008)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Barker v. Capotosto, 875 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Iowa 2016)). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence in the record ‘is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.‘” Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Wallace v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Dirs., 754 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 2008)). “We . . . view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will grant that party all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” Plowman, 896 N.W.2d at 398 (alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Gray, 880 N.W.2d at 455). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the only conflict concerns the legal consequences of undisputed facts.” Id. (quoting Peppmeier v. Murphy, 708 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 2005)).
We review constitutional challenges to statutes de novo. Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010). We presume statutes are constitutional, and the party challenging the statute “must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002)). This requires the challenger to “refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found to be constitutional.” Id. (quoting Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 233). If the statute is susceptible to multiple constructions, only one of which is constitutional, we are obliged to adopt the constitutional construction of the statute. Id. Finally, we will
III. Analysis.
A. Preliminary Concepts: Facial Challenge Versus As-Applied Challenge.
A facial challenge is different from an as-applied challenge. See Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 657, 657 (2010). The distinction between the two types of challenges appears simple enough, yet it is unclear and “more illusory than the ready familiarity of the terms suggests.” Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 880 (2005).
A facial challenge is one in which no application of the statute could be constitutional under any set of facts. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004); Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2017); Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 360 (Iowa 2006); F.K. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 2001); State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987); State v. Legg, 785 S.E.2d 369, 371 (S.C. 2016). Such a challenge is “the most difficult . . . to mount successfully” because it requires the challenger to show the statute under scrutiny is unconstitutional in all its applications. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). In contrast, an as-applied challenge alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts. People v. Thompson, 43 N.E.3d 984, 991 (Ill. 2015); Walker v. Johnson County, 209 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 1973); see State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 884 (Iowa 2009); State v. Pocian, 814 N.W.2d 894, 897–98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012).
We examine two cases to illustrate the difference between facial and as-applied challenges. In Gravert v. Nebergall, the landowners alleged Iowa‘s partition fence statute violated the inalienable rights clause of
We then observed whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the landowners. Id. at 187–88. First, we stated the statute served the public purpose even assuming nearby livestock owners received the primary benefits under the statute. Id. at 188. Second, we stated “[a] law does not become unconstitutional because it works a hardship” or because the law requires substantial expenditures for compliance. Id. Moreover, the landowners benefited from the partition fence because it protected their crops from the adjoining landowners’ horses. Id. In sum, in concluding that the means were reasonably necessary to accomplish the stated purpose, we held the landowners failed to show the statute was unduly oppressive as applied to them. Id.
In City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, a vehicle owner alleged the city‘s automated traffic enforcement (ATE) ordinance violated
We first stated the ordinance to control speeding on state highways implicated a public interest. Id. at 352. We then stated the ordinance was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 353. To resolve the issue of whether the ordinance violated the inalienable rights clause of the
We declined to consider a facial challenge to the ATE ordinance. Id. at 346. When “a statute is constitutional as applied to a defendant, the defendant cannot make a facial challenge unless a recognized exception to the standing requirement applies.” Id. (quoting State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 311 n.1 (Iowa 2000)). Because the owner did not claim such an exception, we did not entertain the merits of a facial challenge. See id.
We now turn to the relevant statutory provisions relating to right-to-farm laws generally, and the proper analysis to apply to our law that is at issue here.
B. Right-to-Farm Laws in the United States.
All fifty states have right-to-farm laws that provide farmers with various forms of statutory immunity from nuisance claims similar to
C. Iowa Code Section 657.11(2) Jurisprudence and the Gacke Test.
2. An animal feeding operation, as defined in
section 459.102 , shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance under this chapter or under principles of common law, and the animal feeding operation shall not be found to interfere with another person‘s comfortable use and enjoyment of the person‘s life or property under any other cause of action. However, this section shall not applyif the person bringing the action proves that an injury to the person or damage to the person‘s property is proximately caused by either of the following: a. The failure to comply with a federal statute or regulation or a state statute or rule which applies to the animal feeding operation.
b. Both of the following:
(1) The animal feeding operation unreasonably and for substantial periods of time interferes with the person‘s comfortable use and enjoyment of the person‘s life or property.
(2) The animal feeding operation failed to use existing prudent generally accepted management practices reasonable for the operation.
We examined the constitutionality of
Our holding that
Under these circumstances, “one property owner—the producer—[was] given the right to use his property without due regard for the personal and property rights of his neighbor,” rendering the statutory immunity of
D. The Constitutionality of Iowa Code Section 657.11(2) as Applied
The inalienable rights clause states, “All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights—among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Id. at 186 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1894)).
In applying the first step in Gacke, we held that
The second step involves the three-prong test espoused in Gacke. For courts to determine whether
Following Gacke, courts throughout the state have fashioned the three factors we considered in our as-applied analysis in Gacke into a three-prong test. Consequently, courts have been applying this three-prong test to determine the constitutionality of
The defendants’ request for us to reexamine the validity of Gacke requires us to consider our adherence to stare decisis. “[T]he principle of stare decisis demands that we respect prior precedent and that we do not overturn them merely because we might have come to a different conclusion.” State v. Bruce, 795 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011). Nevertheless, “we must revisit our prior decisions if those decisions are flawed and incompatible with present conditions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Iowa 2014). “[W]hen a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.” McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 395 (Iowa 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921)). In revisiting our prior decisions, we essentially must decide “whether more harm will be done by overruling our previous cases in order to install what we think is clearly the correct principle, or by adhering to an unsound decision in the interest of the rule of stare decisis.” State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 713–14, 74 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1956)). In this case, we must revisit Gacke to determine whether “compelling reasons exist to overturn our prior interpretation.” State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Iowa 2017).
The legal landscape governing CAFOs has changed since we decided Gacke. In Gacke, the plaintiffs lived approximately 1300 feet, or one-quarter mile, away from the CAFOs. 684 N.W.2d at 171. The necessary separation distance for the same size facility today exceeds that, as the minimum distance between the CAFOs and adjacent landowners at issue is 1875 feet. See
Despite these significant statutory and regulatory changes, the analytical framework set forth by the Gacke factors, even with its limitations, are still compatible with present conditions. Changes in the regulatory scheme limiting CAFOs would appear to benefit the adjacent landowners, at least in theory. But the fighting issue remains whether
The defendants argue that the practical effect of applying the factors we promulgated in Gacke has been to boil down the determination of the constitutionality of
Additionally, we agree with the defendants that the district court improperly applied the Gacke test to this case without making specific factual findings in its ruling that
Here, each of the parties presented genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage that could lend themselves to a jury verdict for the nonmoving party. As we have previously held, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the only conflict concerns the legal consequences of undisputed facts.” Plowman, 896 N.W.2d at 398 (quoting Peppmeier, 708 N.W.2d at 58). That is not the case here.
Our holding in Dalarna Farms v. Access Energy Coop., 792 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 2010), demonstrates why the Gacke factors require a fact-based analysis that generally requires a trial on the merits, or at least an evidentiary pretrial hearing. There we rejected the plaintiff‘s argument that
Although it is possible that an as-applied constitutional challenge to
Unlike summarily dismissing such claims through summary judgment, a pretrial hearing, or an appropriate motion after the submission of all the evidence at trial, allows the district court to properly balance the Gacke factors with the legislative purpose of the statute to protect and promote animal agriculture in the state. See
E. The Facial Constitutional Challenge to Iowa Code Section 657.11(2).
In addition to their as-applied challenge to
IV. Conclusion.
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district court ruling declaring that
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who concur specially.
#16–1006, Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, LLC
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring specially).
I join most of the court‘s opinion reversing the district court ruling that erroneously concluded
First, a decade after Gacke, we unanimously held that the deferential rational-basis test is to be applied for challenges under the inalienable rights clause. City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 352 (Iowa 2015). In my view, this is the test that should be applied on remand to adjudicate the constitutional challenge to
Second, Gacke limited its holding to the specific facts of that case and emphasized that “[w]e express no opinion as to whether [
Third, Gacke was wrongly decided. CAFOs may be controversial, but it is not our court‘s role to second-guess policy choices of the elected branches of government. This appeal does not involve a “takings” claim. It does not present a limit on a landowner‘s right to recover damages for diminution in value due to a nuisance. The sole issue presented is whether the legislature, subject to the rational-basis test, can pass a law that affects a landowner‘s ability to recover noneconomic nuisance damages. All other states have passed such right-to-farm laws, and no other state supreme court has held them even partially unconstitutional. To the contrary, other courts have uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to these statutes. Gacke stands alone. I would accept the defendants’
The inalienable rights clause should be read together with the clause that immediately follows it in the Bill of Rights. According to
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the
people, and they have the right, at all times, to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it.
[I]t seems clear by logical deduction, and upon the most abundant authority, that this court has no authority to annul an act of the legislature unless it is found to be in clear, palpable and direct conflict with the written constitution.
Id. at 18–19; see also Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 842–44, 38 N.W.2d 236, 244–45 (1949) (discussing Stewart and subsequent cases).
We need to be cognizant of the right of Iowans to govern themselves through laws passed by their chosen representatives, a right recognized explicitly in
For these reasons, I am unable to fully join the majority opinion.
Mansfield, J., joins this special concurrence.