CITY OF DAVENPORT, Appellee, v. Thomas J. SEYMOUR, Appellant.
No. 06-1753.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Aug. 29, 2008.
755 N.W.2d 533
IV. Conclusion.
Proper venue for the Fromans’ suit is in the south division of the Lee County District Court. We therefore reverse the district court‘s denial of the defendant‘s motion to change venue, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except BAKER, J., who takes no part.
Christopher S. Jackson, Davenport, for appellee.
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, the court must decide whether traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms contained in
If the twentieth century may be characterized as the Era of the Automobile, it was also the Era of Automobile Regulation. In 1902, officers in Westchester County, New York, concealed themselves in fake tree trunks at specified intervals and, armed with stop watches and telephones, attempted to detect and apprehend speeders. Not to be outdone, innovative constables in Massachusetts in 1909 deployed a method of detecting speeding motorists that used a combination of a camera and a stop watch. See Commonwealth v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 128 (1910). These comparatively simple approaches to traffic law enforcement were subsequently replaced in the 1940s and 1950s by “radar” detection systems. Attacked as Orwellian when first introduced, the use of radar is now a standard tool of law enforcement.
Innovation in traffic management has not been limited to speed control. As every motorist knows, automated stop lights have come to replace the blue-suited patrolman with outstretched arms engaged in perpetual motion with a whistle at the ready. Most municipal authorities believe police officers have better things to do than to control traffic at intersections.
Modern technological advances have also led to the development of more sophisticated “automated traffic enforcement” (ATE) systems. Using a combination of cameras and sensors, the ATEs allow municipal governments to detect traffic violations without a law enforcement officer present on the scene. Promoted by private vendors who have developed and operated the systems, ATE red light cameras were first deployed abroad over thirty-five years ago and according to industry sources are now operational in forty-five countries. Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Towards Disaster: How Cleveland‘s Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 Clev. St. L.Rev. 607, 610 (2007). As of 2005, ATE speed detection systems were in use in as many as seventy-five countries. Id.
In this country, speed cameras have been utilized on a limited basis in several states, including Arizona, California, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and the District of Columbia. Red light systems have also been utilized by a number of municipalities, including those in Arizona, California, Virginia, and North Carolina. Id. at 611.
The advent of automatic traffic enforcement has prompted legislative action in a number of jurisdictions. Some state legislatures have elected expressly to authorize local governments to establish ATE systems provided that certain statutory requirements are met, including posting notice to drivers that automated traffic devices are in use. See, e.g.,
In 2004, the City of Davenport enacted an ordinance entitled “Automatic Traffic Enforcement.” Davenport Mun.Code § 10.16.070 (2005). The Davenport ATE ordinance authorized the city to install cameras and vehicle sensors at various locations in the city to make video images of vehicles that fail to obey red light traffic signals or speeding regulations. The information obtained from these automated devices is then forwarded to the Daven
Under the Davenport ATE ordinance, a vehicle owner is issued a notice and is liable for a civil fine as a result of any detected violation. A vehicle owner may rebut the city‘s claim by showing that a stolen vehicle report was made on the vehicle which encompassed the time in which the violation allegedly occurred. Citations issued pursuant to the Davenport ATE ordinance are not reported to the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) for the purpose of the vehicle owner‘s driving record.
A recipient of an automated traffic citation may dispute the citation by requesting the issuance of a municipal infraction citation. If so disputed, the recipient is entitled to a trial before a judge or magistrate. In the event the disputing vehicle owner is found to have violated the ordinance, state-mandated court costs are added to the amount of the violation.
Thomas J. Seymour felt the sting of the Davenport ATE ordinance on April 28, 2006. He received a citation alleging that his vehicle traveled forty-nine miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone on March 17, 2006. Seymour contested the citation.
Seymour‘s case was tried to a magistrate on a stipulated record. Seymour claimed that the ATE ordinance violated due process by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove a citation, by depriving a defendant of the presumption of innocence, by changing the burden of proof from the reasonable doubt standard to the lesser standard of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, and by shifting liability to vehicle owners, not drivers. Seymour also claimed that the Davenport ATE ordinance was invalid because it was preempted by traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms contained in
The magistrate rejected all of Seymour‘s claims, found that he violated the ordinance, and entered judgment against him. Seymour appealed to the district court, which affirmed the judgment.
We granted Seymour‘s application for discretionary review. While Seymour raised constitutional challenges based on due process in the lower courts, he has not pressed these claims on appeal and, as a result, these issues are not before us. The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the Davenport ATE ordinance is preempted because it is inconsistent or contrary to Iowa‘s statewide traffic laws as cited by Seymour.
II. Standard of Review.
A trial court‘s determination of whether a local ordinance is preempted by state law is a matter of statutory construction and is thus reviewable for correction of errors at law. State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Iowa 2007).
III. Discussion.
A. Principles of Preemption Analysis.
The central issue in this case is whether the provisions of the Davenport ATE ordinance are preempted by traffic regulation and enforcement provisions of
In 1968, the Iowa Constitution was amended to provide municipal govern
In order to determine whether municipal action is permitted or prohibited by the legislature, courts have developed the doctrine of preemption. The general thrust of the preemption doctrine in the context of local affairs is that municipalities cannot act if the legislature has directed otherwise. When exercised, legislative power trumps the power of local authorities.
We have recognized three types of preemption. The first type, generally known as express preemption, applies where the legislature has specifically prohibited local action in a given area. Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Iowa 1998); Chelsea Theater Corp. v. City of Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 1977). In cases involving express preemption, the specific language used by the legislature ordinarily provides the courts with the tools necessary to resolve any remaining marginal or mechanical problems in statutory interpretation.
Where the legislature seeks to prohibit municipal action in a particular subject area, express preemption offers the highest degree of certainty with the added benefit of discouraging unseemly internecine power struggles between state and local governments. Express preemption is most consistent with the notion that “[l]imitations on a municipality‘s power over local affairs are not implied; they must be imposed by the legislature.” City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 1990).
Nonetheless, this court has found that express preemption alone is not a sufficient tool to vindicate legislative intent in all circumstances. In order to ensure maximum loyalty to legislative intent, this court has developed the residual doctrine of implied preemption, notwithstanding language in our cases disapproving of implied limitations on municipal power. Implied preemption arises in two situations where the intent of the legislature to preempt is apparent even though the legislature did not expressly preempt in unambiguous language.
Implied preemption occurs where an ordinance prohibits an act permitted by statute, or permits an act prohibited by statute. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 493; Gruen, 457 N.W.2d at 342. Under these circumstances, although there is no express preemption, the statute on its face contains a command or mandate that by its very nature is preemptory. The theory of this branch of implied preemption is that even though an ordinance may not be expressly preempted by the legislature, the ordinance cannot exist harmoniously with a state statute because the ordinance is diametrically in opposition to it. The
Although implied preemption of the conflict variety occurs frequently, the legal standard for its application is demanding. In order to qualify for this branch of implied preemption, a local law must be “irreconcilable” with state law. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d at 342. Further, our cases teach that, if possible, we are to “interpret the state law in such a manner as to render it harmonious with the ordinance.” Id.; see also Iowa Grocery Indus. Ass‘n v. City of Des Moines, 712 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 2006); City of Iowa City v. Westinghouse Learning Corp., 264 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Iowa 1978). In applying implied preemption analysis, we presume that the municipal ordinance is valid. Iowa Grocery, 712 N.W.2d at 680. The cumulative result of these principles is that for implied preemption to occur based on conflict with state law, the conflict must be obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable debate.
A second form of implied preemption occurs when the legislature has so covered a subject by statute as to demonstrate a legislative intent that regulation in the field is preempted by state law. Like implied preemption based on conflict, the test for field preemption is stringent. Extensive regulation of area alone is not sufficient. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 493; City of Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1983). In order to invoke the doctrine of field preemption, there must be some clear expression of legislative intent to preempt a field from regulation by local authorities, or a statement of the legislature‘s desire to have uniform regulations statewide. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 499-500; City of Vinton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 868, 140 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1966). The notion behind field preemption is that the legislature need not employ “magic words” to close the door on municipal authority. Yet, courts are not to speculate on legislative intent, even in a highly regulated field. There must be persuasive concrete evidence of an intent to preempt the field in the language that the legislature actually chose to employ. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 493.
Field preemption is a narrow doctrine that cannot be enlarged by judicial policy preferences. In determining the applicability of field preemption, this court does not entertain arguments that statewide regulation is preferable to local regulation or vice versa, but focuses solely on legislative intent as demonstrated through the language and structure of a statute. Id. at 498-99.
In this case, the parties agree that the legislature has not expressly preempted the Davenport ATE ordinance. The only question is whether one of the branches of implied preemption applies in light of the statutory provisions cited by Seymour.
B. Application of Preemption Principles to the ATE Ordinance.
1. Relevant statutory provisions.
Entitled “Motor Vehicles and the Law of the Road,”
Of central concern to the preemption challenge in this case is
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
The next provision of the code adds additional relevant language.
Local authorities shall have no power to enact, enforce, or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation in any way in conflict with, contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, and no such ordinance, rule or regulation of said local authorities heretofore or hereafter enacted shall have any force or effect, however the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of police power from: [list of fourteen exceptions].
The only exception contained in
Another provision of Iowa law cited by Seymour is
Seymour also cites
2. Contentions of the parties.
The parties agree that there are a number of differences between the provisions of
The parties, however, take opposing views of these differences. The City maintains that the differences between the Davenport ATE ordinance and the applicable state laws demonstrate that the Davenport ATE ordinance is not contrary to, or inconsistent with state law, but is merely supplemental to provisions of the state code. Seymour, on the other hand, maintains that the differences powerfully demonstrate conflict with state law by creating an entirely new enforcement regime that is wholly absent from chapter 321 and related provisions.
3. Application of preemption principles.
A number of our cases have explored the question of whether a local ordinance conflicts with state law, thereby triggering implied preemption. For example, in Iowa Grocery, we invalidated a Des Moines ordinance that allowed the city to charge an administrative fee related to liquor licenses and permits in the face of a state statute which provided that the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division, by rule, shall establish the administrative fee to be assessed by all local authorities. Iowa Grocery, 712 N.W.2d at 680. Similarly, in James Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Ames, 661 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Iowa 2003), we held that an Ames ordinance which prohibited smoking in restaurants during certain hours was preempted by state law which allowed designated smoking areas in restaurants. In these cases, local ordinances simply could not be reconciled with state law. An additional preemption case of older vintage is Engledow, 258 Iowa at 861, 140 N.W.2d at 857. In that case, we invalidated a local ordinance that attempted to change the substantive elements of the crime of reckless driving. Engledow, 258 Iowa at 868, 140 N.W.2d at 861.
The above cases demonstrate that the phrase “irreconcilable” used in preemption analysis is a hard-edged term. In order to be “irreconcilable,” the conflict must be unresolvable short of choosing one enactment over the other. No such bitter choice is presented in this case. The Davenport ATE ordinance simply cannot be said to authorize what the legislature has expressly prohibited, or to prohibit what the legislature has authorized. Nothing in
Using the principles established by our case law regarding implied conflict preemption, namely, that a local ordinance is not impliedly preempted unless it is “irreconcilable,” that every effort should be made to harmonize a local ordinance with a state statute, and that implied preemption only applies where a local ordinance prohibits what a state statute allows or allows what a state statute prohibits, we conclude that implied conflict preemption simply does not apply in this case. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, 521 (1923), whether a municipal ordinance is in conflict is not determined by the penalties prescribed, but whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the state prohibits or forbids or vice versa. See also Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-18, 101 S. Ct. 1124, 1130, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258, 265 (1981) (stating conflict in preemption context is to be assessed by examining the activity which the state has attempted to regulate, rather than the method used); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 329, at 368-70 (stating state and local regulation may coexist in identical areas although local regulation exacts additional requirements, unless state statute limits requirements by prescription).
We find nothing in
We also reject Seymour‘s claim that the Davenport ATE ordinance conflicts with
The remaining question is whether the traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms of
Yet, the introductory language in
Although not articulated as such by the parties, we believe the nub of both the conflict and field preemption issues is whether the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to defeat the Davenport ATE ordinance. Under this rule of statutory interpretation, a provision that a statutory mandate be carried out in one way implies a prohibition against doing it another way. See Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction ch. 46 (6th ed.2000). Arguably, by providing a criminal penalty for speeding and red light violations, the legislature should be deemed to have rejected alternate remedies such as civil penalties.
The issue here, however, is not whether the state legislature has authorized state authorities to establish an ATE system to enforce red light and speeding laws. This case involves the materially different question of whether state law prohibits municipal authorities from creating such a system. Unless the long-deceased Dillon Rule is resurrected, the notion that the mere failure of the legislature to authorize invalidates municipal action is without merit. Under our case law, the state statute and the municipal action must be irreconcilable. The fact that state law does not authorize the state to enforce its statute through certain remedial options does not mean that it forbids municipalities from the same course of action. In the context of state-local preemption, the silence of the legislature is not prohibitory but permissive. See Cameron v. City of Waco, 8 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Civ.App.1928) (holding that rule of expres
We recognize that the Colorado and Minnesota Supreme Courts have held that automated traffic enforcement regimes were preempted by state traffic laws. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1285 (Colo.2002); State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Minn.2007). On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Ohio has reached an opposite conclusion. Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 881 N.E.2d 255, 265 (2008). We have reviewed the Colorado and Minnesota cases and find nothing to dissuade us from our approach, which is dictated by well-established Iowa case law.
In reaching our conclusion, we are aware that the desirability of ATE ordinances is the subject of contentious political debate. See generally Robin Miller, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26 A.L.R.6th 179 (2007). Supporters of ATE ordinances may passionately assert that the presence of the cameras and speed sensors promote public safety and save lives, especially the lives of children, when careless driving and road rage are all too common. In contrast, opponents may view ATE ordinances as unduly intrusive, unfair, and simply amounting to sophisticated speed traps designed to raise funds for cash-strapped municipalities by ensnaring unsuspecting car owners in a municipal bureaucracy under circumstances where most busy people find it preferable to shut up and pay rather than scream and fight.
As we have previously stated, “In construing statutes it is our duty to determine legislative intent; the wisdom of the legislation is not our concern.” Hines v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 330 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1983). As a result, the pros and cons of ATE ordinances have no bearing on the narrow legal issue that we are required to decide in this case. Our only task is to determine, under established legal principles, the issues that the parties have presented, specifically, whether the Davenport ATE ordinance is preempted by the traffic regulatory and enforcement provisions of
We also recognize that a number of statutory and constitutional questions have been raised to ATE ordinances that are not presented in this appeal. ATE ordinances have been attacked as amounting to an unlawful revenue raising measure or as improperly delegating government authority to a private vendor. Andrew W.J. Tarr, Picture It: Red Light Cameras Abide by the Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L.Rev. 1879, 1886 (2002) (issue of unlawful revenue raising); see also Leonte v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 521, 19 Cal. Rptr.3d 879 (2004) (delegation of power). Academic commentators have debated whether ATE ordinances violate rights of privacy. See, e.g., Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You‘re on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 Val. U.L.Rev. 1079 (1997); Mary Lehman, Are Red Light Cameras Snapping Privacy Rights?, 33 U. Tol. L.Rev. 815 (2002); Steven Tafoya Naumchik, Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 30 McGeorge L.Rev. 833 (1999). ATE ordinances also have been attacked on due process, Fourth Amendment, and equal protection grounds. See, e.g., McNeill v. Town of Paradise Valley, 44 Fed. App‘x 871 (9th Cir.2002) (Fourth
All of the above questions are not raised in this appeal, and we consequently express no view on them. This court is not a roving commission that offers instinctual legal reactions to interesting issues that have not been raised or briefed by the parties and for which the record is often entirely inadequate if not completely barren. We decide only the concrete issues that were presented, litigated, and preserved in this case.
IV. Conclusion.
We hold the Davenport ATE ordinance is not preempted by the traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms of
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except WIGGINS, J., who dissents and BAKER, J., who takes no part.
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I cannot agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the legislature‘s comprehensive enactment of the traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms contained in chapter 321 of the Iowa Code does not preempt Davenport‘s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance. Although the majority recognizes the doctrine of implied preemption, it fails to follow our existing case law in its application of the doctrine.
Chapter 321 includes a uniform law provision.
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
Chapter 321 also limits the power of local authorities to enact an ordinance that conflicts with the Code.
Local authorities shall have no power to enact, enforce, or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation in any way in conflict with, contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, and no such ordinance, rule or regulation of said local authorities heretofore or hereafter enacted shall have any force or effect....
This court has applied these sections on two prior occasions and struck down local ordinances that were inconsistent with chapter 321. Central City v. Eddy, 173 N.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Iowa 1970); City of Vinton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 868, 140 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1966). In City of Vinton, the city enacted a local ordinance defining reckless driving as:
“Every driver of any vehicle upon any street in the city shall drive and operate such vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and with due regard and pre
caution for the safety of pedestrians, persons, property and other vehicles. No person shall operate or drive any vehicle in a manner or at a speed greater or other than is reasonable and safe with respect to such vehicles, persons, pedestrians or property.”
City of Vinton, 258 Iowa at 864, 140 N.W.2d at 860 (citation omitted). Although a prior state statute defined reckless driving in this manner, the present state statute only allowed a finding of reckless driving when “[a]ny person []drives any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property....” Id. at 865, 140 N.W.2d at 860.
There this court recognized the state of mind of the violator for committing the offense of reckless driving was lower under the city ordinance than the state statute. The city ordinance only required a finding of negligence to hold the driver culpable, while the state ordinance required a finding of “either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Id. In analyzing the city ordinance, the court first determined that this type of regulation was not contained as an exception to section
Next, the court considered whether the city ordinance was consistent with the state statute, as required by section
In applying these principles, the court found the difference between the state of mind needed to hold violators liable under the state and city laws destroyed the uniformity required by sections
In 1970 the court was asked to revisit a similar issue. Central City, 173 N.W.2d at 583-85. There the city held drivers culpable for careless or negligent driving on public streets, alleys, and highways. Id. at 583. Our court recognized that the legislature only held a driver culpable for driving with either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Id. at 584. Thus, the city‘s ordinance holding a driver culpable for negligent driving was inconsistent with state law. Id. Accordingly, the ordinance was invalid. Id.
Applying established law to the facts of this case can only lead to one conclusion--Davenport‘s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance violates sections
The legislature has defined when an owner of a vehicle may be culpable for a violation of chapter 321.
It may be asserted that because the violation of the ordinance is a civil infraction, it is not inconsistent with
In Illinois several municipalities passed local ordinances allowing traffic offenders to pay a civil settlement fee in lieu of court adjudication. People ex rel. Ryan v. Vill. of Hanover Park, 311 Ill. App. 3d 515, 243 Ill. Dec. 823, 724 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1999). Like Davenport‘s ordinance, a traffic violator in these municipalities would pay a fine to the municipality and the violation would not be reported to the state. Section 11-207, chapter 11 of the Illinois Code contains the same language as section
The Illinois Appellate Court found this statute violated the uniformity requirement of traffic laws contained in section 11-207 of chapter 11 for two reasons. Id. at 143-44. First, the ordinance allows certain moving violations to be adjudicated administratively, while the Illinois Code requires moving violations to be dealt with judicially. Id. at 140. Second, by not reporting the violations to the licensing authority, the licensing authority cannot exercise its exclusive authority to cancel, suspend, or revoke a license. Id. at 141. I agree with the reasoning of the Illinois court.
The Iowa legislature has given Iowa municipalities the power to adjudicate parking violations administratively.
Another problem with the administrative adjudication under the Davenport ordinance is its failure to report violators to the department of transportation (DOT). The DOT is the sole agency designated by the legislature to administer the issuance, suspension, and revocation of a driver‘s license.
In order for the DOT to administer the suspension or revocation of a driver‘s license, it must receive a record of the conviction from the court system.
The Davenport ordinance circumvents the DOT‘s exclusive control, and undermines the goal set forth by the legislature that repeat offenders should be kept off our roads. Why would the legislature allow a person with five violations under the Davenport ordinance to continue to drive, when its stated legislative policy is to prohibit a driver with three moving violations in any other part of the state from operating a motor vehicle? An unsafe driver in Davenport is an unsafe driver anywhere else in this state. By not applying our suspension and revocation laws uniformly, our streets and highways become a more dangerous place.
I understand Davenport‘s desire to decrease the occurrences of speeding without the expense of adding more officers for enforcement in these tough economic times. I also understand the city‘s need to raise revenue from new sources. However, I cannot believe an ordinance that holds the owner strictly liable and does nothing to remove repeat offenders from the road furthers the legislative intent of sections
Accordingly, without specific authorization by the legislature to hold owners strictly liable for the acts of a driver, without judicial adjudication, and without DOT authority to regulate who should not be on the roads, I would hold Davenport‘s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance invalid.
STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jackie Lynn BRANDON, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 07-1206.
Court of Appeals of Iowa.
May 29, 2008.