Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLCGoddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Suttell, Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, Indeglia
OPINION
Chief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.
Which period of limitation applies to a civil action alleging a violation of the employer drug testing statute (EDTS)1—ten years as provided in
I
Facts and Procedural History
On March 27, 2014, Melissa Goddard (plaintiff) filed a complaint against APG Security-RI, LLC, as well as against Scott Hemingway and Anna Vidiri in their capacities as employees/agents of APG Security-RI, LLC (collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged that, in January 2010, when plaintiff was employed as a security guard by APG Security-RI, LLC, defendants violated
II
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court applies the same standard as the hearing justice.” Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, 115 A.3d 938, 942 (R.I.2015) (quoting Woonsocket School Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 787 (R.I.2014)). “Because the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, our review is confined to the four corners of that pleading.” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787). “We will ‘assume[ ] the allegations contained in the complaint to be true and view[ ] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.’ ” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787). “A motion to dismiss is properly granted when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff‘s claim.” Id. (quoting Chafee, 89 A.3d at 787).
This appeal also presents us with a question of law regarding which of two general civil action statutes of limitations will apply to causes of action arising from alleged violations of the EDTS. It is well settled that ” ‘[t]he question of whether a statute of limitations has run against a plaintiff‘s claim is * * * a question of law,’ which this Court reviews de novo.” Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 942-43 (quoting Ballesta v. McHale, 823 A.2d 292, 294 (R.I.2003)). “[T]his Court [also] reviews questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.” Id. at 943 (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150, 1156 (R.I.2014)).
III
Discussion
The plaintiff argues that the ten-year statute of limitations in
The defendants counterargue that the three-year statute of limitations in
The EDTS provides employees with a right to be free from drug tests that are not administered in accordance with the process set forth within the statute. See
When a statute creates a civil remedy for its violation but is silent regarding the applicable limitations period, we have often decided between one of two residual statutes of limitations provided in chapter 1 of title 9: either the three years provided in
“to include within that period of limitation actions brought for injuries resulting from invasions of rights that inhere in man as a rational being, that is, rights to which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law. Such rights, of course, are to be distinguished from those which accrue to an individual by reason of some peculiar status or by virtue of an interest created
by contract or property.” Id. at 20-21, 199 A.2d at 610.
We have repeatedly applied the framework established in Commerce Oil to determine which statute of limitations applies to various causes of action. See, e.g., Paul, 745 A.2d at 172; McBurney v. Roszkowski, 687 A.2d 447, 448-49 (R.I.1997) (holding that an action for intentional interference with a contract was subject to the ten-year statute of limitations); Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 23, 24, 26 (R.I.1986) (holding that actions for legal malpractice were essentially claims for negligent breach of contract and were therefore subject to the statute of limitations in
Since our pronouncement in Commerce Oil, we have not had an occasion to either define or apply the “peculiar status” exception to the comprehensive construction that we have afforded the language “injuries to the person” under
The plaintiff has essentially alleged a violation of her right to be free from drug testing that is not conducted in accordance with the mandates set forth in the EDTS. See
We note that our conclusion is consistent with statutes of limitations that the General
The plaintiff also sought damages pursuant to
IV
Conclusion
Because the plaintiff filed her complaint more than three years after the alleged violation of the EDTS, her claims pursuant to both the EDTS and
Notes
“(a) No employer or agent of any employer shall, either orally or in writing, request, require, or subject any employee to submit a sample of his or her urine, blood, or other bodily fluid or tissue for testing as a condition of continued employment unless that test is administered in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
“Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his or her person, reputation, or estate by reason of the commission of any crime or offense, he or she may recover his or her damages for the injury in a civil action against the offender, and it shall not be any defense to such action that no criminal complaint for the crime or offense has been made; and whenever any person shall be guilty of larceny, he or she shall be liable to the owner of the money or articles taken for twice the value thereof, unless the money or articles are restored, and for the value thereof in case of restoration.”