Melissa E. Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC, alias John Doe Corporation
134 A.3d 173
R.I.2016Background
- Plaintiff Melissa Goddard sued APG Security-RI, LLC and two employees, alleging that in January 2010 she was required to submit to an unlawful drug test and was then terminated in violation of the Employer Drug Testing Statute (EDTS), G.L. 1956 § 28-6.5-1.
- Goddard sought civil relief under the EDTS and under G.L. § 9-1-2 (civil liability for victims of crimes); the EDTS creates criminal and civil remedies but is silent on the applicable statute of limitations for civil claims.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as time-barred; the Superior Court held the three-year limitations period of § 9-1-14(b) applied and dismissed the complaint as filed after that period.
- Goddard argued the ten-year residual period of § 9-1-13(a) should apply because (1) EDTS is silent and (2) EDTS rights arise from a "peculiar status" (employee) rather than as injuries to the person.
- The Supreme Court granted review, considered briefing and oral argument, and reviewed whether EDTS claims constitute "injuries to the person" (three-year limit) or fall under the ten-year general period.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable statute of limitations for EDTS civil claims | § 9-1-13(a)’s ten-year period applies because EDTS is silent and EDTS rights arise from a peculiar status (employee) | § 9-1-14(b)’s three-year “injuries to the person” period applies because EDTS violations invade personal rights, not rights from peculiar status | The three-year statute in § 9-1-14(b) applies; EDTS violations are injuries to the person |
| Accrual date for limitations | (implicit) accrual when injury discovered or when test administered | Limitations begin when the drug test was administered | Court accepted that limitations began at test administration and plaintiff sued after three years, so claims were time-barred |
| Applicability of § 9-1-2 civil remedy timeframe | § 9-1-2 claims tied to EDTS violation should follow the same limitations analysis | § 9-1-14(b) governs § 9-1-2 actions arising from EDTS misdemeanor | § 9-1-2 claims are subject to § 9-1-14(b)’s three-year limit |
| Public policy and consistency with employment statutes | Ten-year period appropriate under general residual rule | Shorter periods are consistent with other employment/statutory schemes and policy favoring prompt claims | Court noted legislative practice favors short employment-related limitations and relied on three-year period |
Key Cases Cited
- Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606 (1964) (defines “injuries to the person” vs. rights arising from peculiar status)
- Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (2000) (applies § 9-1-14(b) to determine limitations for statutory civil claims)
- Lyons v. Town of Scituate, 554 A.2d 1034 (1989) (applies three-year rule to § 9-1-2 claims)
- Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721 (1985) (holds libel and similar personal-right invasions fall under § 9-1-14(b))
- Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22 (1986) (distinguishes contract-based claims subject to ten-year period)
Decision: Affirmed the Superior Court; EDTS and § 9-1-2 claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b) and Goddard’s suit was time-barred.