NATIONAL REFRIGERATION, INC. v. CAPITAL PROPERTIES, INC. et al.
No. 2011-54-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
April 17, 2014.
88 A.3d 1150
Further, assuming arguendo that we were to adopt the plaintiffs’ interpretation of Textron and determine that the loss was “sudden and accidental” from their perspective, the damage would nevertheless remain uncovered under the policy. The plain language of the policy protects against loss caused by the “[s]udden and accidental tearing apart, cracking, burning or bulging of a steam or hot water heating system.” The plaintiffs, however, failed to present any evidence indicating that the loss was due to such a tearing apart, cracking, burning or bulging; therefore, whether or not the damage was sudden and accidental is of no moment. Because the undisputed evidence indicates that the damage to the plaintiffs’ property was caused by corrosion—damage not covered by their insurance policy—there remain no genuine issues of material fact and Merrimack is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the record of this case shall be returned thereto.
Mitchell R. Edwards, Esq., Thomas R. Gonnella, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.
The plaintiff, National Refrigeration, Inc. (National Refrigeration or plaintiff), appeals from a Superior Court judgment granting the motion of the defendants Capital Properties, Inc. (Capital Properties or owner) and Capitol Cove, LLC1 (Capitol Cove or lessee) for final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,2 in this mechanics’ lien action. The plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Providence Builders, LLC (Providence Builders or builder), performed work on a property in the City of Providence that was owned by Capital Properties and leased by Capitol Cove. When a dispute arose regarding payment, the plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against the owner, the lessee, and the builder. Pursuant to the provisions of Rhode Island‘s Mechanics’ Lien Statute (lien statute),
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, and in entering final judgment in favor of Capital Properties and Capitol Cove. The plaintiff argues that the owner, lessee, and surety are all directly liable for the relief sought under the mechanics’ lien statute, and that, because plaintiff complied with the requirements of the lien statute, judgment should be awarded in its favor.5 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
Capital Properties is the owner of a parcel of land located at One Park Row West in the City of Providence. Capitol Cove entered into a ground lease with Capital Properties. Capitol Cove then entered into a contract with Providence Builders for the construction of a condominium development оn the property. Builder, as construction manager, then entered into a subcontract with plaintiff to install the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems for the development. A dispute arose between plaintiff and builder concerning payment, and plaintiff recorded a lien against the property and also filed a complaint to enforce that lien pursuant to the lien statute.6
Owner and lessee filed an ex parte motion to discharge the lien upon deposit of a bond with the Registry of the Court, pursuant to
Pursuant to
The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the first count; defendants objected and Capital Properties and Capitоl Cove filed cross-motions requesting that final judgment enter in their favor pursuant to Rule 54(b).8 At a hearing on November 23, 2010, the hearing justice denied plaintiff‘s motion and granted summary judgment to Capital Properties and Capitol Cove. Final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered on December 6, 2010, from which plaintiff timely appealed.
II
Standard of Review
The plaintiff appeals both the denial of its motion for summary judgment and the hearing justice‘s grant of defendants’ Rule 54(b) motion. “Because an order denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory determination and is not entitled to an appeal of right, we do not generally review such a denial.” McKinnon v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 713 A.2d 245, 247 (R.I. 1998).9
“This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justicе.” Carreiro v. Tobin, 66 A.3d 820, 822 (R.I.2013) (quoting Great American E & S Insurance Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571, 574 (R.I.2012)). “Specifically, ‘we will affirm a summary judgment if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‘” McKinnon, 713 A.2d at 247
III
Discussion
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in entering judgment in favor оf Capital Properties and Capitol Cove because they, as well as builder and Liberty, are all directly liable to it for any rights it has under the lien statute. The plaintiff asserts that builder‘s counterclaim for setoff is separate from plaintiff‘s claim against owner and lessee and that, because there is no setoff at issue on count 1, and plaintiff complied with the procedures necessary to assert a mechanics’ lien, it was error to grant judgment in favor of Capital Properties and Capitol Cove.
The defendant Capital Properties argues that a mechanics’ lien action is an action in rem and that the plain language of
“The mechanics’ lien statute was designed to prevent unjust enrichment by one person at the expense of another.” Tilcon Gammino, Inc. v. Commercial Associates, 570 A.2d 1102, 1107 (R.I.1990). We have stated that the statute‘s intended purpose is to “afford a liberal remedy to all who have contributed labor or material towards adding to the value of the property to which the lien attaches.” Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 803 (R.I.2005) (quoting Field & Slocomb v. Consolidated Mineral Water Co., 25 R.I. 319, 320, 55 A. 757, 758 (1903)). “This [C]ourt has long ago held that a mechanic[s‘] lien proceeding is an equitable in rem proceeding. * * * The true respondent, therefore, is the land upon which the lien attaches.” Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 570 A.2d at 1107.
The effect of placing suсh a lien on the property is substantial, clouding title and “impair[ing] the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property.” Rossi, 867 A.2d at 810 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991)). As a safeguard against erroneous deprivation of the owner or lessee‘s property rights, ”
Section 34-28-17(a) provides, in pertinent part:
“At any time after the recording of a notice of intention or after the filing of a complaint to enforce a lien under
§§ 34-28-10 and34-28-13 , the owner or lessee or tenant of the land described in the notice or complaint may pay into the registry of the court * * * cash equal to the total amount of the notice of intention and the accounts and demands of all persons claiming liens therein * * * including costs, interest at the statutory rate and reasonable attorney‘s fees of the lien holder, or may, in lieu of cash, deposit in the registry of the court the bond of a surety company licensed to do business in this stаte in the total amount * * * and on proper proof of payment or deposit and on motion of the owner or lessee or tenant, any justice of the superior court shall enter ex parte an order discharging the notice of intention and lis pendens and dismissing the cause as to the owner or lessee or tenant * * *”
The hearing justice held that, while the lien law “is less than a masterpiece in clarity[,] * * * on some points it is clear, and that is [that] once the bond is posted, the persons whom the mechanics’ lien was filed against * * * go on with their busi-
The plaintiff argues that
“In the event that the complaint has been filed with the appropriate superior court, and after depositing cash or the bond of a surety company and discharging the notice of intention and lis pendens, and dismissing the cause as noted in this sеction, the lien plaintiff shall amend the complaint, to include the surety as defendant within sixty (60) days * * *”
To support this argument, plaintiff points to the word “include” as indicative of a legislative intent to allow a plaintiff to supplement the original complaint by adding a party rather than substituting one party for another. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the owner and lessee should remain as defendants along with the surety.
“This Court reviews questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo.” Morel v. Napolitano, 64 A.3d 1176, 1179 (R.I.2013). “When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “The plain meaning approach, however, is not the equivalent of myopic literalism, and it is entirely proper for us to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.” Peloquin v. Haven Health Center of Greenville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 425 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I.2012)). “Therefore we must consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.” Id. (quoting Mendes, 41 A.3d at 1002). “Finally, under nо circumstances will this Court construe a statute to reach an absurd result.” Id. (quoting Mendes, 41 A.3d at 1002).
In our opinion, the plaintiff‘s reliance on the word “include” is misplaced. Were it indicative of the presence of multiple parties, as plaintiff argues, surely that is consonant with situations in which a general contractor (like builder) remains a defendant, whilе the surety is included as an additional defendant. “The bond stands as security for any claim made by [plaintiff]; the real property is no longer at risk or encumbered in any way.” Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912, 923 (R.I.2004). To read
Finally, we address the plaintiff‘s contention that, because there is no setoff at issue on count 1, and the plaintiff complied with the procedures necessary tо assert a mechanics’ lien, the hearing justice erred in granting judgment to Capital Properties and Capitol Cove. It is true that owner and lessee did not counterclaim for setoff; but, at the same time, the plaintiff does not have a claim against owner or lessee. The only dispute that remains is between the plaintiff and builder, with Liberty included as surety. We have previously stated that “[a] setoff * * * becomes part of a single controversy between the parties, requiring only one verdict and one judgment * * *” Keystone Elevator Co., 850 A.2d at 919. To allow the plaintiff to recover the full amount of its claim against the owner and lessee before the disputed
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
SUTTELL, C.J.
David F. MILLER et al. v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 2013-63-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
April 17, 2014.
Notes
“In the event that the complaint has been filed with the appropriate superior court, and after depositing cash or the bond of a surety company and discharging the notice of intention and lis pendens, and dismissing the cause as noted in this section, the lien plaintiff shall amend the complaint, to include the surety as defendant within sixty (60) days after the person or entity claiming the lien is given notice of the order in regard to the bond.”