TAMMY MCKEE, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Michael Wade McKee, Plaintiff, versus CITY OF SKIATOOK, OKLAHOMA; LEIANNE RICHARDS, Defendants.
Case No. 23-cv-209-JDR-MTS
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
September 12, 2025
On May 29, 2022, City of Skiatook Police Officer Leianne Richards pursued a speeding motorcyclist from Skiatook, Oklahoma to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The chase ended tragically: Officer Richards‘s patrol car collided with the motorcycle, causing the death of its rider, Michael Wade McKee. Plaintiff Tammy McKee, acting on her own behalf and as representative of Mr. McKee‘s estate, sued Officer Richards and the City of Skiatook for violations of state and federal law. Dkt. 2. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff‘s state-law claims against the City [Dkt. 22], and Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s remaining claims. Dkts. 62, 63. For the reasons set forth below, their motions are granted.
I1
Officer Leianne Richards of the Skiatook Police Department was driving her marked patrol vehicle through a residential neighborhood when an
Mr. McKee turned onto Highway 11, and Officer Richards continued to pursue him. Id. (statement of fact no. 9). She followed Mr. McKee out of Skiatook, through Sperry, and into Tulsa where Highway 11 transitions into a four-lane street known as Peoria Avenue. Id. (statement of fact no. 13); Dkts. 62-8 at 7, 62-10 at 4 (discussing change from Highway 11 to Peoria Avenue).4 Traffic was “light” during the pursuit. Id. (statement of fact no. 10). Although Mr. McKee reached speeds of more than 100 miles per hour during the eighteen-mile chase, there were no collisions or near-collisions with vehicles or pedestrians until the pursuit‘s sudden and deadly end. Id. (statement of fact no. 14).
Unbeknownst to Mr. McKee and Officer Richards, a bridge just south of the intersection of 31st Street and Peoria Avenue was undergoing construction, and a portion of Peoria Avenue was therefore closed. Dkt. 62 at 14 (statement of fact no. 28). Mr. McKee and Officer Richards drove into the construction zone. To do so, they passed several type III barricades with flashing lights, crossed into the northbound lane (the only lane not blocked by a barricade), and passed signs indicating that the road was closed, the bridge was out, and traffic should use alternate routes. Id. at 14-15 (statements of fact nos. 28-34).
At this point, the parties’ stories diverge: Officer Richards asserts that, when she drove into the construction zone, she saw a semi-trailer parked in the northbound lane and lost sight of Mr. McKee. She applied her brakes and
Both parties agree that Officer Richards‘s vehicle collided with Mr. McKee‘s motorcycle while he was still on it. Dkt. 62 at 16 (statement of fact no. 39); Dkt. 77 at 13.8 They also agree Mr. McKee “had either stopped his motorcycle or slowed down to a pace less than [Officer Richards] was traveling” at the time of the collision. Dkt. 62 at 16 (statement of fact no. 39); Dkt. 77 at 12.9 When Officer Richards‘s vehicle struck the motorcycle, Mr. McKee
The City required its officers to undergo specific training, including mandatory basic academy training and certification by the Oklahoma Counsel on Law Enforcement Education and Training. Dkt. 63 at 9 (statement of fact no. 1). Officers were required to read, understand, and comply with the City‘s policies and procedures (which included policies governing the use of force and vehicle pursuits) and complete daily training bulletins relevant to those policies and procedures. Id. (statements of fact nos. 1, 2);10 Dkt. 63-1. In the five years prior to the accident at issue, City police officers had been involved in sixteen or fewer high-speed pursuits outside the city limits. Dkt. 63 at 11 (statement of fact no. 5); Dkt. 89 at 10-11. Of those, six were terminated by the involved officer, three resulted in the driver being apprehended after the driver‘s vehicle became stuck or disabled, and one ended when the Oklahoma Highway Patrol used stop sticks to disable a vehicle. Dkt. 63 at 11 (statement of fact no. 5).11
Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Mr. McKee‘s estate, sued Officer Richards and the City. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that (1) both Officer Richards and the City are liable under
II
Summary judgment may only be entered if the moving party can show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When a defendant moves for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, as Officer Richards does here, the Court applies the standard above while considering the “substantive burden[] on the underlying issue[]” of qualified immunity. Rife v. Oklahoma Dep‘t of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 643 (10th Cir. 2017). Once qualified immunity is asserted, the plaintiff bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that a reasonable factfinder could find facts supporting the violation of a constitutional right that had been clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id. (citing Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014)) (footnote omitted). Once “this burden is met, the defendant must show that (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact and (2) the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011)).
III
The Court begins with Plaintiff‘s federal claims against Officer Richards. Officer Richards has invoked the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Dkt. 14 at 3-4. Plaintiff therefore bears the initial burden of pointing to facts that, if true, would (1) demonstrate that Officer Richards violated Mr. McKee‘s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the incident that Officer Richards‘s conduct was unlawful. See D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018); Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2020). This Court “may address either prong of the inquiry first and need not address both if one is dispositive.” Heard v. Dulayev, 29 F.4th 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
A
The Court turns first to Plaintiff‘s claim that Officer Richards illegally arrested Mr. McKee. This claim appears to be, in large part, duplicative of Plaintiff‘s excessive-force claim.13 But there is at least some suggestion in Plaintiffs’ complaint and brief that Officer Richards violated Mr. McKee‘s federal rights by arresting him without authority or probable cause to do so.
It was Plaintiff‘s burden to point to facts that, if true, would demonstrate that Mr. McKee was arrested in violation of his federal constitutional or statutory rights. Sawyers, 962 F.3d at 1282. But Plaintiff has failed to point to any facts suggesting that Officer Richards lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. McKee. See generally Dkt. 77.15 She has likewise failed to point to any facts suggesting that the arrest itself (independent of the use of force) violated Mr. McKee‘s federal rights. Id. And the facts of record establish that Officer Richards observed Mr. McKee speeding in a residential area, confirmed with her radar that he was speeding, and signaled for Mr. McKee to pull over before pursuing him for failing to do so. See Dkt. 62 at 11-12. These facts would preclude a jury from finding that Officer Richards lacked probable cause to stop Mr. McKee as a general matter. See United States v. Morgan, 855 F.3d 1122, 1123 (10th Cir. 2017) (“A traffic stop is a seizure but is ‘reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.‘” (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996))).
Plaintiff also bore the burden of pointing to case law clearly establishing that, at the time of the incident, Officer Richards‘s conduct was notice that the arrest itself (independent of the force used to effect it) violated Mr. McKee‘s federal rights. Sawyers, 962 F.3d at 1282. Plaintiff failed to meet this
B
The Court now turns to Plaintiff‘s claim that Officer Richards used excessive force against Mr. McKee. An excessive-force claim is, in effect, a challenge to the reasonableness of an arrest or seizure. See Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 663 (10th Cir. 2010). The use of even deadly force
1
To establish that an officer‘s use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must first show that a seizure occurred. Thomas, 607 F.3d at 663 (noting that a plaintiff “must show both that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that the seizure was ‘unreasonable‘” (quoting Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal citation omitted)). Officer Richards argues that she did not “unreasonably seize” Mr. McKee because she did not “seize” him at all; according to Officer Richards, the collision was an accident, nothing more, and that accidental conduct cannot give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation.
“Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.” See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).17 If, as Officer Richards claims, there is no evidence that she intended to seize, arrest, or use force against Mr. McKee, then Plaintiff cannot prevail on her Fourth Amendment claim as a matter of law. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (“We illustrated the point by saying that no
Officer Richards argues there is no evidence that would permit a jury to find she intentionally hit Mr. McKee. See Dkt. 62 at 24, 25-30. In support of this position, she points to her own testimony that she did everything she could to avoid an accident, her post-collision statements describing the collision as an “accident” rather than a tactical decision, and data collected from the airbag control module on her vehicle, which indicates that Officer Richards applied her brakes and steered to the right, left, and back to the right in the moments prior to the accident.19 Dkt. 62-6 at 21; Dkt. 62-8 at 8; Dkt. 62-11 at 18-19. Plaintiff, in response, argues that the evidence of Officer Richards‘s speed, acceleration, and position prior to the crash, the physical evidence at the scene of the collision, and Officer Richards‘s own statements
Although this is a close case, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. Officer Richards‘s testimony shows that, for most of the pursuit, she followed three or four car lengths behind Mr. McKee. See Dkt. 62-3 at 10-12, 14, 21, 28, 32-33, 51). She closed that gap just prior to the collision, following approximately one car length behind Mr. McKee as she passed the barriers and entered the construction site. Id. at 59-60. There is evidence that Officer Richards was accelerating three-to-five seconds prior to striking Mr. McKee. Dkt. 62-11 at 18-19. And although the brake switch was activated one-and-a-half seconds prior to the collision, there is no evidence as to how much braking percentage was used by Officer Richards, nor is there evidence that officers investigating the collision found any skid marks indicative of sudden braking. Id. at 19; Dkt. 62-3 at 61. This evidence could be consistent with Officer Richards‘s claim that she suddenly and accidentally collided with Mr. McKee while trying to avoid a parked trailer; but it could also be consistent with Plaintiff‘s claim that Officer Richards made a tactical decision to forcibly end the chase once Mr. McKee entered the construction zone.
Officer Richards argues that her statements after the collision show that she did not intend to strike Mr. McKee. See Dkt. 62 at 26-29. But a jury could decide not to credit Officer Richards‘s statements based on the evidence discussed above. And as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, courts ruling on motions for summary judgment should exercise caution when considering the potentially self-serving statements of officers, particularly when the witness most likely to contradict the officer is dead and unable to testify. E.g., Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1218 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the evidence could support the conclusion that the victim did not fire his weapon at the officer, despite the officer‘s statement to the contrary).
After considering all the evidence, the Court concludes that a question of fact remains as to Officer Richards‘s intent at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Court declines to hold as a matter of law that no Fourth-Amendment seizure took place. The Court assumes, for purposes of this opinion, that Officer Richards intentionally struck Mr. McKee‘s motorcycle as he was slowing down to prevent him from fleeing further. The limited factual record and the critical question of Officer Richards‘s intent makes further analysis of the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis difficult. Accordingly, the Court moves to the second step of the qualified-immunity inquiry: Whether Officer Richards‘s conduct violated Mr. McKee‘s clearly established federal rights. Cf. Osborn, 2021 WL 5495179, at *3 (resolving summary judgment under the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis because the critical question of the officer‘s intent remained a question for the jury, and prevented the court from determining “whether the seizure, if it occurred, was reasonable“).
Even if Officer Richards intentionally struck Mr. McKee‘s motorcycle to stop him from fleeing, the defense of qualified immunity will shield her from liability unless her conduct was “unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938, 951 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To show that Officer Richards violated clearly established law, Plaintiff “must point to Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedents [o]n point, or to the clear weight of authority from other circuit courts deciding that the law was as the plaintiff maintains.” Thompson v. Ragland, 23 F.4th 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff‘s burden is a heavy one, and it cannot be satisfied by references to high-level legal truisms. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (recognizing that “clearly established law” should not be defined “at a high level of generality“); Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10th Cir.1995) (describing the plaintiff‘s “heavy” preliminary burden). Instead, Plaintiff must point to law that is particularized to the facts of her case, i.e., where “an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017).
Plaintiff cites many cases in her brief, but most of her arguments consist of general applications of broad legal principles. See Dkt. 77 at 18-19, 20-25. Rather than describe how particular cases informed Officer Richards (and others) that it is unreasonable to stop a fleeing motorcyclist by striking him with a police vehicle, Plaintiff argues only that “the obvious case law of Smith v. Cupp, Walker v. Davis, Harris v. Coweta Cty., Reavis v. Frost, supra, hold it is a 4th Amendment excessive force violation to hit a motorcycle with a police car, especially for misdemeanor traffic offenses such as reckless driving.” Dkt. 77 at 41. The Court has reservations as to whether this recitation is sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff‘s burden. Nevertheless, the Court will consider whether these cases, together or separately, were sufficient to alert Officer Richards that her actions were unlawful.
The Court finds Reavis and Smith to be of limited value. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that the term “deadly force” encompasses a spectrum of activity, some more likely to cause death than others, and that “just because a situation justifies ramming does not mean it will justify shooting a suspect in the head.” Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2009).21 An officer who read Reavis and Smith might have known that she could not shoot a motorist from behind when the motorist presented no risk to anyone and had not led vehicles on a high-speed chase through multiple jurisdictions; she would not have necessarily concluded that it would be unlawful to end a high-speed chase by ramming a fleeing vehicle as it entered a construction zone22 in a residential area. Those cases would not have provided fair warning to Officer Richards that her conduct was unconstitutional. Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1157 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating that, “while
Next, Plaintiff cites Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005). In that case, the court of appeals initially held that it was well-established by 2001 that an officer could not use deadly force—including ramming another vehicle at high speed—when the fleeing suspect was neither armed nor dangerous. Id. at 1320-21. The court of appeals issued a substitute opinion with a similar holding. See Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia, 433 F.3d 807, 820-21 (11th Cir. 2005). But the substituted opinion was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the court of appeals erred when it assumed that the fleeing suspect did not present a danger to others. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The Court noted that a video depicted the suspect “racing down” narrow roads at night, swerving around cars, crossing the double-yellow line, and running red lights in a manner that “plac[ed] police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.” Id. at 379-80. In view of the risk presented by the suspect, the Court held that it was reasonable, and not a constitutional violation, for the pursuing officers to ram the suspect‘s vehicle even though doing so created a “high likelihood of serious injury or death” to the suspect. Id. at 384.
The version of Harris cited by the Plaintiff could not have put Officer Richards on notice of the fact that her actions were unreasonable. That case is no longer good law, and the opinion reversing it, Scott v. Harris, demonstrates that there are cases where it is acceptable to ram a fleeing vehicle notwithstanding the risk created to the vehicle‘s occupant. Id. Neither Harris‘s now-invalid holding nor Scott would have put Officer Richards on notice of the fact the Fourth Amendment prohibited her from striking Mr. McKee‘s motorcycle with her police cruiser.
The cases cited by Plaintiff, whether considered individually or collectively, fail to show that the unlawfulness of Officer Richards‘s conduct was clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. And the Court‘s own research shows that the question of whether and when an officer may ram a speeding motorcycle is fact-specific and not easily resolved by a clear set of rules. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that a motorist‘s reckless driving creates a “substantial but not imminent risk” to innocent bystanders even when there are “no other motorists in the immediate vicinity.” Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1189. Whether the “risk imposed on innocent bystanders and police by a motorist‘s reckless driving justifies . . . a level of force that is nearly certain to cause the motorist‘s death” is “not an easy question, or one that any court could feel confident in answering.” Id. And the Court could find no case law within the Tenth Circuit directly addressing how that question
There are some opinions outside of the Tenth Circuit involving facts that are similar to those presented here. But those cases are in tension with one another. For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that, as of 2014, it was not clearly established that an officer would violate the Fourth Amendment by using a “rolling block” to stop a fleeing motorcyclist who had been travelling at speeds of 100 miles per hour or more on a two-lane road with “light but consistent traffic.” Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 2019).23 The Sixth Circuit held in 2016 that an officer could not use his vehicle to stop a fleeing motorcyclist who had been speeding in excess of 100 miles per hour when the collision occurred at 4:20 a.m. on a divided highway with “no pedestrians or businesses in sight.” Stamm v. Miller, 657 F. App‘x 492, 495 (6th Cir. 2016). And the Fourth Circuit held in 2007 that a police officer acted reasonably when he intentionally rammed a motorcycle at the end of an eight-mile chase during which he committed numerous traffic violations. Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2007).
These cases do not establish, by the clear weight of authority from outside this circuit, that Officer Richards‘s conduct was clearly unconstitutional at the time of the accident. If anything, these cases show that the question of whether and when an officer may ram a motorcycle is a fact-specific question ill-suited to resolution on qualified immunity grounds in all but the clearest of cases. Although Plaintiff believes that Officer Richards should have been “forced to decide—with life-or-death consequences for innocent motorists,
Plaintiff has failed to show that Officer Richards violated clearly established law by striking Mr. McKee. As a result, Officer Richards is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s excessive force claim. See Cordova, 569 F.3d at 1193 (granting qualified immunity where the law was “vague” as to whether potential risk to unknown third parties could justify the use of force nearly certain to cause death); Morrow, 917 F.3d at 879 (“Cases cutting both ways do not clearly establish the law.“).
C
Plaintiff next purports to bring a deliberate indifference claim against Officer Richards. Dkt. 77 at 36-37. To the extent she successfully alleged this claim,24 is foreclosed by binding precedent unless Plaintiff can show that Officer Richards intended to harm Mr. McKee.25 Assuming Plaintiff can prove this element, her deliberate-indifference claim is subject to the same qualified immunity defense as the other constitutional claims raised by Plaintiff. See Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying qualified
IV
The Court next considers Plaintiff‘s claims that the City is responsible for Officer Richards‘s wrongful arrest and excessive use of force against Mr. McKee. Plaintiff sets forth several reasons why the City should be held liable for Officer Richards‘s conduct: First, she claims that the City‘s policies and procedures were the moving force behind Officer Richards‘s conduct. Second, she argues that the City failed to provide adequate training and supervision on the handling of minor arrests and police pursuits. Dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 14-27. Third, she alleges that the City ratified Officer Richards‘s conduct by failing to discipline her appropriately. The Court will address each theory in turn.
A
The Court begins with Plaintiff‘s claim that the City‘s policies and procedures caused Officer Richards to violate Mr. McKee‘s constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that a local government can be sued directly under
Plaintiff points to two policies that allegedly gave rise to Mr. McKee‘s death. First, she notes that the City‘s policies permitted officers to engage in tactical vehicle interventions and ramming to end police chases. Second, she argues that the City had an ongoing practice of allowing officers to engage in high-speed pursuits outside city limits. Plaintiff has failed to establish that either policy caused Mr. McKee‘s injuries or was adopted with deliberate indifference to a risk of constitutional harm.
The City‘s policies on pursuit intervention techniques are not causally connected to Mr. McKee‘s injuries. Although the Skiatook Police Department Policy Manual authorizes officers to engage in tactical vehicle interventions and ramming, it specifies that TVIs and ramming should only be used
There is likewise no evidence that the City‘s purported practice of permitting its officers to go on high-speed chases outside of city limits caused Mr. McKee‘s injuries. Assuming for argument‘s sake that this policy can be inferred from the evidence of record, Plaintiff has not identified evidence that the policy was causally connected to Mr. McKee‘s injuries. Plaintiff has not pointed to a single high-speed chase (other than the one at issue in this case) that culminated in an alleged constitutional violation. In fact, the evidence
Even if Plaintiff could establish that Mr. McKee‘s injuries were the product of either of the policies discussed above, there is no evidence that would permit a jury to find that the City was deliberately indifferent to the risk that its policies were “enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769. There is no evidence that the City was aware of a pattern of other, similar constitutional violations, which is “ordinarily necessary” to satisfy the “stringent deliberate indifference standard.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). And Plaintiff has not shown that this is the rare case where deliberate
B
The Court next turns to Plaintiff‘s claim that the City failed to train Officer Richards regarding high-speed pursuits, tactical vehicle interventions, and ramming. There are “limited circumstances” under which a municipality can be held liable for failure to train its employees under
A municipality‘s failure to train its officers gives rise to
There is no evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations that predates Mr. McKee‘s death. Although there is some evidence that other City officers have engaged in high-speed chases, there is no evidence that any of those chases involved the allegedly unconstitutional use of a vehicle to end a pursuit. Dkt. 63 at 10; Dkt. 89 at 11. And there is no evidence of any other incident in which an officer used a patrol car to ram or otherwise seize a fleeing suspect. Cf. Dkt. 63 at 11. Plaintiff‘s oblique references to high-speed chases, without more, cannot establish that the City was deliberately indifferent to the risk that its deficient training would give rise to constitutional violations.
The Court disagrees with Plaintiff‘s suggestion that it would have been “obvious” to the City that its officers might use cars to unconstitutionally seize fleeing misdemeanants without specific training to the contrary. The City maintained policies on vehicle pursuits, pursuit interventions, and the appropriate use of force. Dkt. 63 at 9; Dkt. 63-1 at 6-27. Those policies prohibited officers from using ramming or other pursuit intervention techniques except in limited circumstances. Dkt. 63-1 at 15-17. All City officers were required to read, understand, and comply with those policies, and the City required officers to complete daily training bulletins relevant to its policies and procedures in addition to their other training requirements. Dkt. 63 at 9. It would not be “plainly obvious” that an officer who read these policies would violate them by ramming a fleeing suspected misdemeanant. Cf. George, 32 F.4th at 1253-54 (affirming summary judgment where the evidence showed that all officers had access to the county‘s handbook and were required to participate in ongoing training regarding the implementation of those policies). The Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict on a failure-to-train theory.
The Court now turns to Plaintiff‘s claim that the City ratified Officer Richards‘s conduct by failing to investigate and discipline Officer Richards for using excessive force. A “municipality will not be found liable under a ratification theory unless a final decisionmaker ratifies an employee‘s specific unconstitutional actions, as well as the basis for these actions.” Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2010). The evidence of record fails to provide any evidence that would permit a finding of ratification here. The City investigated Officer Richards‘s conduct and, rather than condoning those actions, disciplined her for violating the City‘s policies. Dkt. 63 at 11 (statement of fact no. 9); Dkt. 89 at 14. Although the City did not separately discipline her for any alleged constitutional violations, that failure is not the equivalent of an express approval of Officer Richards‘s actions and the basis for them. The record is insufficient to permit a jury to find that the City ratified Officer Richards‘s allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
V
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff‘s state-law assault claim against Officer Richards. Officer Richards argues that there is no evidence that she intended to hit Mr. McKee, and that the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act shields her from liability. Dkt. 62 at 41-42. Plaintiff responds only to the first of these two arguments. Dkt. 77 at 42.
The Court has already held that there is evidence that could permit a jury to find that Officer Richards intentionally collided with Mr. McKee‘s motorcycle. Thus, this case will proceed to trial unless the OGTCA bars Plaintiff‘s assault claim. But neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has fully developed this issue, which is now the only one remaining for the Court‘s consideration. Rather than direct the parties to provide additional briefing, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s remaining assault claim. The question of whether the OGTCA bars recovery is a state-specific claim best addressed in state court. See Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm‘n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that, when all fed-
VI
For the reasons discussed above, the Court holds that Officer Richards is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the federal claims asserted against her. The Court further holds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the City is liable for any of the constitutional claims asserted against it, and the City is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff‘s constitutional claims. This leaves Plaintiff‘s state-law assault claim pending against Officer Richards, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over that claim. For all these reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [Dkts. 62, 63] are granted.
DATED this 12th day of September 2025.
JOHN D. RUSSELL
United States District Judge