Walker v. Davis
649 F.3d 502
6th Cir.
2011
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 alleged conspiracy Ashley Carpenter’s

to commit fraud.

AFFIRMED. WALKER, Denise as Administratrix of Germany, the Estate of Thomas Brian Deceased, T.A.G., and Next Friend of

minor, Plaintiff-Appellee, Danny DAVIS, County Deputy Allen

Sheriff, Capacity; in his Individual Carter, County Sheriff, Allen

Sam Capacities, Individual and Official Defendants-Appellants.

No. 09-5949. Appeals, United States Court of Sixth Circuit. Argued: March 2011. Decided and Aug. Filed: Rehearing Rehearing En Banc

Denied Oct. 2011.* Jr., English,

ARGUED: Charles E. En- Lucas, glish, Owsley, LLP, Priest & Bowl- Green, Kentucky, for Appellants. Wells, PLLC, Trevor W. Miller Wells Lexington, Kentucky, Appellee. for ON Jr., BRIEF: E. English, English, Charles Lucas, LLP, Priest Owsley, Bowling & Green, Kentucky, Appellants. for T. Ross Turner, Madisonville, Kentucky, for Ap- pellee. KEITH, McKEAGUE,

Before: KETHLEDGE, Judges. KETHLEDGE, J., opinion delivered the court, KEITH, J., joined. in which McKEAGUE, 504-11), (pp. J. delivered separate dissenting opinion.

* Judge McKeague grant rehearing the reasons stated in his dissent.

503 brought Denise Walker this U.S.C. OPINION § behalf of 1983 suit on estate KETHLEDGE, Judge. son, claiming minor that Davis’s use of case, are re- as we facts of this Germany violated the Fourth against force appeal, are to view them quired summary Amendment. Davis moved a Germany riding killed while Thomas qualified immuni- judgment on the basis of field, in empty an motorcycle across ty. The district court denied the motion. low-speed after a night, middle followed. appeal This chase, Danny Davis Deputy when Sheriff review the court’s denial of We motorcycle that intentionally rammed the Ash, immunity de novo. Harrison v. court held that riding. The district he was (6th Cir.2008). jurisdic- Our F.3d actions, viewed, violated Germa- so Davis’s question limited to the whether the tion is constitutional clearly established ny’s evidence, light considered in the most fa- immu- thereby precluding qualified rights, Estate, shows a violation vorable to affirm. nity for Davis. We right. established constitutional court’s view of the take the district We See id. at 517. to Germa- in the most favorable facts gener It has been settled law for a Green, Hayden Estate. See ny’s that, Amendment, under the Fourth ation (6th Cir.2011). Shortly after no poses immediate “[w]here Kentucky, police in rural midnight to the officer and no threat to oth motorcycle at Germany riding his clocked ers, resulting failing the harm from hour per hour in a 55 miles per 70 miles justify him not does the use of apprehend (who That officer is not defendant zone. deadly force to do so.” Tennessee v. Gar here) Germany for pull over tried 1, 11, ner, stop. refused to but speeding, (1985). Here, Germany posed L.Ed.2d 1 pursuit about the Davis then heard Deputy anyone threat to as he rode no immediate Germany approached As over the radio. motorcycle empty field in the across location, the road Davis blocked night Kentucky. in rural middle Germany maneuvered with his cruiser. fact, others, among That renders this case gave cleanly. him Davis then around v. Har patently distinguishable Scott The entire lasted about chase. ris, place empty five minutes and took (2007), in which Harris had L.Ed.2d 686 Germany never highway. stretches “Hollywood-style car police on a led per during hour

went above 60 miles sort, frightening placing of the most chase light. red itself. He ran one chase bystanders innocent police officers and Germany eventually turned off the road injury.” of serious great alike at risk muddy field. Davis fol- and cut across 1769. The chase here in his cruiser. Accord- lowed close behind sleeper by comparison. awas expert— to the Estate’s reconstruction that, at the time Nor does it matter things, the lo- analyzed, among other who actions, few, if any, there were of Davis’s between the two paint cation of transfers in in which cruisers reported cases intentionally rammed vehicles—Davis then motorcycles. tentionally rammed Germany’s motorcycle. obviously sense—and so— dragged common motorcycle thrown from motorcycle intentionally ramming a cruiser, him to that crushing underneath the applica- involves with a cruiser death. it burden to deadly mately, plaintiffs prove force. This case is the potentially tion of protected by the rule that the officer is “general governed is thus Streicher, doctrine. capable giving law are See Ciminillo statements of the *3 Cir.2006). (6th 461, F.3d 466 warning to officers even clear and fair question action has not very where the To determine if an officer is entitled to unlawful.” previously held Smith been qualified immunity, Supreme (6th Cir.2005) 766, 776-77 Cupp, 430 First, two-prong has established a test. omitted). (internal marks “must reviewing court decide whether fact, Whether, in the collision here was alleged that a has plaintiff facts jury to decide. Davis intentional is for of a make out a violation constitutional But the as we insists it was not. Callahan, 223, right.” Pearson v. 555 U.S. them, make out a violation of must view 232, (2009) 808, 129 S.Ct. 172 L.Ed.2d 565 Germany’s clearly established constitution- Saucier, (citing rights. al court’s denial of district 2151). Second, court “must decide if immunity is affirmed. qualified right clearly at issue was established alleged at the time of the defendant’s mis- McKEAGUE, Judge, dissenting. (internal quotation conduct.” Id. marks I because I think respectfully dissent right clearly For a to be estab- significantly has majority that the down- lished, right “the contours must be played the level of risk that sufficiently clear that reasonable official clearly- and defined public, doing would understand that what he is too gen- established law at level of right.” Creigh- violates that Anderson v. erality. Because do not believe that ton, 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. alleged prohibited by conduct was (1987). words, In other pre- L.Ed.2d 523 law, clearly-established I would find that “dictate, existing truly law must is qualified immunity. Davis is entitled to (not compel just suggest or allow or raise Qualified immunity question about), “government every shields the conclusion for like-situated, performing discretionary government agent officials functions reasonable civil liability damages doing from for insofar what the is defendant violates clearly Gragg as their conduct does not violate federal law in the circumstances.” Dev., statutory v. Ky. established or constitutional Cabinet Workforce (6th Cir.2002) rights person of which a reasonable would F.3d (citation original) v. Fitzgerald, quotation have known.” Harlow and internal 800, 818, omitted); U.S. marks also 73 L.Ed.2d see Akers v. McGin- (1982). nis, (6th Cir.2003) acknowledges The doctrine “that can clearly reasonable mistakes be made as must be “so legal particular to the acts constraints established when the were committed position, conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an that officer in the defendant’s how legal objectively, clearly officer to determine the relevant measured would have doctrine, force, apply here excessive will understood that he was under an affirma- confronts,” duty the factual situation the officer tive to have refrained such con- duct”). thus, if put the officer makes a “If the reasonable law did requires, mistake as to what the law on notice that would be his conduct unlawful, to qualified immunity. summary judgment officer is entitled based on Katz, 194, 205, qualified appropriate.” immunity Saucier v. Sauci- (2001). er, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 121 S.Ct. 2151. Ulti- Pursu- Pearson, However, Tabor testified that. appeals courts of he [are] ant to “the thought that their sound discre the absence other vehicles to exercise permitted prongs approx- of the two of was unusual. then went deciding which tion imately immunity analysis muddy should be 263 feet into the field when allegéd intentionally of the circum Davis is to have first addressed motorcycle. pur- case at hand.” rammed his The entire particular in the stances apartment complex suit—from the S.Ct. 808. minutes, approximately field—lasted five explained As approximately and covered ten miles. Be- law, diving into the it is nec- before *4 Davis, Germany fore was struck there “to determine the relevant facts.” essary Germany was no indication that intended 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769. At the officers, obey fleeing. to and cease summary judgment stage, the relevant fact, After the it was discovered that Ger- plaintiffs version of the facts are many was intoxicated at the time of the undisputed, those facts that are as well as pursuit. in the to the light viewed most favorable 380, majority, 1769 I find that the plaintiff. See id. at S.Ct. Unlike sec- of of plaintiffs prong dispositive, that the version ond the test is and qualified immunity a accepted appropriate facts is when there is here be- facts). “genuine” dispute put as to those cause the law did not Davis on notice ramming Germany’s into car was Here, patrolling Officer Tabor was clearly begin by unlawful. noting Scottsville, apartment complex Ken- problems majority’s there are two with the Germany tucky traveling when he noticed general proposition contention that the of speed limit on a per 15 miles hour over poses no im- “[w]here Gamer — highway. attempted four-lane Tabor to mediate threat to the officer and no threat stop Germany by activating lights his and others, resulting failing the harm sirens, refused, contin- but and apprehend justify him does not the use away. pursued ued to drive As Tabor deadly force to provided do clear so”— Germany, joined Davis the chase from the guidance warning and fair to Davis that direction, po- opposite positioned and his alleged conduct was unlawful. Germany’s path car in in another at- lice First, Supreme explained him. has tempt stop stopping, Instead Court inquiry swerved into the lane for oncom- that the into whether constitu traffic, right clearly car. tional established “must and went around Davis’s thereafter, Shortly Germany sped through light specific be undertaken con case, four-way general Ta- not as a broad a red intersection. text Saucier, stopped proposition.” then in the intersection to 533 U.S. at bor traffic, Anderson, safety, clear for the officers’ and S.Ct. 2151. See also (“It motorists, 640, not be safety possible of other S.Ct. 3034 should therefore, surprising, allowed Davis to take over lead of that our cases estab which occasions, alleged the official is pursuit. On at least two lish ‘clearly Germany slowed down “and then all of a have violated must have been es in a more and again particularized, off at an tablished’ [took] sudden sense.”). relevant, Thus, Still, hence more speed.” erratic rate Haugen, speed during never exceeded Brosseau (2004), hour, 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 per more than 60 miles and Tabor S.Ct. (and against using vehicle. cautioned Gamer testified that he never saw another Court Connor, suspect] 109 S.Ct. have believed Graham v. ” (1989)) 382-83, 127 prop- for the threat.’ 550 U.S. at 104 L.Ed.2d Garner, established that (quoting that it was 471 U.S. at osition S.Ct. 1769 1694) (internal violating plaintiffs con- an officer was 105 S.Ct. 198-99, Id. at rights. Thus,

stitutional found that has Gamer and “are cast at 596. Gamer Graham case, applicability to this which has “scant “ they do little generality,” level of facts,” vastly ‘nothing to different do “ the lead of the ‘follow[] more than striking with one car another or even with text” to establish Fourth Amendment’s A general.... car chases car’s “ contrary of force is ‘use is, fact, much bumping fleeing car if it is excessive under Fourth Amendment policeman’s shooting gun like a so as to ” ” objective standards of reasonableness.’ person.’ hit a Id. at 198-99, (quoting Id. at 125 S.Ct. 596 Sau- (quoting Cnty. Adams v. St. Lucie Sheriff’s 2151). cier, In- (11th Cir.1992) Dept., 962 F.2d term, deed, recently past as this (Edmondson, J., dissenting)); see also they noted that “have re- *5 Knoblauch, ex rel. Pasco v. Pasco peatedly told courts not to define (5th Cir.2009) 572, clearly of established law level in Supreme Court Scott “determine[d] general generality. proposition, could not a clear Fourth Gamer establish an example, that unreasonable search governing Amendment rule car chases be the Fourth seizure violates Amendment is suspect fleeing cause that case involved a determining in help of little whether the foot”). particular violative nature of conduct is Scott, Like this case involves neither a al-Kidd, clearly established.” Ashcroft - chase, police shooting nor a foot and is -, 2084, 2074, 131 S.Ct. (2011) (internal vastly different from the facts in Gamer. L.Ed.2d 1149 in believe Brosseau and Scott demon- is the “obvious case” ‘clearly language “can establish’ strate that the broad Gamer Gamer answer, body even without a of relevant inapplicable determining to our task of Brosseau, case law.” at clearly it whether was established that 596; Cupp, S.Ct. Smith Moreover, Davis’s conduct was unlawful. cf. (6th Cir.2005) (“Gamer and Gra- majority’s seemingly straightforward clearly ham establish that a flee- dispose ig- of Gamer to of this case use ing in a car posed danger that has never nores the Court’s admonition that “we anyone to right has the established way must our through still slosh the fact- ” force.”) (em- deadly not to be seized with Scott, ‘reasonableness,’ bound morass of added). phasis 550 U.S. at in these cases, police chase immunity be-

Second, in Supreme inquiry cause the into it whether rejected the in use of Gamer the context clearly established that an officer’s conduct a car explained, chase. As the Court “depends violated the Fourth Amendment simply application “Gamer was of the very case,” much on the facts of each Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test Brosseau, [holding] that it was S.Ct. unreasonable to Instead, kill I find that it is more ‘young, slight, burglary appropriate and unarmed’ suspect by shooting involving suspects fleeing him ‘in the back of the to look cases vehicles, foot, running away police head’ while he was and a decision reasonably bump and when the officer ‘could not officer to vehicle in chase, culpability plaintiff assist in tive where he order to terminate “ ignored warnings has officers’ inquiry into ‘whether our engaged flight). stop reckless spe clearly established ” Moreover, it made no difference to the Scott, 550 U.S. of the case.’ cific context that “when rammed [the officer] Saucier, (quoting 127 S.Ct. 1769 suspect’s] vehicle it was not threaten 2151). ing any pedestrians” other vehicles or be Court’s represents Scott “[undoubtedly [the officer] cause waited subject. law on this clearly-established executing for the road to be clear before question pre- The Court characterized n. his maneuver.” Id. in that case as follows: sented Thus, original). consider whether a law enforcement We question presented Court answered can, consistent with the Fourth official affirmative, leaving us with this rule: Amendment, fleeing attempt stop attempt officer’s to terminate a “[a] continuing public-en- from motorist dangerous high-speed car chase that by ramming the motor- dangering flight bystanders of innocent threatens lives way: Put another ist’s car from behind. Amendment, does not violate the Fourth place actions that an officer take Can places even when it motorist at inju- of a serious fleeing motorist at risk injury risk of serious or death.” stop the motor- ry or death in order to 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769. flight endangering the lives ist’s Scott, our Since Court has had the bystanders? innocent opportunity qualified immunity to consider *6 Scott, 374, 127 at S.Ct. 1769. is 550 U.S. ramming in the context of an officer notes, true, correctly the majority the a chase. A few of our vehicle end sister a “Hol police led the on motorist Scott In v. circuits have. Pasco ex rel Pasco fright car chase of the most lywood-style Knoblauch, Fifth that it the Circuit held obviously posed that threat ening sort” objectively reasonable for an officer to suspect of others. to the lives by bumping terminate a chase the than a dozen other swerved “around more during high-speed car the course of a line, cars, double-yellow cross[ed] curvy chase “on a two-lane road a resi- traveling in both directions to cars force[d] approximately dential area at 3:00 respective being shoulders to avoid their morning,” believed the when hit.” at 127 S.Ct. 1769. Based Id. suspect might driving have been while in- that car “[t]he those the Court found toxicated, the fact that the officer despite initiated in this respondent chase that the vehicles, pedestri- conceded that “no other posed a substantial and immediate ans, bystanders or other were encountered others; injury to physical risk of serious during pursuit,” and that the officer jury could conclude other no reasonable suspect may conceded that the have decel- Id. at 127 S.Ct. 1769. Unlike wise.” erated at the end of the chase. 566 F.3d noted, Garner, respon the Court “it was at 579. The Fifth noted that al- (by of a flight speeding dent’s itself means though specific every facts of chase “the automobile) different, that the threat of ‘seri posed ac- will be [Scott] ” at physical danger harm ... to others.’ knowledged generally ous inherent Garner, (quoting suspects fleeing in vehi- 382 n. 1694); pose public.” at see also id. cles Id. at 580. Moreover, it is the court found that “the hold- at 127 S.Ct. 1769 on the ing dependent of was not into account the rela- Scott appropriate to take dispositive,” and the high speeds was “not bystander rather, aof actual existence — driving a motor- suspect concerned about the fact that the “was the Court was car, require could have been than a does not safety cycle, those who rather of continued,” because if the chase result from Scott since the [than ] harmed different acknowledged that the sus- Scott the motorist will be probability anyone at the threatening pect was not ramming] high in either [by harmed at rammed his car. Id. moment the officer at circumstance.” Id. 418. Scott, n. at 380 (citing 580-81 Fisher, Sharp In the Eleventh Circuit 1769). Likewise, court held that a police also relied on and found hours, morning the rural “early to terminate a chase attempt officer’s area, and the fact that [the nature of the objectively car was ramming suspect’s down before suspect] may have slowed (11th Cir. reasonable. 532 actions impact [the officer’s] do not render 2008). case, suspect In that was flee undisputed “the unreasonable” because speed “high [for] rate suspect] indicate that would [the facts have failing] respond least 20 miles anyone he en- serious lights [giving] blue and sirens and no indi countered,” way “had no and the officer stopping slowing cation of knowing if another vehicle enter driving erratically” and ... down suspect’s] path person or whether a when there were other motorists might walking have been around the next highway. Despite Id. at 1184. the fact corner.” Id. 581. that the officer’s observation of the driver Coe, Abney In the Fourth Circuit erratically only a changing lanes was “for considered whether an officer who was time,” period short id. alleged intentionally to have rammed a without indication that had motorcyclist resulting during pursuit, motorist, narrowly or hit another missed death, quali- was entitled to ramming the car to the court held end (4th immunity. F.3d 412 Cir. fied reasonable, objectively the chase was id. 2007). The defendant-officer observed the *7 motorcyclist double-yellow cross lines to spectrum At the other end the are vehicle, lights and activated his and pass (6th Duva, Kirby cases like 530 F.3d 475 attempt in an him over. Id. pull sirens Cir.2008) Passinault, Murray-Ruhl and ensued, suspect at 414. A pursuit and (6th Cir.2007), Fed.Appx. where “illegally passed by crossing vehicles dou- immunity in we considered yellow ble lines on no less than five occa- shooting fleeing context of officers running stop signs ... ... and

sions two Kirby, suspect In motorist. refusing] pull over” even when a pulled by police, attempted over but then placed “directly cruiser was front of the during stop. car traffic using to flee motorcycle.” Throughout Id. at 417. so, In doing the course of he was shot chase, fairly the traffic on the road was scene, multiple times the officers on the heavy, suspect but the never exceeded the at found and died. 530 F.3d 479-80. We speed limit. at 414. Fourth Id. Cir- facts, plaintiffs suspect that under the cuit held that the officer’s actions were moving slowly non-aggres- “was and in a “eminently reasonable” because the motor- manner, not have hit sive could cyclist’s put “behavior other motorists at officers, stationary at the time of and was substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at so, shooting.” at 482. Because “no doing 417. In noted that the Id. court facts, danger” under these motorcyclist fact that did not reach one was ever inju- erty persons and at serious risk of conclude jury that “a could concluded we would not have ry. officers reasonable that threat.” Id. an immediate

perceived Risk of violence is inherent to vehicle added). Then, we held (emphasis 482-83 confrontations that flight. Between the shooting, it was time of the “[a]t incident, initiate and terminate the under Gamer clearly established high intervening pursuit creates risks of at non- may not fire police officers crashes ... It is well known that when sus- fleeing [the felons such as dangerous vehicles as their offenders use motor Murray- Similarly, Id. at 483. pect].” escape they po- means of create serious Ruhl, approaching the the officers were injury to others physical tential risks of vehicle, under the stopped and continues, ... As that the risk of plaintiffs version accident accumulates. away from the offi- simply tried to drive cers, anyone, pointing never vehicle — States, U.S. -, Sykes v. United respond to an having opportunity or (2011) 2267, 2274, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 multi- stop, when an officer fired order to also that between 18% 41% suspect. Fed.Appx. ple shots on the crashes, all chases involve and that chase Thus, we held that because the at 344. related crashes kill more than 100 nonsus prolonged have a interac- officer “did not pects every year). in which he demon- suspect] tion with [the Indeed, many particular elements of this harm an officer or willingness strated danger chase demonstrate the inherent jury in reckless behavior engage police: undisputed from the It is reasonably competent no could find that traveling speed over the have shot the victim.” Id. at officer would limit, through that he went a red “at Likewise, we held that speed,” rate of and that clearly established under Gamer issue was into the lane of traffic to “an obvious went other avoid presented the facts because deadly Any force” in involving the use of car. one of these deci- jury sions, could conclude particularly speeding through which “a reasonable a red suspect] posed danger no a reckless act that could have light, general public.” officers easily the death of another motor- caused added) (internal quotation Moreover, intoxication, ist. al- short, In marks and officers, though suspected by “con- clear- these two cases show that the law is firms ... the nature and risk to others cannot ly established that an officer shoot conduct,” [Germany’s] posed by Ger- *8 posed has never fleeing motorist who many’s Abney, indifference. See 493 F.3d danger a risk of others. that at 417. It makes little difference no present during the other vehicles were not have might the instant chase While chase, because these actions indicate that Scott, chase in the been as dramatic as the Germany posed would have a substantial majority ignores the fact that the Germa- encountered, that he any risk to motorist the officers still ny’s decision to flee from way knowing no and because Davis had endangered public. As at the next recently explained in a different if there would be a motorist corner, context, fleeing light, the act of or around the next had stop Pasco, extremely dangerous: in a vehicle alone is 566 F.3d the chase continued. See Indeed, that un- considering at 581. expected with is the Confrontation pursuit prop- disputed record shows flight. places result of vehicle highway near an was less certain to cause the death of a four-lane began on Scott, officer complex, that another apartment suspect Kirby, see traffic at the traffic felt the need to clear 383-84, that ram- thought the officer that, and signal, ming a motorists car is different than unusual, logical traffic was it is absence of a shooting poses motorist because it “a would eventu to conclude injury likelihood of serious or death” ally other motorists. This is encounter death”); certainty rather than “near see case because the chase had especially the Cordova, (explaining miles, already approximately covered that Scott makes clear that there ais Germany and all indications were that de force”). meaningful “spectrum deadly I by any possible, means escape sired to Scott, find that this case is much closer to by running through lights, red whether Pasco, Abney Sharp and cases —-all in a Nor trying to lose the officers field. which the court concluded that the officer’s collision do I think it matters that ram objectively decision to the vehicle was field, in a occurred because reasonable, Kirby than it is to or Gamer. time, only in the field for short and event, In situation is “[w]hether [this] likely using the field to out police using deadly more like the force Davis, fleeing maneuver and continue (but death) not of a level certain to cause short, In highway.1 this was one of prevent a substantial risk of harm to “police situations in which officers those others, or police shooting more like the split-second judg are often force to make poses who minimal risk of harm to tense, ments'—in circumstances that are Cordova, immediately others is not clear.” uncertain, rapidly evolving and —about very least, At Davis necessary.” amount of force Gra “was confronted with situation that fell ham, S.Ct. 1865. cases, between these two lines of and the majority, express opinion Like the I no Indeed, result was uncertain.” Id. none of whether Davis violated con- cases, Scott, including “truly these compel” Instead, rights. stitutional I consider the conclusion that a reasonable whether it was established Davis’s situation would have to wait until not], Davis consistent with the “[could fleeing suspect narrowly misses or col- Amendment, Fourth stop motor- motorist, lides with another before decid- continuing ist from public-endangering ing to ram vehicle. See flight by ramming the [vehicle] motorist’s Gragg, 289 F.3d at 964. The standards from behind.” governing “depend[ this claim very much ] If Germany S.Ct. 1769. had never case,” Brosseau, on the facts of each anyone, likely this case would fall U.S. at and as then- Kirby Murray-Ruhl, line with judge explained McConnell in a in- join majority finding motorist, volving shooting of a fleeing clearly prohibited by Davis’s conduct was vague “the law ... has been on whether Instead, Gamer. this case is one in which *9 potential risk to unknown par- third potential “the risk to parties third was as substantial, imminent, Scott,” justify ties is sufficient to but less use of force Cordova, nearly Aragon, Cordova v. 569 F.3d certain to cause death.” (10th Cir.2009), added). and the level of force used F.3d Indeed, possibility harming 1. it would have been safer to termi- other motorists. See Harris, nate the chase in the field where there was no 550 U.S. at 380 n. 127 S.Ct. 1769. single no one “has identified Because the conduct at issue predating materially [ramming a car]

prohibits context,” I and because believe similar that Davis’s ac- demonstrate these cases hazy be- “at fell border tions best force,” the acceptable tween excessive failed to show that Plaintiff has clearly-estab- prohibited by conduct was Xenia, 417 Lyons City lished law. (6th Cir.2005) (internal quo- omitted); see tation marks and Cordova, (holding at 1193 un- in this area is the law because clear, motor- an officer who shot believing “was not unreasonable ist parties to third potential motorist) (emphasis justify” shooting the added). dis- Accordingly, respectfully

sent. America, STATES of

UNITED Plaintiff-Appellee, WALKER, Defendant- Darrell D.

Appellant. No. 09-6498. Appeals, States Court of United Sixth Circuit. Aug.

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