*1
Marlington
al., Appellants,
Doe et
Local School
Education, Appellee,
District Board of
et al.
Marlington
[Cite as Doe v.
Local School Dist. Bd.
Edn.,
presents purely legal issue: immunity whether the granted by R.C. Chapter 2744 applies to bar liability of a school district for negligent supervision of the conduct of children on a Doe, school bus. Jane and John the court-appointed Roe,1 Holly minor, custodians of sued the Local Marlington School District Board of Education and several employees of the school district seeking damages after their daughter was sexually molested another child on a school bus. The board moved for summary judgment and raised the defense of political subdivi- immunity sion Chapter The trial court denied the board’s motion for summary judgment, and the appealed. board The court of appeals reversed, holding that the alleged negligent supervision of the children on the bus did not constitute negligent operation of a motor vehicle within We accepted the Does’ of that appeal judgment to this court. plaintiffs, 1. The Boe,” names of the individual boy as well as that of “Bob who was the perpetrator arose, of the actions out of which the protect case are identified fictitious names to privacy. then’ that the R.C. correctly that the court determined appellate conclude We 2}{¶ injuries sustained as subdivision not this claim *2 of a motor vehicle does negligent a result of the on a school bus. We conduct of the children supervision for judgment. therefore affirm the court appeals’
I
A District, but was Marlington Roe lived within the Local School she Holly 3}{¶ Elementary the Louis- fourth-grade Fairhope enrolled as a student at School District, City special-education during received services ville School where she year. transportation school Marlington’s the 2004-2005 school buses afternoons, In took and from her school. Roe special-needs students Roe to students, three other who Marlington special-needs rode home on a bus with boys were at the Middle School. Those four students were enrolled Louisville only on the bus Wright regular bus. Sabrina was the driver during September through that route the afternoons from the third week of because, assigned 2004. No bus was to that route in part, mid-November aide for the programs special-needs the individualized education four students who require present. plaintiffs rode that bus did not that a bus aide be The Boe, bus, that Bob one of the on that serious boys had exhibited behavior that problems, including physical aggression. Marlington and verbal asserted history Boe had no of sexual that was to defendants. misconduct known ride, Boe morning slumped On the March bus aide saw Bob 4}{¶ his seat to Roe and that Boe had Roe’s up next discovered his hand dress. The Roe, immediately separated Upon Holly aide the two students. questioning aide that Boe molested that sexually morning. bus learned had her on the bus also on “every day Roe told the aide Boe had done similar things Sabrina Wright’s” school of the afternoon Wright, afternoon bus. driver bus from conduct, had this mid-September 2004 mid-November never witnessed Roe questioned had told no one about it until the bus aide on March 16, 2005, employees 2005. The afternoon of March of the district notified Jane Doe, day. Roe’s of what occurred that guardian, had bus, and the later that on Wright’s The Does school district learned Roe
5} {¶ bus; Wright on the thought was sometimes seen floor of the students were “playing Wright deposition anytime testified at her she saw the tag.” move to “playing tag,” Wright separate students told the students another gross on Boe later to a pleaded delinquency charge seat the bus. “true” sexual assault Roe. imposition violation R.C. 2907.05 based his sexual
B Roe, Does, Local right Marlington The in their own and on behalf sued Middleton, Education, and Patricia the director Wright, District Board of School ], district, ], wan- “negligent[ transportation alleging reckless[ for the and/or safely vehicle” and that defendants failed to motor ton[] of] Roe and the on the bus. The board moved for supervise students transport that it was entitled to summary judgment, part claiming summary judgment. 2744.02. The Does the motion for opposed summary judgment trial court the board’s motion for without denied 2744.02(C), that order to R.C. which opinion. appealed pursuant The board an political employee order that denies subdivision or provides “[a]n alleged immunity liability provided subdivision the benefit of an as law is a final order.” chapter provision this other
C
appeals
appellate
The court of
reversed. The
court determined that
{¶ 8}
Wright’s
inadequate
of the students on her school
supervision
Sabrina
bus
not amount to
of a motor
within
negligent operation
did
the
vehicle
the
2744.02(B)(1),
immunity
liability
of R.C.
so as to avoid the board’s
under
2744.02(A)(1).
Edn.,
v. Marlington
R.C.
Doe
School Dist. Bd.
5th Dist. No.
of
¶
2006CA00102,
II The issue in this case is whether a school bus supervision driver’s of the {¶ 9} conduct of children on a school bus amounts to a operation of motor vehicle within statutory exception political immunity subdivision under bus, Does that argue R.C. The the context of school motor vehicle” means all of the essential functions that “operation the bus board, contrast, by driver is trained or to do law. The required argues bus, operating just driving even if a motor vehicle entails more than it is still bus, equipment tied to the movement of the vehicle or the on the and thus of students of the conduct the supervision not include of the bus does on board.
A
subdivision
political
Chapter
purpose
R.C.
recognized
The
subdivisions.”
integrity
political
law,
of the fiscal
immunity
“preservation
is
(1994),
70 Ohio St.3d
Human Servs.
Cty. Dept.
v.
Wilson
Stark
to this
Assembly’s response
2744 was the General
Chapter
105.
N.E.2d
Id. We
subdivisions.
immunity
political
governmental
abrogation
court’s
provisions
as we consider and
mind
legislative purpose
bear this
Chapter
ais
immunity
Chapter
The
of the defense
analysis
2744.02(A)(1)
subdivision,
like
First,
political
provides
one.
familiar
“for
here,
liability
damages
immune from
generally
the school district
any act or
death,
caused
person
property allegedly
or loss to
or
injury,
of the
subdivision
employee
political
subdivision or an
political
omission of the
func-
function.” Governmental
governmental
proprietary
connection with a
education.” See
provision
system
public
tions include “[t]he
2744.01(C)(2)(c).
transportation
in this court do not contest
parties
function.2
a governmental
to and from school on school buses is
students
Second,
statutory
one of five
subdivision has
unless
political
(5). Finally,
through
liability applies. See R.C.
exceptions creating
subdivi-
immunity applies,
if a
that an
even
court finds
2744.03(A) if one of the
to R.C.
immunity may
pursuant
sion’s
be reinstated
83 Ohio St.3d
applies.
defenses in that section
See Cater Cleveland
*4
28,
{¶ 13}
2744.02(B).
provides:
in
The statute
because of the first
Code, political
Revised
“Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the
{¶ 14}
death,
injury,
person
in
in a civil action for
or loss to
damages
subdivision is liable
or
an act or omission of the
subdivision
property allegedly
or
caused
166, 170,
(1999),
App.3d
Dayton City
137 Ohio
{¶ 15} death, injury, are liable for to person loss or property caused any motor vehicle by their when employees employees are engaged within the scope of their employment authority.” (Emphasis added.) parties dispute do not Wright, Sabrina the bus in
{¶ 16} driver question, acting was within the scope employment of her authority when she drove the school bus on which Boe committed sexual misconduct against Roe. parties Neither do the that a dispute school bus is a “motor vehicle.”3
B The resolution of in the issue this depends case on what “operation {¶ 17} of’ a motor vehicle means R.C. The term “operation” is not defined by R.C. 2744.02. The parties agree generally that the term “operation”
2744.02(B)(1) should be plain afforded its ordinary meaning. “The rule is that when the language statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need the rules of statutory interpreta- tion.” State ex rel. Jones v. Conrad 92 Ohio St.3d 750 N.E.2d However, parties have different view of the plain and ordinary “operation.” The Does argue that “operation” must be understood terms of its context and that driving school bus involves not only vehicle but also supervising the student passengers. The Does rely upon Ohio regulations that require bus drivers to be in pupil trained management, as well as case law states, other to support their argument that operation of a school bus includes supervision of the contrast, students. By the board contends that the plain meaning of “operation” of a motor vehicle R.C. refers injuries that occur as a direct result of driving or moving the vehicle and that Ohio appellate courts generally 2744.02(B)(l)’s have construed R.C. immunity excep- tion in that manner. One dictionary definition of “operate” control or “[t]o direct the
functioning of.”
(3d
II
Ed.2005)
Webster’s
New College Dictionary
786. That
definition suggests that “operation,” when
used
vehicle,
reference to a motor
*5
purpose
2744,
3. For
Chapter
the
of R.C.
a
meaning
“motor vehicle” has the same
inas R.C. 4511.01.
2744.01(E).
4511.01(B)
R.C.
R.C.
“every
defines “motor
propelled
vehicle” as
vehicle
or drawn
power”
exceptions
with certain
not relevant here.
itself as
the motor vehicle
functioning of
directing
or
the
controlling
to
pertains
within the car.
occupants
the
directing
opposed
(1986), 22 Ohio
Cleary
to our decision
State
point
Does also
The
of
574,
interpretation
their
support
198, 22
490 N.E.2d
OBR
St.3d
2744.02(B)(1).
addressed the
Cleary
of a motor vehicle
“operation”
while
a motor vehicle
4511.19(A)(1),
operating
prohibits
which
meaning of R.C.
that
In
this court held
Cleary,
of
drug
alcohol or a
abuse.
under the influence of
4511.19 included
of former R.C.
purpose
for the
of a motor vehicle”
“operation
though
running,
the
even
engine
in the
key
ignition
in the car with the
sitting
The court
syllabus.
two of the
paragraph
id. at
moving.4
car
not
See
the
was
the car.
just driving
than
meant more
a motor vehicle
operating
reasoned
the wheel of
drug
or
of abuse behind
any
influence of alcohol
“A
under the
person
the
the statute is directed whether
the
hazard at which
a motor vehicle is
obvious
574.
at
22 OBR
490 N.E.2d
or in motion.” Id.
stationary
vehicle is
of former
Cleary’s reading
on
is
Cleary misplaced.
The Does’ reliance
under the
driving
the
of
while
4511.19,
dangers
a statute intended to combat
R.C.
alcohol,
expanding
as a license for
or
cannot be taken
drugs
influence of
2744.02(B)(1) to include
a motor vehicle under R.C.
meaning
operation
of
activity
is to
driving, however unrelated
may
a driver
do while
anything
key
ignition
acts
in the
Cleary,
putting
car. Even in
moving the
or
functioning,
operation
to the
engine
directly
physical
were
related
racing
relationship
it to move. The same close
potential
causing
the ear and had the
of the
supervising
the conduct
not exist between
a motor vehicle
does
in the motor vehicle.
4511.01 to add a
Assembly has amended R.C.
Cleary,
Since
the General
23}
{¶
123,149
Laws,
II,
2951.
No.
Ohio
Part
“operate.”
Am.Sub.S.B.
definition
4511.01(HHH)
“to cause or have caused
“operate”
means
provides
vehicle, streetcar,
trolley.” That statute was
effect
or trackless
movement
at
this case. Id.
3216.
precipitated
at the time of the events
for the
Although the R.C.
addition of R.C.
Assembly’s
a motor vehicle
the General
predates
4511.01(HHH)’s
light
that definition nevertheless sheds
“operate,”
definition
2744.01(E)
expressly
“operation”
Cleary
example,
Por
Am.Sub.
times since
was decided.
4.
4511.19 has been amended several
4511.19(A)
Laws,
II, 2467, 2958,
person
123,149
to read: “No
shall
rewrote R.C.
No.
Ohio
Part
S.B.
state, if,
operation,
vehicle, streetcar,
trolley
within this
at the time of
operate any
or trackless
abuse,
(1)
alcohol,
drug
a
or a
following apply:
person
under the influence of
of the
4511.194,
being
prohibits
person
also added R.C.
which
combination of them.” The act
alcohol,
abuse,
drug
a combination
physical
while under the influence of
control of vehicle
at
of them.
Id.
*6
Chapter
in R.C.
of “motor vehicle”
for the definition
to R.C. 4511.01
points
meaning
in
gleaning
is also useful
in
4511.01
R.C.
“operate”
The definition
(1980), 62
2744.02(B)(1). See,
Papadopulos
Meeks v.
e.g.,
in R.C.
“operation”
(“the
in
Assembly,
212,
{¶
to
given
“operation”
courts have
interpretation
with the
consistent
generally
Disk,
2744.02(B)(1).
5th
Local School
For
Doe v. Jackson
example,
¶
reject-
court
2006CA00212,
school bus driver’s duties. management. See Ohio Adm. requirements pupil include instruction training (minimum 3301-83-10(A)(2)(f) in- training requirements school-bus-driver Code 3301-83-10(B)(7) (annual training inservice pupil management) clude However, it not follow that does pupil management). school bus drivers includes driver, trained, or for which the driver is duty of a school bus every required meaning of the school bus within the operation constitutes in public also school bus drivers to be trained regulations require The Ohio 3301-83-10(A)(2)(b), relations, and the of first aid and “[u]se Adm.Code Ohio 3301-83-10(A)(2)(h). No one equipment,” Ohio Adm.Code pathogens blood borne a school operating “public part contended that relations” yet seriously has bus. Does’ contention statute forecloses the Because the Ohio 28}
{¶ not find the Does’ we do applies, in R.C. immunity exception interpreting citations of cases from other states *7 Does have not The immunity persuasive.
motor vehicle in those states’ statutes vehicle, is used phrase a motor as the operation that held that of cited cases on statutes, of students negligent supervision in includes governmental-immunity by of one student another. Cf. that fails to the assault prevent school bus 946 P.2d 544 (Colo.App.1997), Dist. Denver Regional Transp. Stockwell of was beaten injuries passenger claim that suffered a bus who (rejecting of a motor operation resulted from passengers public transportation other statute); Chan governmental-immunity vehicle within the of Colorado’s (the (2002), 315, 321, of a operation 652 N.W.2d Muskegon dler v. 467 Mich. ac “encompasses statute Michigan governmental-immunity motor vehicle under vehicle”). of a motor directly driving tivities that are associated with the plain language case are the alleged distressing, While the facts this {¶ 29} 2744.02(B)(l)’s immunity negligent to for the exception political subdivision scope not include within its operation of motor vehicle does It on a school bus as here. is our supervision the conduct students it; it not our duty Assembly to the statute as the General has drafted See, to rewrite it. Bd. Edn. Pike-Delta-York Local School Dist. duty e.g., Cty. Budget v. Fulton Comm. 41 Ohio St.2d 70 O.O.2d (“Courts authority ignore, guise statutory N.E.2d 566 do not have the to * * * a statute. The interpretation, plain unambiguous language * * * from remedy by appellants desired this court must be obtained Assembly”). General
Ill exception immunity we hold that the to subdivision Accordingly, {¶ 30} 2744.02(B)(1) “negligent in R.C. for the of a motor vehicle” does not in the vehicle. encompass supervision the conduct The of the court of is affirmed. judgment appeals affirmed.
Judgment Lundberg Stratton, Moyer, C.J., JJ., concur. O’Donnell, Lanzinger, J., dissents. Pfeifer,
O’Connor, J., dissents without opinion. J., dissenting.
Pfeifer,
I in this will be startled to learn school bus drivers state parents Ohio A can “Lord have one don’t crash the bus. school bus become responsibility: but wheels, an long of the Flies” on but as as the driver maintains assured apparently drivers, a no liability clear distance from other school board faces what It turns out that the school bus driver’s is no more happens cargo inside. than that of the truck driver. Just don’t crash the precious garbage bus! I hold that of a school bus “operation” pursuant would 2744.02(B)(1) safety. majority includes attention to student writes “the 2744.02(B)(1) for the negligent operation motor vehicle pertains only negligence causing otherwise However, “driving” vehicle to be moved.” does not refer to —it “operation.” “operation” refers to I would hold that of a motor vehicle includes “driving” but also includes other activities relevant to the general purpose vehicle. *8 distinguishes The Ohio Administrative Code between a “driving” school
{¶ 34} bus; code, bus and a school in a “operating” “driving” only bus is one aspect of “operating” may a bus. Before a bus driver a “operat[e] pupils school bus with board,” he or she must complete training “[d]riving includes the bus” but added.) also includes “[p]upil management.” (Emphasis Ohio Adm.Code 3301- 83-10(A)(2)(d) (f). a “operating pre-school Before bus with and special needs board,” children on in training driver must receive “[a]ppropriate behavior added.) 3301-83-10(A)(3)(a). management.” (Emphasis Ohio Adm.Code Throughout 3301-83-10, regard Ohio Adm.Code in to driver-training require- ments, renewal, annual inservice training, and certification is treated as only part one a operating school bus. in Dayton (1999), 566, The court Groves v. Pub. Schools 132 Ohio App.3d 734,
725 N.E.2d
recognized that there is more to the
a
operation of
school bus
Groves,
than
In
driving.
a
student
injuries
disabled
she had suffered
as a result of a district bus driver’s
negligence
failing to secure her in her
helping
wheelchair when
her off the bus. The court held that
assisting
handicapped student off the bus
of a
part
was
bus driver’s duties and could be
a jury
found
to be
part
“operating” the school bus for
purposes
570,
Id. at
21 on school anything happens can ever be liable for whether a school board But the surreptitious. injurious apparently activities this case were bus. The apply It would to cases where the abuse was visible. holding today apply would where a It would to cases screaming help. apply to where a child was for cases drove long onto the bus. As as the driver strange bus driver allowed adults district would be immune. safely, the school 2744.02(B)(1) sure, But R.C. operating complex. To be a school bus is vehicle, to the inherent regard motorized without any
refers to the any particular type of vehicle. The complexities operating aspects operating should to all immunity contained R.C. a school bus.
II (1994), I v. 68 Ohio St.3d 624 Sandusky As wrote Garrett 38} {¶ (Pfeifer, J., munici concurring), immunity, including N.E.2d 704 “Governmental the Ohio immunity, contrary to the clear and mandate of pal Constitution; it was Sovereign immunity Constitution.” is not rooted the Ohio Homes, In Inc. originally Portage a creation of the common law. Haverlack abrogated this court OBR N.E.2d subdivisions, so the sovereign immunity political common-law doctrine of statute. R.C. Assembly by imposing sovereign immunity by General responded But seq. purporting grant 2744.01 et statute Constitution, I and its grant subdivisions violates Section Article of the Ohio remedy any injured to a citizen: right “All an done him in his open, every person, injury courts shall be law, land, goods, person, reputation, remedy by shall have due course justice delay.” shall have administered without denial or *9 stands, Assembly’s As it virtual proclamation General injured 2744.01 that “the can do no certain seq. King wrong” profoundly et leaves court, I remedy Ohioans with no direct defiance of Section Article of the said, “Kings As Bernard once are not born: George Ohio Constitution. Shaw case, they by are made artificial hallucination.” Or this statute. Oldfield, Oldfield, L.L.C., Hill, for Joy Hill Hardman John F. Malek appellants. Ke’m,
Britton, Smith, Co., L.P.A., Smith, K. & Kalail David Kane Krista Peters Slick, for Massey; Mary appellees. and Sherrie C. Jo Shannon Keith, Harry urging Legal Rights B. reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Service. Houston, Plakas, Raies, Ltd., K. and Edmond J. Mannos & Denise Tzangas, Mack, amici for the Education of reversal for curiae Ohio Coalition urging Fund, Foundation, Disabilities, Equal Children with Children’s Defense Justice Association for Justice. and Ohio L.P.A.,
Means, Bichimer, Co., Donovsky, Burkholder & Baker Nicole M. Ross, urging Richard affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio School Boards W. Association. Appellee. Center, Inc., Appellant, Levin, Commr.,
Nestle R&D
Tax
Ctr.,
Levin,
[Cite as Nestle R&D
Inc. v.
franchise claims a tax credit creating jobs new it does so 5733.12(B). filing a refund claim under R.C. This case asks three-year when the limitations a claim period filing begins such to run. Tax Commissioner (“BTA”) and the Board of Tax Appeals held that the period began limitations run at the time taxes were deemed to have been paid. argues Nestle that the period to run at a began later time: the date on which Department Development issued the certificate verifies the amount of the tax credit. hold that the three-year period We limitations commences to run when Department of Development issues the certificate. We therefore reverse the *10 BTA’s decision and remand for further proceedings.