MCCLAIN, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE.
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4722
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
December 29, 2022
Criminal law—Wrongful imprisonment—Jury trial—Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution—There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in a wrongful-imprisonment action, because the action did not exist at common law. (No. 2021-0718—Submitted May 24, 2022—Decided December 29, 2022.
Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as McClain v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4722.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4722
MCCLAIN, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as McClain v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4722.]
STEWART, J.
{1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to decide whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial under
Facts and Procedural History
{2} In 1995, McClain was indicted for murder in violation of
{3} In 2002, McClain filed in the trial court a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. After converting the motion for leave into a motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion. The First District reversed the trial court‘s judgment and remanded for a new trial. State v. McClain, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040647 (Aug. 17, 2005). In 2006, McClain was retried by a jury and acquitted of all offenses.
{4} McClain filed an action against appellee, the state of Ohio, to be declared a “wrongly imprisoned individual” under
{5} The trial court held that McClain failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the murder offense or that no offense was committed by any person; it therefore declined to declare McClain a wrongfully imprisoned person. McClain appealed to the First District, raising a single assignment of error: the trial court erred by refusing to grant McClain‘s right to a jury trial. The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, overruled McClain‘s assignment of error, holding that McClain did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the wrongful-imprisonment action. 2021-Ohio-1423, 171 N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 30.
{6} McClain filed a discretionary appeal in this court, raising a single proposition of law:
The divided court in the First District erred when it held, in direct contravention of
Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution , that Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial for his wrongful imprisonment claim.
See 164 Ohio St.3d 1460, 2021-Ohio-3594, 174 N.E.3d 810.
Law and Analysis
{7}
{9} To be declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” by the court of common pleas under the first step of the statute, an individual needs to satisfy the five elements of
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor.
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor.
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty.
(4) The individual‘s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal and all of the following apply:
(a) No criminal proceeding is pending against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(b) The prosecuting attorney in the case, within one year after the date of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not sought any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, provided that this division does not limit or affect the seeking of any such appeal after the expiration of that one-year period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.
(c) The prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, within one year after the date of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not brought a criminal proceeding against the individual for any act associated with that conviction, provided that this division does not limit or affect the bringing of any such proceeding after the expiration of that one-year period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.
(5) Subsequent to sentencing or during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in procedure was discovered that occurred prior to, during, or after sentencing, that involved a violation of the Brady Rule which violated the individual‘s
rights to a fair trial under the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution, and that resulted in the individual‘s release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated either that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, was not committed by the individual or that no offense was committed by any person.
{10} McClain argues that a wrongful-imprisonment claim has roots in the common law in the intentional tort of false imprisonment, which carried with it a right to a jury trial. McClain further asserts that this court recognized a common-law claim of false imprisonment against state officials long before
{11} The state first responds that McClain‘s claim is statutory and has no common-law analogue. Second, the state argues that because McClain essentially seeks a declaratory judgment that he qualifies as a wrongfully imprisoned person under
{12} Contrary to McClain‘s assertion, a wrongful-imprisonment claim is different than a claim at common law for the intentional tort of false imprisonment. The latter exists when “a person confines another intentionally ‘without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.‘” Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 573 N.E.2d 633 (1991), quoting Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Section 3.7, at 226 (1956). While the common law sometimes allowed plaintiffs to bring false-imprisonment claims against state officials, see, e.g., Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918), it did not permit suits against the state itself, Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 518, 118 N.E. 102 (1917). However,
{13} In contrast, the underlying purpose of
{14} A wrongfully imprisoned person could not bring an action against the state at common law, because the state enjoyed sovereign immunity. See Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 53, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989). And unlike the false-imprisonment tort, the wrongful-imprisonment statute requires that plaintiffs bring wrongful-imprisonment claims against the state for damages, not state officials. See
{15} This court has recognized that the first step of the wrongful-imprisonment statute—being declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual in the court of common pleas—“has no parallel in the ancient dual system of law and equity.” Walden at 53; see also Renee v. Sanders, 160 Ohio St. 279, 282, 116 N.E.2d 420 (1953) (“[Declaratory-judgment actions] did not exist prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution, and consequently it is manifest that there was no right to trial by jury in such actions prior to the adoption of the Constitution“).
{16} Moreover, we have characterized a wrongful-imprisonment action under
{17} Accordingly, we hold that
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ., concur.
DEWINE, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ.
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.
DEWINE, J., concurring.
{18} The majority opinion correctly concludes that the Ohio Constitution‘s jury trial right does not attach to a wrongful imprisonment action brought against the state. The Ohio Constitution codified a preexisting right to a jury trial and, as the majority explains, there was nothing
{19} I write separately to add a few points to the majority opinion‘s analysis. First, I explain that in addition to failing because of the lack of a historical analogue, the claim that there is a jury trial right here also fails because it is inconsistent with the state‘s waiver of sovereign immunity. Second, I supplement the majority opinion‘s analysis of the lack of historical analogues to the wrongful imprisonment action by explaining that prior to the enactment of
The state‘s waiver of sovereign immunity is limited and does not include a right to a jury trial
{20} At common law, the state, as sovereign, could not be sued without its consent. Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 515, 118 N.E. 102 (1917). Indeed, “[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries.” Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Hyatt, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1485, 203 L.Ed.2d 768 (2019). Thus, “[o]nly the sovereign‘s own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity.” Id.
{21} The Ohio Constitution is in line with this historical understanding of sovereignty. It provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”
{22} The state waives sovereign immunity “by express power conferred by statute, and in the manner so expressed.” See Hunter v. Mercer Cty. Commrs., 10 Ohio St. 515, 520 (1860). Thus, when a state chooses to waive its immunity, it “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted.” Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 15 L.Ed. 991 (1857); see also Raudabaugh at 515.
{23} One example of such a waiver comes from the Court of Claims Act,
{24} The General Assembly waived sovereign immunity again in 1986 when it “authorize[d] civil actions against the state, for specified monetary amounts, in
{25} This case pertains to step one. There, the court of common pleas “has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine” a wrongful-imprisonment action.
{26} McClain‘s contention that he is entitled to a jury trial contradicts the “manner” that the General Assembly has “provided by law” for wrongful imprisonment actions to proceed.
R.C. 2743.48 creates a special proceeding with no common-law analogue
{27} In addition to failing because it is inconsistent with the state‘s limited waiver of sovereign immunity, McClain‘s claim fails because there was no judicial action comparable to wrongful imprisonment available at common law.
{28} The Ohio Constitution speaks of “[t]he right of trial by jury.”
{29} The majority opinion properly characterizes the type of suit that McClain has commenced as a “special proceeding” one that “is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.”
{30} The 1986 codification of the wrongful-imprisonment action “replac[ed] the former practice of compensating wrongfully imprisoned persons by ad hoc moral claims legislation.” Walden, 47 Ohio St.3d at 49, 547 N.E.2d 962. That is, prior to the advent of
Where the state inflicts an injury upon an individual, for the reparation of which no law exists, and the facts incident thereto are not in dispute, and the Legislature finds that a moral obligation rests upon the state to compensate the injured party for the damages sustained, the Legislature has full authority to provide, by special enactment, for the appropriation of public money to meet such moral obligation * * *
Spitzig v. State, 119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394, syllabus (1928).
{31} Special bills could grant individualized permission to bring a claim against the state in a court of law or order direct compensation of a sum certain for torts committed by the state. Thomas W. Kahle & Stephen R. Schmidt, Claims against the State of Ohio: Sovereign Immunity, the Sundry Claims Board and the Proposed Court of Claims Act, 35 Ohio St.L.J. 462, 469 (1974). As an example of the former, the General Assembly passed a bill that read: “Morris Seely * * * is hereby authorized and empowered to institute, commence and prosecute an amicable suit * * * in the court of common pleas * * * against the state of Ohio for the recovery of any and all such damages which he may have sustained by reason of the nonperformance upon the part of the state of any contract entered into * * * .” An Act for the relief of Morris Seely, 37 Ohio Laws 220 (1839); see also Seely v. State, 11 Ohio 501 (1842). Such enactments functioned as individualized waivers of immunity from suits commenced against the state. Other times, the General Assembly used its appropriation power directly, see
{32} Perhaps seeing a need to streamline this ad hoc legislative practice, the General Assembly in 1917 created the Sundry Claims Board. H.B. 32, 107 Ohio Law 532. The board was “empowered to receive original papers representing claims against the state of Ohio for the payment of which no monies have been appropriated,” to “carefully investigate[]” such claims, and to tender its “approval or disapproval” to “the chairman of the finance committee of the house of representatives of the next general assembly.” Id. In effect, approval of the Sundry Claims Board amounted to its recommendation that the legislature appropriate funds to remedy wrongs committed by the state.
{33} On rare occasions, victims of wrongful imprisonment received compensation through appropriations bills passed at the behest of the Sundry Claims Board. In one 1959 “sundry appropriations” bill, the state awarded Joseph Cole Jr. $5,000 “for damages sustained as the result of his wrongful arrest and imprisonment,” Roy Donley $2,400 “for wrongful incarceration” after someone else confessed to the crime, and Aaron Morgan $5,000 “for false incarceration” after a writ of habeas corpus issued for his release. Am.H.B. No. 1125, 128 Ohio Laws Supp. 127, 141. And in a 1971 “sundry appropriation,” the state awarded Charles Bailey $30,000 after he served approximately 10 years of “unlawful incarceration.” Am.S.B. No. 562, 134 Ohio Laws 520, 525.
{34} But perceived defects in the sundry-claims process spelled the end of the board and gave rise to the Court of Claims
{35} In the case of Frank Johns, after a writ of habeas corpus was issued ordering his release from prison, see Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir.1972) (ineffective assistance of counsel), he persuaded the General Assembly to pass a special bill on his behalf, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221, Section 41, 137 Ohio Laws Supp. 172, 434 (1977). That legislation “authorized [Johns] to file a claim for damages in the Court of Claims for unlawful incarceration,” among other things. Id. The bill tasked the court of claims with determining whether “Johns ha[d] been unlawfully incarcerated by the State of Ohio,” and if so, to compensate him. Id. Although litigation tactics ultimately cost Johns any chance of compensation, Johns at 329, the legislation granting him special authority shows that the first step to earning relief from the state for wrongful imprisonment was obtaining authorization to sue by special bill—itself a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
{36} Similarly, when “[Leonard] O‘Neil filed suit in the Court of Claims seeking to recover damages for his unlawful incarceration,” the court turned him away. O‘Neil v. State, 13 Ohio App.3d 320, 321, 469 N.E.2d 1010 (10th Dist.1984). But the General Assembly subsequently passed a bill authorizing “O‘Neil to ‘file a claim in the Court of Claims against the State of Ohio for * * * damages that allegedly resulted from an erroneous imprisonment.‘” Id., quoting Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, Section 2, 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1896, 1897 (1981). Equipped with admission into court, O‘Neil returned to the court of claims and received compensation.
{37} This history makes clear that McClain‘s wrongful imprisonment claim fails the test for the attachment of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. The right to seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment “is specially created by”
{38} Courts have long played a role in freeing wrongfully imprisoned individuals through the writ of habeas corpus. In re Collier, 6 Ohio St. 55, 59 (1856). But prior to
{39} McClain analogizes his claim to the common-law tort of false imprisonment, for which a jury did traditionally play a role in assessing liability and damages. See Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 24-25. But “an action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained where the wrong complained of is imprisonment in accordance with the judgment or order of a court.” Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. 473, 475 (1882). That defeats the analogy because a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” must have been “sentenced to” a “term of imprisonment” after being “found guilty.”
Conclusion
{40} McClain is attempting to require the state to defend itself before a jury in a civil case. Trial by jury, however, is not the “manner” in which the state has agreed by law to be sued for wrongful imprisonment. And the constitutional right to a jury trial,
KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
{41} I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in Judge Bergeron‘s well-researched and well-reasoned dissenting opinion in the First District Court of Appeals. 2021-Ohio-1423, 171 N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 32-70 (Bergeron, J., dissenting). I would hold that a constitutional right to a jury trial exists in an action under
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, for appellee.
Koenig & Owen, L.L.C., Charles A. Koenig, and James D. Owen, for appellant.