Matter of McCrory v. Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of TrusteesMatter of McCrory v. Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of Trustees
APPEAL by the petitioners/plaintiffs, in a hybrid proceeding pursuant to
Suzanne McCrory and Stuart Tiekert, Mamaroneck, NY, appellants pro se.
Spolzino Smith Buss & Jacobs LLP, White Plains, NY (Robert A. Spolzino and Edward A. Smith III of counsel), for respondent.
RIVERA, J.P.
OPINION & ORDER
The Open Meetings Law (
“It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that the public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy. The people must be able to remain informed if they are to retain control over those who are their public servants. It is the only climate under which the commonweal will prosper and enable the governmental process to operate for the benefit of those who created it” (
Public Officers Law § 100 ).
The instant appeal presents the question of who has standing to challenge an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Law. In furtherance of and consistent with the provisions of the Open Meetings Law, we conclude that the petitioners/plaintiffs, as members of the public who were allegedly excluded from certain municipal meetings, have standing to bring the instant proceeding/action.
In 2017, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the appellants), who are members of the public and residents of the Village of Mamaroneck, commenced the instant hybrid proceeding pursuant to
The Village Board moved, inter alia, pursuant to
The Open Meetings Law was intended, as its very name suggests, to open the decision-making process of elected officials to the public while simultaneously striking a balance in protecting the ability of government to carry out its functions and responsibilities (see Matter of Gordon v Village of Monticello, 87 NY2d 124, 126). In enacting the Open Meetings Law, the Legislature sought to ensure that “public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy” (
The statute provides generally that “[e]very meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public,” except for executive sessions that may be called for specified reasons (
Therefore, the issue to be decided is whether the appellants herein are aggrieved persons with standing to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Law.
Across a wide spectrum of cases, courts have had occasion to consider the issue of “aggrievement” and, in particular, who is “aggrieved” in order to determine and confer standing. For example, in a proceeding to review an assessment of real property under
In the context of appellate jurisdiction, an appellant may only seek review upon a showing that he or she is “aggrieved” by a judgment or order (
“[f]irst, a person is aggrieved when he or she asks for relief but that relief is denied in whole or in part. Second, a person is aggrieved when someone asks for relief against him or her, which the person opposes, and the relief is granted in whole or in part” (Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156-157 [emphasis omitted]).
Case law on the issue of who has standing to commence a proceeding/action to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Law is sparse. In Matter of Sanna v Lindenhurst Bd. of Educ. (85 AD2d 157, 158), the petitioner sought to
“petitioner‘s standing derived from her membership in that class aggrieved by the board‘s unintentional lapse in its decision-making process (i.e., the citizenry), and not from her status as the subject of those deliberations whose private employment interests are affected by the resulting determination. That vindication of the public‘s right to observe might often concomitantly requite a petitioner‘s private grievance cannot be gainsaid; however, in fashioning a remedy for violation of these statutes, the reviewing court must focus solely upon the public injury” (id. at 162 [emphasis added]).
Thus, in Sanna, with regard to standing, this Court‘s holding expressly centered on the “public injury” or injury to the “citizenry” of which the petitioner was a member, not on her status as the subject of the board‘s deliberation. The Court of Appeals later affirmed this Court‘s decision and order in Sanna, without expressly addressing the issue of standing (see Matter of Sanna v Lindenhurst Bd. of Educ., 58 NY2d 626, 627-628).
In Matter of Friends of Pine Bush v Planning Bd. of City of Albany (71 AD2d 780), following two public hearings held on applications for approval of two subdivision plats in an area in the City of Albany known as the Pine Bush, the Planning Board of the City of Albany (hereinafter the planning board) approved both subdivision plats at a meeting held on July 17, 1978. The petitioners, an unincorporated association called Friends of the Pine Bush and five individuals who were members of the association and resided in the City of Albany, commenced a proceeding to annul the planning board‘s action in approving the plats. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the planning board failed to comply with the Open Meetings Law. In its answer, the planning board argued that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing. The Appellate Division, Third Department, found that “[a]s residents of the city, the individual petitioners
In Matter of Zehner v Board of Educ. of the Jordan-Elbridge Cent. School Dist. (29 Misc 3d 1206[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51709[U], *2 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County]), the Supreme Court found, when addressing standing, that the petitioner, a member of the general public, a district taxpayer, and an employee of the school district, had established that he was in the “zone of interest” that the Open Meetings Law was designed to protect. Moreover, he was in attendance at the meeting in question when the executive session was called and the public was excluded, and he was a member of the citizenry aggrieved by the alleged violation. The court further determined that, as a lawful attendee of the meeting in question, the petitioner was an aggrieved party and had standing to challenge the school board‘s activities.
In contrast to the foregoing, the Supreme Court herein applied reasoning, often articulated in land use cases, that, for standing purposes, a petitioner or plaintiff must show that it would suffer direct harm (i.e., injury in fact) that is in some way different from that of the public at large (see e.g. Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 304-305; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 774). In so finding, the court utilized as support Matter of Rivers v Young (26 Misc 3d 946 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]), a case decided by the Supreme Court, Westchester County. Therein, the petitioner, who identified himself as a “duly qualified resident of the City of Mount Vernon,” argued, inter alia, that a public hearing date for public comment on the municipality‘s 2010 budget was set at a hearing held in violation of the Open Meetings Law and was not properly noticed (id. at 947 [internal quotation marks omitted]). On the issue of standing, that court determined that the petitioner‘s allegation that, as a member of the general public, he was affected by a proposed budget was insufficient to confer standing (see id. at 950). Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for lack of standing.
Guided by the settled principle that “[w]hen presented with a question of statutory interpretation, a court‘s primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature‘” (Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 31 NY3d 523, 528, quoting Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463; see Nadkos, Inc. v Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group LLC, 34 NY3d 1, 7), we disagree with the Supreme Court‘s determination that the appellants did not have standing to commence this proceeding/action. The purpose of the Open Meetings Law and the intent of the Legislature in enacting that law dictate that the harm or injury is the alleged unlawful exclusion of the public from a municipal meeting. The Open Meetings Law plainly confers upon the public the right to attend certain meetings of public bodies (see
Accordingly, the order and judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, that branch of the Village Board‘s motion which was pursuant to
Thus, the order and judgment is reversed, on the law, that branch of the Village Board‘s motion which was pursuant to
DILLON, AUSTIN and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the order
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court