New Yorkers for Constitutional Freedoms v. New York State SenateNew Yorkers for Constitutional Freedoms v. New York State Senate
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), for defendants/appellants.
Liberty Counsel, Lynchburg, Virginia (Rena M. Lindevaldsen of counsel), and Joseph P. Miller, Cuba, for plaintiffs/respondents.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FAHEY, J.
This appeal arises from the passage of the Marriage Equality Act (MEA) (L 2011, ch 95, § 3), which permits same-sex couples to marry in this state (see
Defendants appeal, and in doing so bring before us none of the policy considerations relative to the MEA that lurk beneath the verified complaint in this action. Rather, our primary task on this appeal is to interpret the exemption to the OML embodied in
I
As noted, this appeal arises from the passage of the MEA and the legalization of gender-neutral marriage in New York State. Legislation proposing to legalize such marriage failed in 2009, but in 2011 four Republican State Senators joined Democratic State Senators in voting for the MEA, which was signed into law by Governor Andrew Cuomo on June 24, 2011. At the time the MEA was enacted, 32 of the 62 members of the State Senate were Republicans.
Our review begins with the verified complaint, which sets forth what is characterized as the series of events that precipitated the passage of the MEA. In mid-May 2011, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a registered Independent, accompanied by New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn, a registered Democrat, met individually with Republican State Senators to lobby on behalf of 2011 New York Assembly Bill A8354, which provided the foundation for what ultimately became the MEA. According to the verified complaint, Mayor Bloomberg’s lobbying efforts with respect to the assembly bill were not limited to May 2011. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that Mayor Bloomberg met with the entire Republican Conference of the Senate, i.e., 32 of the 62 senators, in a closed meeting at the New York Capitol Building on June 16, 2011 (hereafter, Bloomberg meeting). At that meeting, Mayor Bloomberg spoke to the Republican Conference and pledged financial support for the campaigns of Republican Senators who voted in favor of the MEA. In contrast to the access granted Mayor Bloomberg, neither plaintiff Duane R. Motley, the Senior Lobbyist with plaintiff New Yorkers for Constitutional Freedoms, nor plaintiff Nathaniel S. Leiter, the Executive Director of Torah Jews for Decency, was permitted to address the Republican Conference that day.
Similarly to Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Cuomo, a registered Democrat, lobbied on behalf of the MEA. According to the veri
Plaintiffs do not specify a date on which the Cuomo meeting occurred, but one of the exhibits to the verified complaint suggests that it may have been held on June 20, 2011. In the event that the Cuomo meeting was indeed held on June 20, 2011, it occurred subsequent to the Assembly’s passage of the MEA on June 15, 2011, which was facilitated by a message of necessity from Governor Cuomo dispensing with the constitutionally mandated waiting period of three days for the passage of bills (see
Once passed by the Assembly, the MEA was delivered to the Senate, and during the week of June 20, 2011 there was what Motley describes as an “unprecedented” denial of public access to the Republican Senators. Plaintiffs allege that, on Tuesday, June 21, 2011, lobbyists and activists were locked out of the Senate lobby and that, on June 22 and 23, 2011, the Senate lobby was only partially reopened to legislative staff and lobbyists. On Friday, June 24, 2011, the lockout resumed, thereby preventing the public from accessing the Senate lobby and the Republican side of the Senate chamber. Moreover, the Republican Senators allegedly turned off their cell phones on June 24, 2011 and met for five hours on that date without providing for access to staff or the public.
The MEA was amended on June 24, 2011 (hereafter, Bill) to include limited protections for certain religious entities (see L 2011, ch 95, § 3), and Governor Cuomo issued messages of necessity to the Assembly and the Senate with respect to the Bill on that date, again dispensing with one of the constitutional requirements for enacting a bill into law. The Bill, now identified as A8520-2011, passed the Assembly, and thereafter was passed by the Senate in a regular session by a vote of 33 to 29. Governor Cuomo signed the Bill into law on June 24, 2011 at 11:15 p.m.
II
Plaintiffs commenced this action approximately one month after the MEA was enacted. In addition to providing the basis for the foregoing factual summary, the verified complaint asserted three causes of action against defendants and defendant Attorney General. Our concern rests with the first cause of action, which alleges the violation of the OML arising from the purported conduct of business of a public body in a closed session and seeks a declaration nullifying the MEA pursuant to
As noted, in lieu of an answer defendants moved to dismiss the verified complaint pursuant to
III
Before turning to the primary issue on appeal, we briefly consider two preliminary points of far less significance. First, “although defendant[s] purport[ ] to appeal ‘from each and every part’ of the [judgment], [they are] not aggrieved by those parts . . . granting [their] motion in part and thus may not appeal therefrom” (K.J.D.E. Corp. v Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 89 AD3d 1531, 1532 [2011]; see Viscosi v Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 87 AD3d 1307, 1307 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). Put differently, defendants may appeal from the judgment only to the extent that it denied their motion (see
Second, defendants contend in their main brief that plaintiffs may not prosecute this case without running afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause of the state constitution (see
IV
A.
We now turn to the primary issue on appeal, i.e., the interpretation of the exemption.
“The purpose of the [OML] is to prevent public bodies from debating and deciding in private matters that they are required to debate and decide in public, i.e., ‘deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy’ ” (Matter of Zehner v Board of Educ. of Jordan-Elbridge Cent. School Dist., 91 AD3d 1349, 1350 [2012]; see Matter of Gordon v Village of Monticello, 87 NY2d 124, 126-127 [1995]). Pursuant to
“[T]he provisions of the [OML] are to be liberally construed in accordance with the statute’s purposes” (Gordon, 87 NY2d at 127), and here we are called upon to construe the “guest” exemption, which is contained in
ture’ ” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a] at 177; see Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006]), and “ ‘we turn first to the plain language of the statute [ ] as the best evidence of legislative intent’ ” (Matter of Stateway Plaza Shopping Ctr. v Assessor of City of Watertown, 87 AD3d 1359, 1361 [2011], quoting Matter of Malta Town Ctr. I, Ltd. v Town of Malta Bd. of Assessment Review, 3 NY3d 563, 568 [2004]). Our concern in determining whether the exemption applies to the Bloomberg and Cuomo meetings lies in section 108 (2) (b), and we turn to what we characterize as the “first part” of that paragraph, which provides that, for purposes of section 108, “the deliberations of political committees, conferences and caucuses means a private meeting of members of the senate or assembly of the state of New York, or of the legislative body of a county, city, town or village, who are members or adherents of the same political party” (emphasis added).
The inclusion of the emphasized language in the preceding quote qualifies the political committees, conferences and caucuses (collectively, caucuses) that are exempt from the provisions of the OML, and limits the exempt caucuses to those comprised of members of the same political party. Put differently and by way of example, under
What we characterize as the “second part” of section 108 (2) (b) enhances the exemption articulated in the “first part” of that statute. In the second part of section 108 (2) (b), the legislature noted that the exemption applies “without regard to (i) the subject matter under discussion, including discussions of public business, (ii) the majority or minority status of such political committees, conferences and caucuses or (iii) whether such political committees, conferences and caucuses invite staff or guests to participate in their deliberations.”
We now turn to clause (iii) of the foregoing excerpt, i.e., the provision that the exemption applies without regard to whether the caucuses invite staff or guests to participate in their deliberations. The term “guests” brings us to the critical juncture of this issue: whether plaintiffs are correct that the definition of “guests” in the exemption must be limited to people of the same political party as those of the political caucus seeking the exemption, and thus whether the attendance of Mayor Bloomberg and Governor Cuomo, respectively, at the Bloomberg and Cuomo meetings removed those meetings from the protection of the exemption because neither Mayor Bloomberg nor Governor Cuomo is a registered Republican.
We conclude that the plain language of the statute does not support plaintiffs’ position. “The language of a statute is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense . . . in accordance with its ordinary and accepted meaning, unless the Legislature by definition or from the rest of the context of the statute provides a special meaning” (Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70, 78 [2008], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94 at 191-194 [1971 ed]). A “guest” as defined by both legal and nonlegal dictionaries is “[a] person who is entertained or to whom hospitality is extended” (Black’s Law Dictionary 776 [9th ed 2009]; see New Oxford American Dictionary 772 [3d ed 2010] [defining “guest” as “a person who is invited to . . . take part in a function organized by another”]).
Had the legislature intended to constrict the meaning of “guest” as plaintiffs suggest, it could have done so through the same means by which it limited the definition of caucuses eligible for the exemption. Eligible caucuses include only those comprised of “adherents of the same political party” (
The only case that we could locate on this issue is Warren v Giambra (12 Misc 3d 650 [Sup Ct, Erie County 2006]). There, Supreme Court concluded that a private assembly of the Democratic majority of the county legislature was not an exempt political caucus within the meaning of
Indeed, notwithstanding the absence of controlling authority on this issue, the broad construction of “guests” that we perceive the legislature as having employed is eminently practical. Plaintiffs contend that “guests more properly would apply to topical or strategic experts from whom the caucus seeks input in order to decide how to act on public business.” There is, however, no basis in the statute for reading that subtlety into the definition of “guests,” and that artificial distinction drawn by plaintiffs exposes certain issues arising from their proposed construction of the exemption. For example, in the event that we were to adopt plaintiffs’ limited definition of “guests,” it would be impossible for a Democratic member of a governor’s office, such as a budget director, to speak to a majority Republican caucus. Moreover, assuming that the limitations plaintiffs seek to impose on “guests” under
We next turn to the legislative history of
“Despite the primary importance of literal construction, we [have] recognize[d] that ‘[t]he courts may
The Legislative Declaration accompanying the 1985 amendments to the Public Officers Law that added paragraph (b) to
Finally, at least with respect to the issue whether the Bloomberg and Cuomo meetings violated the OML, we reject what we interpret as plaintiffs’ contention that the OML was violated insofar as the Republican Senate majority conducted public business during private conferences at which “Republican Senators were pressured to change their vote.”
B.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Bloomberg and Cuomo meetings violated the OML, we would not invalidate the MEA and the marriages performed thereunder.
V
Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment should be reversed insofar as appealed from, and judgment should be entered in favor of defendants declaring that defendant New York State Senate did not violate the OML in enacting the MEA and that marriages performed thereunder are valid.
CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI and SCONIERS, JJ., concur with FAHEY, J.
Ordered that the judgment insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, and judgment is granted in favor of defendants-appellants as follows: It is adjudged and declared that defendant New York State Senate did not violate the Open Meetings Law (
Notes
“Nothing contained in [the OML] shall be construed as extending the provisions hereof to: . . .
“2. a. deliberations of political committees, conferences and caucuses.
“b. for purposes of this section, the deliberations of political committees, conferences and caucuses means a private meeting of members of the senate or assembly of the state of New York, or of the legislative body of a county, city, town or village, who are members or adherents of the same political party, without regard to (i) the subject matter under discussion, including discussions of public business, (ii) the majority or minority status of such political committees, conferences and caucuses or (iii) whether such political committees, conferences and caucuses invite staff or guests to participate in their deliberations.”
“The legislature hereby reaffirms that the public business of public bodies of the state of New York should generally be conducted at open and public meetings . . . When enacting the [OML], the legislature intended and provided that the ‘deliberations of political committees, conferences and caucuses’ should be exempt from the coverage of such law. Such exemption was enacted in furtherance of the legislature’s recognition that the public interest is well served by the political party system in legislative bodies because such parties serve as mediating institutions between disparate interest groups and government and promote continuity, stability and orderliness in government. The performance of this function requires the private, candid exchange of ideas and points of view among members of each political party concerning the public business to come before legislative bodies. Recent judicial decisions have, however, eroded this exemption by holding that it applied only to discussions of political business. Accordingly, the legislature hereby declares its adherence to the original intent of the legislature, that the provisions of the [OML] are not applicable to the deliberations of political committees, conferences and caucuses of legislative bodies regardless of (i) the subject matter under discussion, including discussions of public business, (ii) the majority or minority status of such political committees, conferences and caucuses or (iii) whether such political committees, conferences and caucuses invite staff or guests to participate in their deliberations” (L 1985, ch 136, § 1).