Nathaniel V. MASSAQUOI II, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 13-2014 (RBW)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed February 25, 2015
Sarah L. Knapp, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge
The plaintiff, Nathaniel V. Massaquoi II, filed this civil action against the defendant, the District of Columbia,1 asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“),
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff “is a professing Christian male,” Compl. ¶ 46, whose “national origin is the Republic of Liberia,” and is “over the age of forty,” id. ¶ 9. According to the plaintiff, he “suffers from major anxiety.” Id. In October 2007, the plaintiff was hired by the District of Columbia to work at its Child Support Services Division of the Office of the Attorney General (“Child Support Services Division“) as a Community Outreach Specialist. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Since he was hired, the plaintiff has allegedly been subjected to disparate treatment by his immediate manager at the Child Support Services Division, Angelisa Young, an African-American, who “does not suffer from major depressiоn.” Id. ¶ 14. More specifically, Ms. Young allegedly “subject[ed] [the] [p]laintiff to disparate treatment based upon religion, national origin, gender[,] and disability.” Id. ¶ 9. The consequences of this alleged disparate treatment include denial of a promotion opportunity in 2010, id. ¶ 16, as well as denial of medical leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act in October 2011, see id. ¶¶ 17-18.
In February 2012, the plaintiff complained to Nicole Reece, the Acting Chief of Policy, Outreach and Training Section of the Child Support Services Division, that Ms. Young was subjecting the plaintiff tо such disparate treatment, but allegedly no action was taken to address the plaintiff‘s grievances, except to inform Ms. Young of the complaint. See id. ¶¶ 19-21. In the following month, Ms. Reece allegedly moved the plaintiff “from a cubicle only steps away from her office ... to a less desirable location” in the office. Id. ¶ 22. Thereafter, in April 2012, the plaintiff contends that “Ms. Young began to intensify her discriminatory and retaliatory treatment of [the] [p]laintiff.” Id. ¶ 24; see also id. (alleging that discriminatory and retaliatory treatment included “issuing letters of admonition, excluding [the] [p]lain
The plaintiff identifies the following specific examples of this alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. In April 2012, during a staff meeting
Ms. Young asked each staff member to state one good thing that was going on [in] their personal life. When it was [the plaintiff‘s] turn, [he] stated: “God, God is good!” [Ms.] Young began to swag her finger in thе air and stated: “Now, now ... let‘s leave religion out of government!”
Id. ¶ 25. Then in May 2012, when the plaintiff sought to take medical leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act
Ms. Young advised [the] [p]laintiff that she was going to have to take corrective action against him.... Ms. Young stated words [to] th[e] effect [of]: “I know that they are considering your request for FMLA, until they tell me something, I have to do what I have to do!!! I must take corrective action now.”
Id. ¶ 26. In that same month, the plaintiff contends that “Ms. Young yelled at [the] [p]laintiff for purportedly sending too many work-relatеd emails,” and allegedly punished the plaintiff by “fail[ing] to approve one of [the] [p]laintiff‘s work products.” Id. ¶ 27. Later that year, in August 2012, the “[p]laintiff filed an internal discrimination and retaliation complaint with [the Office of Attorney General].” Id. ¶ 30. Then, beginning in November 2012, Ms. Young allegedly started eliminating certain duties the plaintiff had been performing, which fell under his purview as a Community Outreach Specialist. See id. ¶¶ 32-33. The plaintiff was then “placed on administrative leave” in January 2013, “pending termination from employment ... effective” March 2013. Id. ¶ 34. As a result of the above-described events, the plaintiff has allegedly suffered “irreparable loss and injury, including, but not limited to economic loss, humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress[,] and deprivation of his right to equal employment opportunities.” Id. ¶ 37; see also id. ¶¶ 38-43 (detailing the extent of the alleged injuries). The plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, seeking damages for his alleged injuries. See id. at 13-15. The defendant has moved to dismiss the suit. Mot. at 1.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A
III. ANALYSIS
A. Counts One and Three of the Plaintiff‘s Complaint
In counts one and three of his complaint, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has discriminated and retaliated against him, and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, because of his national origin, gender, and religion.4 Compl. ¶¶ 44-55, 66-77. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to plead a claim in either count one or count three of his complaint upon which relief may be granted. Mot. at 1.
1. The Plaintiff‘s Title VII Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claim
Under Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Here, the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that he is entitled to an inference of discrimination based on disparate treatment. Aside from conclusory allegations, the plaintiff offers nothing mоre to suggest that the alleged adverse employment actions he endured while he was employed by the defendant were because of his national origin, gender, or religion.5 In other words, it is not reasonable to infer that just because Ms. Young or Ms. Reece were of a different national origin, gender, and religion than the plaintiff, all disciplinary actions they took against the plaintiff were motivated by these differences. Such an inference is not reasonable here because the complaint is entirely void of any suggestion that the plaintiff was treated any differently than similarly situated employees who were not of the plaintiff‘s national origin, gender, or religion. See Mapp v. District of Columbia, 993 F.Supp.2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The second element—that the adverse action was motivated by discriminatory in
2. The Plaintiff‘s Title VII Retaliation Claim
Title VII also makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful emрloyment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
[T]here is a difference between “adverse actions” that support a claim for discrimination and “materially adverse actions” that support a claim for retaliation. Unlike discriminatory actions, retaliatory actions need not be employment-related or even occur in the workplace, nor must they result in “a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of one‘s employment.” Nonetheless, the allegеd retaliatory action must produce “an injury or harm.” The injury or harm must be “material,” meaning that it could “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Nurriddin v. Bolden, 40 F.Supp.3d 104, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal alterations and citations omitted); see also Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n. 4 (“‘Adverse actions’ in the retaliation context encompass a broader sweep of actions than those in a pure discrimination claim.“).
The plaintiff first engaged in protected activity opposing discrimination in February 2012, when he informally complained to Ms. Reece about Ms. Young‘s conduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 19-21. For the purposes of the Court‘s analysis of the plaintiff‘s Title VII retaliation claim then, any alleged materially adverse employment action that occurred before the plaintiff complained to Ms. Reece is irrelevant. Wilson v. Mabus, 65 F.Supp.3d 127, 133 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The only employment actions that could plausibly be considered retaliation must have taken place after [the] plaintiff engaged in protected activity.” (emphasis added)).
The alleged conduct that occurred after the plaintiff informally complained to Ms. Reece about Ms. Young‘s alleged dis
Likewise, the alleged actions that occurred after the plaintiff filed his internal complaint with the Office of Attorney General in August 2012, Compl. ¶ 30, can also qualify as materially adverse employment actions for several reasons. First, the defendant does not appear to dispute that the placement of the plaintiff on administrative leave in January 2013 and the termination of the plaintiff from the position of Community Outreach Specialist in
Moreover, contrary to the defendant‘s position, Mem. at 15-16, the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a causal connection—albeit on the thinnest of margins—between the protected activity and the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. The рlaintiff alleges that after he informally complained to Ms. Reece in February 2012 about Ms. Young‘s alleged mistreatment of him, a series of disciplinary actions were then instituted against him by the defendant. See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 22, 24-28, 73-74. Similarly, following the filing of the plaintiff‘s formal complaint with the Office of Attorney General in August 2012, the defendant allegedly took additional disciplinary actions against him. See id. ¶¶ 30, 32-34, 73-74. These allegations permit the Court to reasonably infer a plausible retaliation claim. See Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff need not plead temporal proximity to sustain retаliation claim).9 Therefore, with respect to the plaintiff‘s retaliation claim, the defendant‘s motion will be denied.
3. The Plaintiff‘s Title VII Hostile Work Environment
To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege “‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff]‘s employment and create an abusive working environment.‘” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In evaluating a plaintiff‘s allegations, courts must consider “all the circumstances“: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive uttеrance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee‘s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code. Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking the
The plaintiff‘s hostile work environment claim is essentially an amalgamation of his discrimination and retaliation claims, which “[c]ourts have been reluctant to transform ... into a cause of action for hostile work environment.” Wade v. District of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lester v. Natsios, 290 F.Supp.2d 11, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)); Franklin v. Potter, 600 F.Supp.2d 38, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Because [the] plaintiff‘s allegedly ‘hostile’ events ‘are the very employment actions he claims are retaliatory, he cannot so easily bootstrаp alleged retaliatory incidents into a broader hostile work environment claim.‘” (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Keeley v. Small, 391 F.Supp.2d 30, 51 (D.D.C. 2005))). Although incidents of discrimination or retaliation can establish a hostile work environment if connected to a pervasive pattern of severe harassment, the actions alleged by the plaintiff here do not rise to that level. See Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F.Supp.2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[The] [p]laintiff, in effect, seeks to transform his challenges to discrete acts of alleged discrimination or retaliation (e.g., nonpromotions, denial of leave, and termination) into a hostilе work environment claim by combining those events with a series of ordinary workplace difficulties. But mere reference to alleged disparate acts of discrimination against plaintiff cannot be transformed, without more, into a hostile work environment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Franklin, 600 F.Supp.2d at 77 (“Discrete acts constituting discrimination or retaliation claims are different in kind from a hostile work environment claim.” (internal alteration, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted)).
The defendant‘s alleged discriminatory conduct does not permit the Court to infer that the defendant has engaged in a pervasive or severe pattern of harassment because the allegations do not suggest that the defendant‘s conduct has altered the conditions of the plaintiff‘s employment or that it has created an abusive working environment. For example, there is no allegation that the plaintiff was physically threatened or humiliated. The complaints made by the plaintiff comports with “ordinary tribulations in the workplace,” id. at 76 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788), and are therefore insufficient as matter of law to establish that the defendant subjected him to a hostile work environment,10 see, e.g., Casey v. Mabus, 878 F.Supp.2d 175, 189-90 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing hostile work environment claim founded upon the plaintiff‘s “exclusion from the planning and presentation of training courses“); Munro v. LaHood, 839 F.Supp.2d 354, 366 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where
B. Count Two of the Plaintiff‘s Complaint
In count two of his complaint, the plaintiff asserts violations of the ADA. Compl. ¶¶ 56-65. The defendant seeks dismissal of this count on the basis that the plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that he is disabled under the ADA. Mem. at 8-9. The Court agrees that dismissal is required.
The ADA not only forbids discrimination against a “qualified individual on the basis of disability,”
[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of [the ADA] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent,
or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.
The plaintiff‘s complaint does not plausibly assert that he is disabled under the ADA because there is no allegation that his alleged “anxiety disorder” substantially limits a major life activity. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 42, 58. And, contrary to the plaintiff‘s position, see Opp‘n at 6-7, having “failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim that he is substantially limited in a major life activity,” his ADA claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Sheller-Paire v. Gray, 888 F.Supp.2d 34, 42 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Scott v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., 60 F.Supp.3d 156, 163-64 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing ADA claim where there was no allegation that the plaintiff had “a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity as compared to the general public” (emphasis in original) (citing
C. The Plaintiff‘s Request for Leave to Amend His Complaint
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, only count three for retaliation under Title VII remains alive in the matter.11
SO ORDERED