Sillette SHELLER-PAIRE as Personal Representative for the Estate of Dante A. Paire, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Vincent GRAY, Mayor for the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
Civil Case No. 11-1043(RJL)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Aug. 27, 2012.
RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.
166 (1974). Indeed, should plaintiff ultimately prevail, her economic losses can be remedied with money damages. See Davenport v. Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 166 F.3d 356, 367 (D.C.Cir.1999); Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674; Gray v. Dist. of Columbia, 477 F.Supp.2d 70, 75 (D.D.C.2007). Accordingly, because plaintiff‘s injuries are economic in nature, they do not constitute the sort of irreparable harm that justifies preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Davis v. PBGC, 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C.Cir.2009); Smoking Everywhere, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 680 F.Supp.2d 62, 76 (D.D.C.2010); TD Int‘l, LLC v. Fleischmann, 639 F.Supp.2d 46, 48-49 (D.D.C.2009). Plaintiff‘s preliminary injunction thus must be denied on this basis as well.
In sum, the burden of persuasion lies directly on the plaintiff‘s shoulders, and she has failed to carry that burden. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997). Having failed to demonstrate the necessary irreparable harm, the court need not reach the other factors needed to warrant injunctive relief. CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747.
CONCLUSION
Thus, for all of the above reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff‘s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. An appropriate Order will issue with this Memorandum Opinion.
Patricia B. Donkor, Office of the Attorney General, D.C., Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.
Sillette Sheller-Paire brings this action as the personal representative of the estate of Dante A. Paire1 against the District of Columbia‘s mayor and two of the District‘s departments, the Office of Attorney General (“OAG“) and the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department (“Fire Department“). Plaintiff alleges discrimination under federal and state law as well as claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision. Before the Court is the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Defs.’ Mot.“) [Dkt. # 4]. Upon consideration of the parties’ pleadings and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff began employment as a firefighter and emergency medical technician (“EMT“) with the Fire Department on September 6, 2005. Compl. ¶ 3 [Dkt. # 1]. Plaintiff alleges generally that “[t]hroughout Plaintiff‘s employment,” he was “harassed and retaliated against due to his race and perceived disability.” Compl. ¶ 8. Specifically, on or about January 4, 2008, plaintiff‘s immediate supervisor, Lieutenant Robert Edwards, placed him on administrative leave without explanation. Compl. ¶ 9. The battalion fire chief, Kevin Beagley, confirmed his placement on administrative leave and instructed him to contact the Fire Department‘s compliance office for additional information on his duty status. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that, unlike the other employees on his shift, he was not paid for time worked up to that date. Id. Plaintiff sought and received psychiatric treatment from Dr. Jackson of the Police and Fire Clinic as a consequence of these events. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff also sought treatment from his own psychologist, Dr. Laverne Stanforth, from January 5, 2008 until the plaintiff‘s death on February 4, 2009. Id.
Plaintiff repeatedly contacted the Fire Department‘s compliance office and unnamed members of the Fire Department‘s “upper management” from January of
On or around December 3, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the District of Columbia Department of Fire and EMS, alleging discrimination and retaliation. Compl. ¶ 6. The Commission dismissed that charge on March 8, 2011. Defs.’ Reply, Ex. 1 [Dkt. # 9-1]. On June 6, 2011, plaintiff initiated this suit. See generally Compl. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause and the District of Columbia‘s Human Rights Act (“DCHRA“),
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may dismiss a complaint or any portion of it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff‘s Claims Against the Named Defendants
Defendants correctly point out that the OAG and the Fire Department are “non sui juris” and must be dismissed from
Further, defendants also rightly assert that Mayor Gray is not a proper party in interest because plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Mayor in his personal capacity or in his official capacity. Plaintiff‘s allegations do not in any way suggest that the mayor was personally involved in the alleged misconduct. See Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 257-58 (D.C.Cir.1993). And suing a municipal official in his official capacity is the equivalent of suing the municipality itself because the official is not personally liable for damages. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C.Cir.1996). Thus, I will construe plaintiff‘s suit against the mayor as a suit against the District of Columbia. See Henneghan v. Dist. of Columbia Public Schs., 597 F.Supp.2d 34, 37 (D.D.C.2009).
II. Plaintiffs Failure to Provide Adequate Notice Under D.C.Code § 12-309
Plaintiff‘s DCHRA and common law tort claims must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to satisfy the D.C.Code‘s notice requirements for suits against the District.
The District contends that it has not received any notice, even though plaintiff alleges that misconduct began on January 4, 2008 and ended on July 23, 2008. Defs.’ Mot. 16; Defs.’ Mot. Ex. A, Craven Aff. 1-2; see also Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15. Indeed, neither does the complaint indicate that notice was given, see generally Compl., nor does plaintiff‘s opposition brief cite any facts to contest the District‘s argument, see generally Pl.‘s Opp‘n [Dkt. # 6]. Instead, plaintiff wrongly contends that the notice requirements are inapplicable here because “[a]ll actions arising out of the complaint in this matter are based upon the Defendants [sic] violations of the Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights under federal law.” Pl.‘s Opp‘n 15.2 Plaintiff is plainly mistaken — the DCHRA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision claims are nonfederal claims and common law claims. Because plaintiff failed to provide the District with adequate
III. Plaintiff‘s Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3
Plaintiff‘s claim for a remedy against constitutional violations under
Assuming that plaintiff has properly alleged discrimination, plaintiff‘s claim must be dismissed because plaintiff alleges no facts to support a conclusion that the discriminatory actions were the “execution of a government‘s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).5 Municipali- ties
First, plaintiff clearly does not identify any official District policy on investigating discrimination claims or condoning discriminatory conduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. Second, the plaintiff has not alleged that a final policymaker acted or adopted the actions of subordinates. Plaintiff‘s complaint names several Fire Department supervisors, including the assistant fire chief, and generally references the “Department‘s upper management,” see Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15, 21, but none of these officials has authority for establishing final government policy. See Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1451 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that Director of District‘s Department of Corrections was not final decisionmaker); Coleman v. District of Columbia, 828 F.Supp.2d 87, 91-92 (D.D.C.2011) (holding that Fire Chief of FEMS was not final policy maker).6 Furthermore, plaintiff does not plausibly allege any actions “so consistent that they have become ‘custom.‘” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Examining the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff cites only four incidents where fire department management allegedly failed to respond to his requests to provide more information on and to investigate his being placed on leave. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 16. These incidents do not even provide equivocal evidence of constitutional violations, much less a “persistent, pervasive practice of the city officials.” Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 125 (D.C.Cir.1986). Finally,
Further, plaintiff‘s opposition memorandum does little to remedy these defects. Plaintiff merely recites the same allegations as in the complaint, Pl.‘s Opp‘n 11-12, and summarily concludes that “[a]ll of the heretofore exhibits and facts clearly establish sufficient substantiation and inference one could believe the Plaintiff was discriminated against based upon his race and disability,” id. at 15. Therefore, plaintiff‘s claims under § 1983 must fail.
IV. Title VII and ADA Claims
Plaintiff‘s claims under Title VII and the ADA must also be dismissed. First, plaintiff has failed to state a discrimination claim under Title VII and the ADA because plaintiff has not alleged facts that could give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of race or disability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. To establish a prima facie case for discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.Cir.2005); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C.Cir. 1999). Plaintiff‘s complaint fails to allege facts to support this third prong. As previously discussed, the plaintiff alleges no fact from which a reasonable person could infer that his status as an African-American or his alleged disability caused him to suffer an adverse employment action. See supra note 5; Compl. ¶¶ 7-16, 36-43. Although plaintiff makes some bare legal conclusions, see, e.g., id. ¶ 8, the plaintiff never alleges that the adverse employment actions, his placement on leave, were taken because of his race or disability. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-16, 36-43. Therefore, plaintiff‘s discrimination claims must be dismissed.
Second, plaintiff‘s ADA claim is deficient for an additional reason: plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support his claim that he is disabled. A plaintiff “must adequately allege facts sufficient to support the claim that [the plaintiff] has a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA, or else be subject to dismissal.” Mitchell v. Yates, 402 F.Supp.2d 222, 227-29 (D.D.C.2005) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), superseded by statute on other grounds, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, § 3(4)(e)(i), 122 stat. 3553). Under the ADA, a person is disabled if: “(1) he suffers from an impairment; (2) the impairment limits an activity that constitutes a major life activity under the [ADA]; and (3) the limitation is substantial.” Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (interpreting
Although plaintiff claims a disability, he never actually identifies this disability. See generally Compl. Indeed, plaintiff only asserts in his complaint that he had a “mental disability” and that he sought “psychiatric treatment from Dr. Jackson of the Police and Fire Clinic as a benefit of his employment for work related stress.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10. But plaintiff also alleges that he “was cleared by both Drs. Jackson and Stanforth to go back to work in limited duty status” and obtained a limited duty assignment from a Police and Fire Clinic lieutenant. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. As such, plaintiff‘s complaint concedes that he was not restricted from a substantial class of jobs but was capable of performing as a firefighter with limited duties. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim that he is substantially limited in a major life activity.8
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
Notes
Moreover, were plaintiff to amend the complaint to allege the misconduct referenced in the opposition brief, those claims would likely be precluded for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII. “Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995); see also
Only once does plaintiff even remotely allude to a discriminatory intent when he claims that he “was unaware of any white officers ever being required to use their own sick leave under the same or similar circumstances.” Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff does not even actually claim that white co-workers were treated differently, just that he is unaware of any white co-workers being treated this way. This allegation does not support a reasonable inference that the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent. In sum, plaintiff‘s allegations stop well short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.