EXPUNGEMENT — LICENSING RECORDS – WHETHER EXPUNGEMENT OF THE RECORDS OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AFFECTS PROFESSIONAL LICENSING DISCIPLINE THAT RELIED ON THE CONVICTION – WHETHER THE RELATED LICENSING RECORDS MUST BE EXPUNGED
October 6, 2025
110 Op. Att’y Gen. 82
Stephen Conti, LMT, Chair, State Board of Massage Therapy Examiners; Winnie D. Moore, LCPC, Chair, State Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists; Lawrence Franklin, Chair, State Board of Barbers
You asked what happens if a licensee is subject to discipline based on a criminal conviction (the fact of conviction itself rather than the conduct underlying the conviction) but the conviction is later expunged. Specifically, you asked whether “regulatory boards have any duty to rescind, vacate, or otherwise remove from public view any disciplinary orders based solely on a crime or crimes expunged after the issuance of those board orders.
In our opinion, expungement of a conviction does not require a licensing board to rescind or vacate disciplinary action that relied on the conviction. The expungement statute provides for records of an expunged conviction to be sealed and prohibits asking about expunged convictions in certain contexts. But nothing in the statute suggests that expungement retroactively voids or invalidates the original criminal conviction itself. And if the conviction remains in existence, the basis for the licensing board‘s order remains in existence as well.
That said, some specific categories of documents in the record of a license discipline proceeding arising from a criminal conviction may be eligible for expungement. Although the standard expungement order found in the Maryland Rules mentions only police and court records and does not reach licensing agency records at all, the text of the expungement statute leaves open the possibility of expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records when requested in the expungement petition. Even then, though, the “other records” in a licensing file eligible for expungement are likely only those records that originated as police or court records but have come into the hands of the licensing agency. Thus, for example, a copy of an indictment in the files of a licensing board could be expunged, but the administrative order of a licensing board revoking a license could not be. We recognize, however, that these conclusions are not free from doubt, so the General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the scope and effects of expungement in Maryland.
I
Background
A. Expungement as a Remedy for Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction
A criminal record is a heavy burden. Once someone convicted of a crime completes their sentence, they have, as it is commonly said, paid their debt to society. But “collateral consequences” of the conviction can linger long after the sentence ends. “Collateral consequences are the penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages imposed upon a person as a result of a criminal conviction” as distinguished from the “direct consequences imposed as part of the court‘s judgment at sentencing.”
Some of these consequences stem from laws that explicitly impose the consequence. For example, a criminal conviction can render someone legally ineligible for certain public housing, welfare, and healthcare benefits. See, e.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Note, Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an Extraordinary Harm, 25 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol‘y 169, 173-74 (2017). Or, as discussed further below, a criminal conviction can trigger the denial or revocation of a professional license. Infra Part I.C. In Maryland, a criminal conviction can affect, among other things, one‘s right to serve on a jury, capacity to serve as personal representative of an estate, or ability to adopt a child. See
But the stigma of a criminal record can weigh even more heavily than these formal disabilities. See, e.g., Maryland Equitable Justice Collaborative, Breaking the 71%: A Path Toward Racial Equity in the Criminal Legal System 54 (2024) (“MEJC Report“); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104-05 (2013). Would-be employers, landlords, and others can easily look up criminal records from both official sources and private background check services. See Logan, supra, at 1107-08; Anna Kessler, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 403, 411-12 (2015); Collateral Consequences Report at 10, 12. That easy access subjects people with criminal records to discrimination in almost every facet of life. See, e.g., MEJC Report at 54; Logan, supra, at 1107-09; Yee, supra, at 170-71. “These compounded barriers not only undermine an individual‘s ability to rebuild their life but also perpetuate cycles of recidivism, which places strain on families, communities, and the criminal legal system itself.” MEJC Report at 54. The scope of the problem is vast. By some estimates, one third of the U.S. adult population has a record of arrest and/or conviction. Yee, supra, at 171. And the burden falls disproportionately on communities that are exposed at higher rates to the criminal justice system. See MEJC Report at 7, 54.
Expungemеnt aims to address this problem. Almost every state allows expungement of criminal records in at least some
Expungement does not erase all collateral consequences of a conviction, however. First, expunged records often are not destroyed, but may be retained for certain law-enforcement purposes. E.g., Kessler, supra, at 433. Thus, some commentators have argued that “sealing” is a more accurate term than “expungement.” Id. Second, the scope of expungement, meaning what public records are expunged or sealed and what collateral consequences are removed, depends on the statute. Legislatures crafting expungement remedies must strike a balance among the reduction of collateral consequences, protection of the public, and preservation of records for law-enforcement and other purposes. See, e.g., Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 115-16 (1966); E.A. v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm‘n, 208 N.J. Super. 65, 68 (1986); D.A. v. State, 58 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ind. 2016). This means some collateral consequences usually remain even after expungement. Finally, non-governmental records are often unaffected by expungement. This includes government records harvested into private databases. See Murray, supra, at 377-78. Data brokers often fail to update their records to reflect the expungement of a conviction. Id.
B. Maryland‘s Expungement Law
Maryland‘s expungement statute is codified at Title 10, Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Procedure Article (the “Expungement Law“), with implementing court rules found in Title 4, Chapter 500 of the Maryland Rules. The Expungement Law focuses on
[R]emoval from public inspection:
(1) by obliteration;
(2) by removal to a separate secure area to which persons who do not have a legitimate reason for access are denied access; or
(3) if access to a court record or police record can be obtained only by reference to another court record or police record, by the expungement of it or the part of it that provides access.
As noted, the scheme focuses on the expungement of court records and police records, both of which are defined terms. “[C]ourt record,” as relevant here, means “an official record of a court that the clerk of a court or other court personnel keeps about . . . a criminal proceeding,” and includes “an index, docket entry, charging document, pleading, memorandum, transcription of proceedings, electronic recording, order, and judgment.”
Although the Expungement Law provides for expungement of records of a variety of cases not resulting in conviction, such as arrests without charges, cases terminated by dismissal or nolle prosequi, and acquittals,
- When a person was convicted of only one criminal act, not a crime of violence, and received a full and unconditional pardon from the Governor.
CP § 10-105(a)(8) . When a person was convicted of certain minor public-order offenses, including public urination and loitering. Id. (a)(9) .- When a person was convicted of a crime, but the underlying act is no longer a crime.
Id. (a)(11) . - When a person was convicted of simple cannabis possession.
Id. (a)(12) . - When a conviction was vacated on the ground that the defendant was a victim of human trafficking.
Id. (a)(13) ;CP § 8-302 . - When a person was convicted of one of a lengthy list of specified misdemeanors.
CP § 10-110(a)(1) . - When a person was convicted of one of a shorter list of specified felonies,
id. (a)(2) , specifically: Theft under§ 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article ; possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance under§ 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article ; or burglary (except first degree burglary with intent to commit a crime of violence) under§§ 6-202(a) ,6-203 , or6-204 of the Criminal Law Article .
Expungement is available regardless of whether the conviction resulted from a guilty verdict at trial or a guilty plea, because the term “convicted” encompasses both scenarios. See Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 642-43 (1985). Also, if a guilty plea to an offense not enumerated above leads to probation before judgment, the record is eligible for expungement, assuming successful completion of probation. See
An individual with a qualifying conviction becomes entitled to expungement after a specified waiting period. The waiting period usually begins upon completion of the sentence. See
Unless the State‘s Attorney or a law enforcement agency objects, the court “shall рass an order requiring the expungement of all police records and court records about the charge.”
Some police records and court records are expressly exempt from expungement. Court records exempt from expungement include “the published opinion of a court,” “a cash receipt or disbursement record that is necessary for audit purposes,” and “a transcript of court proceedings made by a court reporter in a multiple defendant case.”
The General Assembly first enacted general expungement legislation in 1975. 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 260. It did so apparently in response to the then-Court of Appeals’ decision in Doe v. Commander, Wheaton Police Dep‘t, 273 Md. 262 (1974), suggesting the possibility of an inherent judicial authority to expunge in the absence of statutory authority, see Mora v. State, 123 Md. App. 699, 710 (1998), aff‘d, 355 Md. 639 (1999). Since 1975, the Legislature has gradually broadened the availability of the remedy. In particular, it has expanded what dispositions and what crimes are eligible for expungement. For example, under the original statute, records of convictions could not be expunged. In 1982, the General Assembly allowed expungement of records of pardoned convictions. 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. In 2008, it extended expungement to convictions of certain minor public-order offenses. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 616. And in 2016, under the Justice Reinvestment Act, it extended expungement to a much longer list of misdemeanor convictions, with a 2018 amendment adding certain felony convictions. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515; 2018 Md. Laws, ch. 143. More recently, the Legislature has focused on expungement of cannabis-related charges, including automatic expungement in certain circumstances. See
Many occupations and professions in Maryland require licenses, from physicians to cosmetologists to maritime pilots.
Relevant here, the Health Occupations Article gives various health professions boards the authority to suspend or revoke a license if the licensee is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude.3 For some professionals, like physicians, license revocation is mandatory upon conviction of (or plea to) a crime of moral turpitude.
Meanwhile, the Business Occupations and Professions Article usually provides for license discipline upon conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor directly related to the licensee‘s fitness to practice.5 There are some minor variations.6 Under most of these provisions, the board must consider the specific circumstances of the crime and its relationship to the licensed activities. See, e.g.,
To recap, then, most licenses under the Health Oсcupations Article and Business Occupations and Professions Article can be revoked or suspended if the holder is convicted of a felony. And most can also be revoked either for a misdemeanor of moral turpitude, or a misdemeanor related to fitness to practice. Although you asked about these two Articles in particular, statutes elsewhere in the Code have similar provisions. See, e.g.,
II
Analysis
Your question is: when a licensing board bases a disciplinary order on a criminal conviction, and the records of the conviction are later expunged, must the board “rescind” or “vacate” the order, or otherwise “remove [it] from public view“? That question raises two related legal issues. First, when a court expunges a conviction, does that action invalidate or void any discipline that relied on the conviction? Second, does an expungement order under the Expungement Law reach the records of a licensing board‘s disciplinary action, such that, even if the discipline itself is not affected, the records reflecting the disciplinary action must be destroyed or removed from public access? We consider each question in turn.
A. Expungement of a Criminal Conviction Does Not Invalidate Earlier License Discipline thаt Relied on the Conviction
To begin, we consider whether expungement invalidates or voids any discipline that relied on the conviction. For the reasons explained below, our view is that although expungement seals certain records of a criminal investigation, arrest, and conviction, expungement does not retroactively invalidate or void the conviction itself.
Because expungement is a statutory remedy, the effect of expungement is a question of statutory interpretation. See In re Cintron, 265 Md. App. 481, 500-01 (2025). At one time, Maryland‘s highest court left open the question whether courts might have inherent or equitable authority to expunge criminal records. See Doe, 273 Md. at 275-76. But the enactment of the Expungement Law “obviated” any “common law right of expungement” and established the “primary remedial mechanism” in the area. Reid v. State, 239 Md. App. 1, 15 (2018). The expungement procedure derived from the Expungement Law is therefore “exclusive and mandatory” except in juvenile cases. See
“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate’ the General Assembly‘s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” E.g., Zukowski v. Anne Arundel County, 490 Md. 243, 264 (2025) (citation omitted). This search for legislative intent begins with the statute‘s plain language. Id. It also considers context, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole and the underlying “purpose, aim or policy” of the legislation. Id. We may also examine other extrinsic evidence of intent, including legislative history. E.g., Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113-14 (2018). But a court “will not read into the statute words that give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond the words the Legislature used.” E.g., Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643, 671 (2014) (citation omitted).
In considering the effect of expungement, the natural place to begin is the language of the statutory provision defining “expunge” and “expungement.” Expunge means “to remove information from public inspection in accordance with” the Expungement Law.
The other provisions of the Expungement Law that deal with expungement‘s effects also suggest that expungement does not
Indeed, the General Assembly has rejected the idea that expungement requires the State to behave for all purposes as though the conviction never happened. The Legislature specifically excluded certain items from expungement‘s reach, including court opinions, some trial transcripts, and police work product.
The Appellate Court also has rejected the argument that expungement means across-the-board “erasure.” Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 500-01. In Cintron, the Howard County police had investigated an alleged crime by a Baltimore City police officer and sent copies of evidence from the police record to the Baltimore City police. Id. at 487-88. The charge was later expunged. Id. But the expungement order did not include the Baltimore City police among the custodians required to expunge police records. Id. The City police later used its copies of the evidence in a disciplinary proceeding against the officer. The court held that this use of the evidence was proper, because the City police were never subject to an expungement order. Id. at 498-99. In the court‘s view, the “clеar and unambiguous” language of the statute reflected a legislative “balance” between privacy and law-enforcement needs. Id. at 500-01. And under that clear language, the effect of
The probation-before-judgment statute offers an illuminating contrast. That statute lets the court stay the entry of judgment in a criminal case and place the defendant on probation.
Courts in other states have also observed that expungement or sealing of criminal records is not equivalent to voiding or vacating the conviction. For example, a New York appellate court held that a statute that “simply create[d] a mechanism for restricting future access to existing records” of certain drug-related charges did not “contemplate any alteration of the underlying criminal judgment reflected in those records.” People v. M.E., 121 A.D.3d 157, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly explained that expungement “of a conviction merely deletes the evidence of the underlying conviction from court records” and “does not invalidate the conviction,” contrasting that concept with vacatur, which results from legal or factual flaws in the original proceedings and “invalidates the conviction itself.” State v. Braunschweig, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 754-56 (2018). And along the same lines, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals observed that expungement “casts no doubt on the integrity of the conviction itself, but dеnotes a policy judgment to remove the conviction from a person‘s public record.” Hickerson v. United States, 287 A.3d 237, 243 (2023). Although these opinions interpreted different
To be clear, we do not address the prospective effects of expungement. That is, we do not consider what effects expungement may have on governmental actions taken after a court grants expungement. We conclude only that expungement does not actually vacate, retroactively invalidate, or render void ab initio, an earlier final judgment of conviction. The Expungement Law defines expungement‘s effects. And those effects do not include invalidating the underlying conviction.
2. Because Expungement Leaves the Underlying Conviction in Existence, It Does Not Invalidate Discipline that Relied on an Expunged Conviction
Given our conclusion that expungement does not invalidate the conviction itself, nothing requires the invalidation of a final administrative agency action that relied on a later-expunged conviction (assuming nothing else changed). The factual and legal basis of the administrative agency‘s action remains in existence.7
We reached a similar conclusiоn decades ago in the related context of gubernatorial pardons.
Out-of-state authority supports the conclusion that expungement does not bear on the propriety of a license revocation when the expungement occurred after the licensing board‘s action. See, e.g., Schillerstrom v. State, 180 Ariz. 468, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994);
We therefore conclude that expungement of the records of a criminal conviction does not invalidate or vacate, or require the rescission of, disciplinary action by a licensing board that relied on the conviction. The General Assembly defined expungement as the protection and sealing of certain records and information. But we see no evidence that it intended the underlying convictions themselves would be vacated or retroactively voided. And that means administrative agency actions based on the original conviction, at least those that became final before the expungement order, retain their foundation.
We must also consider whether, even if expungement does not invalidate license discipline that relied on a conviction, documents related to that discipline can or must be expunged, i.e., destroyed or protected from public disclosure under the Expungement Law. As we have discussed, expungement deals primarily with the confidentiality of records. It is thus possible that, even if expungement does not restore a license, it still requires the licensing board to destroy (or remove from public access) records about the revocation of the license.
However, as we will explain, we think only limited types of records from license discipline proceedings will be subject to expungement, for two reasons. First, the standard expungement order issued by Maryland courts only reaches police records and court records. Licensing boards’ records fall into neither of those categories. Although the expungement statute also contemplates a request to expunge “other records” held by the State, an expungement order will not reach “other records” without a specific request. Second, even if the petitioner so requests, the term “other records” likely does not include records generated by a licensing board itself in the disciplinary process. Instead, it would likely reach only records that originated as court or police records and were received by the board. We turn now to flesh out those two points.
1. An Expungement Order Ordinarily Reaches Only Police and Court Records
The standard form expungement order found in the Maryland Rules reaches only police records and court records. “An order for expungement of records shall be substantially in [this] form . . . as modified to suit the circumstances of the case.”
Having found that [name] of [address] is entitled to expungement of the police records pertaining to that individual‘s arrest, detention, or confinement on or about [date], at [location], Maryland, by a law enforcement officer of the [law enforcement agency], and the court records in this action, it is . . .
ORDERED that the clerk forthwith shall serve on each custodian of police and court records designated in this Order and on the Central Repository a copy of this Order together with a blank form of Certificate of Comрliance; and it is further
ORDERED that within 60 days after the entry of this Order or, if this Order is stayed, 30 days after the stay is lifted, the clerk and the following custodians of court and police records and the Central Repository shall (1) expunge all court and police records pertaining to this action or proceeding in their custody (2) file an executed Certificate of Compliance, and (3) serve a copy of the Certificate of Compliance on the applicant/petitioner/defendant[.]
Records held by a licensing board are not “police records” or “court records” within the meaning of the Expungement Law. The law defines these records not only in terms of their nature but also their custodian. Police records are “official record[s] that a law enforcement unit, booking facility, or the Central Repository maintains” about a person‘s arrest or detention.
The form‘s focus on police and court records is consistent with the Expungement Law‘s focus on those records. The first provision of the Expungement Law (after the definitions section) reads: “A police record or a court record is subject to expungement under this subtitle.”
The implementing Rules also assume that only police and court records are subject to expungement.
Some provisions of the expungement statute do contemplate expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records. Section 10-105(a), in particular, states that a person “may file a petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record, court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political subdivision.”
Thus, in the bulk of cases where a licensee informs one of your boards that a conviction has been expunged, the expungement order will not reach records of your board. The standard form expungement order only reaches police and court records. And even to the extent other records are expungeable, an expungement order will not reach them except upon specific request. We turn now to the question of what non-police and court records a petitioner may in theory request to have expunged.
As just noted, some provisions of the Expungement Law seem to contemplate expungement of “other records” beyond police and court records.
For reasons that we will explain below, although not free from doubt, we think the best way to hаrmonize the law‘s provisions here, consistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation, is to give meaning to the statutory references to “other records” but read them to mean only records that are the same in substance as police and court records without technically meeting the statutory definitions of those terms. On this understanding, “other records” would mean documents that originated as police or court records but have come into the hands of other custodians, including licensing boards.
As a starting point, we do not think the term “other records” can be read so broadly as to cover all public records that mention the criminal charge. Although the term may be broad in the abstract, “the meaning of [even] the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears,” e.g., Adelakun v. Adelakun, 491 Md. 1, 22 (2025) (quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017)), and the context here suggests that the meaning is more limited.
For one thing, reading “other records” that broadly would create conflict with the requirements of other statutes. We have a mandate to read, where possible, the General Assembly‘s enactments on the same subject as a “consistent and harmonious body of law.” See, e.g., State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115 (1997) (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39 (1992)). The Health Occupations boards are subject to a statutory requirement to post disciplinary orders on their websites.
A reading of “other records” that encompassed all public records referencing a conviction would also create significant practical problems. “When seeking legislative intent, we consider not only the objectives and purpose of the enactment, but the consequences resulting from one construction rather than another.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 69 (1994). For example, the law does not contemplate expungement by redaction alone, except in the narrow case of docket and index entries. See
Reading “other records” to cover all public records mentioning a conviction would also leave licensing boards in a bind when asked about the status of licenses revoked for criminal conviction. As we have explained, expungement does not invalidate the license discipline itself. Supra Part II.A. But if all records mentioning the conviction (which would include the final disciplinary order and most or all records of the disciplinary proceedings) were expunged, then, if asked about the licensee‘s status, agency staff could not respond without obtaining a court order to disclose information from expunged records. See
But the provision must cover some records beyond police records and court records, as we cannot read the phrase “other records” out of the statute entirely. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass‘n v. Public Serv. Comm‘n, 361 Md. 196, 214-15 (2000) (stating the rule of interpretation that words in the statute should not be rendered meaningless). Again, the traditional canons of statutory interpretation guide our efforts to assign meaning to this phrase. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512 (1987).
First, we think the phrase “other records” most likely only covers records that are closely related to police and court recоrds. This follows from the principle that we should harmonize the statute‘s provisions to the extent we can. E.g., Robinson, 435 Md. at 77. As we previously noted, various provisions of the Expungement Law assume that expungement only applies to police and court records. Supra Part II.B.1. For example, the statute provides that if the court, after a hearing, finds the petitioner entitled to expungement, the “court shall order the expungement of all police records and court records about the charge,” with no mention of “other records.”
Other textual evidence also supports the view that “other records” should be closely related to police and court records. Originally, the “other records” provision applied to “police records,
The history of the “other records” provision again supports this focus on police and court records. The language first appeared in 1982, when the General Assembly for the first time authorized expungement of certain conviction records.9 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 872. Among other changes, the 1982 bill amended the language authorizing a petition for expungement to read: “[A] person . . . may file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and requesting expungement of the police records, court records, and other records maintained by the Stаte of Maryland and its subdivisions, pertaining to the charge.”
The General Assembly also is presumed to know that the Maryland Rules have never contemplated expungement of records related to convictions, other than police and court records. Compare
To sum up, then, we think the best way to reconcile the available evidence of legislative intent is to conclude that “other records” are records that are not within the statutory definitions of “police records” and “court records,” but are similar in nature to police and court records and “pertain to the charge” in the same way as those records. The question becomes: what records might fall into that category?
We can think of only one category of records that is sufficiently related to “police records” and “court records” (and that pertains tо the charge in the same way) but does not fulfill the statutory definitions: records that originated as police or court records but are not held by a court or police department. The Expungement Law defines police records and court records both by their nature and by their location. Thus, a record that is a police or court record by virtue of its content would not fulfill the statutory definition if found in the hands of a different custodian, like a licensing board. So, for example, a criminal court docket sheet is a “court record” only if found in the records of the court itself. See
Indeed, at least some other states, when faced with similar ambiguity in their expungement statutes, have read those statutes as limited to records originating from the police investigation or court proceedings. In Oregon, for example, expungement applies to “the record of conviction and other official records in the case, including the records of arrest.” Or. Op. Att‘y Gen. No. OP-2000-1, 2000 WL 992134, at *5 (citation omitted). The Oregon Attorney General interpreted “other official records in the case” to mean “all records that were generated by law enforcement or the court in the course of the criminal investigation and judicial proceeding” but not records of licensing agency disciplinary proceedings.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky read the phrase “records relating to the arrest, charge, or other matters arising out of the arrest or charge” as applying only to records that were, by their nature, “criminal records” or “law enforcement records.” See Louisville/Jefferson County Metro. Gov‘t v. Moore, 701 S.W.3d 335, 353-54 (Ky. 2024). This would exclude “internal employment files” or “personnel files,” even when information in those files was obtained from police records. See id. at 354-55. Again, this reading gives meaning to the phrase “other matters” while still striking a reasonable balance between expungement and government functioning, and focusing on the records that are the expungement law‘s core concern.
There are also other states that have taken similar approaches. See, e.g., D.A., 58 N.E.3d at 172 (concluding that the term “conviction records” did not include records related to a civil forfeiture); Director of Revenue v. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d 391, 392-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (statute authorizing expungement “from all official records [of] all recordations of [an] arrest, plea, trial or
An example will illustrate how our reading works in practice. Suppose, to use one of the hypotheticals you raised in your opinion request, a licensed drug counselor were convicted of a drug-related offense, and the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists determined the crime to be one of moral turpitude and revoked the counselor‘s license. The files of the board would then likely contain records that originated as police or court records in the criminal case, such as a docket sheet, charging documents, a plea agreement, or the judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Oltman, 162 Md. App. at 468. But it would also contain records that originated from the board itself, like meeting minutes and the final order of discipline. Assume the former licensee then petitioned for expungement and specifically sought expungement of records of the Board of Professional Counselors and Therapists as “other records.”
Under our interpretation, the former category of documents (e.g., the criminal charging document) would be subject to expungement as “other records,” but the latter (e.g., the board‘s minutes) would not. The former, in the hands of the licensing board, would not be “court records” as defined in
In sum, our opinion is that the Expungement Law does not authorize or require expungement of all records of a license discipline proceeding arising from a criminal conviction. The most reasonable reading is that it authorizes expungement only of records that originated as part of the criminal case and later came
C. Legislative Clarification of the Scope of Expungement May Be Advisable
We acknowledge that there are policy arguments that could support a broader scope of expungement. After all, the overall purpose of expungement is to reduce the stigma borne by individuals with criminal records. Supra Part I.A. The continued availability of State records that reference a criminal conviction, but fall outside the category of “other records,” arguably undermines that purpose. And even for records that are expungeable, an expungement petitioner will likely have difficulty identifying every custodian of expungeable records. See Cintron, 265 Md. App. at 502 (noting this “pragmatic concern[]“).
For these reasons and given the ambiguity in the statutory scheme, the General Assembly may wish to consider clarifying the law governing the following issues: which records, if any, beyond police records and court records are subject to expungement under the Expungement Law; under what circumstances expungement may affect previously issued license discipline that relied exclusively on a criminal conviction; and the relationship between the Expungement Law and statutes that require public posting of licensing boards’ disciplinary orders.
III
Conclusion
As the law currently stands, expungement of a criminal conviction requires the destruction, or removal to a limited-access area, of certain records but does not invalidate or void the оriginal conviction. Thus, any professional disciplinary actions that relied on the criminal conviction also are not invalidated by expungement. In addition, expungement generally does not require the destruction or removal of all records related to a license discipline matter based on a criminal conviction. Rather, the best reading of current law in our view is that expungement can, at most, only reach records in the hands of licensing agencies that originated in the criminal case as police or court records. And even these
Anthony G. Brown
Attorney General of Maryland
Thomas S. Chapman
Deputy Chief,
Opinions & Advice
Patrick B. Hughes
Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice