Jennifer Adelakun v. Adeniyi Adelakun
No. 35
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND
July 1, 2025
September Term, 2024
Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ.
Case No. C-13-FM-23-001251
Argued: April 4, 2025
Opinion by Watts, J.
Filed: July 1, 2025
In this case, we must determine whether
Jennifer Adelakun, Petitioner (hereinafter “Mother”), and Adeniyi Adelakun, Respondent (hereinafter “Father”), were married on August 4, 2016. They have three young children.
Mother filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County a complaint for absolute divorce from Father in which she requested, among other things, primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the couple’s three minor children, as well as pendente lite child support, permanent child support, pendente lite alimony, rehabilitative alimony, and permanent alimony, all retroactive to the date of filing. Father filed a counter-complaint for limited divorce in which he requested primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the children, as well as child support based on the Maryland Child Support Guidelines or an amount above the guidelines if applicable.
A family magistrate in the Circuit Court for Howard County held a pendente lite hearing and issued a report and recommendations, finding, among other things, that both parents are capable of earning significant income and can cover their own expenses during the pendente lite period, and that neither had demonstrated a credible financial need for pendente lite alimony or child support. The circuit court entered an order adopting the magistrate’s recommendations and denied Mother’s request for pendente lite alimony and
Citing
Mother filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the issue of whether an order denying pendente lite child support and alimony is appealable under
On April 8, 2025, after having held oral argument on April 4, 2025, this Court issued a per curiam order affirming the Appellate Court’s judgment. See Adelakun v. Adelakun, 490 Md. 201, 203, ___ A.3d ___ (2025). We concluded that the Appellate Court “correctly held that an interlocutory order denying pendente lite alimony and child support is not appealable as an order for the payment of money pursuant to
We now explain the basis for our April 8, 2025 order.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were married on August 4, 2016, in Jamaica. They are the parents of three children, a daughter born in December 2018 and twin sons born in September 2019.
On July 19, 2023, in the circuit court, Mother filed a “Complaint for Absolute Divorce by Mutual Consent.” Mother requested, among other things, that the circuit court grant her primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the children, “child support pursuant to the Maryland Child Support Guidelines retroactively, pendente lite and permanently until the Minor Children reach the age of majority[,]” and “alimony, retroactively, pendente lite, rehabilitative and permanently[.]” In the complaint, Mother alleged that she was unemployed and “currently not earning any income” and that she “has had substantial financial difficulties including significant debt acquired during the marriage.” Mother asserted that she required spousal support from Father, and alleged that Father “earns enough to provide spousal support to [Mother], including payment of the mortgage on the Marital Home.”
On August 14, 2023, Father filed a “Counter-Complaint for Limited Divorce” requesting, among other things, sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, or alternatively, shared physical custody with Father “being the primary.” Father requested that Mother be ordered to pay child support “in an amount in accordance with the Maryland Child Support Guidelines, or an amount above the guidelines, if applicable.” Father asserted that Mother is a “licensed attorney[,]” “gainfully employed[,]” and “capable of contributing to the support of the minor children.” Father did not request pendente lite child support or alimony.
Pendente Lite Hearing
On October 31, 2023, the family magistrate held a pendente lite hearing. At the
Mother testified that she was not currently employed, but earned $520 per month from a daycare center she owned. According to Mother, that was the only income she had at the time. Mother testified that she had an ownership interest in J. Anukem and Associates, a law firm that had “been reorganized to be a consulting firm[.]” According to Mother, she was not currently receiving any income from the firm. Mother testified that she stopped practicing law in December 2021 and became “inactive” as a member of the Maryland Bar.
Mother testified that she had incorporated a business called Innovative Technology Solutions, but had not “done anything with it.” According to Mother, she was also previously involved with a company known as Phase 5 Consulting, an IT consulting firm, for which she served as a project manager on a contract and as CEO. Mother testified that she stepped down as CEO of Phase 5 Consulting in June 2023 because “the business incurred a lot of debt and [she] could not keep up with it.”
Mother testified that she had transferred Phase 5 Consulting to a person named Kimberly Kight, whom she described as her business partner, and that she was not currently
Mother testified that, at some point in the past year, Ms. Kight and Ms. Kight’s business loaned her “over” $500,000 as “working capital for [her] to try to get J. Anukem and Associates up and running as a consulting firm. And also for living expenses.” Mother testified that Ms. Kight made her sign an agreement and that she was expected to pay the loan back. Mother testified that Ms. Kight was currently paying her car note, cell phone bill, “and other expenses[,]” and that none of her personal expenses were being paid for by any of her businesses.
Mother testified that she lived in the marital home with her three children, Ms. Kight, and Ms. Kight’s teenage daughter. Mother described the marital home as a 12,000 square-foot home with seven bedrooms, eleven bathrooms, and two kitchens. According to Mother and her counsel, during the marriage, Father had given Mother $8,250 for all of the household expenses and paid the mortgage through his business. Mother testified that the $8,250 payment was “split up[,]” with $2,500 paid directly to Mother, $2,500 to Mother’s law firm, and $3,250 to Mother’s consulting firm.
Mother testified that she filed a financial statement that accurately reflected her current expenses, income, assets, and liabilities. Mother testified that the expense for a “domestic assistance/housekeeper” listed on the statement was for a housekeeper who came to the home five days a week, and that the family had always had a housekeeper come
Mother testified that her payments to Ms. Kight for the $500,000 loan were approximately $1,450 per month. Mother testified that historically every year the family travels to Jamaica and that they typically take an additional vacation per year. According to Mother, she prepaid for a cruise, which was scheduled for December 2023. Mother testified that she was not able to support herself and her children on her current income.
On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that, although Ms. Kight and her daughter live in the marital home, Ms. Kight was not paying rent. Mother testified that, in 2022, she received around $103,000 in income from Phase 5 Consulting. Mother also acknowledged that the family’s 2021 amended tax returns showed that her law firm had gross receipts in the amount of $955,000 and profit in the amount of $109,000, which she characterized as her salary. In response to a question as to whether she owned “seven properties by tenants with the right of survivorship” with Ms. Kight, Mother acknowledged that she did but testified that she was not receiving any money from the properties.
Father testified that he is a “child adolescent and adult psychiatrist” and owns his own business. Father testified that Mother had filed several protective orders against him,
Father testified that the housekeeper also works as the nanny and that he could not afford to pay for either service because of what had happened to him as a result of Mother’s actions. Father testified that his business pays the mortgage for the marital home, in the amount of approximately $10,500 per month. Father testified that he pays for the family’s health insurance, approximately $2,400 per month, and for the children’s extracurricular activities such as soccer and swimming. Father testified that, at the time of the hearing, he owed approximately $454,000 in student loans.
Father testified that it was not accurate that he paid Mother a total of $8,250 per month for household expenses. Rather, according to Father, from March 2020 to Spring 2023, he gave Mother $2,500 per month for household expenses. Father testified that he had paid $3,250 per month toward Phase Five and $2,500 per month toward J. Anukem and Associates. Father testified that he had previously been able to make the payments on a monthly basis because of his prior income.
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendations
On December 6, 2023, the magistrate issued a report and recommendations, recommending, among other things, that the parties be granted pendente lite joint legal and shared physical custody of the children and that Mother’s requests for pendente lite child
The magistrate found that, “[i]n 2020 tax forms, [M]other and [F]ather reported on their taxes that [M]other’s gross receipts from her law firm were $686K and that they were $955K in tax year 2021.” The magistrate found that “Mother’s W2 for 2022 from Phase V Consulting, Inc. indicates that she earned $103,749 in that year from that company.” The magistrate noted that, “[i]n July 2023, $469K was deposited to [M]other’s account[,]” and that Mother said that $450,000 was a loan from Ms. Kight.
The magistrate noted that Mother’s testimony about her status as an active lawyer had been inconsistent, finding that “Mother testified both that she became ‘inactive’ as a lawyer in 2021 and also that she became ‘inactive’ as a lawyer in 2023.” The magistrate found that “Mother turned the company [Phase 5 Consulting] over to Ms. Kight at the same time she filed for divorce.” The magistrate also observed that, “[a]lthough [M]other’s
As to Mother’s financial status, the magistrate found:
[M]other’s statements regarding a complete lack of ongoing income lack[] credibility and [are] not supported by other credible evidence. Mother’s testimony regarding her income and employment are contradictory and not credible. The portions of Mother’s testimony and evidence that [are] credible do[] not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a [pendente lite] financial need.
As to Father’s income, the magistrate found:
[F]ather’s statements regarding a decrease in income [are] more credible, but also lack[] substantial evidentiary support. Father states that his employment has been affected by the repeated and recent filings for protective and peace orders against him as well as a criminal complaint filed against him for which he was arrested. All of these filings are regarding the strife between [M]other and [F]ather. None of the cases filed against him are proven to have been sustained against him. There is no peace or protective order against him and there is no criminal conviction against him. It is reasonable to believe that his employment has been affected by the recent significant court filings against him.
Having reviewed the testimony and evidence concerning Mother’s and Father’s income, the magistrate found as follows:
Prior to the initiation of the litigation between the parties, both parties earned substantial income from several business ventures each. They are capable of earning significant income and each able to cover their own expenses during the [pendente lite] period. Neither parent has demonstrated a credible financial need for [pendente lite] alimony at this point in the litigation. The parties’ recent history indicates this case as an above guidelines case regarding child support. Both parties are capable of supporting the children while they are in their custody. The parties should share in the payment of the housing for the benefit of the children but should not exchange child support under current circumstances.
Exceptions, Exceptions Hearing, and Pendente Lite Order
On December 15, 2023, Mother filed exceptions to the magistrate’s report and
On February 13, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on Mother’s exceptions. As alleged in the exceptions, Mother’s counsel argued that the magistrate erred in failing to award pendente lite child support and alimony and not making a finding about the parties’ incomes and the family’s expenses. Father’s counsel argued that the magistrate found that “Mother’s statements regarding a complete lack of ongoing income lack[] credibility and [are] not supported by other credible evidence.” Father’s counsel stated that Mother’s amended financial statement indicated that she was paying $6,500 per month for a housekeeper, which “seems a bit excessive” “[i]f you do not have a source of income[.]” Father’s counsel pointed out that Mother had also indicated that she had “prepaid the private school preschool tuition for two of the children[,]” which according to Father’s counsel cost approximately $52,000. In addition, Father’s counsel noted that Mother testified that she had prepaid “for a Disney vacation for the minor children and her” and indicated a monthly expense of $1,200 for vacation, which if this were for the cruise would be a vacation costing a total of $14,000. Father’s counsel asserted that “there was ample evidence” before the magistrate that Mother “had ample funds at her disposal, and there was not a pendente lite need for child support nor alimony.”
After hearing argument from the parties, ruling from the bench, the circuit court
Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland
On September 26, 2024, the Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal. See Adelakun, 263 Md. App. at 384, 323 A.3d at 515. The Appellate Court held that
The Appellate Court explained that, prior to oral argument, it had issued a show cause order directing the parties to address why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 370, 323 A.3d at 507. Mother had responded that the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
The Appellate Court stated that case law demonstrated that the legislative history of
The Appellate Court explained that “[t]he conclusion that an interlocutory appeal from an order for the payment of money applies only to an order requiring a party to take affirmative action to pay is supported by” this Court’s interpretation of the “parallel provision” in
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
On October 7, 2024, Mother petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following three issues:
- Is an order denying pendente lite child support and alimony appealable under
CJ[] § 12-303(3)(v) ? Alternatively, is entry of a Rule 8-602(g)(1)(C) judgment appropriate?- May a trial court deny pendente lite child support and alimony without making findings as to the parties’ actual adjusted income?
On November 22, 2024, we granted the petition as to the first question only. See Adelakun, 489 Md. 244, 327 A.3d 111.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Statutory Construction
Whether a court has jurisdiction is an issue of law, and we review de novo the Appellate Court’s conclusion concerning whether or not it had appellate jurisdiction. See Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. ProVen Mgmt., Inc., 472 Md. 642, 664, 248 A.3d 271, 284 (2021) (“The present appeal is a jurisdictional dispute, pertaining solely to conclusions of law respecting jurisdiction. Accordingly, we review de novo the [Appellate Court’s] conclusion that it had jurisdiction to hear [an] appeal.” (Cleaned up)).
“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.” Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC, 479 Md. 515, 540, 278 A.3d 1216, 1231 (2022) (cleaned up). We have described the pertinent rules of statutory construction as follows:
As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly
used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends.
Id. at 540-41, 278 A.3d at 1231 (cleaned up). “To ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of [a] term[], we look to dictionary definitions as a starting point, as it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.” Sabisch v. Moyer, 466 Md. 327, 366, 220 A.3d 272, 294 (2019) (cleaned up).
In Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP, 473 Md. 356, 377, 250 A.3d 197, 209 (2021), we stated:
Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.
(Cleaned up).
Appellate Jurisdiction and Appealability
“[U]nless constitutionally authorized, appellate jurisdiction is determined entirely by statute, and therefore, a right of appeal only exists to the extent that it has been legislatively granted.” ProVen, 472 Md. at 665, 248 A.3d at 284 (cleaned up). Pursuant to
An order constitutes a final judgment where the following three conditions are satisfied: “(1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy; (2) it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it on the docket.” Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. Md. Dep’t of Agric., 439 Md. 262, 278, 96 A.3d 105, 114 (2014) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, “[t]here are three categorical exceptions to the general rule limiting appeals only from a final judgment”: “(1) interlocutory orders that are appealable by statute; (2) orders that are appealable by the common-law collateral order doctrine; and (3) orders that adjudicate completely one of multiple claims in an action and are certified (and certifiable) under
Maryland appellate courts have held that cases involving interlocutory orders for the payment of money in the form of pendente lite child support and alimony are appealable. See, e.g., In re Katherine C., 390 Md. 554, 557 & n.4, 890 A.2d 295, 296-97 & n.4 (2006) (This Court stated that the case involved a pendente lite child support order requiring the mother to pay $282 per month and noted that, although pendente lite orders are not final judgments, “appellate court jurisdiction is appropriate for the interlocutory
CJ § 12-303(3)(v)
A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case:
. . .
(3) An order:
. . .
(v) For the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court[.]
CJ § 12-303(3)(v): Plain Language
This Court has not previously addressed whether an interlocutory order denying
Mother contends, however, that the word “for” in the phrase “for the payment of money” is ambiguous and has a broader meaning that encompasses both positive and negative determinations and includes “[w]ith respect or regard to; on the part of” the payment of money. Stated otherwise, Mother appears to argue that the word “for” in the phrase “for the payment of money” could mean pertaining to or involving and does not require that, to be appealable under
In light of Mother‘s focus on the word “for,” we turn to the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the word. Sabisch, 466 Md. at 366, 220 A.3d at 294 (cleaned up). Merriam-Webster‘s Dictionary defines “for,” as, among other things, a preposition “used as a function word to indicate purpose” and “with respect to: concerning[.]” For, Merriam-Webster (2025), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for [https://perma.cc/L39S-PADY] (capitalization omitted). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “for,” in relevant
To be sure, the word “for,” used as a preposition, has a variety of definitions, some of which have a broader meaning than others. That there may be definitions of the word “for” that have a broader meaning, though, than a definition of the word that would amount to directing payment or providing for payment is not the end of the plain language analysis. Under the rules of statutory construction, “the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. . . . [N]ot only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.” Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295, 173 A.3d 549, 562 (2017) (citation omitted).
When
In addition, the language of
Mother maintains that
We conclude that, when read in the context of
CJ § 12-303(3)(v): Legislative History
Although the plain language of
At common law, “appeals were allowed only from judgments rendered by courts of law, and then only if the judgments were final ones.” Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 278, 422 A.2d at 413 (citations omitted); see also Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 18, 467 A.2d at 508. In 1718, the right to appeal from an equity decree was provided through an Act of Maryland‘s Provincial Assembly. See Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 19, 467 A.2d at 508. “Neither the Acts of 1718 nor its successors, however, made clear whether an appeal was available only from a final decree or also from an interlocutory order in equity.” Id. at 19, 467 A.2d at 508; see also Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 279, 422 A.2d at 414 (“The 1721 Act (ch. XIV) accorded the right of appeal to one aggrieved ‘by any decree of the Chancery Court . . .,’ but it was not entirely clear whether that meant only final decrees, as was supposed by some, or included certain types of interlocutory orders, as was the practice in England.” (Ellipses in original)).
In 1830, the General Assembly “attempted to end this confusion” “by eliminating entirely the right to appeal from interlocutory orders and finding another way to deal with the problem.” Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 280, 422 A.2d at 414. At that time, through chapter 185 of the 1830 Maryland Laws, the General Assembly restricted appeals from equity to final decrees, but added the following “proviso“:
Provided always, that the execution of any decree or order of the chancery, or any county court for the sale, conveyance, or delivery of possession, of real or personal property, or the payment of money, or the bringing of money into court, or the appointment of a receiver, or the opening of any way public or private, from which the right of an immediate appeal is taken away by this act, shall not be suspended or staid, unless a prayer for an appeal be entered on the docket, or filed among the proceedings in the cause, and bond in such penalty as the chancellor, or county courts, (as the case may be) may prescribe, with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the chancellor or county court, shall be given.
Id. at 280, 422 A.2d at 414. The 1830 Act “mark[ed] the first apparent delineation of these special types of interlocutory equity orders—including an order for the payment of
In 1841, the General Assembly amended the 1830 Act by authorizing an appeal in equity from certain interlocutory orders, including an order for the payment of money. See Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 19, 467 A.2d at 508; Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 280-81, 422 A.2d at 414-15. The 1841 Act provided, in relevant part:
That so much of the first section of the said act, as takes away the immediate right of appeal from any decree or order of the court of chancery, or any county court sitting as a court of equity, for the sale, conveyance or delivery of real or personal property, or the payment of money, unless such delivery or payment be directed to be made to a receiver, to be appointed by such court, be, and the same is hereby repealed; and that from any such decree or order heretofore passed, or hereafter to be passed, the right of an immediate appeal is hereby given.
Della Ratta, 47 Md. App. at 280-81, 422 A.2d at 414-15. With the 1841 Act, “the General Assembly, for the first time, created specific distinctions among equity decrees for the purpose of appeal[,]” but “[i]n one sense, [] merely reinstituted what had formerly been the practice, based upon the English experience, of allowing appeals from certain types of interlocutory orders but not others.” Id. at 281, 422 A.2d at 415. The “real significance” of the 1841 Act was that the General Assembly “was deciding which types of orders could be immediately appealed and which types could not.” Id. at 281, 422 A.2d at 415.4 The
Over the next nearly 100 years, the statutory provision “remained substantially unchanged and intact[.]” Id. at 282, 422 A.2d at 415 (citations omitted). In 1957, the General Assembly recodified the laws relating to judicial proceedings; the statutory right of appeal from interlocutory orders “remained limited to equity orders.” Id. at 282, 422 A.2d at 415. In 1962, “an appeal was first authorized from an interlocutory order of a court of law.” Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 19, 467 A.2d at 508. The 1962 Act limited such interlocutory appeals, though, to “interlocutory orders with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt of or charging of income, interest or dividends therefrom or the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order.” Id. at 19, 467 A.2d at 508 (cleaned up). “Appeals at law could not be taken
In 1973, the General Assembly enacted
In Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 20, 467 A.2d at 508, we explained that the history of
A little over a year after Anthony Plumbing, in Simmons v. Perkins, 302 Md. 232, 236, 486 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1985), after reviewing the legislative history of
The legislative history of
For support, Mother relies on the definition of “for” from the 1828 edition of Webster‘s American Dictionary of the English Language, the edition available when the statute was enacted in 1841.5 We are unpersuaded by Mother‘s argument that, because the word “for” had broad meanings when the General Assembly enacted the 1841 Act, the General Assembly must have meant to “encompass[] both positive and negative determinations[,]” and that, if the General Assembly “had intended a more restrictive meaning, it certainly could have used a more restrictive term than the word ‘for’ as it was understood at that time.” The 1841 Act introduced the language that exists in
Although in the 1841 Act the General Assembly could have used the word “for” to connote a broad meaning encompassing a negative determination, i.e., an order denying payment, based on various definitions of the word “for” in use at the time, the language of the 1841 Act indicates that the General Assembly intended the word “for” to mean an order directing the payment of money—as the plain language demonstrates. There is no indication in the legislative history of
CJ § 12-303(3)(v): Relevant Case Law
Maryland case law confirms that we have held that
Our holdings in Anthony Plumbing and Simmons demonstrate that this Court has declined to expand the definition of what an “order for the payment of money” means to include an order assessing civil penalties and costs or an order assessing attorney‘s fees. In Anthony Plumbing, 298 Md. at 14, 21, 467 A.2d at 505, 509, where the trial court had assessed civil penalties against the defendant and awarded the plaintiff the costs of the action, we concluded that an order assessing civil penalties “is not in the nature of an equitable decree” and instead “creates a debt recoverable by an action at law.” We determined that an award of costs of an action is “not considered to be equitable in nature, and thus not appealable under”
Our conclusion that an interlocutory appeal from an order for the payment of money means an order that affirmatively directs a party to pay money, and not one that denies or does not grant a request for the payment of money, is also supported by our discussion in Washington City & P.L.R. Co. v. S. Md. R.R. Co., 55 Md. 153, 157 (1880), in which we interpreted Article 5, Section 21 (a precursor of
If [the court] had refused to pass the order for sale, it is very clear that no appeal would have lain from such refusal; and having passed the order, if for satisfactory cause subsequently appearing, the order not having been executed, the Court deemed it proper to rescind that order, and thus leave the question of sale to depend upon the final determination of the cause, no person can rightfully complain by way of appeal.
Id. And, we concluded: “While an appeal will lie from an order directing the sale (Code, Art. 5, sec. 21[),] the statute makes no provision for an appeal from an order refusing to authorize a sale before final decree, or from an order suspending or rescinding an interlocutory order of sale.” Id. at 157.
Given that in Washington City, we construed “[f]or the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property” to not authorize an appeal from an order refusing to authorize a sale or from an order suspending or rescinding a sale, and that the statutory language at issue there immediately precedes “the payment of money,” it is logical to conclude that “[f]or . . . the payment of money” does not authorize an appeal from an order refusing to authorize a payment of money. We also note that, in McLaughlin v. Ward, 240 Md. App. 76, 86, 201 A.3d 19, 24 (2019), the Appellate Court determined that case law demonstrates that an order “‘[f]or the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real . . . property’ necessarily entails an order requiring that property be sold.” (Alteration and ellipsis in original).
Mother relies on Chappell v. Chappell, 86 Md. 532, 39 A. 984 (1898), as standing for the propositions that interlocutory review of orders allowing or disallowing pendente lite support is necessary and that “both spouses must have equal rights to challenge the allowance or disallowance of alimony by interlocutory appeal.” In Chappell, 86 Md. at 536-37, 39 A. at 986, however, referring to appeals from final judgments, we stated:
There can be no doubt whatever that a court of equity has power to allow alimony to a wife pending a suit for divorce; nor can its authority to require the husband to pay her counsel fees and the costs of the proceeding be disputed. These are not now open questions in Maryland. The amount allowed is regulated by the circumstances of each case and is usually said to rest in the chancellor‘s sound discretion. But it by no means follows that this discretion is never open to review. So far from this being so, it has been held on appeal from the final decree that the amount allowed for alimony may be curtailed. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill, 106. And where an allowance was refused upon an application made to the lower court after final decree, and after the record had been transmitted to this court on an appeal from the final decree, it was held that an appeal would lie from such refusal. Rohrback v. Rohrback, 75 Md. 317, 23 Atl. 610. It is not perceived how, if an appeal will lie from an order refusing to allow alimony, none can be entertained from an improvident order making such an allowance. . . . Certainly an order to pay alimony and an order to pay counsel fees are orders to pay money, and from an order to pay money (other than an order to pay money to a receiver) section 25 of article 5 of the Code, in express terms, allows an appeal.
In stating that “[i]t is not perceived how, if an appeal will lie from an order refusing to allow alimony, none can be entertained from an improvident order making such an allowance[,]” Chappell, 86 Md. at 536, 39 A. at 986, this Court was referring not to an appeal from an interlocutory order refusing to allow alimony, but to appeals concerning alimony that occurred after a “final decree,” as the citations and discussions of Ricketts and Rohrback indicated.
In Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 462, 413 A.2d 549, 552 (1980), we quoted language from Chappell, stating:
Orders for the payment of alimony or child support are not expressly covered by the statute. However, our cases make clear that such orders are orders “(f)or . . . the payment of money” under [CJ §] 12-303. For instance, in Chappell . . ., the Court was faced with that very question in construing the predecessor of the present statute. The Court held that such an order was one directing money to be paid within the purview of Code (1888) Art. 5, s 25, the predecessor statute[.]
In sum, Maryland case law supports our determination that an interlocutory order is appealable as an order for the payment of money under
Additional Thoughts
Just as a circuit court‘s order denying a request for pendente lite alimony and child support is not appealable under
As explained above, part of the rationale for permitting a party to appeal an order that directs the party to pay money is that, where a party fails to comply with an order for the payment of money, the circuit court can impose penalties for noncompliance, which may include a finding of contempt and imprisonment. See Simmons, 302 Md. at 236, 486 A.2d at 1194 (“The distinctive feature of the kind of equitable order described in Anthony Plumbing is that the court has available to it, among other possible sanctions for a violation of the order, the sanction of imprisonment for contempt.“). A party who receives an order partially denying a request for pendente lite child support and alimony would be similarly situated to a person whose request for pendente lite alimony and child support is denied in its entirety, such as Mother in this case, who is attempting to appeal the denial. Given the plain language of
Finally, to the extent that Mother has contended that the denial order in this case is an order for the payment of money because it awarded $0 in pendente lite alimony and child support, this argument is not convincing. It likely goes without saying, but a person
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, in our order of April 8, 2025, we concluded that the Appellate Court “correctly held that an interlocutory order denying pendente lite alimony and child support is not appealable as an order for the payment of money pursuant to