Thomas F. Burke, M.D. v. Maryland Board of Physicians
No. 0513
In the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
April 28, 2021
Opinion by Wells, J.
September Term, 2020; Reported; Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24C19007001; Filed: April 28, 2021
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – JUDICIAL REVIEW – AGENCY EXPERTISE – SCOPE OF REVIEW
The scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions made by the Board. Administrative agency final orders are subject to deferential judicial review. Appellate courts review final agency decisions in the light most favorable to the agency as agency decisions are presumed correct. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the agency‘s expertise.
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – JUDICIAL REVIEW – SUBSTANCIAL EVIDENCE
An agency‘s findings must be supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the Board. Substantial evidence is “evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.‘” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531, 537 (2019).
HEALTH – PROFESSIONAL REGULATION – DISCIPLINE, REVOCATION, AND SUSPENSION – MORAL TURPITUDE
Moral turpitude in the criminal context focuses on truthfulness whereas moral turpitude in the administrative context is a broader and more fluid concept. In the administrative law context, moral turpitude affects public confidence in the administration of government. Stidwell v. Md. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam‘rs, 144 Md. App. 613, 619 (2002).
HEALTH – PROFESSIONAL REGULATION – DISCIPLINE, REVOCATION, AND SUSPENSION – CRIMINAL CONVICTION – MORAL TURPITUDE
Based on the precedent established in Stidwell, 144 Md. App. 613, we hold that the appellant‘s “intentional and knowing” decision to prescribe controlled dangerous substances outside the course of acceptable medical standards constituted a crime of moral turpitude. While the appellant may still have credibility to testify in court, his actions decreased the public‘s confidence in the practice of medicine.
HEALTH – PROFESSIONAL LICENSING – MORAL TURPITUDE – PRESCRIPTIONS – CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUSBTANCES – GUILTY PLEA
The appellant‘s guilty plea to five counts of the misdemeanor offense of writing prescriptions for controlled dangerous substances outside the scope of the medical profession was a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
CONSTITUIONAL LAW – DUE PROCESS – PROPERTY INTEREST – MEDICAL LICENSE
A licensed medical professional has a property right in their medical license and this right cannot be deprived without due process of law. The right to practice medicine is subject to the police power of the State to regulate public health and safety.
CONSTITUIONAL LAW – DUE PROCESS – PROPERTY INTEREST – MEDICAL LICENSE
While the appellant had a property interest in his license, the State did not deprive him due process by summarily suspending his license because the property right was subject to the State‘s police powers.
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – ARBITRARY AND CAPRCIOUS
Arbitrary and capricious review applies to review of the agency‘s discretionary functions. A reviewing court applies a high level of deference to an agency‘s exercise of its discretionary power. A reviewing court will only intervene in an agency‘s discretionary decisions if the agency acted “arbitrary or capricious.”
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – ARBITRARY AND CAPRCIOUS – DEFERENCE TO AGENCY
Here, the agency‘s decision to charge the appellant under
HEALTH – PROFESSIONAL REGULATION – DISCIPLINE, REVOCATION, AND SUSPENSION – HEARING
HEALTH – PROFESSIONAL REGULATION – DISCIPLINE, REVOCATION, AND SUSPENSION – HEARING
In this case, the agency‘s decision to deny the appellant‘s request for a hearing was not arbitrary or capricious because the statute allows the Board to proceed with summary disposition after an individual has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
OPINION
Opinion by Wells, J.
Filed: April 28, 2021
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Doctor Burke was licensed to practice medicine in Maryland on July 21, 1995, under license number D47746. He remained a practicing physician until the Board revoked his license on November 20, 2018. Dr. Burke is board-certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine in general Internal Medicine, Pulmonary Disease, Critical Care and Sleep Medicine. He is also certified in Sleep Medicine by the American Board of Sleep Medicine. Beginning in 2001 and up until his license was revoked, he practiced at Chesapeake Pulmonary Associates in Fallston.
A. Dr. Burke‘s Criminal Charges
The Grand Jury for Harford County returned a sixty-two-count indictment against Dr. Burke on February 28, 2018, charging him with various offenses related to the distribution, possession, or the writing of prescriptions for controlled dangerous substances (“CDS“). On January 28, 2019, Dr. Burke pleaded guilty to five counts, each alleging a violation of
On January 28, 2019, the Circuit Court for Harford County sentenced Dr. Burke to two-years’ incarceration on each count, to be served consecutively, with all but three years suspended and imposed a period of probation. The court gave credit against the sentence for time served awaiting disposition. As a condition of the plea, Dr. Burke surrendered his Drug Enforcement Administration and Maryland CDS registrations during the term of probation.
B. Maryland Board of Physicians Initial Proceedings
On November 20, 2018, prior to Dr. Burke entering the guilty pleas as described, the Board summarily suspended his medical license under
Later, on December 3, 2018, the Board charged Dr. Burke with violating
In the meantime, on May 7, 2019, the Office of Attorney General (“OAG“) filed a petition to revoke Dr. Burke‘s medical license based on his January 2019 convictions. The Board charged Dr. Burke under
These charges were in addition to the charges that had been previously filed under
On September 9, 2019, the Board issued a Final Decision and Order and revoked Dr. Burke‘s medical license. The Board found that Dr. Burke‘s convictions on five counts of prescribing CDS outside the course of his regular professional duties constituted crimes of moral turpitude and were violative of the standards of the medical profession. The Board then cancelled the September 25, 2019 DCCR because the Board had now revoked Dr. Burke‘s license under
C. Judicial Review of the Board‘s Decision
On October 9, 2019, Dr. Burke filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Board opposed. After the June 25, 2020 hearing, the circuit court affirmed the Board‘s decision in a written memorandum and order. Dr. Burke filed a timely appeal.
Standard of Review
The Maryland Board of Physicians is an adjudicative administrative body in the Executive Branch of the Maryland state government and “its decisions are subject to the same standards of judicial review as adjudicatory decisions of other administrative agencies.” NIHC, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 439 Md. 668, 683 (2014). This Court confines its review to the administrative agency‘s decision and does not review the decision of the circuit court. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531, 537 (2019); Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 136-37 (2011) (noting that “[o]n review of an agency‘s decision, we focus on the agency‘s decision and look past the circuit court‘s decision“); Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160 (2005) (explaining that the Court “review[s] directly the action of the agency, rather than the decision of the intervening reviewing courts“).
Final decisions are reviewed “in accordance with the well-established principles of administrative law.” Para v. 1691 Ltd. P‘ship, 211 Md. App. 335, 354 (2013). An administrative agency‘s final order “is subject to deferential judicial review.” Id. (quoting Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc. v. Md. Health Res. Planning Comm‘n, 125 Md. App. 183, 220 (1999)); Md. Nat‘l Capital Park & Planning Comm‘n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass‘n, 412 Md. 73, 84 (2009) (“Review of an administrative agency‘s action generally is a narrow and highly deferential inquiry.“). A reviewing court reviews “the agency‘s decision in the light most favorable to it” because the agency‘s decision “is prima facie correct and presumed valid” as it is within the agency‘s role to resolve evidentiary conflicts. Md. Aviation Admin v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 (2005) (quoting Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-69 (1999)); Md. State Bd. of Social Exam‘rs v. Chertkov, 121 Md. App. 574, 583 (1998) (“Final decisions are presumptively correct, and a court must show deference both to findings of fact and drawings of inferences by an agency.“).
This Court, however, cannot uphold or reverse the decision of the Board on any grounds “other than the findings and reasons set forth by the [Board].” Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 437 Md. 492, 503 (2014); Frey, 422 Md. at 137;
The substantial evidence standard refers to “evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.‘” Pollard, 466 Md. at 537; Frey, 422 Md. at 136-37 (explaining that substantial evidence “consider[s] whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached“). This standard is applied to both the agency‘s factual findings and mixed questions of law and fact, such as to “issues of whether the agency applied the law correctly to the facts.” Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass‘n, 412 Md. at 84; Frey, 422 Md. at 137 (“We review factual findings and inferences therefrom under a substantial evidence standard.“); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bannings Beltway Pontiac, 138 Md. App. 671 (2001).
The entire record is reviewed to determine whether the final order is “supported by substantial evidence and correct conclusions of law.” Pollard, 466 Md. at 537; Bd of Directors of Cameron Grove Condo., II v. State Comm‘n on Hum. Relations, 431 Md. 61, 80 (2013); Para, 211 Md. App. at 354 (explaining that the reviewing court looks to “whether the agency‘s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency“); Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass‘n, 412 Md. at 84 (noting that the reviewing court examines whether “there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency‘s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is based on an erroneous legal conclusion“); Noland, 386 Md. at 571 (quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 67-69) (explaining that a reviewing court is “limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency‘s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law“); Stidwell v. Md. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam‘rs, 144 Md. App. 613, 616 (2002). The Court, however, has the authority “to overrule an agency‘s factual finding only when the finding is ‘unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted.‘” Spencer v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529 (2004) (citing
Great weight is afforded to the legal conclusions drawn by the agency “when they are premised upon an interpretation of the statutes that the agency administers and the regulations promulgated for that purpose.” Frey, 422 Md. at 138. Although the reviewing court affords great weight to the legal conclusions drawn from the interpretation of the agency‘s statutes, the court affords no deference to an agency‘s “application and analysis of caselaw.” Pollard, 466 Md. at 527. On judicial review, this Court may substitute its judgment for the agency‘s judgment to determine whether the agency‘s conclusions of law are correct. Spencer, 380 Md. at 528 (2004).
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board‘s Conclusion that Dr. Burke Committed Crimes of Moral Turpitude
a. Parties’ Contentions
Dr. Burke contends that the Board‘s decision to revoke his license was not based on substantial evidence. He claims the Board failed to analyze the specific facts and circumstances of his case before concluding that he pleaded guilty to crimes of moral turpitude. Therefore, in his opinion, the Board had no grounds to revoke his medical license. The Board argues that substantial evidence supports its decision. The Board emphasized that the term “moral turpitude” is not limited to its common law definition but has a broader meaning in the administrative law context.
b. Moral Turpitude
We have said that the phrase “moral turpitude” is “chameleon-like, adopting different shades of meaning in different legal contexts,” eluding a fixed definition. Stidwell, 144 Md. App. at 617. Generally, moral turpitude “has been defined . . . as importing ‘an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which [one] owes to his fellow[s]…, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between [persons].‘” Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n of Md. v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 459 (1977) (citing Braverman v. Bar Ass‘n of Balt., 209 Md. 328, 344 (1956)). The expression “moral turpitude,” as developed at common law, referred to “infamous crimes, that precluded their perpetrators from testifying.”4 Oltman v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 162 Md. App. 457, 484 (2005) (citing Stidwell, 144 Md. App. at 616).
While Maryland has abrogated the statute disqualifying individuals convicted of infamous crimes from testifying, these crimes may still be used to impeach witnesses. Stidwell, 144 Md. App. at 617. In a criminal context, moral turpitude tends to focus “primarily on truthfulness,” whereas in the administrative law context it is a more fluid concept. Id. at 618. “For the business of professional licensing and public appointments, the expression [moral turpitude] strikes the broader chord of public confidence in the administration of government.” Id. at 619; Oltman, 162 Md. App. at 484 (explaining moral turpitude is broadly defined in terms of professional licensing).
Stidwell is instructive. There, the Maryland State Board of Chiropractic Examiners denied the petitioner‘s application to practice massage therapy because of the petitioner‘s prior conviction for solicitation. 144 Md. App. at 615. The circuit court affirmed the Board‘s conclusion that solicitation was a crime of moral turpitude. Id. at 615-16. This Court held that while the appellant was “qualified to give testimony, or to be certified in another profession,” the appellant‘s “prurient offense casts an unsavory, even menacing shadow” over the field of massage therapy. Id. at 618. We explained that the definition of moral turpitude is different in the context of administrative law and so, “a person who has credibility to testify may not have the public‘s
c. The Elements of CR § 5-902 Establish Moral Turpitude.
Dr. Burke next argues that the offense to which he pleaded guilty did not constitute a crime of moral turpitude. We disagree and explain. Determining whether an individual has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude “necessarily begins with an examination of the criminal statute itself.” Walman, 259 Md. at 460. If the criminal statute does not establish moral turpitude on its face, then the analysis “hinges on the facts present in the individual case at hand.” Id. at 462.
The statute to which Dr. Burke pleaded guilty is
(c) An authorized provider may not prescribe, administer, manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess a controlled dangerous substance, drug paraphernalia, or controlled paraphernalia except:
(1) in the course of regular professional duties; and
(2) in conformity with this title and the standards of the authorized provider‘s profession relating to controlled dangerous substances, drug paraphernalia, or controlled paraphernalia.
Dr. Burke pleaded guilty to five counts of prescribing CDS outside “the course of regular professional duties” and not within “conformity . . . [of] the standards of [his] profession,” specifically, Oxycodone, Amphetamine (commonly known as “Adderall“), Alprazolam (commonly known as “Xanax“) and Diazepam. In entering a guilty plea to these charges, Dr. Burke admitted to engaging in conduct “that constitute[d] all the elements of a formal criminal charge.” Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 599 (2000) (citing Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 364 (1981)). A guilty plea is the admission of guilt of a substantive crime. Id. His guilty plea established his guilt and admission to prescribing CDS not in accordance with his professional duties.
Even though Dr. Burke pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally writing prescriptions for CDS outside the accepted medical practices, he tries to justify his actions. He urges this Court to recognize that “[t]he sole ‘crime’ for which [he] endured seventeen months in prison (after pleading guilty following four postponements of his trial) and had his medical license revoked, was his failure to document his clinical rationale or perform a sufficiently thorough examination prior to issuing prescriptions to three individuals with whom he shared a personal relationship.” This characterization ignores the actual language of Dr. Burke‘s guilty plea. Dr. Burke “did not dispute the elements of the charges to which he pled guilty and he accepted the plea agreement.”6 He did not
Dr. Burke argues that “the simple possession of one (1) sleeping pill, by a physician, if self-prescribed, regardless of the documentation, could be sufficient to satisfy the elements of this statute” but, he claims, this action would hardly constitute a “crime involving moral turpitude.” This argument, again, ignores the gravity of his conduct. The issue is not whether Dr. Burke wrote a prescription for one sleeping pill, but rather Dr. Burke wrote multiple scripts for drugs such as Xanax, Oxycodone, and Adderall to people who were not his patients. The Board explained that Dr. Burke‘s conviction involved moral turpitude because “based on the facts of this case, [he] acted contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty that he owes to his fellow citizens in the [S]tate of Maryland.” The Board concluded that Dr. Burke‘s criminal conduct “showed such disregard for social norms and the ethical standards of the medical profession that he undermined the public‘s confidence in the profession.” We agree.
Dr. Burke urges us to find an exception to the statute and overlook the facts of his guilty plea. He argues that “[a]n uninterested person reading the Revocation Order, without any prior knowledge of this case would have no way of knowing if Dr. Burke was prescribing narcotics to be sold by a drug cartel for his own personal gain or writing five prescriptions for his spouse in an emergency setting.” Once again, this argument ignores that Dr. Burke pleaded guilty to prescribing drugs to individuals who were not his patients. Dr. Burke seems to suggest that he should be given a pass for his behavior by having us find a “friends and family exception” in the statute. We decline to do so. Regardless of whether the drugs were sold to a drug cartel or prescribed to friends, under Maryland law, a doctor may not use their license to prescribe CDS in a manner inconsistent with the standards of their profession.
Dr. Burke also argues that if the Board had “carefully parsed out and properly considered the actual facts of the offenses for which Dr. Burke pled guilty,” then it would have concluded that his actions did not involve moral turpitude. Dr. Burke emphasizes that in failing to analyze “the actual facts” the Board did not properly consider the plea agreement or the proceedings. We are not convinced.
The Board was required to consider “at least one of the following: (i) stipulated statement of facts or statement of facts on the record; (ii) plea agreement containing agreed facts; (iii) transcript of plea agreement proceedings or (iv) written or transcribed opinion or statement.” COMAR 10.32.02.04(C)(1)(b). The Board is not required to include a certain number of references or specific facts, but rather it is only required to consider “at least one,” which we conclude the Board did in citing the plea agreement.
Dr. Burke goes on to rationalize his behavior by saying that he prescribed “non-narcotic, minimal abuse potential,
Further, Dr. Burke explained that he prescribed his girlfriend—an individual who struggles with an opioid addiction—oxycodone as a means of ensuring she would not purchase heroin to cope with the pain of her sprained ankle.
In its Final Order, the Board explained that “the public relies on medical professionals to appropriately prescribe drugs because lay people, especially those with an addiction problem, do not know and have no way of knowing which drugs are appropriate to be taking” (citing the plea agreement proceedings). While Dr. Burke contends that his actions were not “shocking to the moral sense of the community,” we disagree. Dr. Burke‘s decision to prescribe drugs “outside of the standards of the medical profession” could have led to an overdose, especially in persons with a history of substance use and “show[s] such disregard for social norms and ethical standards of the medical profession that he undermined the public‘s confidence in the profession.” As the court explained at the plea hearing, “[w]e rely on medical professionals to make decisions and make recommendations and make prescriptions for us because we don‘t know. We have no way of knowing.” [E. 257].
In Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n of Md. v. Proctor, the respondent pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine. 309 Md. 412, 414 (1987). The Attorney Grievance Commission filed for disciplinary action and the circuit court concluded that the respondent engaged in illegal patients at increased risk of suicide, or who are using alcohol, opioids, or other sedating drugs.” Id. In 2019, about 16% of overdose deaths involving opioids also involved benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines and Opioids, Nat‘l Inst. Drug Abuse, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/benzodiazepines-opioids. Dr. Burke prescribed Alprazolam (Xanax) to his brother and his girlfriend who both have substance use problems.
conduct involving moral turpitude because he possessed “both marijuana and cocaine,” “personally used both drugs” and that he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute. Id. at 414. The Court held that “the illegal conduct engaged in by Respondent involved moral turpitude.” Id. at 419. The Court reached this conclusion because even though the respondent was not convicted of this offense, the respondent acknowledged that sufficient evidence existed to sustain the circuit court‘s finding that the respondent possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute. Id. at 418. The Court explained that violations of the relevant CDS statute “will ordinarily involve moral turpitude,” but emphasized that “each case must be decided on its own facts.” Id. at 419.
Unlike in Proctor, where the respondent had not been convicted of intent to distribute marijuana, here, Dr. Burke pleaded guilty to five counts of “knowingly and intentionally” prescribing several CDS outside “the course of regular professional duties” and out of conformity with “Title 5
We hold there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board‘s conclusion that Dr. Burke‘s actions reflect negatively on “the many legitimate physicians who practice medicine in accordance with professional and ethical standards, and with respect for patient safety and societal values.”8 The Board properly concluded that Dr. Burke‘s actions were “directly connected to the medical profession” and that in writing “illegal prescriptions of CDS,” he brought “shame to the medical profession.” While we afford great weight to the legal conclusions drawn by the Board and defer to its expertise in finding that Dr. Burke committed a crime that involved moral turpitude in the administrative sphere, we independently draw the same conclusion. Frey, 422 Md. at 138. Dr. Burke‘s actions negatively impact “public confidence” in the medical profession and cast an “unsavory . . . shadow” over the field. Para, 211 Md. App. at 355; Stidwell, 144 Md. App. at 618.
II. The Board Did Not Act in an Arbitrary or Capricious Manner When It Denied Dr. Burke a Hearing Because HO § 14-404(b)(2) Does Not Require That He Have One
A. Parties’ Contentions
Dr. Burke contends that he had a protected property interest in his medical license and that the Board denied him due process by revoking his license without providing him with an evidentiary hearing. Dr. Burke also contends that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in revoking his license under
turpitude. The Board argued that it followed the procedures outlined under
B. Standard of Review
This Court may reverse or modify the decision of the Board if it concludes that “any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision . . . is arbitrary or capricious.”
C. Analysis
1. Property Interest in a Medical License
Dr. Burke argues that he has a protected property interest in his medical license and that he thus must receive due process before his license is revoked. Dr. Burke is correct that “the right of a licensed physician to practice medicine is a property right of which a physician cannot be deprived without due process of law.” Md. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Felsenberg, 351 Md. 288, 306 (1998). However, this right is conditional and “subject to the paramount police power of the State.” Comm‘n on Med. Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390 (1981) (citing Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 880 (1954)). The Court of Appeals explained in Stillman that no one “has an absolute vested right to practice medicine,” but instead individuals have “a conditional right which is subordinate to the police power of the State to protect and preserve the public health.” Stillman, 291 Md. at 405 (citing Reetz v. People of the State of Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903)). Therefore, Dr. Burke‘s right to practice medicine is not absolute and his license may be revoked pursuant to conditions imposed by the State in the interest of public health and safety.
2. Entitlement to a Hearing
Dr. Burke argues that the Board denied him due process by revoking his license under
Dr. Burke was not entitled to a hearing because the Board had the discretion to discipline Dr. Burke under
In Felsenberg, the Board denied Dr. Felsenberg the opportunity for a hearing because it was undisputed that he had
As in Felsenberg, where there was no dispute that the respondent had been convicted of a crime, so too here Dr. Burke does not deny that he pleaded guilty to
Dr. Burke‘s argument, that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner because it did not analyze the plea agreement, fails. The regulations do not require consideration of the guilty plea, but rather only that the Board review the documents included in the OAG‘s petition. COMAR 10.32.02.07. After the Board receives the petition, reviews the documents and determines that the respondent‘s actions come “within the language and intent of [§14-404(b)], and the disciplinary panel has a basis for finding preliminarily that it applies to the respondent,” then the Board “shall vote” to issue a show cause order to the respondent. COMAR 10.32.02.07C(2). The responses to a show cause order are limited to the following issues: “(A) lack of conviction or plea; (B) whether the crime is one involving moral turpitude; (C) misidentity of the respondent with the defendant in the criminal matter; and (D) other relevant issues, if any, other than mitigation.” COMAR 10.32.02.07E (emphasis added).
Dr. Burke‘s response to the show cause petition did not claim that he was misidentified or that he had not pleaded guilty. Instead his response emphasized “mitigating
Dr. Burke‘s license was summarily suspended on September 9, 2019, which was two weeks prior to the DCCR hearing scheduled for September 25. While Dr. Burke contends that the Board proceeded under
Under
In conclusion, we hold that the Board followed the statutory requirements in revoking Dr. Burke‘s medical license. Under the provisions of
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.