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Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. Public Service Commission
760 A.2d 1087
Md.
2000
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*1 MID-ATLANTIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND et al. 157, Sept. Term,

No. Appeals Maryland. Court of (PER ORDER). July 20, 2000 CURIAM (OPINION). Oct. *2 (Thomas L.

Kenneth Wiseman R. Kline Mark F. Sund- L.L.P.), DC, back of & Andrews Kurth Washington, petitioner. (Brett Jennings

Deborah E. Ingerman Piper, Marbury, LLP), Wolfe, Rudnick Miller, & Susan Stevens General Coun- (Public sel Service Com’n of Maryland), Michael J. Travieso (Sandra Fields, M. Guthorn and F. People’s William Office of (Gorak Counsel), L.L.C.), Thomas Gorak Bay Baltimore, C. & *3 Curran, Jr., (M. Joseph Atty. Hare, J. Gen. Atty. Brent Asst. Gen.), Annapolis, (Gordon, Allan J. Feinblatt, Malester Roth- man, Hollander, (Miles Hoffberger LLC), Henry & J. Suelau P.C.), Stockbridge, Milton, Baltimore, & Jeral A. respon- dents. Smith,

Gordon J. John Hengerer, & of Brief National Energy Ass’n Marketers filed on of petitioner, behalf Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae. BELL, C.J.,

Argued ELDRIDGE, before and RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER For filed, reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be having argument Court heard oral in captioned above case, having and concluded that the has appellant standing judicial review, seek it is 20th of day July, ORDERED, by Appeals the Court of of Maryland, majori- ty concurring, Court that the judgment the Circuit be, Court for City reversed, Baltimore and hereby, it is and City Baltimore Court for to the Circuit is remanded case and it further proceedings, for further in accor- the Court stays imposed by that the ORDERED 30, 2000, judgment on the with its Order dated June dance and City April dated for Baltimore Court Circuit of the Public # 75757 and Order May entered 1999, be, filed November Maryland Commission Service dissolved, applying prejudice without they hereby, are and review, and stay pending judicial Court for to the Circuit is further forthwith; costs to shall issue

ORDERED that the mandate by the paid appellees. OPINION BELL, Judge. Chief Mid- appellant, case whether the presents

The issue this (“MAPSA”), a trade associ- Association Supply Atlantic Power becoming suppliers who are interested companies ation of in the proceedings to the electricity Maryland,1 and re- Commission, to seek has Public Service order, Public Service appellee view of the issued (“PSC”), and settlement approving stipulation Baltimore appellees into and between agreement, entered (“BGE”), Maryland Office Company Electric Gas and (“OPC”), Resources- Natural People’s Counsel Re- the Power Plant Maryland Energy Administration (“DNR/MEA”) others, collectively repre- Program search classes, and the all environmental interests senting customer City deter- Court Baltimore large.2 at The Circuit public *4 and, accordingly, standing appellant had no mined that that, matter, associations argues policy trade appellant 1. as The they are the most standing seek review as often have should necessary providing input to the means of efficient and economical policy in view of making process. reach the issue We do not decision statutory as matter of construction. resolution the case our of moved, review, appellant in the Along petition 2. with its for Court, stay portions Service Commission certain of the Public Circuit petition dismissed its for granted review. We for appellant’s petition and, writ of certiorari following oral argument July on issued our reversing decision judgment of the remanding Circuit Court and the case court to conduct explain review. We now the reasons for that decision. controversy

The seeds of this sown were first when the PSC developed policy designed initiatives to restructure electric i.e., Maryland, industry develop a market capable sup- porting competition the sale of electricity the BGE area, service and later when the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act of 1999 by was enacted the General Assembly the Governor. See 1999 Md. Laws. and signed by into law Chap. to, with, 3. Pursuant and in accordance the PSC’s initiatives, an application BGE filed forth setting its restruc- turing It plan. was docketed in Commission Case 8794. The OPC also a petition filed to reduce the rates charged BGE. case, That docketed Case was consolidated with Case 8794. Pennsylvania

The appellant corporation operates which aas for companies trade association participating both the wholesale and retail electric supply Maryland, markets in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio and the District of capacity, Columbia. In that petition filed a to intervene in the OPC’s petition rate reduction action. That granted.3 was order, alia, particular, relating recovery inter those to BGE’s competitive stranded costs and charge. collection transition The stay subsequently by motion to was denied that court and the Court Therefore, Special and, thus, Appeals. petition for certiorari reviewed, being presented issue to the Court in the context of a request stay, granted, along grant which the Court with its certiorari, pending, during, be addressed the Court’s review of standing argument, the merits of the issue. After oral the Court announced the stay. decision issue and lifted its thus, stay, and, therefore, longer no is before this Court will not be

further addressed. proceedings Intervention in before the Public Service Commission is governed by Maryland Code Utility 3-106 the Public Com- Article, panies provides: *5 seen, because, that matter occurred, as we have that When consolidated, appel- the restructuring had been plan and the did, to, fully negotia- the participate lant was enabled Obviously, its at issue. to the settlement leading up tions provisions as to those parties, of two other and that opposition, costs, the allocation the stranded addressing of the settlement rates, unbundling did of the rate reduction agree- sign to settlement appellant refused prevail and other parties, BGE and several ment reached had Once the settlement been on 1999. signed June proceed- in the reached, participated thereafter appellant PSC, challenging those terms the settlement in the ings Its efforts in the negotiations. opposed it earlier had during negotiations. than When no more successful PSC were settlement, No. by Commission Order approved the PSC petition its appellant filed on November review.4 files, "(a) timely person may apply Application. person —If proceeding before the Commission. intervene in a "(b) grant to intervene unless Commission shall leave Decision.—The the Commission concludes that: represent "(1) proceeding adequately the interest parties to the intervene; person seeking of the "(2) irrelevant or that the seeks raise are the issues immaterial. "(c) rights Rights intervenor has all the An intervener.— proceeding. party to a Commission, "(2) an individual who is proceeding before the In a may represent or herself.” intervenor himself an submitted, petition for certiorari and brief on the appellant The in its merits, proceeding parties did not the other to the that "[b]ecause interest, adequately represent MAPSA’s intervention was MAPSA’s Court, hand, ruling on the the Circuit granted....” On the other issue, "peti- noted that summary judgment on the motion for granted to intervene in the Commission’s MAPSA was leave tioner longstanding proceedings with PSC tradition which in accordance parties participate encourages of all interested the involvement public regulations governing Maryland’s policy and establishment of public utilities.” George’s County, petition the Circuit Court for Prince was filed in transferred, appellant to of BGE and the but with the consent City. for Baltimore Circuit Court BGE summary judgment moved issue appellant’s standing to prosecute proceeding. argued It in the motion and before the Circuit Court that the *6 interest,” not “a appellant party person or in pointing out that, association, an only as in a operating representative capacity, it had no interest in proceedings separate the and distinct from the interests of its Rejecting members. the appellant’s Commission, party rebuttal —it was a before the participating fully in the proceedings, it meets the definition of and, event, party, in any controlling the clearly statute gives it unambiguously standing5 court agreed with BGE —the granted and thus the motion for summary judgment. In conclusion, its reaching it relied on of legislative history statute, rather than the clear of the import language: appellant’s] argument ignores “What ... [the is that which came to the attention of namely the Court of Appeals, Court, appellant citing Bosley Dorsey, contended in the Circuit v. 239-40, 229, and, (1948) 191 Md. particular, 60 A.2d in (1939) Maryland §§ Code Article 359 and the latter section being predecessor (1998) § Code 3-302 of the Public Article, Companies traditionally Utilities that associations have been authorized to seek review of orders of Public Service Commission. provided: § Article association, "Any company, corporation, person partnership or sub- sub-title, ject any provisions of of this person party or other or interest, vacate, right proceed in shall have the in the courts to set any grounds aside or have modified order of said Commission on the unlawful, that such order is unreasonable or as hereinafter more particularly set forth.” provided: Article sub-title, "Any corporation subject any provisions to this or sub-title, any person being any in interest dissatisfied with commission, rates, tolls, fixing order any of the or charges, rate schedules, rates, joint any fixing any rate or regulations, service, practices, may acts or any commence action the Circuit any county, any judge Court for Supreme or before of the Bench of any City, City appropriate Baltimore court of Baltimore jurisdic- adopted tion purpose, against for the the commission any as defendant to ground vacate and set aside such order on the rates, tolls, schedules, rates, charges, joint that the rate or rate or unlawful, fixed in such order regulation, is or that practice, such unreasonable, act or service fixed in such order is in which action a copy complaint shall be served with the summons.” Public Service Com- to amend the legislative active efforts fact, an effort to establish underway. law then mission in the 1947 Counsel rights People’s for the Office appeal was one of Assembly defeated and that had been General Dorsey, Bosley for the Court’s decision the bases than [229,] 239-40[, Rather ]. 60 A.2d review statutory the current standard misread is consistency, this Court purpose of historical of the fact significance the historical persuaded an the reference to of the law abandons current codification review having right to obtain ‘association’ now, statuto- is limited with orders. That entitlement PSC and this to ‘a in interest’ ry exceptions, statutory scheme. Whether term art undefined in a contested analogizes ‘aggrieved party to an the Court of a final decision case,’ who entitled *7 Act or mere- Maryland Administrative Procedure under the Bosley cited in v. of the PSC cases ly language looks 694], 235-36[, the inescapable 191 Md. at 60 A.2d at Dorsey, reasonably ‘party is that interest’ result having adversely entity to be an ‘an interest interpreted ” v. Public Service Commission by affected order.’ (1927). 464, [, 404, Byron, 407] 153 Md. 471 138 A. omitted). (citation accordingly petition the appellant’s

The court dismissed mentioned, review, already prejudice. -with As we of certiorari granted petition for writ and appellant’s judgment. reversed that statutory of construction are well settled.

The canons those, of this recently dispositive reaffirmed relevant and We Chase, v. 360 Md. Mayor City case in & Council Baltimore of (2000). case, 121, 128, 987, In that quoting 756 A.2d 991 v. Dir. Fin. and Potomac Tel. Co. Md. Chesapeake of of 567, Baltimore, 343 Md. 683 Mayor City Council of (1996), said, regard, A.2d 517-18 we in that statutory discern goal interpretation, the real of pursuing begin inquiry of we our Legislature, ment the intent and, with the words of the statute they when are clear there, it unambiguous, we end point well. The was made yet again that we neither add nor a delete words to clear and unambiguous give statute to it meaning not reflected words Legislature engage used or forced subtle interpretation in an attempt limit extend or the statute’s Moreover, meaning. whenever possible, the statute should be clause, word, read so that no sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.

We also reviewed those canons applicable when the statute to interpreted part is a statutory scheme. Quoting Comm’r, 124, 131-32, GEICO v. Insurance 332 Md. (1993), 630 A.2d 717-18 we necessity reading noted the subject statutes the same together, harmonizing them to possible, the extent and that such statutes are to be read rendering them, avoid or “any either portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory.” at Id. A.2d at 717. While we acknowledged role that legislative history plays in of statutes, the interpretation even when the words Legislature used are unambiguous, clear and see Harris v. State, 137, 146, 331 Md. (1993), A.2d indicating that, in the interest of completeness, may, we and sometimes will, legislative statute, review the history a clear we explained, State, quoting Coleman 281 Md. (1977) (“a court general as a rule surmise

a legislative contrary intention plain statute or exceptions insert not made the legislature”), that “the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; is not undertaken to contradict plain meaning *8 Chase, statute.” 360 Md. at 756 A.2d at 993. right

The to review of an or order decision of the Public Service Commission is by Maryland controlled (1999) 3-202(a) § Code Utility the Public Companies Arti cle. It provides:

“(a) In general. Except for the Commission, staff of the a — interest, party or in person including People’s Counsel, that is dissatisfied a final decision or order of or decision judicial review may seek Commission in this subtitle.” provided as order language, plain unambiguous. By its is clear and The statute or of a Commission judicial review eligible to to seek interest” person a decision, “party must be petitioner believe or order. We the decision with and be “dissatisfied” a party if is either petitioner fulfilled the test is that the status or, if a party, not a the Commission before proceedings to the believe, we appellant qualifies, in interest.” “person under either status. Utility Compa- the Public term under

“Person” is a defined l-101(s) that term Article defines that nies Article. Section trustee, individual, receiver, guardian, personal to “an mean and kind fiduciary, representative representative, association, or other enti- firm, corporation, any partnership, definition, parties agree, appellant, ty.” as Under association, a association, person. an albeit a trade was, the parties as we have seen and The appellant Because agree, party before the PSC. also proceedings these allowed, intervene, moved, Code and was Article, Companies governing Utility § Public 3-106 of the implicated. Be proceedings, intervention § 3- meaning “party,” used § 3-106 defines the cause 3-202(a) 3- together. Section 202(a), it must be read if to intervene permitted shall be provides person that the Commission timely application makes person being not person of that are that the interests concludes or issues the and that the issue adequately represented Thus, to nor immaterial. neither irrelevant seeks raise are Commission, a proceeding to a before become a Commission, to determined, by have have been party must being adequately is not proceeding an interest in the turn, interest, has determined been and that represented proceeding.6 consequence or of no not to be frivolous participating as a requirements appellees that “the 6. The state strict,” they position, very ‘party’ level are at the administrative *9 granted, Once has person intervention been the has all the rights of case, to the In proceeding. having intervened, appellant fully the participated pro- the PSC which ceedings at the settlement agreement underlying the Commission order was the approved Commission. Section 3-106 informs meaning also the phrase, the “person seen, in interest.” requires As we have to intervene that there be an interest that person seeking the to intervene has that is not being adequately represented. that, It follows once intervention granted, has been the interest that Commission has found the person have had is dissipat- not ed.

The requirement that there be dissatisfaction with the sought decision to be reviewed is when the fulfilled party or judicial review, interest proffering seeks for reasons the court to reverse order or In this decision. case, appellant sought judicial and, has to the more point, it has advanced rational for overturning basis ie., order,7 agreement the settlement by the approved Commission does not with comply the mandate of the Electric Competition event, Customer Choice and Act.8 In there suggest, agreed, with which the Commission as demonstrated its order, stating requested that "all entities that leave to intervene in these proceedings granted party consolidated Contrary were status.” to the position Commission, appellees apparently and the interven- review, require tion perfunctory statute seems to more than a done, perhaps charged but with which the Commission is nonetheless. By characterizing 7. appellant’s seeking basis for to overturn the agreement "rational,” settlement and thus the Commission’s order as commenting we are not argument, only merits its its bona entitling fides appellant to seek review. addition, certiorari, appellant, petition in its offered three indicia of its dissatisfaction with the Commission order: "(i) opposed sign MAPSA underlying did not the settlement (ii) sought judicial Commission Order MAPSA review of the Commis- Order, (iii) sought sion stay portions MAPSA has selected prosecutes petition

the Commission Order while it its review.” with the “dissatisfied” appellant no that the dispute serious PSC. decision and order of the they As differently. see quite the issue appellees view *10 dissatisfaction, test

it, applicable than argue, rather and conclusion, this In standing “aggrievement.” support is interest,’” ‘in phrase rely “modifying on the appellees 3-202(a), § lan- 3-202(a), legislative history §in used 3-202(a),9 fact that “this and the in cases guage applying contexts, an held, analogous that consistently has Court judicial review aggrieved is not or entitled association interest at stake that is itself has an unless association its members.” from the interests of separate and distinct 191 interest,” Dorsey, v. citing Bosley As “in phrase, to the (1948), 236, Service v. 60 at 694 Public Comm’n Md. at A.2d (1927) 404, 464, 471, Gregg A. 406 and 153 Md. 138 Byron, 1111, (1913), Laird, appellees 121 87 A. 1114 Md. it to mean an interpreted “having that Court assert has Commission].” adversely [of interest affected sure, to it in made the attributed To be the Court statements cases; however, Bosley, In context critical. those standing of an nothing the issue had do with example, judicial review of an order as to which it association to seek Court was question before the whether dissatisfied. review, People’s Counsel had seek fact, appellant agree. goes saying It does not without that believes, nothing argues, that the in the cases is more generic commentary. than It asserts: Laird, 1, (1913)] [Gregg 87 A. [121 Court in 1111 “[r]he v.] pointed rights parties aggrieved simply out that ‘the who feel guarded protected by fully by the action of the commission are newly law. provision the’ review of the then enacted PSC Thus, 32-33, added). (emphasis 87 A. the Court’s 121 Md. at at 1114 generic commentary establishing partic- as in Laird cannot be read Likewise, [Public ularized standard of harm. the Court in Service 474, [404,] [464,] Byron, 138 v.] 153 Md. A. ], (1927) proceeding under the PSC Law [ described arising passed as one from 'an order at the conclusion of an issue by competent and in which has been heard and determined tribunal any corporation subject such a manner to cause dissatisfaction ” added) party (emphasis to the act or to other in interest.’ (citation omitted). right, his own under the applicable provisions of the Public effect, Service see note 5, Commission Law then in supra, where §§ Code Article 359 and out,, applicable provisions, is, are set “whether the Peo- ple’s Counsel a ‘person in interest’ contemplation within the Id. Court, of the statute.” at A.2d at 693. The having “[ojrdinarily noted that an attorney is not a ato suit in merely which he acts in a professional capacity representing id. at a litigant,” v. Elgin, A.2d Pressman citing at (1947), 187 Md. set out People’s Counsel’s contention, that right his to seek review was as the agent the persons order, affected the Commission’s that he was injuriously Id. It was in by that affected order. this context that the Court meaning addressed the of a in interest.

After the tracing development of the Office of People’s Counsel, the Court addressed who was authorized to seek §§ review under 359 and 425: Commission, v.

“In Gregg Public [Laird] Service 1, 121 Md. 32, (1913) 1111, ], A. 87 1114 [ the first the test of Public Law, Service Commission that, the Court of Appeals held while the statute did not use ‘appeal’ the word in connection right with the challenge Commission, to an of order the the rights parties of any aggrieved of by any action the Com fully mission safeguarded were the by provision that any subject corporation to the ‘any person statute and in inter est being dissatisfied with any may order’ commence a suit against the Commission. from an Appeals of the may Commission be taken by either a regulated public utility by or or any corporations individuals having an interest adversely affected by the order. Public Service v. Byron, 464, 471, [, Md. 138 A. (1927)].[10]” 464, Byron, (1927), In Public Service Comm’n v. 153 Md. 138 A. 404 the one of issues before City Hagerstown, the Court was whether the of beneficiary, which was a necessary party against was a to an action the orders, challenging Public Service Commission certain its of initiated. “person in inter- People’s was a that Counsel Court held Id, 28, pointing to §§ 359 and 415. addition Art. est” under as those were the same People’s Counsel

out duties id. at 236, 694, it at Attorney, former Assistant reasoned: no from 1912 to 1922 did that at time

“It is conceded from to privilege appeal Counsel have the Assistant General earnestly con- complainant But orders of the Commission. to gives right appeal him the the statute tended that Counsel is argued People’s that the implication. He Counsel, as was the Assistant of the General subordinate an Counsel, is an of the Governor and appointee but General allegiance no of the utilities with for the customers agent cannot, however, the fact brush aside We Commission. transferring functions Assis- Legislature, that the for the Counsel, laid down People’s tant General Counsel performed the same duties which were People’s Counsel Reorgani- Under the State the Assistant General Counsel. Act, January office zation which took effect abolished, the Governor Assistant General Counsel 414, (1924) predecessor § pursuant Maryland Article Code Bosley Dorsey, Article in effect in Code (1948). any corporation Noting "[w]hile Md. 60 A.2d 691 any person subject provisions in interest to the statute prescribes plaintiff, plainly the statute become defendant,” only necessary Byron, 153 at commission as that, point made the consistent with that 138 A. at the Court affected, section, corporate adversely private interest is "[i]f cited, position may attempt to enforce its under the section hence *12 acquiescence proceed or is an indication of satisfaction its failure so to order, changed by set aside or unless in in the which statute will not be by satisfactory opponent shall show clear and the authorized action its complained of is or unreasonable.” evidence that the order unlawful 23, 408) 471, [(1939)] (citing A. Art. We Id. at 138 at 407 Md.Code municipality in the outcome of the said ‘‘Asthe was interested further: party, upon application proper proceedings, it would have been made, court, of the trial a defendant.” could have been the discretion Commission, 473, (citing at A. 407 Benson v. Public Service Id. 138 at 398, (1922)); Public Commis 141 Md. 118 A. 852 Chenoweth v. Service sion, 622, (1923); Light A. Wichita Railroad and Co. v. 143 Md. Commission, 51, 48, 43 67 L.Ed. 260 U.S. S.Ct. Kansas Public Utilities (1922). of Maryland was authorized to appoint the People’s Counsel. The Act provided rights, that all the powers and duties upon had been conferred the Assistant General Coun- sel ‘shall be transferred to and thereafter be exercised and counsel, performed by said people’s who shall be the lawful of 1922, successor said Assistant General Counsel.’ Laws of 29, 13. ch. art.

“While the Public Service Commission Law it makes duty of the Counsel People’s before the appear Commis- sion on behalf of the or public public defense of the (Laws 563, 1912, 1924, 534, interests of ch. Laws of ch. Laws 1927, 201, 1939, 353), ch. Code art. sec. it does not authorize him to prosecute appeals from orders significant Commission. It is also that Section after providing that the experts services employed by the Commission and also its records and other facilities shall be of by availed People’s performance Counsel in the of his duties, public provides further that nothing contained there- prevent shall ‘any party or interest’ in any proceeding before the from appearing or from being represented by counsel. As the Counsel is People’s an attorney himself required to appear before the Commis- sion, this provision strongly indicates that the Legislature ” did not consider him as a or ‘party interest.’ 236-37, Id. at 60 A.2d at 694. The persuaded Court was also it the fact that was the Commission’s practice to “call upon People’s Counsel to support its orders.” Id. at at A.2d Moreover, rejected argument that a court “at liberty legislative surmise a intent contrary to the letter statute, indulge in the license of inserting omitting object words with the making express statute an intent which is not original evidenced in the form.” Id. at also, A.2d at 694. See Public Service Comm’n Maryland Counsel, People’s 8-9, 309 Md. 522 (1987). 372-73 Gregg Byron neither nor was the issue presents this case

addressed. In Byron, issues, there were two whether municipality benefitted the Commission order was a neces- *13 subject order and challenging an action sary party to proper was the City Court Baltimore the Circuit whether Among the various 469, 138 A. at 406. 153 Md. at venue. See the “action whether Gregg in was questions raised an execution before granting of to the amount[ed] Commission Md. at appellant.” against entered judgment [was] to that responding in the course of A. at 1114. It was interest of concerning the that the statements argument made. order were Commission’s challenger believe, and when that enacted significant, It we decided, standing issue the law addressed Bosley Public to those whom solely by reference to entities it had an or as to whom Law applied Commission Service indeed, no define, and, there was statute effect; it did not to review of a delineated, rights Maryland Code Only in the Commission. proceedings before 16(d)11 That “party” § used. was the term Art. 78 section, very general prescribed its predecessor, as did challenge resort to the courts entities who could terms the however, 74(a), 415(a), § former orders. Section have necessary to be met to out the standard set referred challenge. Significantly, that section maintain such after, interest,” cataloguing the again only “person Only with the re-codification applies. entities to which the law law, Laws, see 1955 Md. Public Service Commission part of Chap. concept “party” did the become standing. See delineating the law the test section of (1955, Repl.Vol.) § Art. 83. And the Maryland Code in the Commission provided for intervention re-codification proceedings. 3-202, § interest,” argue that “in as used

The appellees “person” § “party” both as enacted in modifies and, so, provisions of the Public By Maryland, Laws of ch.

11. placed 23 and from Article Service Commission law were removed formerly 16 of Art. 78 was Article Code. Section 78 of 359 of Art. requirements “the Gregg, set forth in Byron and Bosley, only ‘regulated’ entities and other persons parties ‘in *14 interest,’ i.e., affected, adversely may judicial obtain review of a Commission order continue to Only control. associa- (and entities) tions ‘subject other to regulation’ by the persons or parties and ‘in interest’ have stand- ing appeal to Commission decisions.” maintain, words, They in other that the only substantive change by effected the 1955 re-codification of the Public Service Commission Law was the consolidation provi- into one sion of the several that theretofore had addressed issue.12 Support argument for the was in found a Staff to the Report Commission on Organization State, Administrative of the rec- ommending no change judicial to the existing require- review ments,13 “Report of the Commission to Revise and Recodi- fy the Laws Concerning the Public Commission,” Service which, like the Staff Report, explicit contained no recommen- change dation to judicial requirements14 review and the § absence an explanatory note to 83 indicating such an intention.

We are not persuaded. The argument in flies the face of the plain unambiguous and language the statute. More- 16(d) 74(a), taxicabs, 12. §§ to relating addition and also judicial provided: addressed review. It association, "Any person, corporation of interest who shall be dissatisfied at action of Public refusing Service Commission for grant permit hereunder, ruling, regulation or for order or shall right have appeal provided of an in Section of this Article Appeals.” and to the Court of Report The author of the Sykes, Staff Esq., Melvin who wrote: "[cjorporations persons in appeal interest from commission Court____ by filing provisions orders in the Circuit The well-drawn, easily review are brief and understood.” Report 14. The following: introduction to the contained the "changes phraselogy present in of the law not are intended to effect any change meaning specifically unless such intention is stated in notes, explanatory language or the clear of the draft leads inescapably to the change conclusion that some meaning must have been intended.” review provi- over, change in focus the drastic 1955, to seek Before conclusion. opposite to the sion leads to the Com- review, not have been one need or affected just subject to the law proceeding, mission only the re-codification challenged. With decision was able affected the decision adversely one interested too, so, those who were decision, but were challenge ruling of which the to be proceeding out parties to the Thus, of the statute the clear challenged emanated. to the “leads, Assembly,] led the General must have [and itself change meaning must have been that some conclusion intended.” rely finally Maryland indicating cases appellees only and entitled to aggrieved

an association separate case an interest or stake when it has *15 members whose interests distinct from the interests the County v. Planning Housing & Ass’n represents, see Citizens 345, 333, County, 273 Md. 329 A.2d Baltimore Executive of 681, (1974); County, 247 Bryniarski Montgomery v. 687-88 (1967); 142-46, 289, 137, Heights 230 293 Norwood Md. A.2d Baltimore, Mayor City Council Ass’n v. & Improvement (1950); 1, 8, 1, Maryland 4 Naturopathic 72 A.2d 195 Md. 630, 538, (1948), Kloman, 626, 191 62 A.2d 539 Ass’n v. Md. party has as a participated or not the association whether Mary See Medical Assoc. v. agency proceedings. Waste the 596, 613, 241, Coalition, 612 249-50 327 Md. A.2d land Waste Env., v. (1992); Department Ass’n Sugarloaf Citizens’ (1996). 605, Although not 271, 286, 686 613 344 Md. A.2d also is embodied by appellees, principle on relied Act, Maryland Procedure see Administrative 10-222(a) Vol.) (1984, § of the State Govern Repl. Code Article, provides: ment (1)

“(a) Except provided as Review decision. of final (b) section, who is party aggrieved of this subsection judicial in a contested case is entitled to final decision provided in this section.” of the decision as (holding A.2d at 614 “that the 344 Md. at Sugarloaf, mirrors statutory ‘aggrieved’ that a requirement general common law standing principles applicable to decisions”), review of administrative citing Medical Waste Coalition, Assocs. v. Maryland supra, Waste 327 Md. at 611 n. 612 A.2d at 248-49 n. quoting Bryniarski, atMd. 230 A.2d at 294. are

Again, persuaded. we appellees’ argument again once plain belied govern- the statute ing entitlement review. Additionally, the Public Service Commission its proceedings exempted have been APA, from requirements including the provision governing This review. exclusion is indicative of an intention the part Legislature to continue the applicability of the unique provisions to which the Public subject, Service Commission is separate from applicable those agencies to which the APA applies. See State Government 10-203(3)(vi).15 § Article Had the Legislature intended that standard for review of Public Service Commission proceedings be the same prescribed as that for contested APA, cases under the it is inconceivable that it would have excluded Public Service APA, Commission from the or at § least not from the coverage of 10-206.

Moreover, out, appellant points interpret,, 3- 202(a) as appellees word, do would render the “dissatis- fied,” which has been a part the scheme its inception, since “meaningless, surplusage, GEICO, superfluous, or nugatory.” 332 Md. at at 717. difference, There is a as our cases recognize, see George’s Carusillo Prince County, 289 424 A.2d (treating separately *16 provides: 15. That section

"(a) General apply exclusions. —This subtitle does not to:

government: "(3) following agencies [******] of the Executive Branch of the State The review. Procedure Act —Contested subtitle to which the exclusion "(vi) the Public Service Commission....” [******] Cases,” § applies 10-206(a) is "Subtitle 2. Administrative of which covers judicial

215 that under the APA and standard under review 404);16 (1957, § Art. see Repl.Vol.) 1980 Maiyland Code Waste, 327 Md. at also, supra, Medical Waste the “dissatisfied” 9, 612 at 248 note between 611 note has the law requirements. long It been “aggrieved” give settled, that statutes are to be read to well Maryland and otherwise contravenes meaning every word used and do GEICO, 332 Md. statutory rule of construction. this cardinal Chase, Md. at 756 supra, 717. at 630 A.2d at See 991; Congregation, Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel A.2d at (1998). 720 A.2d reasons, concludes that the foregoing For this Court of the Commis- has to seek appellant as to it is dissatisfied. sion order HARRELL, Judge, dissenting, joined by RODOWSKY RAKER, Judges: majority’s stay to lift the agree

I with the decision (“Commission”); how- order of the Public Service regard to I am the Court’s decision with unpersuaded ever standing to seek trade association’s Appellant 1999. the Commission’s November review from statute majority plain language holds that association grants standing to seek review to trade of its no interest at stake than the interest with different majority’s holding in this case offends settled members. The law. statutory construction and established case principles standing. Ac- I that the trade association lacks would hold judgment I affirm the of the cordingly, dissent and would City dismissing petition for Baltimore Circuit Court judicial review. (1957, Repl.Vol.), provided Maiyland Code Art. pertinent part: "Any any regulation person, dissatisfied with order or ... subtitle, provisions [Secretary] may commence ... under the of this any county

any in the court for ... to vacate and set action circuit regulation.” aside such order *17 3-202(a) Section Utility the Public Companies Article (“PUC”), judicial limits the right to seek to party review “a or interest, in person including Counsel, the People’s is by a dissatisfied final decision or order of the Commission.” (“MAPSA”) The Mid-Atlantic Supply Power Association con- tends that it was both a party before the Commission and a person statute,1 as defined by that, because clearly order, “dissatisfied” with the Commission’s it is enti- tled to seek problem review. The with this analysis is ignores that it “in modifying phrase interest” contained the statute. Bosley Dorsey, (1948), A.2d 691

Court was asked determine if newly the Commission’s then People’s created Counsel possessed requisite seek review of an order Commission.2 The statute, time, as written at the separate contained two provi- sions for review from an order It Commission. provided, pertinent part, follows:

Any company, corporation, association, or person partner- ship subject any of the provisions sub-title, of this or person interest, or shall have the right proceed vacate, to the courts to set aside or have modified an order of said ground that such order unrea- unlawful, sonable or as hereinafter more particularly set forth.

Maryland Code, 1939, 23, § Article 359. The further statute provided:

Any subject sub-title, corporation to this or any provisions sub-title, of this any person being interest any commission, dissatisfied with fixing any rates, tolls, rate or schedules, charges, joint rates, rate or l-101(s) individual, Section of the PUC defines a as "an receiver, trustee, guardian, personal representative, fiduciary, repre- any firm, any association, sentative partnership, kind and corpora- entity.” tion or Bosley, process 2. At the time review was referred to as appeal. an service, acts or regulations, practices, fixing any any order any Court for in the Circuit commence action *18 bench of Balti- supreme of the any judge county, or before City appropriate any in court of Baltimore City, more against purpose, for the adopted jurisdiction any to vacate and set aside as a defendant the commission tolls, rates, or ground that the rate such order the schedules, rates, in such order is joint rate or fixed charges, or act service unlawful, regulation, practice, or that such any unreasonable, copy in which action a in is fixed such order the summons. shall be served with complaint of the question pre- § 415. The Code, Article People’s is a in the Counsel Bosley was “whether sented statute.” contemplation the the in interest’ within ‘person 233, 60 at 693. 191 Md. at provisions as interpreted statutory the two

The Court judicial any “regulated review to seek granting corporations having or an or ... utility any individuals public Bosley, 191 at order.” Md. adversely by affected the interest Byron, (citing at Public Serv. Comm’n 60 A.2d (1927)). 464, 471, 138 language, A. Based on this Legislature that intended rejected argument the Court as an People’s Counsel could seek review that public. agent

Shortly Assembly after General amended the Bosley, the specifically People’s to allow the Counsel seek PUC Assembly recodify In decided review. 1955 General REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE PUC. THE PUB- AND THE LAWS CONCERNING RECODIFY (1955) (“REPORT”), leg- LIC SERVICE COMMISSION result, in that study part, islative commission noted “[a]s integrated statutory plan, defect of lack an basic repetition.” REPORT law also swollen with much needless Thus, goal of the recodification was to proposed at 3. basic reorganize into a repetition eliminate such the statute at 4. The Commission also coherent form. See REPORT stated, any in Report, “changes in the introduction to the present any of the law are not intended to effect phraseology in change meaning unless specifically such intention is stated notes, in explanatory or the clear of the draft inescapably leads to the conclusion that some change mean- must ing have been intended.” REPORT at 5. The 1955 revision of the a product PUC was of the Commission’s recommendations. provisions statute, of the former Commission,

recommended were recodified into one section. provided, pertinent The recodified statute part, as follows: interest,

Any party including the People’s Counsel, final dissatisfied decision commission, form", whether affirmative or negative entitled provided review thereof as in this subti- tle. *19 Code, 1955, 78, § Article In 83.3 Bureau Mines of Creek, 143,

v. George’s 155, 748, 272 Md. 321 A.2d 754-55 (1974), we identified the of significance changes made ato in a statute recodification: in of change phraseology

[A] in a statute codification will law, not as a general modify rule the change unless the sois radical or material that the intention of the to Legislature modify the law appears unmistakable from of language the the Code.

The comment to former of 83 Article 78 of the revised code specifically stated that the section was intended integrate to the existing provisions easily review into one 69; understandable section. See REPORT at see also Allers Tittsworth, v. 677, 683, 269 Md. 309 A.2d (explaining that it is of practice well-settled this Court refer to the Revisor’s Notes when searching legislative intent). Thus, other than to alter the result in Bosley expressly declaring the People’s ‘party Counsel to be a in interest,’ changes made to the statute during nearly 3. The used in this is statute identical the statute as appears today. of enlarge per- the class not intended were recodification interpreted of class as scope beyond in interest sons or ... individuals i.e., public utility any ‘regulated Bosley, by the adversely affected an interest having or corporations Depending 60 A.2d at 694. at Bosley, Md. order.’ “including” or when context, “include” the words upon “in meaning of “and” have the a statute used City Baltimore Housing Authority to.” addition See (2000). Bennett, other 754 A.2d 359 Md. standing as enjoys statutory words, only entity People’s is the Office of interest persons representative Counsel. meaning plain assertion is that the majority’s basic standing to obtain allows MAPSA

the statute majority asserts Majority at 204-05. The opinion this case. than “an something means less that the term “dissatisfied” interest,” “in term affected” and thus the adversely interest Court, “dissatisfied” Bosley would render interpreted 207-13, at 214-15. Because meaningless. Majority opinion interpretation principal statutory guidelines one so no reasonably a statute read possible, that “[i]f surplusage is rendered phrase, word clause or sentence Correction, 360- Dep’t meaningless,” Mazor v. (1977), majority reasons that 369 A.2d 86-87 less than to confer based on statute should be read adversely Although interpretation an interest affected.4 *20 present presented by the Although upon to decide the issue called (albeit dicta) case, predecessors to that the seem have assumed our by of standing conferred the various iterations to seek review requirement interest be pertinent a that one’s the statute included Bosley aggrieved. Dorsey, 191 adversely and one be See v. affected that 691, 229, 235-36, (1948) any rights (stating that of 60 A.2d 694 the Md. completely parties aggrieved by any the Commission were action of “ ‘any person being dissatisfied by provision the that in interest secured against and any may a suit the Commission” with order’ commence may "[ajppeals be taken either that from an order of the Commission corporations by regulated public utility by any individuals or having adversely by (citing Public Serv. affected the order" an interest 464, 471, (1927); Gregg Byron, 138 A. 407 Comm’n v. 153 Md. Laird, (1913))); Byron, Md. at Md. 87 A. 1114 153 121 220

of the it facially appealing, persuade statute is to fails me its (1) correctness for three reasons: the majority’s construction (2) would also surplusage; create the interpretation of the Bosley is more plain Court consistent with the statute; Legislature the interpretation relied on the given to the language Bosley when it recodified the statute.

First, majority’s under the language, construction “in phrase interest” would If surplusage. become as- one sumes term “dissatisfied” term key determining is review, what required is “in then interest” adds nothing construction, to the statute. Under all that would required be seek review is that or a an dissatisfied with order or decision of the Commission. were, This If construction cannot be correct. it literally anyone empowered would be to seek of a Public Service Commission order. Hypothetically, a citizen service area pertinent not covered PSC order in the case present challenge could that order because he or she dissatisfied with the fact citizens in the erstwhile BGE paying service area will be less an electricity. Such consequence absurd could not have been the intention of Mazor, Legislature. See 279 Md. at 87 369 at (“[Wjherever possible an interpretation given should statutory language which will not lead to absurd conse- I quences.”). am not persuaded Legislature intended set the bar so low. If we must choose between two statute, interpretations aof each of which create sur- would plusage, we should the interpretation Legis- choose which the ("If affected, any corporate private A. at adversely interest is may attempt position to enforce its under the section cited ...." (referring provided "any Art. corporation then subject any person being to this sub-title ... and in interest dissatisfied any with may any commission ... commence ... action commission....”)); against Gregg, at A. at 1114 ("[T]he rights parties may aggrieved by who feel the action of the fully guarded protected Commission are provision of section any person being of the Act 'that ... any in interest dissatisfied with order of the against commence action ... omitted)). (emphasis Commission ....’"

221 an which does not create previously accepted has lature absurd result. fails of the statute

Second, majority’s interpretation “in interest” articulated definition of because of plain is more consistent with Bosley Court to as in is often referred phrase “party interest” statute. The in of party in “real interest.” definition party “real In more of much debate. recent has been the issue interest” in interest as: party been to define a real years, the trend has law to enforce the the substantive person A entitled under generally, necessarily, but not upon and who right sued final outcome. from the actions benefits (7th ed.1999); 1143 see also LAW DICTIONARY BLACKS 4, 7-8, 323 Hayes, Inc. v. Liquors, South Down (1991). however, be This, the definition 162-63 could it the statute at Assembly intended when enacted the General is supposed to establish This section of statute issue here. Thus, incor interpretation an rights.5 who enforce “party interest” would porates the modern definition Assembly must meaningless. The General render the statute something in interest” to mean “party person have or intended other than the modern definition. written and recodi- originally

At the time the statute was fied, in defined as party generally interest” “real follows: in name of the brought suits requiring statutes interest,” is person means the who

“real this term actually subject-matter, interested in the substantially nominal, formal, only from has distinguished one who it. technical it or connection with or interest (4th ed.1951). This defi- BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY general to fit more into appropriately nition would seem standing ... ... whether the interest question "The concerns complainant sought protected by arguably zone within the to be regulated by question.” protected the statute ... to be interests Processing Orgs. Camp, U.S. S.Ct. 'n Serv. Ass Data (1970). 25 L.Ed.2d legislative intent the statute. If a party interest has a substantial stake in proceedings, every reasonable to that in nearly assume when instance *22 order, would be dissatisfied with an the order adversely also Thus, would affect its plain interests. the meaning of the statute comports closely interpreta- more with tion provided by the court than Bosley interpretation with the majority today. asserts

Third, evén if interpretation in Bosley the statute was intended, not what Legislature Legislature earlier since has on that in interpretation relied recodifying the statute. Assembly “The General is presumed to be aware of and, this interpretation Court’s of its if enactments such interpretation legislatively overturned, is not to have ac- in quiesced that interpretation.” Nationwide Mutual Insur- G, 131, 143, ance v. Co. USF & 314 Md. 550 A.2d (1988)(intemal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Harden v. Admin., Mass Transit 277 Md. 354 A.2d (1976)). If Legislature had intended trade association to review, judicial able seek it could have removed the “in phrase interest” or specifically provided for such an even- tuality. Assembly

The General did make one change substantive our in interpretation by Bosley specifically allowing the Peo- ple’s Nevertheless, Counsel to seek review. neither change, nor changes subsequently, made have “in Thus, removed the term from the interest” statute. interpretation given to that in phrase Bosley has accept- been ed by Legislature, we can conclude that it is the interpretation that the General Assembly intended at recodifi- A reviewing cation. court cannot look simply plain at the language of in ignore the statute a vacuum and comments to a interpreting statute decision very similar language. legislative history and the interpretation given to the nearly identical Bosley allows us to ascertain the real Mazor, Legislature. intention See 279 Md. at (“The A.2d at 86 cardinal rule construction a statute is to carry ascertain and out the real intention of legislature.”). Dorsey controlling in the instant Bosley The decision Counsel, in Therefore, than the party, People’s other case. Commission, from an order of the review seek by the order. adversely have an interest affected still must Mary- generate electricity or distribute MAPSA does not its land, Only propose deregulation. nor to do so after does adversely the Com- members be affected constituent with no legally is a association order. MAPSA trade mission implementation interest direct or substantial cognizable adversely an interest affected It does not have order. recognize. Consequently, MAP- the order that we should present in the case. standing to review SA has no seek by the properly petition Its dismissed Circuit Court. and RAKER authorize me state

Judges RODOWSKY *23 join this dissent. they 760 A.2d MARYLAND v.

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF Donna A. LEWIS. Term, 26, Sept. No. 2000.

Misc. AG Maryland. Appeals of Court of Oct.

ORDER to terminate inac- having petition The Court considered case, in the response tive status filed thereto above day of is this 12th October

Case Details

Case Name: Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. Public Service Commission
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Oct 12, 2000
Citation: 760 A.2d 1087
Docket Number: 157, Sept. Term, 1999
Court Abbreviation: Md.
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