JOSE ANDRES CAZARES, as Special Administrator of the Estate of ANDREW CAZARES, deceased and FAUSTO T. MANZERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of FAUSTO A. MANZERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH FRUGOLI, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 13 C 5626
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
March 11, 2014
Plaintiffs Andrew Cazares and Fausto A. Manzera were killed when the car they were riding in was struck by a car driven by an off-duty Chicago police officer, Joseph Frugoli. Jose Andres Cazeres and Fausto T. Manzera, as special administrators of the estates of Andrew Cazares and Fausto T. Manzera, respectively, sued the officer and the City of Chicago alleging that both violated the constitutional rights of the deceased in relation to that car accident on April 10, 2009. Specifically, in Count VIII of Cazares’ Complaint and Count VI of Manzera‘s Complaint, the plaintiffs allege Monell claims under
BACKGROUND
This Court takes the following allegations from the Manzera Complaint1, which the Plaintiffs originally filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County on July 12, 2013, and treats them as true for purposes of the City‘s motion.
April 10, 2009 Incident
On April 10, 2009, defendant Joseph Frugoli, a Chicago Police Officer, was off-duty drinking alcoholic beverages at “Dugan‘s on Halsted” (the “Tavern“) with other off-duty officers and in the presence of on-duty officers. (Dkt. 1-1, Manzera Complaint P. 7 ¶ 4). Frugoli became intoxicated while at the Tavern. (Compl. P. 7, ¶ 5). Frugoli left the Tavern and got into his car, which he proceeded to operate while intoxicated. (Compl. P. 7, ¶ 6; P. 11 ¶ 7). Frugoli drove his car southbound on Interstate 94, where Plaintiffs’ decedents were also driving. (Compl. P. 7, ¶ 8-9). Frugoli‘s car came into contact with and struck the decedents’ stopped car on the road. (Compl. P. 7, ¶ 8; P. 8, ¶ 10). Both decedents sustained severe injuries and subsequently died. (Compl. P. 10, ¶ 21).
Previous Conduct
On January 16, 2005, Frugoli was involved in an auto accident where Chicago police investigators determined that the contributory causes were speeding and consumption of alcohol.
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face when the complaint contains factual content that supports a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm. Id. The complaint should be dismissed only if the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. See Visiting Nurses Ass‘n of Southwestern Indiana, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 2000). For purposes of this motion, this Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant‘s favor. See Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013). In this case, the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ complaint properly outline the elements of a constitutional violation by the City.
DISCUSSION
In Count VI of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the City violated their decedents’
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ Monell claim asserts that the City‘s de facto policies were the moving force behind the deprivation of the decedents’ substantive due process right to be secure in their bodily integrity. See Board of County Com‘rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough for a
A. Deprivation of Federal Right
Although the Plaintiffs base their state claim against Frugoli on negligence, the allegations in the Monell Count do not involve negligence. The Monell allegations describe the City‘s conduct in (1) concealing officer misconduct; (2) improperly investigating complaints against off-duty officers; (3) failing to enforce its own rules; (4) failing to monitor its officers; and (5) creating an environment of a “code of silence” regarding officer misconduct, all of which cumulatively led to the loss of bodily integrity suffered by the Plaintiffs’ decedents. The fact that the Plaintiffs use a negligence standard in their claim against Frugoli individually does not doom their Monell claim. See Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2012)
Despite the Plaintiff‘s state claim alleging negligence of Frugoli‘s activity, no culpability level is mentioned in the Monell claim. This does not preclude the Court from recognizing that driving under the influence of alcohol involves an inference of recklessness. See United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995) (abrogated on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008) (“Drunk driving is a reckless act, perhaps an act of gross recklessness. Any drunk driver who takes to the road should know he runs a risk of injuring another person....Driving under the influence vastly increases the probability that the driver will injure someone in an accident.“); see also Begay, 553 U.S. at 141 (DUI involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and is extremely dangerous); United States v. O‘Brien, 238 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2001) (homicide resulting from driving while under the influence of alcohol should be treated as reckless); Bazan-Reyes v. I.N.S., 256 F.3d 600, 609 (risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural nor
Moreover, even if Frugoli‘s drunk driving was deemed negligent, and not reckless, the Plaintiffs are not challenging the individual activity in their Monell claim, but rather the City‘s policies that allowed it to occur. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436, 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982) (Section 1983 liability rises when “the state system itself” causes a constitutional deprivation “through negligence, maliciousness, or otherwise“). The Plaintiffs’ theory of municipal liability based on the alleged policies of concealing officer misconduct and failing to discipline officers for misconduct is not dependent on Frugoli violating their constitutional rights. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304-05 (city‘s policies can harm plaintiff even if officer not individually culpable).
Because the rules of due process are not “subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory,” conscience shocking behavior in one context may not be patently egregious in another. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850. The unfamiliar territory in this case involves whether City policies infused a sense of omnipotence in Frugoli such that he felt he could operate a vehicle under the
B. Widespread Custom, Policy, or Procedure
Under the second requirement, the Plaintiffs must establish that their constitutional injury was caused by (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well-settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see also Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2009). The Plaintiffs bring their claim under the second option by alleging facts creating the inference that the City has well-settled, widespread policies of (1) concealing officer misconduct; (2) investigating complaints against off-duty officers differently from complaints against other citizens; (3) failing to enforce its own rules; (4) failing to monitor its officers; and (5) creating an environment of a “code of silence” regarding officer misconduct. More than mere allegations are necessary, however. To demonstrate that the City is liable for these harmful policies, the Plaintiffs must show that the City was “deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious consequences.” Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002). The Plaintiffs must show that the City was aware of the risk created by the policies and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent that risk. See Id.
In support of their allegations, the Plaintiffs assert that on two separate occasions prior to April 10, 2009, Frugoli was involved in automobile accidents where he was intoxicated. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that on (1) January 16, 2005, Frugoli struck a motor vehicle from behind where Chicago police investigators determined that alcohol consumption was a
By pleading specific accounts of incidents in which the City failed to take any action whatsoever after learning that one of its police officers had been involved in automobile accidents involving intoxication, and accepting these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the alleged de facto policies caused the decedents’ substantive due process injury. Ultimately, the evidence will determine whether a widespread policy of concealing officer misconduct and failing to discipline officers for misconduct exists, but at this stage, the Plaintiffs have met their pleading burden.
C. Proximate Cause
Finally, the Plaintiffs must plead that the City‘s de facto policies were the “moving force” behind their constitutional injury, See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407-08, meaning they must set forth allegations creating a plausible link between the polices and the deprivation of the decedents’ right to bodily integrity. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 306. Construing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, they have sufficiently pled this requirement of their Monell claim. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that on two separate occasions, Frugoli was not disciplined for driving under the influence of alcohol and being involved in an automobile
CONCLUSION
Because the Complaint sufficiently alleged the plausibility of a constitutional injury and for the reasons explained above, the City‘s motion to dismiss the Monell claim is denied.
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: March 11, 2014