MAGNOLIA ISLAND PLANTATION, L.L.C.; BARBARA MARIE CAREY LOLLAR v. JULIAN C. WHITTINGTON
No. 20-30805
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
March 21, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:18-CV-1526
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
In this interlocutory appeal, the question presented is whether Julian Whittington, the sheriff of Bossier Parish, Louisiana, is entitled to qualified immunity barring Barbara Lollar‘s claim that his improper management of the sheriff‘s sale of property in which she claimed an interest violated her protected rights. The district court denied immunity. On appeal, however, we hold that the Sheriff is entitled tо qualified immunity as to Lollar‘s claim under
I
A
This appeаl represents one small piece of a sprawling litigation over a land transaction gone awry. William A. Lucky, III, a businessman who owns land in the Shreveport area, sought to acquire a 365-acre tract endowed with cоnsiderable oil and gas deposits. The owner had a personal dispute with Lucky and would not sell to him, so Lucky allegedly enlisted the aid of Barbara Lollar, an independent contractor in real estate with whom Lucky had а longstanding personal and business relationship. Lollar did purchase the property, but she refused to turn it over to Lucky and denied that any agency agreement ever existed.
Lucky sued Lollar in state court for money damаges on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. Immediately before the trial court was to hand down its decision, however, Lollar conveyed the land to her husband, Ronald Lollar, in exchange for a promissory note (the “Note“) in the amount of $1.73 million. Her husband, in turn, conveyed the land to Magnolia Island Plantation, L.L.C., an entity he had created three days earlier; Magnolia also assumed the duty to pay the Note. In short, as of the time of this appeal, the owner of the property and the obligor on the Note is Magnolia. The state trial court subsequently ordered Lollar to pay Lucky approximately $1.8 million in damages and authorized the seizure and sheriff‘s sale оf the Note in satisfaction of the judgment against Lollar.
B
Now enter the defendant, Sheriff Whittington. He is the lone appellant in this interlocutory immunity appeal. Whether he is entitled to qualified immunity from this suit is the sole question before us.
Under Louisiana law, the debtor and creditor each have the right to appoint an appraiser to evaluate certain property sold at a sheriff‘s sale.
Ultimately, the Sheriff‘s office accepted the recommendation. Lacour was appointed and subsequently issued a valuation of approximately $157,000. In arriving at this figure, Lacour did not conduct any independent research, nor did he review the Note itself. An entity controlled by Lucky‘s family purchased the Note at the sheriff‘s sale for $105,000, slightly more than the minimum bid and substantially less than its face value of about $1.7 million.
C
Lollar, unhappy with this outcome, procеeded to sue Lucky and Whittington in federal court. Lollar alleged that Whittington violated
The Sheriff moved for summary judgment, claiming that he was entitled to qualified immunity from the suit. The district court granted summary judgment as to one claim not relevant here, but otherwise denied immunity. Sheriff Whittington has now filed this interlocutory appeal, in which the sole issue is whether the Sheriff was entitled to immunity.
We have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment. Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2013).
II
A
In addressing a qualified immunity question on interlocutory review, we lack jurisdiction to decide any material factual dispute. Id. Instead, we only have jurisdiction to decide what “legal consequences” flow from the undisputed facts. Id. at 731 (quoting Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). Of course, we viеw the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. In other words, our task is simply to examine a particular set of facts to determine whether those facts
B
We first turn to Lollar‘s federal cause of action under
1
“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Although factual inferences are always drawn in favor of the non-moving party, once the qualified immunity defense is asserted, “the burden . . . shifts” to the opponent of immunity. Id. That party—in this case, Lollar—must then show that (1) the “official‘s conduct violated a constitutional right” of the opponent оf immunity, and (2) “the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id. We may address these two prongs of the qualified immunity question in either order or may resolve the case using only a single prong. Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, we need not examine the “clearly established” prong, because Lollar has failed to meet her burden of showing a constitutional violation.
2
We begin with the uncontested point that, for purposes of this appeal, Lollar is suing the Sheriff in his individual capacity.1 An official cannot be held liable in his individual capacity merely because a subordinate committed some constitutional violation; “[s]ection 1983 does not impose vicarious or respondeat-suрerior liability.” Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1988). Instead, a defendant must either be “personally involved in the constitutional violation” or commit “acts [that] are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged.” Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). In other words, a “supervisor is not personally liable for his subordinate‘s actions in which he had no involvement.” James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). Lollar, therefore, was obligated to show some personal involvement of Sheriff Whittington in the alleged due process violation.
This Lollаr has failed to do. Both before the district court and on appeal, Lollar has not pointed to any competent summary judgment evidence indicating that the Sheriff himself was involved personally in the disputed sale. Indeеd, when repeatedly pressed at oral argument, Lollar‘s counsel could not cite any instance where Lollar had made assertions about the Sheriff‘s personal involvement.2 Therefore, Lollar has not pointed to any
Because Lollar cannot provide any evidence that the Sheriff himself violated her rights, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court‘s denial of summary judgment on Lollar‘s individual capacity § 1983 claim is error and is reversed.
C
Lollar also makes due process arguments under the Louisiana constitution. We have recognized that federal qualified immunity principles may be applied to claims under the Louisiana constitution “[i]nasmuch as [they] parallel entirely the § 1983 allegations.” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 2005). Lollar‘s state constitutional claim parallels—and indeed, is indistinguishable from—her arguments under the Federal Constitution and § 1983. The fоregoing federal qualified immunity analysis is therefore applicable to Lollar‘s claim under the state constitution as well, and the district court‘s refusal to grant immunity as to said claim is reversed.
III
Sheriff Whittington also asserts that the district сourt erred by denying him state discretionary immunity, which, according to the Sheriff, shields him from Lollar‘s claim under the Louisiana state statute governing sheriff‘s sales. See
As a well-established general rule, this court “will not reach the merits of аn issue not considered by the district court.” Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Ridpath, 447 F.3d at 305 (stating that circuit court was not required to consider qualified immunity where it was raised only in a reply brief before the district court). This case presents no exception to the established rule.
Because the Sheriff raised state discretionary immunity only in his district court reply brief, that court‘s refusal to consider the matter was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, the denial of summary judgment as to state discretionary immunity is affirmed.3
IV
In this appeal, we have held that Lollar was required to point to evidence showing Sheriff Whittington—as opposed to his subordinates—violated her constitutional rights. She failed to do so. The Sheriff is therefore entitled to qualified immunity against the individual capacity § 1983 claim and the state constitutional claim. The denial of summary judgment is REVERSED as to these claims.
We have further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to address Sheriff Whittington‘s defеnse of state discretionary immunity where he raised the issue only in a district court reply
Finally, the casе is REMANDED for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as to Lollar‘s remaining claims.
REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED.
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